SRST!

ITS PHILOSOPHICAL ENVIRONMENT

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SṚṢṬI : ITS PHILOSOPHICAL ENTAILMENT

PRĀSTHĀNA MĪMĀṂSĀ SERIES

STUDIES IN FOUNDATIONS OF THEORETICAL SCIENCES IN INDIAN PERSPECTIVE

VOLUME 2

PRASTHĀNA MĪMĀMSĀ ANTHOLOGY SERIES : 2

SṚṢṬI

ITS PHILOSOPHICAL ENTAILMENT

Edited by

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Ramaswami
G.C. Pande

PREFACE

This volume is an offspring of an efficacious marriage of two initiatives:

1. Formation of an active research network - *Prasthāna Mīmāṃsā Samāgama* - out of an emerging trend of explorations on the foundational and methodological aspect of theoretical sciences (Logic, Linguistics, Mathematics and Cognitive Science) in Indian tradition. It is a conscious attempt to rise above prevalent apathy in Indian academics towards foundational research in general and specially to rise above the widespread practice of mere expository or literal reassertion of the fragmented elements of Indian theoretical heritage. The root enthusiasm for foundational appraisal of Indian theoretical heritage, with a view to revitalize sustainable claims, stems from the possibility of transcending current foundational impasse in various theoretical fields as well as the desire to institute autonomous capability of formulating comprehensive and contemporary research problems and insights. This initiative is being coordinated by the National Institute of Science, Technology and Development Studies, New Delhi.
2. Ongoing institutional programme of the Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts, New Delhi, for cross-disciplinary and cross-civilizational acculturation on the basis of explorations woven around notions that are of perennial significance for human experience. First phase of the programme dealt with the notion of SPACE and the second ongoing phase deals with the notion of TIME or *KĀLA*. The second phase is in a preparatory state and is to culminate in an international symposium and exhibition in November 1990. In order to sensitize reflection on the phenomena of temporality attempts are being made under the programme to promote and precipitate academic gatherings on specific issues related to the overall thrust of the programme. The purpose being to trigger explorative capabilities inherent in Indian academics for focussing on the issues related to time.

The network constituted a condition and the ongoing programme an occasion to explore realms where foundational studies on Indian theoretical heritage and the problematic of temporality overlaps. There is no settled discourse situation available readily in the region of overlap. Moreover such an endeavour has to reckon with pathetic stratification of discourse along traditional and modern grooves and further fragmentation of discourse along narrow captivities of disciplines or *sampradaya-s*. To overcome this situation new issues have to be opened and new discourse initiated, the ones which are not *ab initio* saddled with the conceptual cleavage one witnesses between traditional and modern discourse. The issues were to be such that they are at once transparent to both and thus relevant to both. Two themes were singled out to investigate problematic of temporality (*kālasāpekṣatā* or *kālāropaṇa*) in the context of Indian tradition. Interestingly these themes do not deal directly with the notion of time (*kālatattva*) as such. The themes got formulated quite naturally along the lines of enquiry initiated in the recent trend of

foundational appraisal of theoretical aspect of Indian heritage. Since thrust of enquiry on these themes is new, on each of the themes workshops were organized in order to precipitate and discover transparency of the issues. The two themes were:

a. Temporality and Logical Structure in Indian Theoretical Heritage.

b. *Sṛṣṭi* - Its Philosophical Entailment.

Essays in this volume, except that of John Vattanky, have been selected from the contributions to the workshop on the second theme held in March 1990 at Jadavpur University, Calcutta. Vattanky's paper was chosen because of its relevance for the theme. It was earlier presented at a seminar on 'The Enterprise of Navya Nyāya : An Indian Tradition of Logic' held at NISTADS, New Delhi. This theme was chosen in consultation with colleagues in *Prasthāna Mīmāṃsā* Network. Responses to the invitation to contribute was overwhelming. This was quite heartening since we started at a point where there was uncertainty as to what important issues if any were there. Everyone had to reach for the real issue. As a result of very intensive and prolonged discussions in the workshop and outside and on the basis of papers presented by senior and eminent as well as young and competent scholars from wide variety of areas of knowledge there did surface a comprehensive and connected picture of the way we look at ourselves, the world we inhabit and the nature and value of theoretical enterprise. The picture that emerged and how it emerged have been told in the review paper included at the end of the volume. We shall soon revise this volume in the light of this picture. We now know better in which other areas and along which lines inquiries are to be conducted if the structure of the Indian mind is to be rediscovered in its depth and intricate detail.

Editors own contribution has been rendered insignificant by the dedication and service of a number of scholars and colleagues belonging to the department of Philosophy Jadavpur University, Calcutta and NISTADS, New Delhi. We shall be failing in our duty if we do not mention by name Chandan Goswami, Uma Chattopadhyay, Piyali Palit and Ratna Dutta from Calcutta and Anuradha Singh of NISTADS, New Delhi. The way Jadavpur University Department of Philosophy as a whole cooperated to make the workshop a success is quite characteristic of this department; nonetheless it is a matter of pride. The way NISTADS staff helped in preparation of this volume in a very short period is also a matter of great pride. We consider ourself most fortunate to have received encouragement and active support from Professor Gopināth Bhaṭṭāchārya, since diceased and surely missed, and Pandit Pañchānan Shastri. Pandit Shastri is still helping us in so many ways despite his old age.

Instead of attempting translation of all essays into one language for the benefit of readers, the essays included here are in the languages they were writtin in. As a result this volume has written material in three languages - English, Hindi and Sanskrit. This is by no means a happy situation but under the circumstances it is the best.

P.K. MUKHOPADHYAY
NAVJYOTI SINGH

NOVEMBER 1990

INTRODUCTION : A SEARCH FOR THE REAL ISSUE

P.K.Mukhopadhyay

It takes quite some time after birth for a human individual to launch a theoretical enterprise. And in the meantime he learns a lot. Quite a large number of his beliefs are such that he is not the first person to entertain them. These beliefs he picked up while growing, these are what he inherited unknowingly rather then acquired as a result of conscious effort. He often is not aware that he has these beliefs till special occasion arises. Nonetheless these beliefs lie there as background beliefs which determine not only the areas towards which his theoretical activities are directed but also what appeals to him as acceptable mode of explanation or what decides for him the norm of understanding. The common heritage of men belonging to certain cultural community accounts for broad unity of the orientation, norms of understanding and method of enquiry which they come to share long before they become conscious of them and longer before they succeeded in articulating them. An important part of our attempt to understand a culture is to find out this body of background beliefs. This may not be difficult at a fairly later date of the development of a culture. For, by then not only theoretical inquiries into various specific fields had already been undertaken but also there develops foundational cultural inquiry studying live cultural history and philosophy. Sometimes however forced intermingling of cultures creates after some time and in the mind of some urge to rediscover their original cultural identity. And this effort may take either of these four forms.

(a) Serious study of past works which are devoted explicitly to the task of isolating and explaining basic and unifying outlook pervasively present in the society and expressing itself in all and sundry ways in which men of all the different walks of life think, speak and behave.

(b) Again we may identify and isolate certain important features which are both theoretically important and most widely present in different types of theoretical disciplines which have been developed and to infer from the presence of these features what might have been the pre-theoretical cultural basis of these features.

(c) Again some might consciously avoid arguing from the actual shape theoretical activities have taken and try to conduct their search in non-theoretical areas of culture.

(d) There is still another way of bringing out clearly the pre-theoretical and pervasive dispositions of a culture. We take up some theme of theoretical interest

which may even be of recent origin and try to construct an answer or explanation which would be recognizably Indian in form and style.

There are different ways in which one can conduct ones search for the basic dispositions of a certain culture. There are also themes of varying degrees of promise. The more promising one one chooses the better. We think that the theme of *Sṛṣṭi* answers to this description perfectly. For not only there are developed philosophical theories of *Sṛṣṭi* in Indian heritage but also various art forms, institutions, customs and practices of ordinary men including forms of speech, testify to the influence of certain views about *Sṛṣṭi*. Again it is a theme which is modern and about which other cultures have developed theories as well as peculiar attitudes. So an attempt to react to the relevant questions and opinions from Indian perspective may serve the purpose in hand. But what is more is that the theme is most promising from our point of view in the sense that conception of *Sṛṣṭi* is so mixed up with other concepts like *kāla, atma, adṛṣṭa* and the live, that superficial and over all similarity with some relevant themes of other cultures may not allow us to over-simplify our responsibility. To give just one example, he will be saying too little who says that one aspect of the characteristic Indian way of looking at *Sṛṣṭi* is that it has a creator. For the notion of creator is itself so characteristically different. Whatever that may be the important point is that there are so many still more basic concepts which might have gone into the making of the concept of *Sṛṣṭi*. Is it not then the case that the pre-theoretical dispositions correspond to these more basic analytical ingredients of the concept of *Sṛṣṭi*? The answer is emphatically in the negative. For one does not wait with certain well-formed basic notion to be able eventually do something with them - to build a complex notion with their help. Such a building block atomistic approach may not be correct. We have access to or available to us the unclarified complex notion of *Sṛṣṭi*. We have a certain attitude to *Sṛṣṭi*. Subsequently analysis of this notion in the line of the characteristic attitude we have towards it yields certain components. And in another sense it is central to the body of notions. So all the three theories of God, man and world refer to and emanate from our views about *Sṛṣṭi*. In a sense long before we became aware of these three separately we confronted with this world around us. In course of our systematic and resolute attempt to understand this world around us this creation that we came to discover or develop the things or notions of God, self and material of creation. So the beginning of all theoretical dispositions are the world around us and rationality in us. Given these two theories are bound to develop. And they did develop in different cultures. If there are marked difference amongst these theories then the same may not be always satisfactorily explained in terms or say socio-economic conditions or even by social historians. They may have to be explained in terms of one factor which is equally basic and almost originally given. It is the dispositions which are cultural in nature.

Indian mind is characteristically anti-mystical, rational and its speculations are realistic speculation. So while speculating on the origin of the universe the thinkers of India seemed to have in mind the most familiar and humdrum example of a potter making a clay pot as his paradigm of creation. Three features of this paradigm have

been emphasised : there being a creator; there being some purpose, and; there being some stuff. I would like to argue that except for one or two cases, philosophers of different schools, amidst all their differences, have retained this model with suitable adjustments. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school is widely known for its most faithful and literal adherence to this model and to the norm of realistic speculation. As to rationality, again almost every school betrayed its preference for causal model of explanation. This pre-disposition to anti-mystical causal rationality created two major problems for philosophical theories which eventually became two important philosophical themes : (1) how to reconcile speculative causal rationality with practical reason, rationality, and (2) how to reconcile structural analysis of the model of explanation with the causal model of explanation.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika picture of *Sṛṣṭi* being most detailed, the other pictures may be viewed as departure from or simplification of this picture. Let us pursue this line. The Naiyāyika-s and the Vaiśeṣika-s begin in the true and characteristic Indian way. Their realistic speculation about creation begins with such familiar instance of experienced production as production of a jar. But then in the analogy of this ordinary human creation they sought to explain the postulated grand creation. Though a section of Mīmāṃsā philosophers prefer to remain thoroughly realistic, they resolve to restrict the application of the expression *Sṛṣṭi* to ordinary particular instances of creation or *khaṇḍa Sṛṣṭi*. One is the ordinary creation or production of individual things and another is grand creation or *mahāsṛṣṭi*. Perhaps they would argue that what is called *mahāsṛṣṭi* is nothing but a manner of speaking, an useful way of talking generally about all the individual and perfectly admissible created things like a pot or a piece of cloth. But there is no one single grand creation over and above each and every particular created things. If on the other hand this *mahāsṛṣṭi* is neither just a manner of speaking, nor one single unitary thing but *actual* totality of all created things then such a totality is a fiction. It makes little sense to have an actual collection of all past, present and future productions. This is one way of understanding Mīmāṃsā rejection of *mahāsṛṣṭi*. But textually more accurate sense of *mahāsṛṣṭi* is - allegedly created things the creation of which is not evidenced by common experience. Thus creation of a pot by a potter is perfectly acceptable or *prasiddha utpatti*. But creation of the mountain or body or sapling cannot be accepted. The are *aprasiddhāntpatti*. But this example also does not bring out clearly the sense. The Mīmāṃsaka-s mean to say that there is no absolutely first creation: That there is a gap between rejecting *utpatti* of mountain etc. and the rejection of absolutely first creation whereby is meant creation independent of *karma* and it is this gap which is not always clearly maintained. It seems that it is an essential part of Indian way of looking at *Sṛṣṭi* that the necessity of *Sṛṣṭi* is a sort of moral necessity. There is no *Sṛṣṭi* which has not been brought into being by pre-existing *karma* or *adṛṣṭa*. This is not fate. There is a difference between fate and *karma*. This on analysis reveals how as Indians we are pre-disposed to look at the world as *bhogya* or *bhogasthāna*.

Thus if Mīmāṃsā rejection of *mahāsṛṣṭi* means objection against extending similar truth claim to mountain or body of what is true of a pot being produced by a

potter then there is a departure from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position. If on the other hand it means rejection of absolute creation or creation not necessitated practically or normally (as distinct from physical, scientific or logical necessity) by *karma* then there is no departure. However clarity on this point is greatly lacking and as a result argument against first creation is taken as or passes for argument against creation. Argument from the necessity of pre-existing *adṛṣṭa* proves not what the Mīmāṃsā philosophers derive that there was no creation or this world has not been created. All that it proves is the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conclusion that every creation must be a second and subsequent creation. There can be no absolutely first *Sṛṣṭi*. But somehow equivocating on the word *'anādi'* the theses of both these schools of Indian philosophy are called *anāditva* thesis. The component word *ādi* means both creation or beginning and first. Accordingly *anādi* can be used in the sense of no-beginning or in the sense of not the first. The Mīmāṃsā position is that this world has no beginning. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view is that this world is not the first. That means there was a world prior to this one and by the same logic there was still a prior one and so on - the series continues, we can stretch it as back as we wish but we can never come to a stop. The *series* will have no beginning. The crucial difference between the Mīmāṃsā and the Vaiśeṣika in that according to the Mīmāṃsaka-s *this* world has no beginning according to the Naiyāyika-s *this* world has beginning but the series of world has no beginning. The issue before us is therefore to choose between *vyakti sṛṣṭi-anāditva* and *sṛṣṭi-pravāha-anāditva*. What is the point of choosing! What is really involved?

To accept that this world is *anādi* would mean break down of causal law or principle and this would mean break down of prospect of explaining or understanding this world. The condition is similar to what happens in case we admit an absolute beginning. For all laws in terms of which we are supposed to explain and understand this world break down at that point as has been said - *sargādau ca kriyā nāsti tādṛk kālohi neṣyata*. On the other hand anti-mystical rationality demands that there has to be some explanation in any situation. But given the model of explanation we have, this means that the world must be a created one. Why the world has to be a created one and why it has to have an explanation, and that too a causal explanation at that? We shall come to that presently. But to operate a causal framework is to look at this world as a vast system of causally interconnected things and events. With such a causal system there may be individual things which are eternal or uncaused, i.e., without beginning. But everything cannot be such. At least one thing must be created and caused. And among the causes of a created thing at least one cause must itself be caused and one among the causes of that must itself had been caused and so on. Causal process can be pushed backward in time infinitely. There cannot be beginning of time or of causal process. Now to claim that the *Sṛṣṭi* or the universe is *anādi* in the Mīmāṃsā sense should amount to saying that nothing in the world has been created. So in a bid to represent the Mīmāṃsaka-s as consistent, their position had been held to be that - *na kadācit anidṛśaṃ jagat*. This amounts to rejecting or limiting the scope of the application of causal explanation and necessity.

The Mimamsa rejection of *mahāsṛṣṭi* or absolute creation does not lead them to the acceptance of God with a limited power of creation; instead they reject God also. Could it therefore be the case that they think God must be an absolute creator. But it will not be an Indian way of arguing if one says so. Since there are so many things that are there without needing the agency of God or any form of divine intervention, God should be rejected. For those who admit God as well as those who do not admit God equally believe that there are things both eternal and non-eternal which go into the creation of the world and which are independent of God. *Karma* is a thing which is neither created by God nor is it created by *karma* itself; and yet it is both itself created and is a necessary causal condition of the world or creation. So for all practical purposes it satisfies the condition of a creator. It satisfies the theoretical requirement also of stopping infinite regress. For, in *karma* we get something which is a cause and is not created. So *karma* can take the place of God. But again, this is not an Indian way of arguing. In the first place the Naiyāyika-s and other philosophers reject absolute creation and absolute creator not only in the cheap and weak sense, but also in the strong sense. In the cheap sense the theory of absolute creation attributes to God *acintya* power or creating everything out of nothing; it gives him power of creating even the eternal things like atoms or time.

But in this sense nobody perhaps believes in absolute creation. For the believer in the theoretically unlimited power of God may easily say that all they mean is that there is nothing other than God which is eternal and God creates everything not out of nothing but out of himself. So more rational version of absolute creation is that God is the creator of everything that is created. And the Naiyāyika-s reject even this version of absolute creation. They think that there is at least one created, a thing thing which God does not create but which necessarily goes into the creation of the world. Such rejection of absolute creation gives the Mīmāṃsaka-s a really strong argument to reject God. For if one created thing can be created without the need for God then we can very well dispense away with the idea. We can accept that God is not the creator of the uncreated thing but we cannot accept God as unnecessary even for creation. What can be said in favour of the Naiyāyika-s is really very strong. They de-mystify everything. From the fact that we do not need a weaver for the creation of a created thing jar it does not follow that there is no need for a Weaver. Secondly, if God had to be creator of everything created, then the process of creation could not start. The conception of creation would have become unintelligible. For in that case before creation there would be only God and other eternal things. If these were sufficient causal conditions for creation (i.e., creation of everything, say of the world) then the world would already be there, because all the causes are there all the time. If we said that creation would follow the appropriate desire of God - *sṛsikṣa* -, that would mean God would first create *sṛsikṣa* and then with the help of it he would create the world. But since conditions for *sṛsikṣa* and for that matter everything created are all the time there, the world has to be there too. Thus there seems to be only two positions possible for one who believes that God is the creator of everything created.

(1) Everything or the world is there all the time. *Na kadācit anidṛśaṃ jagat.*

(2) The world was not always there, it has been created. God is the creator of everything created. And how God started the creation is beyond comprehension of man. It is even a sacrilege.

The second of these two positions does not so much embody reasoned theoretical conclusion as highlight the way some religious communities are disposed to think. Hence, at best, it will be useless to comment that this position is theoretically speaking most unsatisfying. So far as the first position is concerned, it seems to be the theoretical conclusion of the Mīmāṃsaka-s. But the arguments which I have offered here are not what may be found in the standard texts of the Mīmāṃsā school. But this way of arguing has two virtues, it is a stronger defence and it brings to the fore the real issue with the Naiyāyika-s. It is popularly believed that the issue of admitting or not admitting God is really an issue of whether God also creates the uncreated thing or whether God can have a body or whether God can create without a body. No Indian or non-Indian seems to have ever demanded that God must be the creator of the uncreated. As to whether God can have a body or whether without a body God can be a creator, the issues have been raised or understood to have been raised on the assumption that God cannot have body and without body he cannot create. And pat comes the reply from the Naiyāyika-s, let God have an eternal body. So the real issue, as in the case of *srsiksa* noted above, is just whether God needs first to create a body in order to be able subsequently to create the world. For, in that case he should be able to create the body without a body or by creating still earlier another body. So either no body is needed or infinite regress results. If there cannot be and is not any creation there is (so far) no need to admit God. So either there is no creator or no God and we have no good reason to admit that he is; or there is a God and that he creates, and not to believe in this is a sacrilege, though we cannot make it rationally intelligible. So we are to choose between rational disbelief and rejection on the one hand and mystical dogmatism or dogmatic mysticism on the other.

My preference is not to choose either but to accept the Nyāya position which is, as I said, the typical Indian position. It is the position of non-mystical but rational attitude of belief; another, perhaps the better way of putting it is that the position is one of 'authoritarian rational' - an expression and a concept we owe to my teacher, Professor Gopinath Bhattacharya. But lest I may be misunderstood I should clarify a bit two things. The occasion for misunderstanding is that I remarked that the Nyāya position is the characteristic Indian position and that position is different from both the positions discussed in the preceding pages. But those positions include Mīmāṃsā position. So let me clarify the remark as well as the Mīmāṃsā stand itself. When I said that the Nyāya position is the characteristic Indian position, I meant the Nyāya position relating to *Srṣṭi* primarily and not the one which related primarily to the nature and existence of God. And contrary to popular belief there is no substantial difference, as I shall argue between the Naiyāyika-s and the Mīmāṃsaka-s about the nature of *Srṣṭi*.

In the paragraph preceding the last paragraph I noted that one of the two conclusions which rationally follow from the thesis that God is the creator of everything created is that there is no God because there is no creation. The line of argument followed has been to some extent my own and I resorted to it with a view to defend and make sense of the Mīmāṃsā position as best possible. Textual evidence is there to attribute to the Mīmāṃsaka-s both the views that there is no God and that there is no creation. Even if the line of argument presented is otherwise correct the conclusion is counter intuitive. For, who can deny that creation is there and taking place all the time around us! So as the negative position of the Mīmāṃsaka-s should be rephrased and instead of saying that they reject *Sṛṣṭi* (creation) it is said that the Mīmāṃsaka-s reject *mahāsṛṣṭi*. Its corollary thesis is not that *Sṛṣṭi* is not there but that the *Sṛṣṭi* (is there but it) is *anādi*. And this is the view which I remarked is substantially the same as that of the Naiyāyika-s. Hence my remark that so far as the theme of *Sṛṣṭi* is concerned the Nyāya position is the characteristic Indian position. What I meant to say rather strongly is that the characteristically Indian way of looking at *Sṛṣṭi*, which other *āstika* and *nāstika* systems largely accepts, has been accepted and successfully defended by the Naiyāyika-s. But so far as the argument is concerned it may proceed in different ways.

(1) One may argue that there is no God from the fact or reasoned conclusion that *Srsti* is *anadi*.

(2) One may argue that *Sṛṣṭi* is *anādi* from the fact or belief that there is no God.

(3) Or again one may argue from the inconsistency of the respective views that there is no God or that creation took place at certain point of time.

But what difference is there between rejecting *mahāsṛṣṭi* and rejecting *Sṛṣṭi* in general? *Sṛṣṭi* is a fact of experience or is experientially evidenced. Examples of *Sṛṣṭi* in this sense is a jar made by a potter or a piece of cloth woven by a weaver. In short man made creations or handicrafts of man are there. Thus to accept *Sṛṣṭi* but to reject *mahāsṛṣṭi* is hardly different from admitting man as creator but rejecting such a thing as divine creation. And I presented Mīmāṃsā contention to be that - unlike ordinary creation God's creation is not experientially evidenced. Further there could not be divine creation, if there were no creator God. But if God were there he could not create and there would not have been *mahāsṛṣṭi*, there would not perhaps have been any *Sṛṣṭi* at all. Two major points emerge. The Mīmāṃsā view *'na kadācit anidṛśaṃ jagat'* should not be understood to mean that there was never absence of this world or that the world has not been created but only that this world is *anādi*. Secondly, that the world is *anādi* seems to derive from the fact that there was no God. The Mīmāṃsaka-s do not think that if there is no creator God the world should become eternal or *nitya*. They rather think that what follows is that there could be no beginning. Similarly the Naiyāyika-s do not think that to admit God is to forego the conclusion that this world is *anadi*. There is something about the world which both the Mīmāṃsaka-s and the Naiyāyika-s and for that matter all the Indians believe which makes the *Sṛṣṭi anādi* irrespective of whether there is a God or not.

We should therefore de-link question about the beginninglessness of the world from the question about the existence of God; and both these questions should be delinked from whether there is anything eternal other than God and whether that thing goes into the making of the world. For the Naiyāyika-s the question is if presence of God or even creator God does not make the world to have beginning then in which sense can he be a creator? To the Mīmāṃsaka-s we ask the question, since nobody challenges *anāditva* thesis and since rejection of God is not necessary for proving that the world is *anādi*, what point could they have in trying to disprove Gods existence? The answer is that the real point at issue between the Naiyayika-s and the (some) Mīmāṃsaka-s has not been creator God but *pramāṇa puruṣa* God. The Mīmāṃsaka-s do not admit God as a *pramāṇa puruṣa* which lends his authority to the Vaidika sentences. The Naiyāyika-s admit God, though not for just this purpose. But neither the Mīmāṃsaka-s nor the Naiyāyika-s think that *apauruṣeyatva* thesis and *Īśvarakartṛkatva* thesis are just two alternative thesis needed for the explanation and defence of the way the *āstika-s* are disposed to look at the Veda - that it is infallible. If one believes that they are equally correct but alternative accounts then none of the accounts would have any necessity. That the *apauruṣeyatva* thesis, if correct, can fully found the *āstika* disposition is accepted by every one including the Naiyāyika-s. But to demonstrate their theory is necessary that the Mīmāṃsaka-s must reject the *pramāṇa puruṣa* theory of the Naiyāyika-s. They realised that they would not be able to show that if there was God as *pramāṇa puruṣa* then the *āstika* disposition could not be founded. So they opted for the more radical way of rejecting the very existence of God. A necessary part of this rejection must be refutation of the argument for God given by the Naiyāyika-s. But the Nyāya argument from the validity of the Veda-s cannot be disproved easily except by accepting the necessity of *apauruṣeyatva* thesis; and since that will be circular, the Mīmāṃsaka-s turn to criticizing and rejecting the other argument of the Naiyāyika-s which is most famous also. This is the argument of God as the creator of the world or *jagat kartā*. It may not be said that the Mīmāṃsaka-s are so short-sighted as not to see that God cannot be disproved by disproving that he is the creator. For, to exist God need not be a creator. True, and it is known to the Mīmāṃsaka-s also. But the standard and perhaps the only way God is conceived to form the validity of the Veda is by creating or producing, uttering so to say the Veda.

The issue about the creator God between the Mīmāṃsaka-s and the Naiyāyika-s is secondary or derivative and between them there is no issue regarding beginninglessness of *Sṛṣṭi*. The heart of the Mīmāṃsaka-s is in the Veda; their major concern is the truth and import of the Veda - its *prāmāṇya* and *tatparyārtha*. To determine *tatparyārtha* they have developed elaborate technique and they resolutely employ it. Regarding *prāmāṇya* they rely on standard means of proof. Now while their concern is with what the Veda says, it does not, according to them, say anything or much about this world around us, which is given to us at our birth, which is with us always and which even grows with us. The world is given unto us, as also to others, at our birth. But to those who are born in the Vaidika society and culture another thing also is given almost at the time of birth. It is trust in the Veda-s which everyone born in the Vaidika society was born inheriting. Long before he grows into

a Naiyāyika, Mīmāṃsaka or a Vedāntin and seeks, among other things, to give this trust a rational and theoretical foundation he had it already with him. For it is well founded in the practices of the Vaidika-s the way they speak and live.

Now if the creator God is the relevant issue, however derivative, in the context of theory of creation, how is it relevant? What difference is it going to make in our conception of *Sṛṣṭi*, if God is admitted. Contrary to popular belief acceptance of a creator God does not entail that this world has a beginning. Even a Mīmāṃsaka did not charge a Naiyāyika with contradiction since the latter believes both in God and in the beginninglessness of this universe. It seems that the conception of *anāditva* and for that matter of *anādi Sṛṣṭi* and some other related concepts will change their significance accordingly if one does or does not admit a creator God. We shall come back to this presently. Let me first explain the Nyāya position a bit.

The Naiyāyika-s are fully convinced that the notion of creation which implies that there had been a time prior to when this world was created and at that time nothing created was there is inconsistent. (We shall somewhat modify this remark later). Actually it would be a point where causal and other principles do not hold. For that is the very condition of the exercise of our rationality. They believe that in future there may be or perhaps must be a time when, following the destruction of everything by destroyer God, there will be nothing which is created or better which is created and is destructible. But the notion of a time in the past when, prior to creation, no created non-eternal thing was there is a conception which is inconsistent. It may not be inconsistent in itself but it is inconsistent as an implicate of creation itself. It cannot be either a physical or a logical requirement for creation (for anything to be created), for the world to be created, that there should be a prior stretch of time when nothing created was there. It is not a logical requirement not because it is itself inconsistent, the reasoning being that time itself is created with the creation (of the universe) itself. It cannot be a logical requirement of creation for if the requirement is fulfilled then the creation cannot take place. What renders it possible for a thing to be created, (the prior non-existence of the thing)cannot itself be (created). So the Naiyāyika-s argue that prior to creation there must be something which is not itself eternal. From a set of eternal things alone creation is not possible. The notion of creation carries with it the notion of prior non-existence which means this creation was not always there. But if the set of conditions sufficient for it did not contain anything non-eternal, then the sufficient conditions would always be there and no longer it could be true that the creation was not always there.

The Naiyāyika-s therefore include in the sufficient set of conditions one non-eternal factor as a necessary condition. The only non-eternal condition which they include in the set of conditions of creation which include both an eternal creator and uncaused stuff or material, is *adṛṣṭa* (and prior non-existence). Thus the Naiyāyika-s reject the thesis of absolute creation in the most radical sense of the term. Not only God does not create everything other than himself he does not create even all the created things. There is one created thing *karma* which is not created by God but which is necessary for the creation of everything God creates. Why this (condition) has to be admitted that *karma* is a different question. But that there has to be some

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non-eternal cause of creation which has not been or cannot be created by God is not a matter of blind faith but a closely argued thesis. And the belief in *adṛṣṭa* as non-eternal cause of the world which God cannot create is no mysticism or dogmatism, it is the result of carrying the demand of rationality to their extreme.

One is likely to be intrigued by our exposition for one will remember that the Naiyāyika-s are believed to admit eight to nine *sādhāraṇa kāraṇa-s*. These are called so, because these are common cause of everything; and God is one among them. If God is common cause of everything or everything that is produced, he must be a cause of *karma* also. And it must have been wrong on my part to attribute to the Naiyāyika-s the view that God does not stand as cause to *karma*. Besides if I really believe that God is not a cause with respect to *adṛṣṭa*, how is *adṛṣṭa* to be accounted for. As to the first point, I think that it is not only correct to attribute the view in question to the Naiyāyika- s, it is also the way in which all Indians are predisposed to view the functioning of *adṛṣṭa*. And because they view things in this way it explains why the Indians had never been mystic or fatalists. The Naiyāyika-s have provided the best possible theory which gives really good theoretical foundation to this characteristically Indian way of looking at *Sṛṣṭi*. I do not therefore think it wrong to attribute to Naiyāyika-s the belief that God does not create everything or even everything that is created or caused; he does not cause *karma*. I, however, admit that this tenet of Nyāya philosophy needs a lot of clarification. In the first place this tenet is not one about which most people are explicitly aware; nor is it a tenet which has been very clearly and explicitly stated in most of the relevant texts of Nyāya literature or works by the Indian philosophers. However, it has not been clearly or explicitly said anywhere that God is the cause of *karma*. My critic will say "but nor has it been said explicitly that God is not the cause of *karma*; on the other hand it has been explicitly said and believed that God is, at least according to the older generation of Naiyāyika-s, one among the eight or nine common causes". This is true and that is why, I agree that explanation is necessary.

As I said earlier, in the set of *sādhāraṇa kāraṇa-s* all excepting *karma* is uncreated. And among the seven or eight uncaused common causes there are six or seven which are eternal also. And these eternal among the common causes are all positive entities or *bhāva padārtha-s*. Further they are inferred entities though they are not merely theoretical concepts or tools of explanation. They are real entities and belong to the categories of reals in the stricter sense of Vaiśeṣika category. But as inferred entities they have one thing in common. They are not only inferred they are inferred as cause. They can never be known except as cause; (though they can very well *be* without producing anything just as a potter can exist without at the moment producing a pot). In the very process of inferring them we infer them as cause (or as we say *teṣām kāraṇatvaṃ dharmigrāhakānumānena jñāyate*. This makes their character as cause a part of our conception of the theme). It is not accidental but necessary that we think of them or take them as cause. This is one way of saying that the *kāraṇatva* of these eternal among the *sādhāraṇa kāraṇa-s* or common causes is *svābhāvika*. (It is their *svābhāva* if not also *svarupa*, that they are causes). Now things which are not causes in this sense need not

necessarily be known as cause. They are usually not so known. We know things independently and later discover or establish that they are causally related. We may even know them and know them in relation to serve other things or events which are not causally related. But whenever we know an eternal cause in relation to something I know it as cause in the sense, I carry with me the conception of it as cause. Since our very idea of them is idea of them as cause in relation to whichever other thing we take it as cause of (if there is no special preventing condition for taking them so, as for example when we consider them in relation to some other eternal thing). It is this feature of these eternal causes which is meant to be captured by saying that they are *sādhāraṇa kāraṇa* or common causes - i.e., they are thought to be or taken as causes always and in whichever context or in relation to whichever thing (effect) we think of them. We do not know them independently to be and as cause. Add to this the part that they are eternal or are eternally there. The relevant point is that they are there before anything which is produced. For whatever is produced comes to be at certain particular point of time and is preceded by previously existing absence of it. Every effect is also preceded by whatever eternal thing is included in the set of common causes. So the second reason for calling these eternal things as cause of every effect is that they do not lack the character of regularly (and immediately) preceding every effect. Their *pūrvavṛttitva* is *āvarjaniya*.

This line of explanation or argument may be all right as far as it goes. But there are two points against it. Firstly, this explanation does not seem to cover *sādhāraṇa kāraṇa-s* which are either non-eternal or non-positive. Secondly, it does not tell us how and why other eternal things are not included in the group of common causes. Why self or *jīvātma*, and atoms of four elements of *kṣiti, ap, tejas* and *marut* have been omitted from the list of common causes? To answer the second question first, the explanation provided in the preceding paragraph is only necessary and not sufficient. It is not sufficient for a thing to be regarded as a common cause that it should be eternal and inferred as cause. There should also be appropriate usages to warrant our admitting them as cause of everything. We have usages to this effect in respect of some of the *nimitta kāraṇa-s* only. So far as atoms are concerned, they are not *nimitta kāraṇa-s* nor are their usages which attribute to them the role of cause in respect of every effect (i.e., *kārya sāmānya*). That the argument from relevant usages is available in favour of two of the enteral substances included in the list of common causes and that the same is not available in favour of (*jīvātma*) have been briefly but very clearly shown by our revered teacher Pandit Pañchānan Shastri (who is fortunately present here) in his commentarial work in Sanskrit - **Muktāvali Saṃgraha**. I am extending his line of argument to the God - who is regarded as a common cause partly on the strength of such usages as '*Ahaṃ sarvasya prabhāva mattaḥ sarvaṃ pravartate*' - and atoms of the four elements. An additional argument is there why the atoms should not be regarded as common cause. To be regarded as a cause it is usually required that the thing should not only be a regular antecedent of the effect in question but should also be such as is not known to be a cause except in relation to the effect in question. This new requirement is the requirement of *anyathāsiddha*, put perhaps in rough and ready

English rendering. If we take the colour of a piece of cloth or of a pot as an example of effect then so far as this effect is concerned, the elements of earth atom will fail to qualify as cause. For these atoms will fail to satisfy the requirement of *ananyathāsiddhatva*. These atoms cannot, if at all, cause the colour of the jar without causing the jar first, whereas this jar and its colour are themselves related causally, the jar being the cause of the colour of it. But when the common causes are said to be causes of everything, there is nothing left of which a common cause is first to be known as cause in order that it can be known as cause of any other thing or everything. Within the totality of effects there indeed are things and events which are causally related among themselves. But a common cause is not said to be the cause of a thing because it is the cause of the other thing which is the effect of the first thing. The earth atoms can be said to be cause of the colour of jar justifiably, if at all, because it is the cause of the jar. One may still argue that so far at least two of the three eternal substances included in the list of common cause, viz., *kala* and *desa* - often translated as time and space - we have no evidence for admitting them. True, we know them as cause of their respective particular effects first. But when we known them as cause of their particular effects we known them as cause of their respective particular effects first. But when we known them as cause of their particular effects we known them either as *samavāyi kāraṇa* or as *asamavāyi kāraṇa*. But common causes are *nimitta kāraṇa* of everything. And so far as they are cause of everything there is nothing in respect of which it must be known to be a cause before or in order that it can be (*nimitta*) cause of everything. Among all the things towards which the common causes are *nimitta* causes, there are some which are related to some others as *samavāyi* or *asamavāyi kāraṇa-s*, as for example, respective type of atoms to dyads formed out of them; or conjunction of the atoms to the dyad. Either these *samavāyi* and *asamavāyi kāraṇa-s* of particular effects are not admitted to be cause of any other effect or they are said to be *nimitta kāraṇa-s*. To generalise the sense in which something is known to be the cause of its respective particular effect and the sense in which it is said to be the cause of other thing must be different. So the same thing should not be and should not be known to be in the same sense of cause, the cause of a thing (effect) if it is to be the cause of a thing (effect) in question. And this is what the requirement of *ananyathāsiddhatva* ensures thereby removing suspicion of circularity or infinite regress. What the Naiyāyika-s hold to be common causes are *nimitta kāraṇa-s*. And while they are *nimitta kāraṇa-s* of everything, they are, if at all, *samavāyi* or *asamavāyi kāraṇa* of some particular and respective effects of them (*kṣaimika janyatā*).

The critics will say - all that this line of arguments achieve is that since earth atoms are *samavāyi kāraṇa-s* of their respective particular efforts and inferred as such they cannot be regarded as the same kind of cause of other things. What the argument does not show, is that they cannot be *nimitta kāraṇa-s* of everything. (We understand that in a causal model and taxonomy using causal principle as principle of division, there cannot be common *samavāyi kāraṇa*, particularly because created material objects all have *samavāyi kāraṇa*. This is part of the answer to the important question why all common causes are *nimitta kāraṇa-s*). For the present

our reply is again that there is no usage to warrant the thesis that the atoms of elements are the common (*nimitta*) cause or cause of everything.

Let us now turn to the first of the two points the critics raised. Even if we grant for the moment that we can argue about the negative entities included in the list of common causes that they regularly precede every effect or created things because they themselves have no beginning whether or not they are ever destroyed, we cannot argue in the same way about *karma*. For if *karma* were uncaused then the very purpose of including them in the list of common cause of creation as such or as a whole would have been defeated. So *karma* is not to be regarded as one of the common causes on that ground. Even if it is necessarily inferred as cause, as has been the point, it seems, of Udāyana's proof of *adṛṣṭa*, it cannot be said to precede regularly everything or everything created. *Pūrvavṛttitva* of *karma* is not *avarjanīya* or unexceptionable, as is the case with other causes included in the list of common causes. It cannot at least precede its own creation. Therefore the important difference between *karma* on the one hand and rest of the items listed under common causes on the other - that *karma* and not the other items is created - leads to the further consequence that it cannot be a common cause. It is not only not necessary to hold that *karma* precedes everything which is caused, it is necessary to hold that *karma* cannot be a regular antecedent to everything. Hence it is as such - unjustified to claim God to be a common cause as it is to say that *karma* is a common cause. For neither God nor *karma* can be a common cause. But if the Indian way of looking at *Sṛṣṭi* cannot be systematised or explained except in terms of this doctrine of common cause then the claim of essentially rational character of the culture must have to be given up. Because the impact of this conception is so vast we have to or should be very careful before we make up our mind.

God cannot be the common cause because there must be at least one thing without which he cannot create. He will fail to create not because he lacks in power or knowledge. Even if we grant him, as we do, omniscience and omnipotent he will not be able to create. What stands in the way is the fact that God himself is uncaused and eternal whereas creation has and has to have a beginning. So not only there should be something without which he cannot create but also that something itself should not be uncaused. On the other hand God cannot create that very thing which needs to be there if he is to be able to create at all. Hence for creating the world God must take the help of something which he does not create but which is nonetheless caused. How is it caused! And if one thing can be caused without God creating it then why not everything. Or to put it in a more accurate way, if one thing can be created without anyone creating it then everything could be so created.

One defence may be that the critic is shifting his ground. A causal account of creation needs some common causes. A common cause in this context means cause of everything that constitutes whole of creation, that is, the created world. And what is cause of everything which are both created and constitute *Sṛṣṭi* must for that very reason fall outside *Sṛṣṭi*. God is postulated as a common cause of the created world and not a common cause of everything created. For to do that is to

contend that things are created out of eternal things alone. But this cannot be said as we argued before. Or, at least, this cannot be said without changing the meaning of creation. It is not without reason that the paradigm of causal relation for the Pariṇāma-vādin is not a weaver weaving a piece of cloth with threads. Their paradigm is milk turning into curd. Similarly paradigm with the Vivarta-vādin-s is one moon appearing as many when it is reflected in the waves of the sea. A Pariṇāma-vādin either equivocates in his use of the word 'cause' or he at least rejects ordinary conception of causal creation which permits our taking the creation of a pot to be the paradigm of causal creation. All Vivarta-vādin-s like Advaita Vedāntin-s either reject commonsense view or he uses the word cause in three different senses. Pariṇāma-vādin-s, and for that matter Śaṃkara Vedāntin-s may, it seems, be found to speak of creation of *tattva-s* from *Mahat* to the five gross-elements (*pañca-mahābhūta*) in one sense of creation but when they speak of creation of what comes into being only after the *mahābhūta-s* are created they speak of creation in another sense of the term. All whosoever claims that causal account of creation can be given wholly in terms of eternal or uncreated causal factors must have to change the notion of cause. Either the creation is illusory appearance of the uncreated cause or the set of uncreated causes, or the creation is merely a change of state of the self-same stuff. If we want to advocate a causal outlook without apology and without equivocation we should not aspire to explain the whole of creation only in terms of uncaused causes. To attempt to do that is to attempt the impossible - namely, the attempt to give causal account or origin of everything that is created. The Naiyāyi[illegible]-s aim is something more practicable and less ambitious.

They want to explain every effect which belong to *Sṛṣṭi* or creation. And *karma* is not an effect which belongs to creation. It falls outside creation as much as God falls outside it. They are causes of every effect which constitutes creation. As such they are beyond or outside creation.

karma also cannot be a common cause. It can hardly be the cause of everything or of every thing which constitutes the totality of effects (*kārya jāta*); and this is a familiar philosophical sense of *jagat*. What stands in its way of being the cause of all (effects) events is the fact that it has beginning. Since it is not eternal it must come to be if it is to cause anything. But as cause of every effect belonging to creation *karma* cannot be created by anything which belongs exclusively to the created world. Can it then be created by anything that is a common cause? That it cannot be created by God has already been observed. Nothing else in the list can be a creator. Can it be cause. It cannot be at least for the reason already adduced.

I

CREATION AND CAUSALITY

Gopinatha Bhattacharya

I : CAUSALITY

The subject of this essay is 'Creation and Causality'. But as the idea of 'Creation' presupposes the idea of 'Causality', I shall start with an analysis of some aspects of the concept of 'Causality', and then pass on to the analysis of the notion of 'Creation'.

Among the 'objects' of consciousness some are eternal and others are non-eternal in their nature. If by an 'eternal' object is meant something that has neither a beginning nor an end, then the term 'non-eternal' as the opposite of 'eternal' should mean one or other of the following three things : First, that which has a beginning but no end; secondly, that which has no beginning but an end; and thirdly, that which has both a beginning and an end. Commonly, however, the term 'non-eternal' has a more restricted use and stands simply for that which has no end, i.e. that which is indestructible. In the present discourse, I shall employ the term in its wider usage to mean one or other of the things just mentioned.

(a) As an instance of something which has a beginning but no end we have the negative phenomenon called 'destruction'. A thing once destroyed can never come back. 'Destruction', in other words, can never be revoked or destroyed. Were it otherwise, it would mean the re-emergence of the thing destroyed; but that is never found to be a fact of our experience. Destruction thus has no end, although it has a beginning in the sense that it occurs at a definite time.

(b) As an instance of something that has no beginning but an end, we have again a negative entity 'prior absence' or *'prāgabhāva'* as it is known in Indian philosophy. Every phenomenon that comes to occur at a certain time is preceded by a state when it was not in existence. This state of non-existence does not have any break in the past and in this sense it is without any beginning; but with the occurrence of the phenomenon at a certain time, this state of non-existence must be admitted to have lapsed; otherwise, it will have to be admitted that there may be re-occurrence of what already is in existence, which again is not a fact.

(c) As an instance of something that has both a beginning and an end, we have the whole host of things that we experience around us.

In the case of the first and the third classes of things we seek or speak of some 'cause' of the occurrences. What precisely do we mean by this term 'cause'? The

answer seems to be pretty simple. By the 'cause' of a phenomenon we commonly mean an entity other than the phenomenon itself and which *determines* the occurrence of the phenomenon. We not merely speak of such a determinant; we believe, almost universally, in the existence of such a determinant. This belief was however challenged by a group of Indian thinkers described in Sanskrit texts as Carvaka-s. They do not seem to believe that an event must be determined by something other than itself. Some of them are known as *svabhāva-vādin-s* or 'naturalists' in the sense that the believe that an event occurs at a time just because it is its *svabhāva* or 'nature' to occur at that time. But they have not made clear what sort of thing this so-called 'nature' or *svabhāva* is. Either, it is something other than the event itself, or it is the same thing as itself. Since however the first alternative makes 'the nature of a thing' an other than itself, it gets committed to the position that something other than a thing itself is responsible for its occurrence. It thus commits itself to the principle of causality and therefore contradicts itself. According to the second alternative, the 'nature' of an event is none other than the event itself. To say then that an event occurs from its 'nature' in this sense is to say that an existent something causes its own existence over again. This is hardly intelligible, and it does not conform to our experience. A negative version of this naturalism is found in *akasmikatva-vāda* or, theory of fortuitous generation according to which, whatever occurs occurs from nothing. But as 'nothing' is not an effective entity, the thesis of *akasmikatva-vāda* taken as it is makes no sense at all. To get at all any sense out of it, the thesis would have to be taken to mean that nothing happens from anything. But this is against facts. On these grounds, none of the other Indian thinkers, not excepting the absolute sceptics of Nāgārjuna's camp, have found any merit in the Cārvāka theory of *svabhāva-vada* or *akasmikatva-vāda*. All the *āstika* thinkers and all the partial *nāstika-s* accordingly accept the principle of causality in the sense that the existence of every phenomenon is determined by something other than itself. In spite of this agreement, however, these thinkers have among themselves a wide divergence of opinion with reference to many of the problems they had occasion to discuss about causality.

Indian philosophers are agreed that every phenomenon depend on more than one causal condition and that these conditions can be grouped under two heads- the material cause and the efficient cause. The former consists of the stuff of which a phenomenon is made and the latter is constituted by the remaining conditions necessary for an effectuation. Though they are agreed on these points, they differ first (A) on the nature of the material cause, and secondly (B) on the relation between the material cause and its effect.

(A) On the nature of the material cause, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika-s and the Mīmāṃsaka-s hold views which seem to be quite the reverse of what is accepted in the Sāṃkhya, the Pātañjala and the Vedānta schools. Two important differences may here be noted. In the first place, the material cause of a material effect is, according to the former group, less pervasive than the effect, while according to the latter group it is always more pervasive in its nature. Secondly, according to the first group, the material cause is entitatively quite other than the effect; while,

according to the second group of thinkers, as the material cause of an effect cause continues to persist in the effect, it cannot be entitatively quite different from the latter. Taking the case of an wooden table, its material cause would be 'wood'. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika-s and their supporters, the material cause here would be the pieces of wood that have gone into the making of the table. These pieces are of a size which is smaller than that of the table. In this sense, the material cause of the table is less pervasive than the material effect, the table. The thinkers of the other group do not here agree. According to them, the real material cause of the table is not 'pieces of wood' but simple 'wood'. Their point of view seems to be the following. The pieces of wood that have gone into the making of the table are of specific shapes and measures. These pieces might have been of other shapes and sizes without ceasing to be the material cause of the table. The definite shape and size of the pieces cannot then be taken to be necessary for the origination of the table. But considered as apart from the shape and the size, the pieces of wood which are supposed to be the necessary conditions for the existence of the wooden table are nothing more than simple wood. Not that the pieces can exist as shorn of their shape and size; they cannot, to be sure. But these latter cannot be regarded as having a causal relation to the effect under discussion. What is necessary here is just the thing 'wood' signified by the material noun 'wood', and surely this entity is more pervasive than its effect, the table. What is true of the table is true of every other material effect. This is the first important point of divergence between the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika-s and the Sāṃkhya-Pātañjala-s. It appears that the latter have the better of the other group on this point.

The second important point of difference between the two groups concerns the questions whether the material cause, be it 'pieces of wood' or simple 'wood' continues to exist in the material effect. According to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers it does not and that for the reason that a cause as an entity is different from the effect. If two substances are ontologically different, their characteristics also must be regarded as different from the another, unless there are cogent reasons to the contrary. In the present case, there are no cogent reasons for asserting that the wood of the pieces is numerically identical with the wood of the table, in spite of the fact that the two are entitatively different things. It appears that to thinkers of this school, the substance that is the cause is quite different as an entity from the substance that is the effect, just for reason that a cause is *wholly* different from the effect. The Sāṃkhya-Pātañjala-s do not, however, accept this latter proposition as anything self-evident. They emphasise further that far from being self-evident, the proposition that the cause is wholly different from its effect is against undisputed perceived facts. It is not to be denied, for instance, that we cannot detect any difference between 'wood' as the material cause and the 'wood' of the material effect, the table. There is also no cogent reason for supposing that though we cannot detect any difference whatsoever between the two, there must be some undetectable difference between these different entities. These thinkers accordingly reject the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of the absolute difference between cause and effect. They assert on the other hand that though a cause and its effect are different,

they are not wholly so. They are in part identical also, and the identity concerns the material cause. In other words, the material cause continues to persist in the effect.

It may be remarked here that the difference between the parties on whether the material cause continues to persist in the material effect is connected with a deeper difference on the question whether 'difference' is always absolute difference. It appears that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika-s favour an affirmative answer, while the Sāṃkhya-Pātañjala-s a negative one. The major issue then on which the parties are divided cannot be decided this way or that unless we can come to a decision as to whether 'difference' between any two things is always absolute or whether in some cases at least difference between two things has a place also for some identity between them.

(B) The next topic concerns *the relation between a material cause and its effect.* On this point, again, a wide divergence of views prevails among Indian thinkers, placing them under four distinct classes:-

(a) The Vaibhāṣika Baudha-s hold the doctrine of *asat-kāraṇa-vāda.*

(b) The thinkers of the Nyāya, the Vaiśeṣika and the Mīmāṃsā schools sponsor the theory of *arambha-vada*, otherwise known as *asat-kārya-vāda.*

(c) The thinkers affiliated to the Sāṃkhya and the Pātañjala schools advocate the theory of *pariṇāma-vāda*, otherwise known as *sat-kārya-vāda.*

(d) The thinkers belonging to the Advaita-Vedānta school uphold the theory of *vivarta-vāda.*,

The issue on which these philosophers are divided is : Does an effect before its emergence or appearance exist in its material cause?

(a) According to the Vaibhāṣika-s, the answer is in the negative. On this view, the material cause has got to be divested of its specific character before it can function as a causal condition. An effect comes into being out of the ashes, as it were, of its so-called 'material cause'. In order that a table may come out of a so-called material cause 'a lump of wood', the latter has first to be divested of its distinct individuality as a definite lump. The steps in the process are then : the presence of a lump of wood, the annulment of the specific size-shape of the lump, the appearance of the effect is the state of destruction of the material cause, for the annulment of the specific individuality of the material cause is nothing but its destruction. And 'destruction', on the Bauddha view, is something *asat* or 'unreal'. So, the table has to be regarded as coming out of an absence which is nothing. Because of this, the theory has come to be known as *asat-kāraṇa-vāda.* On this theory only one remark seems to be called for. It is difficult to see how something that is regarded by the Bauddha-s themselves as *anupākhya* or imaginary can be a cause of a real effect in the realm of non-living reals.

(b) According to *āraṃbha-vāda* or *asat-kārya-vāda*, an effect is always an absolutely new and emergent entity. It was not in existence in any form whatever before it actually appears. It depends no doubt for its existence on some antecedents coming together. But it was not actually found to exist in any form in any of

its antecedents before its actual appearance. Again, if an effect already existed in the material cause, there should have been no need for the other causal conditions for ushering it into being; as a matter of fact, however, the other conditions are as much necessary for the effectuation as the material cause. Further, if the effect has existed in its material cause from before, then it should have subserved all its functions from before as it does after its appearance. But that is never found as a fact of experience. The *asat-kārya-vādin* concludes, therefore, that an effect was *a-sat* or non-existent in its material cause before its actual appearance. A table, for instance did not before its appearance exist in any form in the pieces of wood.

(c) To the *pariṇāma-vādin-s* or *sat-kārya-vādin-s*, the above theory has not been found acceptable. They emphasise that an effect before its appearance cannot be absolutely non-existent; it has got to exist in some form. If this is not admitted, then we are confronted with a serious difficulty. According to the *āraṃbha-vādin-s* an effect, say a table before its appearance was in every sense non-existent in its material cause 'wood' or 'pieces of wood'. But it is not the table alone that was in every sense non-existent in 'wood'; an infinity of other things were also similarly non-existent in that same 'wood'. How is it then that when the efficient cause comes to function, it is the non-existent table alone that comes out of the 'wood' and not any of the other non-existent entities. It cannot be said that the non-existent table had a privileged status which the other non-existents did not have. There surely is no difference in status between one absolutely non-existent entity and another. To avoid this difficulty, it has to be said that the non-existent table that came out of 'wood' was not in every sense non-existent like the others that did not come out. It was in some sense existent before its actual emergence. It was latently or potentially existent in the wood, and the potential existence is converted into actual existence with the operation of the efficient cause. It is to be emphasised that potential existence is not the same thing as actual existence. A potential table is not the same thing as the actual table. The latter is an object of possible perception which the former is not; the latter can serve some of our practical purpose which the former cannot; the latter has to depend on the efficient cause for its existence, while the former does not have any such dependence. According to the *sat-kārya-vādin*, then, an effect before its appearance exists in its material cause as a potential entity and not as anything actual. It will be seen that the postulation of this distinction between a potential state of existence and an actual one helps us in overcoming the above mentioned difficulties felt by the *asat-kārya-vādin*. It cannot be said that the postulation is uncalled for. It is on the contrary quite un-avoidable, for it is the only way of making intelligible a status-difference among absolute non-existents, which is other-wise entirely un-intelligible.

It appears then that while to *āraṃbha-vāda* there is such a thing as real genesis (*utpatti*), according to *parinama-vada*, the so-called genesis is only 'manifestation' (*avirbhāva*). Correspondingly according to *asat-kārya-vāda*, there is such a thing as real 'destruction' (*vināśa*), but to *sat-kārya- vāda*, the so called 'destruction' is nothing but 'disappearance' (*tirobhāva*). In place of a real genesis of an effect from a causal complex, the *pariṇāma-vādin-s* believe in 'transformation' (*pariṇāma*) of

something into some other thing. To the *āraṃbha-vādin* a cause is something that ushers in the effect which is an 'other' relatively to it; to the *pariṇāma-vādin*, on the other hand, a cause is what undergoes transformation as the effect. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika-s thus claim that the relation between a cause and its effect is 'difference' (*bheda*), but the Sāṃkhya-Pātañjala-s claim that the relation in question is a kind of 'identity' (*abheda*) that has some place for difference as well.

(d) In this conflict between the theory of *āraṃbha* versus the theory of *pariṇāma*, the Advaita-Vedāntin-s throw their weight with the latter. They hold that the objections against *āraṃbha-vāda* cannot be set aside. They accordingly reject the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position without any hesitation whatever. But they do not for that reason accept *pariṇāma-vāda* either.

It is to be noted that though the Sāṃkhya-s reject *āraṃbha- vāda*, they agree on one aspect of that theory. They hold with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika-s that in any causal situation, the cause and the effect are equally real in their status. It is on this point that the Advaitin-s differ. According to them, in any causal situation, the effect has a lesser reality than the cause. Taking their start from the Sāṃkhya position that the relation between a cause and its effect is not one of absolute difference but one of identity, the Advaitin-s emphasise what the Sāṃkhya-s do not deny, that in spite of the identity between a material cause and its effect, there is some distinction between the two. The material cause and the effect look different. Again, a material cause cannot serve the same purpose as its effect. A lump of wood cannot serve the same purpose as the table. The novelty that characterises the effect is either real or imaginary. On the latter alternative, the difference in function between a material cause and its effect cannot be accounted for. So the first alternative has got to be accepted. But if the difference is something real, then the question is to be faced: was it before its appearance existent in the material cause or not? The latter alternative cannot be accepted by the *sat-kārya-vādin*, for it would then commit him to the position that an effect before its appearance was not existent in its material cause, which is the thesis of *asat-kārya-vāda*. So it has got to be said that the novelty of the effect was before its appearance existent in the material cause. To admit this is to admit that not merely the effect but also its novelty was before its appearance existent in the material cause. But in that case, the material cause by itself should have performed all the functions of the effect. This, however, is not a fact. So the novel feature of the effect cannot be said to have been existent before its appearance in the material cause. But, as the Advaitin argues, if the differential feature were something real, it must have been before its appearance either existent or non-existent in its material cause. Since it cannot be said to be either, it cannot be claimed to be anything real. Yet it cannot be denied that the novelty in question does get presented. It is thus a presented unreal or something *mithyā*. It comes to this then that the difference that is presented to a percipient between a cause and its effect is not anything real. But as an effect is an effect only as involving the *mithyā* differentium in question, it must also be regarded as an illusory appearance. Not that it has no reality whatsoever. But the only reality that it can claim is the reality of the material cause that continues to persist in it. The Advaitin therefore claims

that in any causal situation, it is the material cause alone that can be regarded as real, while there is no reality of the effect taken to be other than the cause. In other words, as between a material cause and its effect, the latter cannot be regarded as having the same reality as the former. In the technical language of Advaita-Vedānta, an effect is a *vivarta* of the material cause. The Advaita theory of causality is accordingly known as *vivarta-vāda* as distinguished from *āraṃbha-vāda* and *pariṇāma-vāda*. It is an improvement on *pariṇāma-vāda* which in its turn is an improvement on *āraṃbha-vāda*. Provisionally at least let us rest with *vivarta-vāda* and proceed to an analysis of the notion of creation in Indian philosophy.

II : CREATION

It is to be kept in mind that the problem of 'creation' is but an extension of the problem of causality and it will be seen that the theories of creation that are to be reported here involve at places one or other of the theories of causality noticed so far. It will have to be seen first what we take the term 'creation' to mean when we speak of the Indian theories of creation. The word is surely used in a special sense and it would only be a truism to say that 'creation' means the creation of the world or *jagat*. The term *jagat*, on the Indian view means the collection of effects (*kārya-jāta*) and not the collection of *Everything* that exists and neither again any interconnected system of things. Eternal entities, not being effects, are not included in the collection of things and events that constitutes *jagat* of the Indian thinkers. Different Indian schools, excepting Cārvāka-s and Bauddha-s have their own lists of eternal entities, but in spite of variations there is agreement on the question of soul or *ātman*. The soul (in the singular) or souls (in the plural) are admitted to be of eternal variety and they do not form any part of the Indian *Jagat*. On this point, the difference between the Vaidika or the Hindu and the Semitic conceptions of creation is quite fundamental. While to the Vaidika-s, a soul or an *ātaman* is an eternal uncreated entity, to thinkers nurtured in the Semitic tradition (that is to say the Judaic, the Christian and the Muslim ideologies), the finite soul is a creation of the Supreme soul. It is because of this difference that the Indian *jagat* has no place for souls, while the European 'world' does have an honoured place for it.

When Indian thinkers speak of 'creation' or *Sṛṣṭi*, the creation means to them a question relating to non-eternal entities like effects, but again the problem of 'creation' does not concern all effects but only those which are not made by human or sub-human beings. By 'Creation' then we here mean the generation of phenomena which do not depend on the activity of humans or sub-humans; that is to say of those which are commonly known as 'natural phenomena'. But that again would not be quite accurate. The genesis of this or that group of natural phenomena comes under the investigational jurisdiction of natural scientists, and it would be rather odd to describe a natural scientist as an investigator of the problem of 'creation', unless we mean by 'creation' nothing but simple causation.

By 'creation' or *Sṛṣṭi* in the sense in which thinkers have used the word, they appear to have meant the *ultimate* origination of non-eternal things. If by 'ultimate' is meant 'absolutely ultimate', then phrase 'ultimate origination of non-eternal things' would mean 'the first origin' of things. It is there necessary to point out that, on the Vaidika view, there is no 'first origination' in a literal sense; on the Semitic view, however, there really is such a thing. As on the question of souls, so on this question of 'first origination' of things there seems to exist a radical divergence of opinion between thinkers owing allegiance to the Vaidika tradition and those who are under the influence of the Mosaic tradition. And this difference of views is connected with the question whether a causal series has an absolute beginning or not. It is found from common experience that the cause or the determinant of a phenomenon is itself another phenomenon and that again depends on another phenomenon and so on. How long would the backward process go on? Sense perception which has its limitations can take us back only to a few steps and then becomes infructuous. Would it be proper to stop with this limitation of the perceptive faculty and assert that a series of causes has a first beginning at the point where perception fails and we cannot proceed further back? The answer may be in the affirmative and then we have to say that the cause which we accept as the 'first' on perceptual evidence is something eternal. But if that were so, then its effect would likewise be eternal. Its cause therefore, cannot be eternal. That would mean that what is perceptually a first cause cannot really be a first cause. If this manner of reasoning is at all a sound one, then we are debarred from accepting any term in a causal series as a first cause. We have to say, in other words, that a causal series is without any beginning. And this actually has been the standpoint of *all* Indian philosophers.

It may be urged however, that if a causal series is really without any beginning, then the question of creation in the sense of 'ultimate origination' cannot arise at all. As a matter of fact, however, most of the *āstika* thinkers are found to speak of *Sṛṣṭi* and *pralaya* or *sarga* and *pratisarga*, meaning creation and dissolution. If they are not speaking nonsense what exactly do they mean by 'creation' in the sense of first origination of things?

It is to be remarked here that the so-called 'first' origination is never taken in Indian philosophy in the sense of an origination that is not preceded by any other origination. All Indian thinkers are agreed that a causal series is without any beginning. Also, it has to be remembered that the causal series which is the *jagat* is not one simple unitary series of causes and effects, it is in fact a vast collection of an indefinite number of divergent cause-effect series. The causal series of happenings of which 'I' am a term is different from the series of which 'you' are a term. The number of causal series forming the collection that is *jagat* is as many as the number of 'subjects' of consciousness and 'object' of consciousness of which I had spoken before. All these series are not necessarily related to one another; some are and some are not. It is to be kept in mind also that the terms of a series involving one subject are all related to the affective experiences of that subject, so that by a period of *Sṛṣṭi* or creation, we understand a period of affective experience (*bhoga*) involving all the subjects living during that period. Most of the Indian

thinkers believe again on the strength of their holy books that the effective experience of all the 'subjects' of consciousness may have a simulations suspension. The period of such a break is called *pralaya* or a state of dissolution which again is followed by a period of creation. When Indian philosophers speak of creation as a first origination (*ādi-sṛṣṭi*), they mean by this 'creation', a creation after a period of dissolution and not the creation that is accepted as the only one on the Semitic view. Our thinkers then believe in an alternation of creation and dissolution from an unbeginning past.

Though most *āstika* thinkers accept this beginningless alternation of creation and dissolution, there are some philosophers of the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā school who do not like to accept anything like creation or dissolution. They believe in the unbeginning character of *jagat*, and in so far agree with the Bauddha-s.

In regard to creation then there seem to be two views among Indian thinkers - one, accepting the fact of creation and the other denying it. To those who accept a state of creation, the following question appears to be relevant. Since creation is nothing but ultimate origination and origination is nothing but causation, it must like other instances of causation have some material cause and some efficient cause to operate on the material. What is this ultimate material and what is the ultimate efficient cause involved in creation?

The answer to this question has not been unanimous. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika-s, the ultimate material of creation comprises the four kinds of *bhautika* or material atoms, and the ultimate efficient cause is the Supreme soul who is a conscious being. According to the Sāṃkhya-Pātañjala-s, the ultimate matrix of creation is constituted by *Pradhāna* which is another name for the three principles, technically called *guṇa-s*, in absolute equipoise; the ultimate efficient cause is the peculiar relation of *sannidhya* to *pradhāna* of an infinite number of conscious beings called *puruṣa-s*. According to Vedāntin-s, the ultimate matrix is *māyā* which is practically another name for the Sāṃkhya *pradhāna*; the ultimate efficient cause is *Iśvara* or a personal God. All these thinkers accept in addition the principle of *adṛṣṭa* as an operative principle in creation. It will be seen that while the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika-s and the Vedāntin-s admit a conscious principle as the ultimate efficient cause of the causal series that is creation, the Sāṃkhya-Pātañjala-s admit no such conscious principle as the controlling cause. The first and the third groups of thinkers are accordingly known as *cetanā-kāraṇa-vādin-s*, while the second group of thinkers are known as *a-cetanā-kāraṇa-vādin-s*. It will have to be remembered also that though the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika-s agree with the Vedāntin-s in accepting a conscious principle as the controller of Creation, they differ radically about the nature of the material out of which the created world comes into being. Again, while the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika-s differ radically from the Sāṃkhya-Pātañjala-s in their account both of the material cause and the efficient cause of creation, they agree in accepting the reality of the created world and differ from the Advaitin-s according to whom the created world is '*mithyā*' or unreal though it is not imaginary. It will be realised that the difference between the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika-s and the Sāṃkhya-s on the nature of the ultimate material cause springs from their difference as to whether a material

cause is less pervasive or more pervasive than its material effect. It will be seen also that the difference between the Advaitin-s and the others regarding the ontic status of the created world follows from their differences in their causal theory as to whether an effect has the same ontic status as the cause or whether, it is a *vivarta* of the cause.

I have given this rapid comparative survey of the views of the major schools on some general aspects of the problem of creation. For obvious reasons I could not enter into the details of this topic.

II

ON THE SHAPE OF A LIVING MOMENT : PHILOSOPHICAL ENTAILMENTS OF ANADI KĀLA

NAVJYOTI SINGH

I : PRELIMINARIES

Man live together. There are institutions which define this together-ness. Family, extended family, village, city, nation,state, profession and languages are all different kind of institutions which determine practices as well as thinking. Though they determine precepts or norms which constitute living but they do so in a way that acculturation across systems of precepts and practices (that is, institutions) is always possible. Acculturation is never at the cost of *composure* given by the legacy of institutions though it is in the nature of *composure* that always there is room for institutional innovation which some times get triggered by acculturation. What is the nature of this *composure*? One thing looks definite that this *composure* can not be adequately grasped if it is construed without taking cognizance of institutionalized legacies. Further more, the *composure* has to be grasped in a way that it enables us to accommodate purposeful-ness of life. 'Legacy' as well as 'striving' seems to be at once constituting this *composure*. Ideality and reality called 'civilization-s' characterizes *departures* (*prasthana-s*) in *composure* of man. Such a departure is in the sense of difference in foundations of 'legacy' as well as 'strivings' that are civilizationally erected by man. Thematizing *composure* in a sense boils down to thematizing principle determinants of civilization.

The issue I will address in this essay is - How to delimit philosophical *composure* of Indian civilization. It can not be located as delimited in a particular philosophical system nor can it be located as delimited in the precepts, norms and practices of a particular *sampradāya* (legacy) in the great Indian heritage. Only way is to locate it as delimited in dispositions which are present pervasively in different *sastra-s* (products of theoretical quests) and *sampradaya-s* (products of life-styles). If it is possible to isolate such *pervasive dispositions* which also unique, in the sense that they uniquely characterize Indian civilization, then their philosophical entailments can be investigated for understanding philosophical *composure*. We can call such an investigation - a dispositional investigation - and the method evolved for the purpose of this investigation - dispositional analytics. Our steps will be the following:

1. Isolate dispositions which are *uniquely* ensouled and enshrined in our civilization. To clarify their unique-hood with respect to other counter-dis-

positions found either in other civilizations or simply imagined. 2. We shall present seven such *basic* dispositions present in Indian civilisation.

3. Following problematic will then be raised : Is there a necessary relation between these dispositions which can help us construe unified elements of our civilizational *composure*.

4. Then evolve analytic methodology for undertaking resolution of the problematic.

5. We shall actually propose their intrinsic inter-relation by showing that they can be individually derived from a unified stance arrived at through our methodological move.

II : PERVASIVE DISPOSITIONS IN INDIAN CIVILIZATION

One of the disposition pervasively shared by the life instituted in Indian civilization is that the world is beginning-less, that is, *anāditva* of *sṛṣṭi* or (*mahasrsti*). Though there exist many philosophical arguments to demonstrate rationality of this disposition, (the most famous among them being the causal argument), they are not important for our purpose. For us, what is most important is that this disposition is not shared by the semitic civilizations. But it still does not constitute an adequate articulation of what can characterize *uniquely* Indian civilization, since even ancient Greeks happen to share it. Never the less this disposition has deep entailments specially so in the light of foundations of the fundamental notion of *authority*.

If there is beginning then the *authority* in human affairs (moral, efficacious as well as epistemic) can be easily founded on the image of beginning. The ideas of good, causality, action, blame and knowledge will get founded on the construal of the beginning. This has been the case with semitic civilisations. Even though difference in the dominant Islamic and Christian construal of the beginning would found *authority* differently. But if there is no beginning then how to found *authority* (moral, efficacious as well as epistemic) in human affairs? This is a most serious question since there does not seem to be a ready simple answer to it. Besides the fate of the civilization nurturing such a disposition will crucially rests on the transparency of the foundation of *authority*.

The Greeks devised a way out. They founded *authority* in their beginning-less universe around the anchor of eternal *logos* which 'steers all things through all'. This logos or 'form' was voluminous enough to contain fecundity witnessed in the universe and was a 'presence as such' governing all. *Authority* could be founded on the basis of the access to this 'presence as such', an accession could provide transparency to striving for good, beauty and truth. It is of little consequence whether *logos* is essential or substantial or a mix of two. Metaphysical systems are merely possible rationalization of disposition for founding *authority*. Beginning-less universe was beginning-less-ly steered by *logos* and thus was saved of chaos and strife by founding *authority*. But in the Indian civilization there is a noticeable absence of the idea of 'form'. There is no explicit notion of *steering* either construed though the image of the beginning or construed through the idea of *logos*. This makes the

question of *authority* quite intricate, novel as well as suspect at least in the eyes of the Greco-European civilizational mould. Never the less this issue is of utmost value for the self clarity of our civilizational fate as well as making it transparent is a civilizational obligation.

Anāditva (beginning-less-ness) of the universe as a disposition is by no means sufficient to characterize Indian civilizational *composure* as it does not sufficiently distinguish Indian and Greek civilizations. It is only when we collaborate it with other pervasively present dispositions that *composure* of Indian civilization can be thematized.

Following are the articulations of other collaborative though equally pervasive dispositions present within our civilization. They determinately differentiate us from the Greeks and perhaps also Chinese:

i. When a question is asked - if *srsti* is *anadi* then what would be the purpose of life or *paraṃ puruśārtha* as then the universe would be dwindling in all possible ways since beginning-less time. Since infinite time is past infinite directions must also have been charted. Most *sampradāya-s* will posit a collaborative disposition that there is a determinate *end* (*sāditva*), a teleological as well as existential *end* for life. The conception of the *end* in terms of *mokṣa, nirvāṇa, mukti* or *siddhi* are pervasively present in the civilization.

ii. If there is a conception of a teleological end in the sense of fulfilment of the purpose of life then there has to be the conception of the condition of life from where the striving for the end finds meaning. Such a condition is another basic disposition, namely, the idea of bondage (*baṅdha*) and strife (*duḥkha*) being in the universe beginning-less-ly (*anādi baṅdha*). That life is in beginning-less state of suffering and bondage. Thus *puruśārtha* (final purpose) can be seen as dissolution of the *anādi baṅdha*. Even this disposition is acceptable to numerous *sampradāya-s* in the Indian civilization.

iii. Between the two, that is, *anādi baṅdha* and *mokṣānta*, there has to be a disposition to found continuity of life. This disposition is enshrined in one or other versions of *karma siddhāṅta*. This is a disposition that life continues through the cycles of birth and death from beginning-less suffering to the cessation of suffering and strife.

iv. This continuity has to be substantiated in the elemental or the most mundane activity of life. Thus a collaborative disposition about the nature of action construed as *saphalatva* of *kriyā* (fruition of human action) can also be discovered as pervasively founded. Through this disposition content of the directed-ness of life is founded in the elemental and elementary conception of everyday actions. *Dharma* (sense of obligation, prohibition, indebtedness etc.) founded as *phala* or fruit of action is central to this disposition and can give content to precepts and practices which ought to be instituted to fulfil essential directed-ness of life. Thus there is a disposition that every thing can be aligned along the directed-ness.

v. Since 'fruition of action' is considered as a temporal human action unit, it can very well be chaotic if it is not collaborated with explicit disposition which could give beginning-less-ly the foundation of directed-ness as well. Thus, disposition towards *apauruśeyatva* (independence from life) of *śabda* (language which discloses purpose) can be pervasively found. Even *Iśvara-vādin-s* (who accept existence of God) within the Indian tradition only echo another interpretation of *apauruśeyatva* or *śabda*. Though there are many diverging interpretations of *apauruśeya śabda*, at least as many as the number of *sampradāya-s*, it still is a pervasive disposition which amounts to a strong claim that *all actions are readable*. And as a corollary it can be said no true tragedy is not possible.

vi. Though all actions are readable, the reading forms a semantic universe of its own since the converse is not true, that is, all readings are not translatable into efficacious or desirable actions. Thus to demarcate between *dharma* and *adharma* idea of *sabda* as a means of knowledge acquisition is accepted as a disposition. *Sabda pramana* as a means to definitive, determinative knowledge is uniquely enshrined in Indian theories, philosophies, practices and precepts.

vii. The theory of knowledge is pre-disposed towards raising the problematic of the process of happening of knowledge - *pramā karaṇa* (*pramāṇa*) - rather than the epistemic analysis of *pramātva* or knowledge as an-end-for-its-own-sake. This disposition is a significant departure in the theory of knowledge enshrined in our civilization in explicit counter-direction from the Greco-European philosophical tradition.

Though these dispositions are widely shared but still their technical content or interpretations are widely diverge when we get into the details of different philosophical systems or different traditions of cultural practices or *sampradāya-s* within the Indian heritage. Philosophical theories give technical content to these dispositions and in a sense represent rationalizations of these dispositions. They do so quite differently or virtually always in contention with each other. But we are not interested in details of the rationalizations. We want to thematize those disposition in an attempt to construe unified elements of our civilizational *composure*. Though this we would do quite philosophically and would take care as not to mis-represent or mis-claim on behalf of particular schools of Indian philosophies.

III : METHODOLOGY OF DISPOSITIONAL ANALYSIS

The question we are now addressing is : Is there a necessary and exact relation between these dispositions independent of rationalisation by philosophical schools? Is any one or more of these dispositions dispensable without disturbing other dispositions or generally without disturbing the *composure* of our civilization? To thematize this problematic we have to evolve a methodology by which we are able to see them in their together-ness. A methodology which could clearly reflect relations between them. How to construe the realm where all these dispositions can be brought face to face together with their necessary relation? Such a theoretical move will have to be conceived. The theoretic move we are proposing

stems from the notice on the nature of Time or *Kāla*. *Kāla* has been conceived as an *āśraya* (ground) where every thing is enacted. Even if *Kāla* is not conceived as an real entity but merely as an *aupādhika* (adventitious) entity, like the way Buddhists do, we can still conceive it as a theoretical ground without committing to the ontic status of *Kāla*. Now *Kāla* itself is to be accepted as *anādi* (beginning-less) on the ground of *anāditva* of *sṛṣṭi*. This all pervasive feature of *Kāla* can be used to reflect on any claim which is made on the ground of pervasion like the ones we have singled out as dispositions. These claims must be grounded on the shape of universal ground. We shall begin with the form of time to analyze necessary relations between the dispositions which have the claim of pervasion.

The together-ness of all pervasive dispositions can be construed as a *moment* since moment is the analytic conception of together-ness. This way our original problematic can be reduced to the nature of this *moment*. The methodological device available for doing so is *akramaka dṛṣṭi naya* - to see them all at once even if we have to conclude essential impossibility of such a complete move. We shall call this *moment* a *living moment* where most authentic and pervasive in the *composure* of life is presented at once. The content of the *living moment* should be able to enliven these dispositions if there exists necessary relation between them and they represent authentic grounding of life in general. It is through the analysis of *living moment* that we would attempt pre-dispositional synthesis of our civilizational *composure* and develop systematic philosophical entailments as elements of the *composure*.

Anādi-anaṅta Kāla gives the idea of infinitary continuum or a unitary planum where is evidenced all or witnessed all. *Akhaṇḍa Mahā Kāla* can be considered as a planum of a *living moment*. But it remains too thin a idea to grasp richness of living. What can be a appropriated in such a moment is perhaps all but only vacuously. How could *moment* be filled with content. We suggest that the shape of the moment itself is sufficient to grasp essential together-ness of the basic dispositions that help us construe the *composure* of Indian civilisation.

Kāla has feature that it implies some kind of sequencing as if a moment follows one after another compulsively and this *pravāha* goes on and has been going on since *anadi* time. There are two distinct kinds of sense of sequencing.

i. The continuum of time which one witnesses, say, as in the case of experiencing pain has a sequencing of an extrinsic kind. What it means is that one does not realise how much time has elapsed while in pain. There is no intrinsic sense of time. The sense of time comes only when an extrinsic comparison is done with other phenomena like rising and setting of Sun or the timings of other activities.

ii. There is an altogether different sequencing which one witnesses while watching the phenomena of thinking. In thinking one episode of thought follows another and there is no sense of comparison with any other phenomena for the realisation of this sequence. This kind of sequencing can be thus called an intrinsic sequencing. By an episode of thinking what we mean is the unit of thinking which could be an episode of an occurrence of a sentence or *jñāna/vākya*. Such an episode by itself suggests that it takes at least three moments - one moment of its origination, one moment

of its sustenance, and one moment of its cessation. This sequence of three conceptually construed moments suggests themselves and stands for one discrete quanta of thought which makes way for anther quanta of thought. The sequencing involved in thinking being intrinsic in its nature discloses the most bare aspect of temporality. And this aspect of temporality is quite different from the commensurable aspect of extrinsic temporality.

We shall concentrate on the second aspect of bare temporality. Since it is in this aspect that we can discover the most minimal and basic feature of time. Why does one thought follow another? Why is not there a continuous occurrence of one thought over a period of time which can be determined in comparison with other phenomenon? Why thought as a phenomena is not like pain which sustains over a period of time. There must be something in the nature of thought itself which makes this sequencing possible. We shall call this nature of sequencing as a *principle of enclosure.* The very fact that thought comes in enclosed form of a sentence or knowledge episode must be responsible for the sequencing one witnesses in thought. As if this enclosure spills into the next enclosure. This outward orientation of the *shape* of thought must be the basis of the possibility of thought itself. In a way, with a unit such as sentence one can say that language is oriented beyond itself. As if the shape of a thought is such that there is a hole in its belly which compulsively makes a thought intrinsically disposed towards its cessation and enactment of the next thought. We would analytically put this particular formal feature of the bare temporality at the centre of our methodological stage. It is our contention that the formal structure of bare temporality is the one in which we can read all the dispositions listed above in a way that their relations become determinant. This formal feature constitutes a *shape* of a *living moment.*

IV : THE SHAPE OF BARE TEMPORALITY AND THE SHAPE OF A LIVING MOMENT

Let us look at the nature of the boundary of a sentence (*vākya*). A *vākya* beholds a linguistic content and the enclosure having this content-ness (*viṣayatā*) has the nature of spilling over. Such a boundary makes *viṣayatā prayojanātmaka* (directed outwards). We can call this *proyojanātmaktā* the veridical content of the *viṣayatā.* The veridical content is the content of the truthful-ness of the *visayata* which beholds in a moment called *vākya. Prayojanātmakatā* consists of contact with the active organs of the body (*karmeṅdriya*) and also the compossibility and consistency with the other sentence. These two aspects of outward directed-ness of sentence constitutes the truth value of the sentence.

The meaning of the sentence is the *viṣayatā* which sprouts (*sphoṭa*) out from a *bhāva bīja* with the help of *sādhana pratyaya* to make possible *siddha vākya.* On the other hand the *prayojana pravṛti* is the shape of the sentence and it also consists in *sadhya siddhatva pravṛti* which has been called *bhāvanā.* This *bhāvanā* gives rise to the action (*kriyā*) which is the *hetu* of the *sādhya* which shows up as a *sampradāna kāraka* in the sentence. Thus *prayojanātmakatva* consists in *sa-phala-kriyā* (action along with its fruition). This is an articulation of the root shape of the living moment. We shall here note two distinct explications based on the root shape of the living moment.

In a theory there is a kind of *ekavākyata* which insures that the entire theory is consistent. This consistency is ensured by the second aspect of *prayojanātva*. As if the *ekavākyatā* breaks up into *khanda vākya-s* in accordance with the veridical content they draw from the *prayojanatamaka ekavākyatā*. This process is a kind of *adhayas* mechanism which describes and ensures unity of purpose of the theory and its breaking down into several sentences which make the body of the theory. Theories like *Vyākaraṇa* or *Āyurveda* are basically directed towards fruition of their respective purposes which shows up even as divided into several theoretically consistent sentences that constitute the body of these theory. The relation among sentences is that of mutual truth value that is basically derived out of *prayojana* of *sastra*.

There might be an occurrence of a *vākya* but there also might be a doubt about its truthful-ness. In that case, to remove the doubt the process of acquisition of knowledge has to be proved to be authentic. The theory of authentication of the process of acquisition of knowledge is called *pramāṇa śāstra* and it has a complex relation with the truth content of the sentences of a theory. The authentication of the means of acquisition of knowledge does not directly establish the truth content of the sentence but merely help in removing the doubt if any about the truthful-ness of the sentence. Thus the theory of *pramāṇa* is essentially a negative theory which does not establish positive truth content but merely helps in the removal of the doubt. The establishment of the positive truth content depends on fruition of the purposive-ness or outward directed-ness of the sentence. Thus this outward directed-ness ensures the truth content of a theory, a content we have called veridical content.

If we take '*viṣayatā - projayanakatva*' of sentence as the root shape of the *living moment* then the directed-ness of the living moment in finality will boil down to cumulative directed-ness which can be called *mahā-vākya* or *paraṃ puruśārtha*.

Now once we understand the root shape of the living moment we can try to relate various basic dispositions in the Indian civilization which we had listed earlier.

1. The form of *sa-phala-kriyā* is such that *kriyā* is a *hetu* and *phala* is *sādhya*. Now the invariable concomitance between *hetu* and *sādhya* in the light of essential directed-ness of this unit cannot be determined by perceptual or inferential means of knowledge acquisition. Thus *śabda* as a independent means of knowledge acquisition has to be accepted out of necessity. Thus the necessity of this basic disposition is established.

2. There are many sentences which occur in man's life time and in society and if a set of all these sentences is made then the relational structure among them can be found in the *prayojanātmakatā* instantiated in them. On the basis of this purposeful-ness or directed-ness these sentences can be organised or ordered in the form of various theories which themselves serve some unified purpose. All this shows that sentences among themselves are only related through the purposeful-ness and it is the relation among purposes which becomes most significant. The relation among purposes is that of *samvāya* or inherence. The purposes form a hierarchy through the relation of inherence among themselves. Thus even sentences form a hierarchy through the relation of inherence among various purposes for which sentences have truth value. This gives a continuity from individual

occurrence of the sentence to that of *mahā-vākya* or *mahā-prayojana*. This *mahā-prayojana* is *mahāphala* of all actions which has been called variously as *nirvāṇa*, *mokṣa* or *siddhi*. Thus there is a necessity of accepting ultimate purpose as well as the necessity of accepting the ultimate bondage or *mahā-bańdha*.

3. Before fruition is achieved it is instantiated in sentences as a thing to be achieved or *sādhya*. This *sādhyatva* has to be independent of the *kriyā-s* which become its *hetu* thus it has to be *apauruśeya* which is another basic disposition listed above.

4. Since there is *kālasthānāṅtaraṇa* or independence of *kriyā* and *phala* from time, it is necessary to accept *karma siddhāṅta*. Some idea of *adṛṣṭa* has to be accepted to save causal relation between *kriyā* and *phala*. It is this causal relation which makes some kind of *karma siddhanta* a necessary elemental disposition for filling in the shape of a living moment.

Since *sastra* has *ekvākyata* and establishment (*siddhi*) of the truth content is in *vyavahāra* is to be accepted there is a primacy of *prayojanātmakatā*. The *authority* in the Indian civilization is founded on the accessability of the *prayojana* which has inherence relation with the *mahā-prayojana*. We would notice that this foundation of *authority* is altogether different from the Greek foundation of *authority* as indicated earlier. Though both civilizations accept *anāditva* of *kāla* and *sṛṣṭi* but both found *authority* in their precepts, norms and practices in altogether different ways. Thus the *composure* of Indian civilization is delineated differently because of different ways of founding authority.

III

SṚṢṬI : A CULTURE SPECIFIC CONCEPT

Uma Bandyopadhyay

In the West it is an important debate among the philosophers as to whether man is born with a *tabula rasa* or with some innate ideas; what exactly is the nature or state of the human mind when a child is born. We are not going into that debate. Rather we want to start from the point on which the philosophers or the scientists or other theoreticians seem to agree. There are facts of experience. This is accepted by all and for the theoreticians it is a starting point from which they develop their theories. It will not be denied by any theoretician that there are books on the table. But the interpretation of this fact may be different from different standpoints. A physicist will give one kind of explanation of it whereas an Idealist philosopher may offer a different explanation. None of these may agree with the common sense views.

Not only they accept some basic facts before they develop their theories but also the theoreticians have certain assumptions before ideas or theories are developed. They may not even be aware of them. They are there as dispositions. Indeed, prior to any theoretical study there are certain dispositions accepting which we proceed to develop the theories. These dispositions are such that theoreticians cannot just throw them away; they develop the theories on the basis of these. These pre-theoretic dispositions are not the result or by-products of the theories, rather they are assumed as the pre-theoretical states of mind. They do not throw away these dispositions not because of their (theoreticians') necessity but they are not even always conscious about these dispositions. These are there in such a way that we cannot go beyond these; rather we proceed with them. I think the idea behind this volume is to (re)discover such dispositions relating to *Sṛṣṭi* and I want to show how they shape our culture.

Before developing their different theories relating to the objects of the world, the theoreticians assume that objects are existing independently of and outside our mind. This is also theoretical conclusion of the realist philosophers. Similarly we accept that the objects of the world are created. A jar we are now perceiving was not there before. It has come to exist after its creation by the potter. This notion of creation is not only applicable to a particular jar or cloth but it is extended to the whole world where we are living. It is one of our most commonly accepted belief that the world is created. Accordingly the notion of *Sṛṣṭi* is there in the common sense level and also perhaps in the theoretical discipline. Whatever we come to

believe in the theoretical level, we are disposed to think, *prior to it*, that the world is a creation. At least in the sense that we have suffering.[1]

Our pre-theoretical dispositions are not confined merely to *Sṛṣṭi*; there are also other pre-theoretical dispositions. For example, there are pre-theoretical dispositions relating to causal relation or relating to *kāla* or time. People are disposed to think, to whatever culture he may belong, that they have relation with *kāla*. Things cannot exist without being in *kāla*. Examples that we have considered here are not of the same status. If we have any pre-disposition relating to causal relation or law of *karma*, that is not so much pervasive as our pre-disposition relating to *Sṛṣṭi* is. The former is a pre-disposition only relating to some culture but the latter is a pre-theoretical disposition irrespective of any culture or creed. A person whether he is a Christian or a Hindu, admits that the world is a creation. Pre-theoretical disposition is not a very clear notion. What we mean is not any assumption or belief of any man. But if most of the people of a culture think or speak or behave in a certain way, then there may be some disposition for that. Dispositions are therefore pervasive and basic ways. Such dispositions may be of two types - (a) Common to most men of a culture and (b) Common to most men of different cultures - say Hinduism and Christianity.

But now the question is: if these pre-theoretical dispositions are same to different cultures then how do they give different shapes to these different cultures? How two absolutely different cultures like Hinduism and Christianity will be shaped by the same pre-theoretical disposition relating to *Sṛṣṭi*? The answer to this question is not very difficult. They may all have the notion of *Sṛṣṭi*; but the notion is different in different culture. In connection with *Sṛṣṭi*, for example, another notion is there, it is a notion of *Sraṣṭā* or creator. Both the Hindu and the Christian people admit the notion of *Sṛṣṭi* and *Sraṣṭā*. The way of conceiving these two things together is different in the two different cultures. The two cultures differ in the very way these two things and their relations are conceived even in the pre-theoretical stage. So the dispositions relating to *Sṛṣṭi* and *Sraṣṭā* have shaped these cultures in different ways.

In this essay I do not mean to pass any value judgement; I am here concerned only with the question - how different cultures are shaped differently by different pre-theoretical dispositions. How does Vaidika culture differ from the Christian culture so far as *Sṛṣṭi* and *Sraṣṭā* are concerned? How does the way of looking at the world turns out to be different in these two cultures? Because, people are pre-disposed to think differently. There is no such thing as looking at the world neutrally and without disposition.

But now, even if we accept that we are pre-disposed to look at (or think about) the world differently, what is the difference? Both the Hindus and the Christians admit that the world is a creation and that the God is the creator of this world. But in the Hindu tradition we seem to take these words in some loose sense whereas in the Christian culture they are taken in a very stricter sense.

In the Hindu tradition, it is our belief that creation or *Sṛṣṭi* is *anādi*, i.e. originless. But, on the other hand, we generally believe that this creation is the creation of a

creator. Two things are to be said against this view : first, it is a contradiction; if creation is originless then how it can be called creation or *Sṛṣṭi*. For creation is what is created; the very word involves reference to prior absence. In the Nyāya terminology it is *prāgabhāva pratiyogin*, i.e. *Sṛṣṭi* is the negatum of prior absence. Secondly, even if we accept that *Sṛṣṭi* is originless, the problem remains with regard to the creator. If something is devoid of origin, what is the need for the creator or how the creator creates that which (is the need for the creator or how the creator creates that which) has no origin? So it is clear that there is an inherent contradiction in the twin acceptance of *anādi Sṛṣṭi* and the notion of creator. If the *Sṛṣṭi* is *anādi* it cannot have any *Sraṣṭā* ; on the other hand, if it has some *Sraṣṭā* it cannot be *anādi*. It therefore seems that there is confusion or contradiction in the way of looking at *Sṛṣṭi*.

The same inconsistency is not present in the Christian culture. Unlike the Hindus, the Christians take the notion of creation in the strict sense of the term. They do not consider *Sṛṣṭi* as *anādi* which implies also that *Sṛṣṭi* is creatorless. They think that at one time there was nothing as existence. *Sṛṣṭi* started from a particular moment and who started it is the creator or the God. God created everything except Himself. In Christianity even self is created by God. So in the strict sense of the term, creation is not *anadi* but it starts at a particular moment and it is God who makes this creation possible.[2] So there is, as it seems to be, no inconsistency in the Christian culture. Moreover, they think God is the creator in the true sense of the term, which means that God is the creator of everything other than God. So the belief is this that self etc. which are thought as something eternal in the Hindu culture are created by God. Excepting God, everything in the world is created. So neither there is any inconsistency in the Christianity nor the Christians take the word creation in a loose sense as it is taken in the Hindu or the Vaidika culture.

This kind of belief gives shape to the Christian culture. And they take God as the supreme authority. So they are to accept the view in their culture that everything depends on the grace of God. It is God who by his own will can do whatever He likes. Man has nothing to do excepting seeking grace of God. So some of the basic themes of metaphysics, say, causality and of epistemology, say, faith, are derived from their disposition to think creation to be an absolute creation.

The Hindu or the Vaidika culture is also shaped by the way we look at *Sṛṣṭi* and *Sraṣṭā*. In most of the philosophical systems, which differ otherwise *Sṛṣṭi* is *anadi* and it is caused by God. Again God's power of creation is limited in the sense that God created only the non-eternal objects. The eternal things like the atoms or the self are not created or caused by God. But can it be possible that creation is *anādi* and even then it is created by God? And also how can it be said that even when God is omniscient and omnipotent as in Christian culture He has only some limited capacity of creation? He is able to create only a part of the world. The solution to this may be to discard either of the views. If we can accept that *Sṛṣṭi* is not *anādi*, i.e. originless but it is *sādi* or has origin, then there is no difficulty in accepting that God is the creator. Or we can go by the other way and can say that *Sṛṣṭi* is *anādi* or originless, so there is no need of admitting the God as the creator. And,

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accordingly, we can discard the notion of God and can solve the problem. That means if in favour of the Hindu tradition it is said that *Sṛṣṭi* has origin, then for such a *Sṛṣṭi* God has got to be admitted as the creator or *Sraṣṭā*. Or one can say by discarding the notion of *Sṛṣṭi* altogether and can say that there is no *Sṛṣṭi* and no need of admitting God's existence. In some philosophical systems of India God is not admitted at all; in some other systems God is admitted but not as creator of the world. Though there is a strong pre-disposition in favour of creator God, there are all sorts of theories of creation. Some think that this *Sṛṣṭi* is *anādi*. Some other Indian philosophers think that *Sṛṣṭi* is *sādi*. Some hold that it is created by God. Some philosophers think there is God but God does not create the world. So we are not pre-disposed to think about the world in any particular way - as *anādi* or *sādi*. But we are pre-disposed to think God is the creator. But how could there develop theories which do not admit God or at least a creator God. I think the basic pre-disposition which is pervasive and central and the disposition which shaped our culture is the following. We are pre-disposed to accept the Veda-s as *pramāṇa*.[3] In the Veda- s all sorts of things are said. So there could develop different theories. They do not come from a single pre-disposition directly but from the Veda-s which has so many suggestions. The philosophical schools that are near to our common sense, accept the view that God is the creator of the world and the world is *anādi*.

Such philosophers as the Naiyāyika-s admit that *Sṛṣṭi* is *anādi*, but add something to it. To them *Sṛṣṭi* is both *anādi* as well as *ādimān*. Only these senses are different. So far as the creation in its ultimate sense is concerned, it is *anādi* and do not need any creator. But in this system creation is taken also in another sense. Creation needs creator which starts after a dissolution (*Pralaya*). This creation is neither *anādi* nor creatorless. It is both *sādi* and needs some creator who is none but God who has that immense capacity of creation. So a Naiyāyika also has no difficulty as we see in the system, to take the word *Sṛṣṭi* in the strict sense and to admit the creator for it.

No longer there is any problem in taking God as omniscient and limited. For the Naiyāyika-s God is not the creator in the sense that everything is created by God excepting God Himself. For God here is taken as only one type of cause, the auxiliary cause (*nimitta kāraṇa*). In case of the production of jar, the potter is the cause in the sense of efficient cause or the agent. A potter cannot create the pot just if he wishes and out of nothing. It is the potter who is the plan maker and from the clay he makes the pot. According to the Naiyāyika-s, God also makes or creates the world from the *upādāna* or materials according to his plan. This is actually the realistic explanation. This may not be taking the word creation in the strict sense as Christianity has done, but it is a realistic explanation of a creator.

But even now one may be in favour of the Christian explanation of creation and creator. For that is the simple form of explanation (*lāghava*) of the whole thing. And they do not need to take the word creation in different senses. They do not need to say, unlike the Hindu or Vaidika, that *Sṛṣṭi* in one sense is *anādi* without any need of any creator but in another sense it is *sādi* and needs a creator. Here I do not want to make any comment which view is better. I want to emphasise how the

theories will be developed depending on both pre-dispositions and theoretical considerations. The Hindus have a realistic approach. We are disposed to think like ordinary man that creation has a beginning like a pot. But it is a theoretical point that contradiction should be avoided. Positing a first cause leads to contradiction. So *Sṛṣṭi* is held to be *anādi*. Hindu theory of *Sṛṣṭi* is, therefore, shaped by both pre-theoretic disposition and theoretical consideration. The theoreticians cannot develop their theories from their clean state of mind. They have some basic dispositions or pre-theoretic dispositions which determine their ways of thinking or developing their theories. The theories do not determine these basic beliefs or the dispositions, rather the theories are developed taking these dispositions as the basis of them.[4] So they are not the consequences of the theories but are natural determining factor of the different theories. We can describe or explain these basic dispositions; but we cannot really criticise them or simply give them up. They are to be admitted if theorising is to be possible. In short, of the following beliefs relating to *Sṛṣṭi* only the first two seems to be pre-theoretical, others are theoretical : (1) *Sṛṣṭi* has a beginning (2) there is a creator (3) *Sṛṣṭi* is *anādi* (4) God is an absolute creator (5) God puts atoms together etc. To reiterate, theorising cannot begin in vacuume. There must be pre-theoretical intuitive or dispositional basis. And this is culture specific.

NOTES

1. "Na hyam saṃsāra anekavidho duḥkhamayo nirpekṣo bharitumarhati...". Udāyanācārya, *Nyāyakusumāñjalivṛtti* in *Nyāyakusumāñjaliḥ*, Chowkhamba, 1957,p.45.

2. Strictly speaking God does not creat the universe at a particular moment in pre-existing time. For, there is no such time. When God creats the world He creats, according to Christian theology, the time itself.

3. This aspect of Hindu rationality was emphesised by Professor Gopinath Bhattacharya when he described this rationality as 'authoritarian rationality'. Cf. Gopinath Bhattacharya, *Essays in Analytic Philosophy*, Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, 1989, Calcutta, p.173.

4. Cf. P.F. Strawson, *Skepticism And Naturalism : Some Varieties*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1985, Chapter 1.

IV

SṚṢṬI : A COMMON CONCERN

Gopa Gupta

Indian culture has a very rich heritage. By Indian culture we would understand the Hindu or the Vaidika Culture in particular but shall also keep in mind some non-Hindu traditions in general, which are actually (in a special sense) off-shoots of the Vaidika tradition itself.

In this paper our main objective is to find out, if there is any, pre-theoretical disposition regarding the notion of *Sṛṣṭi* which has given shape to Indian culture. But along with this we shall also try and see whether or not there exists any basic insight concerning the notion of *Sṛṣṭi* among other cultures as well. This notion being intriguing to all of mankind has provoked man to formulate fullfledged theories on the basis of those intuitions. If we can show there is some pre-theoretical disposition concerning the notion of *Sṛṣṭi* in Indian as well as many other non-Indian cultures then it would be proved that the notion of *Sṛṣṭi* was a common concern of all of mankind irrespective of caste, creed, place etc. We may also go on to show that the starting point of all the theories about *Sṛṣṭi* were probably somewhat same.

If by Indian culture we take the Vaidika one, some may object that the very endeavour is useless as in such a culture can there really be any pre-theoretical disposition about anything, let alone about *Sṛṣṭi*. For the Veda-s being *nitya* (as a *pravāha* at least) are there since beginningless time and man in his advent in creation only derives the ideas from it. No notion in man can be before the Veda-s. It is from this where he has learnt and later theorised about creation.

To this our reaction would be that it is correct to say chronologically the Veda-s are prior to mankind but it would be absurd to hold that even a laymen's conception about *Sṛṣṭi* (however vague unformulated it may be) is derived from it. He may know Veda-s to be the authority regarding things but still he must have a basic notion about the *jagat* in his own way.

By pre-theoretical disposition we would mean that basic intuition which is not nurtured by any theory at all; which is a sort of *anubhava* of man. Theories actually must have their roots in common notions which themselves are not theories. In this case the Veda-s may corroborate our basic notion about *Sṛṣṭi* and thus we would find that our pre-theoretical disposition did not go against the main tenets of the authority.

Let us now proceed towards our original endeavour and first try to find out, if there is any such insight in Indian and other cultures regarding the concept of *Sṛṣṭi*.

Then we shall see what is that intuitive notion of creation which has shaped Indian culture in particular.

Let us ask the question 'what is creation'? To take an example from day to day world we are reminded of say a jar. A jar when created mean quite a few things: (i) it is an effect; (ii) it has a cause; (iii) among other causal condition one is the conscious principle, i.e., here the *kumbhākara*; (iv) it is he who creates the jar at a certain place; (v) it is created out of something which is the materials or *upādāna*, say, clay; (vi) it is created at a certain point in time, before which it was absent; (vii) it exists for a period of time (which is never fixed), and; (viii) it gets destroyed at a point in time either directly or indirectly by a conscious agent or else by *Kāla* (time).

From the above observations we may say that the factors which has to be there at least a moment before the existence of the jar are the following - the *kumbhakāra*, the place or *adhikaraṇa*, the materials or *upādānakāraṇa* and time.

So far it is clear as to how an object is created or *sṛṣṭa* but has this kind of creation bothered mankind from beginningless time? No, then it must be something else which of course has some similarity with the common notion of creation. What is that? It is creation of *jagat* and for that matter *ādyasṛṣṭi*. That it is an effect and is produced out of some cause is an accepted fact but who is the conscious agent without whom there would have been no creation at all? That agent is an 'X' who is conscious and different from human beings, as human beings are incapable of producing this kind of effect. That 'X' may be named as "God" or something else. But this is the conscious principle behind *sṛṣṭikārya* which has to be accepted. Almost all the theories which have later developed consider the intervention of this conscious principle in some way.

Such a God whether has the power to create the world out of nothing is controversial. For the Indians the answer is very clear. He cannot. Even if God is Almighty and *Sarvajñā* he can create the world only out of already existing material. Regarding the nature of material cause there is much difference of opinion amongst the Indian scholars. Among the non-Indians viz. Christians, Jews and Muslims however this would not be accepted as the proper idea about God. Instead they prefer saying God being Almighty has the tremendous power of creating the world out of just nothing. It is according to His will that the world is there and according to His will that it may get destroyed. He creates everything including the souls. For us of course, God has created this world but there had been some materials out of which he could do so. He creates in *Kāla* which is the *adhāra*. The theories have a lot of differences amongst themselves as to what is the material cause. For instance, the Sāṃkhya, Vedāntin-s and Naiyāyika-s would all differ among themselves. But this is an agreed point that God creates not everything. He is the *Sṛṣṭi-kartā-Sarvajña* as well but with these limitations. He cannot do anything he wishes. He cannot create souls which are eternal or *nitya*, neither can he create other accepted eternal *padārtha-s* like, say, *paramāṇu* or *Kāla* etc. *Nitya padārtha-s* by definition are uncreated so not created by God either.

In trying to rediscover the continuation of thought about *Sṛṣṭi* from the pre-theoretical insight to the sophisticated theoretical enterprise of human being we are

led to find something very interesting. How much difference there may be amidst various cultures, one sense of dependence, as I would call it, is seen to be present in all as very basic a notion. So we may guess that this is one of the intuition which was the common basis of different cultures. From this another auxiliary proposition follows; and that is, we are not totally free. In other words, we are sort of guided by many other factors which are beyond human control.

One of our objectives, of trying to find out a common edifice which is the pre-theoretical disposition present in different cultures we may say that the sense of dependence on someone superior to us, and a sense of being not totally free are such notion.

Next we shall proceed to find out what is that peculiarity which marks the difference of Indian culture from others in particular. The basic insight determining our notion of *Sṛṣṭi* is very important and interesting. We do not deviate from our common experience. As in the case of the production of, say, a jar, the jar-makers' purpose is very important so also in case of *Sṛṣṭi*. This purpose is in the conscious agent. *Sṛṣṭi* is thus teleological. It is neither an accident (*ākasmika*) nor it is the nature or *svabhāva* of *Sṛṣṭi* to occur at the time it has occurred. It cannot come to be merely by God's wish either.

Sṛṣṭikārya is the *ādhāra* where there are humans, sub-humans and other innumerable objects. The given fact of experience is that individuals in this world are seen to enjoy and suffer throughout their lifetime. There are some who suffer more and some who enjoy more where the things of the world remains the same. The query as to why this difference of *bhoga*, i.e. experience of pleasure and pain are seen in human beings? This poses a very intriguing problem to even a man on the street. If every *parivartana* or difference is necessarily caused by something else then what causes the difference of *bhoga* amongst people. We could think about some empirical factor but we do not find that they can explain all cases; or we may say it is God's wish that things should happen that way, some men would suffer more or would enjoy more than others. But even to a common man this does not answer the original question. For again the same problem would come up. Why does God the Almighty make one suffer and not the other? We have already discarded the will-theory about God. Thus ordinary man tries to get the answer in a different manner. The proper way of viewing the event is to say that without God there could be no *Sṛṣṭi*, this is alright but God is not the direct cause of man's suffering or enjoyment. It is man himself. He is cause of his *bhoga*, i.e. experience of pleasure or pain. We suffers or enjoys according to what we had done earlier. By the term earlier we would not consider this present birth alone, but many many previous births which actually in many respect determines our present birth or *janma*. 'It is our own fate' as goes the saying, 'that determines our *bhoga*'. If you perform good actions you will enjoy its fruits if you perform bad action you would have to suffer accordingly. No one can release you from this wheel of *Karma*. Even God cannot do so if he wishes to. So, as you sow so you reap.

This world, and for that matter the individuals are there for some purpose, this is where we enjoy or suffer and we enjoy or suffer according as our *Karma* in this

birth and other births, which entails that by the term 'we' not the destructible body but the soul is meant. The soul is the scorehouse of what we do and all we have done before. The body is the medium which helps the soul to have *bhoga*. No one can escape this. We are ourselves responsible for what we do and accordingly to suffer or enjoy in this world. Thus the *jagat* where apart from individual souls numerous other objects are there - they are there as created or *srsta* for the purpose of individual's experience. Everything in this world is for the individual subjects.

This idea may be considered as the pre-theoretical disposition about *Sṛṣṭi* amongst the Indians, and which may have shaped Indian culture. Individuals are themselves responsible for their *bhoga* and probably another idea was also latent. Performing right action leads to the well-being of man. The concept of *Dharma*, to my mind, was also there. I could go on further and say the concept of *Mokṣa* to be a fundamental disposition.

But did all Indian theories about creation which later developed had their basis in the above mentioned intuition? Where then do we place the *Lokāyatika-s*? If their theory be an Indian theory of *Sṛṣṭi* (which it is) did it not in any way have influence on Indian culture? If yes, then where did they begin? Not at least from the basic insight about which we have talked just now. So now do we accommodate the Cārvāka-s? There may be two view points - (i) one may say the Cārvāka notion of *Sṛṣṭi* actually did not have any role in shaping Indian culture , or (ii) it is not the case that the basic pre-theoretical disposition has to be always supported later on by theories. That is the given fact, to begin with we have it but one may as well develop a theory by rejecting the idea altogether. Whether to accept such a theory is our next problem. But this does not debar an idea from bring considered as basic. So in this case whatever views the Cārvāka-s may maintain about the notion of creation they have to begin by denying the commonly accepted fact. Moreover, they at least consider *Sṛṣṭi* to be an effect.

In conclusion I would point out that in pursuit of finding out the pre-theoretical disposition regarding the notion of *Sṛṣṭi* we have only seen how difficult it is to identify once and for all what it is. The question is till open and may be dealt with in other ways.

V

पुराणेषु सृष्टिप्रक्रिया

दामोदराश्रमस्य दण्डिस्वामी

चराचरमिदं विश्वं व्यक्ताव्यक्तात्मकञ्च यत् ।
व्याप्तं येन यन्मयं च विष्णुं तं प्रणमाम्यहम् ॥

इह खलु चतुर्विधपुरुषार्थप्राप्त्युपायप्रदर्शकाणां शास्त्राणां मूलभूताः श्रुतयः स्वतः प्रामाण्यपदवीं भजन्ते । तासामेव श्रुतीनामर्थोपबृंहकाणां पुराणन्यायमीमांसाधर्मशास्त्राणां स्वस्वप्रतिपाद्योपपादने श्रुतिसापेक्षतया वैदिकमार्गावलम्बिषु समादरः क्रियते । वेदार्थविरुद्धमतप्रदर्शकानामागमानामपकृष्टतया ग्रहणं भारतीयैः क्रियते । अत्र च निबन्धे पुराणशास्त्रेषु सृष्टिप्रक्रियां संक्षेपतः प्रदर्श्य तस्या दार्शनिकतात्पर्यं प्रतिपादयितुमिष्यतेऽस्माभिः। सर्गप्रतिसर्गमन्वन्तरवंशवंशानुचरितेति पञ्चलक्षणानां पुराणानां प्रशंसा कृता महाभारते । उक्तं च तत्र 'इतिहासपुराणाभ्यां वेदं समुपबृंहयेत् । विभेत्यल्पश्रुताद्वेदो मामयं प्रहरिष्यतीति' महाभारतस्य आदिपर्वणः प्रथमाध्यायस्य सप्तषष्ट्यधिकशततमाष्टषष्ट्याधिकशततमौ श्लोकौ । इतिहासपुराणाभ्यां वेदान् समुपबृंहयेत्- इतिहासपुराणार्थज्ञानैर्वेदार्थज्ञानं परिपोषयेदिति तदर्थः। यतो वेदाः स्वल्पज्ञाज्जनाद्बिभ्यति । अयमस्मान् प्रहरिष्यति अस्मान् कदर्थीकरिष्यतीति भावः । तेषु पुराणेष्वष्टादशमहापुराणानि भगवद्भिः सर्वज्ञैः वेदव्यासैः रचितानि उक्तञ्च महिम्नः स्तोत्रटीकायां मधुसूदनसरस्वतीपादैः - सर्गप्रतिसंर्गवंशमन्वन्तरवंशानुचरितप्रतिपादकानि भगवता बादरायणेन कृतानि पुराणानि । तानि च ब्राह्मं पाद्मं वैष्णवं शैवं भागवतं नारदीयं मार्कण्डेयमाग्नेयं भविष्यं ब्रह्मवैवर्तं लैङ्गं वाराहं स्कान्दं वामनं कौर्मं मात्सं गारुडं ब्रह्माण्डं चेत्यष्टादश ।एतेषामष्टादशमहापुराणानामाद्यक्षरनामभिः क्रमेण वर्णनं कृतं देवीभागवते । यथा-

मद्वयं भद्वयं चैव ब्रत्रयं वचतुष्टयम् ।
अनापलिङ्गकस्कानि पुराणानि पृथक्पृथक्॥ [देवीभागवतम्,1.3.2]

एवमुपपुराणान्यप्यनेकप्रकाराणि द्रष्टव्यानीति मधुसूदनसरस्वतीपादैः तदीयशिवमहिम्नः स्तोत्रटीकायाम् उक्तम् । देवीभागवतेऽपि चोक्तम् -

तथैवोपपुराणानि शृण्वन्तु ऋषिसत्तमाः ।
सनत्कुमारं प्रथमं नारसिंहं ततः परम् ।
नारदीयं शिवं चैव दौर्वाससमनुत्तमम् ।
कापिलं मानवं चैव तथा चौशनसं स्मृतम् ॥
वारुणं कालिकाख्यं च साम्बं नन्दिकृतं शुभम् ।

सौरं पाराशरं प्रोक्तमादित्यं चातिविस्तरम् ।
माहेश्वरं भागवतं वाशिष्ठं च सविस्तारम् ।
एतान्युपपुराणानि कथितानि महात्मभिः ॥ [देवीभागवतम्, 1.3.13-16]

उपपुराणानां पुराणान्तर्भूततया शिष्टैर्ग्रहणात् प्रामाण्यं चाविसंवादितम् । यद्यपि लोकायतिकदर्शनेतराणि सर्वाण्येव दर्शनानि मोक्षोपायप्रदर्शनपराणि, महर्षिगौतमादयः सर्वे हि प्राणिनां मुक्त्यर्थं स्वस्वशास्त्रेषु उपायान् प्रदर्शितवन्त इति दर्शनशास्त्राणि न धर्मार्थकामात्मकपुरुषार्थसाधनज्ञानोपायप्रतिपादकानि । पुराणानि तु धर्मार्थकाममोक्षोपायप्रदर्शकानि तथापि पुराणानां मोक्षोपायप्रदर्शकत्वसाम्येन दर्शनशास्त्रतुल्यत्वमवश्यमेव अस्ति । किञ्च चतुर्दशविद्यास्थानेषु पुराणानां ग्रहणं सर्वत्रास्त्येव । दर्शनशास्त्राणि यथा वेदप्रतिपाद्यार्थव्याख्यानेन वेदोपबृंहणकारीणि तथा पुराणान्यपि वेदार्थव्याख्यानेन वेदार्थपरिपोषणकारीणीति सृष्टौ दार्शनिकतात्पर्यसमालोचनावसरे कथं पुराणोपदर्शितसृष्टौ दार्शनिकतात्पर्यमिति आक्षेपो निरस्तप्रायः । पुराणानां मोक्षोपायप्रदर्शकत्वं विष्णुपुराणटीकायां श्रीधरस्वामिपादैः प्रतिपादितम् । यथा - 'जगज्जीवात्मपरमात्मनामैकात्म्यप्रतिपादनाभ्यासवशादत्रैव पुराणे मुमुक्षूणां प्रवृत्तिरुचितमित्येतद् व्याख्यायते । तत्र च सर्गप्रतिसर्गवंशमन्वन्तरवंशानुचरितानां तदपवादेन मुक्तेश्च प्रतिपादनम् । सदाचारभूगोलभरतोपाख्यानादिनिरूपणस्य साक्षात् परम्परया वा मुक्तावेवोपयोगो द्रष्टव्यः ।' [विष्णुपुराणं, टीका,1.1.1] पुराणानां वेदार्थपोषकतया शिष्टजनगृहीततया च योगिजनोपादेयत्वं ब्रह्मानन्देन ज्योत्स्नाटीकायामुक्तं - 'भोजनानन्तरं कुर्यान्मोक्षशास्त्रावलोकनम् । पुराणश्रवणं वापि नामसंकीर्तनं विभोः ॥' [हठयोगप्रदीपिका, टीका, 2.48] चतुर्दशानां विद्यास्थानानां नामसंकीर्तनं याज्ञवल्क्यसंहितायामुक्तं, तथाहि-

पुराणन्यायमीमांसाधर्मशास्त्राङ्गमिश्रिताः ।
वेदाः स्थानानि विद्यानां धर्मस्य च चतुर्दश ॥ [याज्ञवल्क्यसंहिता,1.3]

पुराणानि, न्यायः, न्यायशब्देन अक्षपादीयन्यायदर्शनं काणादवैशेषिकदर्शनं च परिगृह्यते । मीमांसापदेन पूर्वमीमांसोत्तरमीमांसे गृह्येते । धर्मशास्त्रपदेन मनुयाज्ञवल्क्यविष्णुयमाङ्गिरोऽत्रिवसिष्ठदक्षसंवर्त-शातातपपराशरगौतमशङ्खलिखितहारीतापस्तम्बोशनोव्यासकात्यायनबृहस्पतिदेवलनारदपैठिनसिकवि-प्रभृतिकृतानिवर्णाश्रमधर्मविशेषप्रतिपादकानि शास्त्राणि गृह्यन्ते । रामायणमहाभारते इतिहासत्वेन प्रसिद्धे अपि धर्मशास्त्रान्तर्भूते । अङ्गपदेन वेदाङ्गानि शिक्षाकल्पव्याकरणनिरुक्तछन्दोज्योतिःसंज्ञकानि गृह्यन्ते । वेदाश्चत्वारः प्रसिद्धाः । एतानि चतुर्दशविद्यास्थानानि । विद्या स्थीयते एभिरेषु वा इति पुरुषार्थसाधनज्ञानोपायः उच्यन्ते । केचित्तु विद्यास्थानशब्दस्य विद्यार्थत्वं कथयन्ति ।तत्तु न युज्यते स्थानपदवैयर्थ्यात् । अत्र विद्याशब्देन पुरुषार्थसाधनज्ञानमुच्यते, भावक्यपूप्रत्ययान्ततया विद्याशब्दस्य ग्रहणम् । तादृश्याः विद्यायाः पुरुषार्थसाधनज्ञानरूपायाः करणमाश्रयो वा स्थानशब्देनोच्यते तथा च पुरुषार्थसाधनज्ञानोपायप्रदर्शकानि शास्त्राणि चतुर्दशविद्यास्थानानि कथ्यन्ते । न्यायमञ्जरीकारैरप्युक्तम् - 'विद्यास्थानत्वं नाम चतुर्दशानां शास्त्राणां पुरुषार्थसाधनज्ञानोपायत्वमेवोच्यते, वेदनं विद्या तच्च न घटपटादिवेदनमपि तु पुरुषार्थसाधनवेदनं, विद्यायाः स्थानमाश्रयोपाय इत्यर्थः । तच्च पुरुषार्थसाधनज्ञानोपायत्वं कस्यचित् साक्षात्कारेण कस्यचिदुपायद्वारेणेति तानीमानि चतुर्दशविद्या-स्थानानीत्याचक्षते ' इति । [न्यायमञ्जरी, प्रमाण प्रकरणम्]

ततश्च न्यायवैशेषिकमीमांसादिशास्त्राणां यथा परमपुरुषार्थमोक्षसाधनज्ञानोपायप्रदर्शकत्वमस्ति तथा पुराणशास्त्राणामपि मोक्षसाधनज्ञानोपायग्राहकत्वं विद्यत एवेति पुराणोपदर्शितसृष्टिप्रक्रिया तद्दार्शनिकतात्पर्यप्रतिपादनं न अकाण्डाभिधानम्।

अथेदानीं पुराणेषु सृष्टिप्रक्रियोच्यते। एकैकस्य महाकल्पस्य अवसाने महाप्रलयो भवति। महाकल्पो नाम ब्रह्मण आयुः परिमितकालः, चतुर्युगसहस्रन्तु ब्रह्मणो दिनमुच्यते, रात्रिरपि ब्रह्मणस्तथैव चतुर्युगसहस्र परिमिता। उक्तं च श्रीभगवता -

सहस्रयुगपर्यन्तमहर्यद्ब्रह्मणो विदुः।
रात्रिं युगसहस्रान्तां तेऽहोरात्रविदो जनाः॥ [श्रीमद्भगवद्गीता, 8.17]

अत्र गीताशास्त्रे यद्युगपदं तद्दिव्ययुगरूपचतुर्युगार्थकं ग्राह्यं विष्णुपुराणादिसंवादात्। तथा च विष्णुपुराणम् -

कृतं त्रेता द्वापरञ्च कलिश्चैव चतुर्युगम्।
प्रोच्यते तत्सहस्रं च ब्रह्मणो दिवसं मुने॥ [विष्णुपुराणम्,3.15]

तस्मादष्टयुगसहस्रपरिमितः कालो ब्रह्मण एकाहोरात्रम्। एतत्परिमाणतः शतं वर्षाणि ब्रह्मण आयुः। आयुषोऽन्ते ब्रह्मा मुच्यते। तदा कार्यजातात्मकः सर्वः प्रपञ्चः परब्रह्मणः प्रकृतौ लीयते। लयस्यापि कालो महाकल्पीयसर्गकालपरिमितः। अयं च लयकालो महाप्रलय इत्युच्यते पुराणादिषु। यद्यपि मीमांसकैर्नव्यनैयायिकैश्च सर्वस्य कार्यस्य प्रलयात्मको महाप्रलयः नाङ्गीक्रियते, तथापि श्रुतिस्मृतीतिहासपुराणादिषु महाप्रलयाभिधानाच्छिष्टैश्च परिगृहीतत्वान्महाप्रलयः प्रामाणिकः। उक्तञ्च न्यायकुसुमाञ्जलौ उदयनाचार्यैः - 'यथा हि वातपित्तश्लेष्मणां चय-प्रकोप - प्रशमक्रमानियमेऽपि एकदा सन्निपातः स्यात्तदादेहसंहारस्तथा कालानलपवनमहार्णवानां सन्निपाते ब्रह्माण्डदेहप्रलयावस्थायां युगपदेव भोगरहिताश्चेतनाः स्युरिति को विरोधः ? कुपितकपिकपोलान्तर्गतोदुम्बरमशकसमूहवत् दावदहन-दन्दह्यमानदारूदरविधूर्णमानघुणसंघातवत् प्रलयपवनोल्लसनीयौर्वानलनिपातिपोतसांयात्रिक-सार्थवद्वेति।'[न्यायकुसुमाञ्जलिः, 2.2] ब्रह्मण एकदिवसपरिमितः कालः कल्प इति कल्पमहाकल्पयोर्भेदः महाप्रलये सत्यज्ञानानन्दात्मक परं ब्रह्म अस्त्येव। तस्य नित्यत्वात् शुद्धत्वाच्च। परब्रह्मात्मको विष्णुरीश्वरः स्वमायायां सर्वं जगत् परिलाप्य सुषुप्तवत्तिष्ठति महाप्रलयकालस्यावसाने प्राणिकर्मभिर्नुद्यमानं परं ब्रह्म किञ्चिदुन्मीषितं भवति। तादृशोन्मीषणावस्था परब्रह्मणो मायोपधानावस्था। तदा मायोपहित ईश्वरो विष्णुर्नारायणाख्य ईक्षणमकुरुत 'बहु स्यां प्रजायेय . . . सोऽकामयत' [तैत्तिरीयोपनिषत्, 2.6.1], 'स ईक्षत लोकान्नु सृजा' [ऐतरेयोपनिषत्, 1.1] इति। ईश्वरस्य संकल्पश्च मायावृत्त्या एवेति न तस्य परिणामित्वापत्तिः। एवमीक्षणं कृत्वा स नारायणो नारायणी अभवत्। नेयं नारायणी नारायणतो भिन्ना अपितु बीजद्विदलवत् नारायणीनारायणौ एक एव। अतएव नेयं नारायणी जडा प्रकृतिरपि तु परमा विद्यारूपा प्रकृतिर्नारायणतोऽभिन्ना, नारायणेन सह नित्यं मिलिता। एतावेव कस्मिंश्चित्पुराणे शिवपार्वतीलक्षणौ, कस्मिंश्चिद्वा लक्ष्मीनारायणात्मकौ, कस्मिंश्चिद्वा ब्रह्मसावित्रीरूपौ कथितौ। नारायण्याश्चेतनात्मक-परमप्रकृतित्वे भगवद्भाष्यकारवचनं प्रमाणमस्ति। यथा - 'इन्द्रस्य यक्षे भक्तिं बुद्धा विद्या उमारूपिणी प्रादुरभूत् स्त्रीरूपा।' [केनोपनिषत्, भाष्यम्, 3.12] 'अथवोमैव हिमवतो दुहिता हैमवती नित्यमेव

सर्वज्ञेनेश्वरेण सह वर्तते ' [केनोपनिषत्,3.12] अनेन भाष्यकारवचनेन उमाया वा नारायण्या वा ब्रह्माण्या वा विद्यारूपत्वं चिदात्मकत्वं निश्चीयते। इयमेव परमा प्रकृतिश्चण्डिका महामाया देवीमाहात्म्ये कीर्तिता।

न च सत्यज्ञानानन्दात्मकपरब्रह्मणो मायोपहितरूपत्वे नारायणनारायण्योः कथम् ईश्वरत्वम् कथं वा चिदात्मकत्वमिति वाच्यम् । स्वाश्रितां मायां वशीकृत्य हि ईश्वरो लोकानुग्रहार्थमाविर्भवति इति गीतादिशास्त्रप्रामाण्यात् मायाधीनतया जीववत् न ईश्वरस्याविर्भावोऽपि तु मायां वशीकृत्य तस्याविर्भाव इति नित्यम् अलुप्तज्ञानादिशक्तिकतया ईश्वरत्वं चिदात्मकत्वञ्च सिध्यति। यत्र जीवस्य चिदात्मकत्वं तत्र ईश्वरस्य चिदात्मकत्वे काप्यनुपपत्तिरिति। एवं स नारायणो नारायणीतोऽभिन्नः प्राणिकर्मफलभोगार्थमेव सत्त्वरजस्तमोगुणात्मिकां जडामपरां प्रकृतिं सांख्यसम्मतमूलकारणात्मिकां प्रधानाख्यां सर्गादौ क्षोभयामास क्षोभिता सा जडा प्रकृतिः साम्यावस्थां विहाय वैषम्यावस्थोपेता महत्तत्त्वं जनयामास प्रथमविकारभूतम्। नात्र सांख्यसम्मतसृष्टिश्चोद्या। सांख्यमते हि पुरुषसम्बन्धमात्रेण मूलप्रकृतिः स्वतन्त्रतया महदादिकं सृजति पुराणमते तु चैतन्यात्मकेश्वराधिष्ठितैव जडा प्रकृतिः महदादिकं सृजति। अथवा ईश्वर एव मूलप्रकृतिद्वारा सर्वं सृजति इति पौराणिकं मतम् । मूलप्रकृतेस्त्रिगुणात्मकतया तत्कार्यस्य महत्तत्त्वस्य अपि कारणगुणानुसारेण सत्त्वरजस्तमोरूपत्रिगुणात्मकत्वं बोद्धव्यम्। इदं महत्तत्त्वं द्विविधं समष्ट्यात्मकं व्यष्ट्यात्मकं च। समष्ट्यात्मकं महत्तत्त्वं हि हिरण्यगर्भस्योपाधिः। अतएव नित्येश्वरस्य नारायणस्य प्रथमा सृष्टिमर्हत्तत्त्वं समष्ट्यात्मकं हिरण्यगर्भरूपञ्च । उपाधेर्महत्तत्त्वस्य प्रथमं सृज्यमानत्वेन तदुपहितस्य हिरण्यगर्भस्य प्राथम्यमुपचर्यते। यद्यपि हिरण्यगर्भस्य चिदात्मकत्वेन उत्पत्त्यभावस्तथापि तदुपाधेर्महतः सृज्यमानतया उपाध्यनुसारितया चोपहितस्य हिरण्यगर्भस्य जायमानत्वमुच्यते। अतएव 'हिरण्यगर्भं जनयामास पूर्वम्' [श्वेताश्वरोपनिषत्,3.4] 'हिण्यगर्भं पश्यत जायमानम्'[श्वेताश्वरोपनिषत्,4.12] ' हिरण्यगर्भः समवर्तताग्रे भूतस्यजातः पतिरेक आसीत्'[ऋक्संहिता, 10. 121.1] इत्यादिश्रुतिषु हिरण्यगर्भस्य जायमानत्वेन वर्णनं नासंगतम्।

ननु श्रुतिषु हिरण्यगर्भस्य भूतपतित्वेनेश्वरत्वं वर्णितं तत् कथमत्र तस्य जनिरुच्यते इति चेत्। सत्यम् स परमात्मा विष्णुः स्वयमेव हिरण्यगर्भरूपेण बूभव इति हिरण्यगर्भः स्वयम्भूरुच्यते। इत्यत स ईश्वर एव हिरण्यगर्भ इति कृत्वा हिरण्यगर्भस्येश्वरत्वे नानुपपत्तिः काचित्। 'पुरुष एवेदं सर्वम्' [तैत्तिरीयारण्यकम्, 3.12.2], ' पुरुष एवेदं विश्वम्' [मुण्डकोपनिषत्, 2.1.10] इत्यादिश्रुतेः। अत्र पुरूषशब्देन परमात्मा विष्णुरूच्यते। यच्च विष्णुपुराणे 'परमात्मा प्रकृतिं पुरुषं च क्षोभयामास' इत्युक्तं, तत्र परमात्मशब्देन निरुपाधिकं ब्रह्म उच्यते। पुरुषशब्देन मायोपहितं नारायणरूपमुच्यते। तथाहि निरुपाधिरूपो विष्णुः परमात्मा पुरुषं नारायणाख्यं क्षोभयामास मायोपहितं चकार इत्यर्थः। ननु शुद्धब्रह्मणो निरुपाधेः कथं क्षोभणकर्तृत्वं येन निरुपाधिः विष्णुः नारायणं मायोपहितं करोति इति त्वयोच्यते। सत्यम्। पुराणे परब्रह्मणोऽचिन्त्यैश्वर्यं स्वीक्रियते, तदैश्वर्यं न मायाकृतम्। अपि तु परब्रह्मणः स्वरूपशक्तिः। तथा चोक्तं श्रीधरस्वामिपादैः - 'अचिन्त्यैश्वर्येण सर्वान् कर्तृकारणादीन् जेतुमतिशयितुं शीलं यस्य' [विष्णुपुराणं, टीका, 2.1] इति तथा - ' तदुक्तं भागवते वदन्ति तत् तत्त्वविदस्तत्त्वं यज्ज्ञानमद्वयम्। ब्रह्मेति परमात्मेति भगवानिति शब्द्यते ' [विष्णुपुराणं, टीका, 2.13]इति। अथवा शुद्धब्रह्मणः किंचिदुन्मेषावस्था एवात्र पुरुषक्षोभणं ग्राह्यम्। शुद्धं ब्रह्म मायोपहितमभूत् सृष्टिप्रथमकाले इत्यर्थः। तेन पुरुषस्य नारायणरूपस्य मायोपहितत्वं क्षोभ इत्येवार्थः। अतएव विष्णुपुराणे उक्तम् -

ततस्तत् परमं ब्रह्म परमात्मा जगन्मयः ।
सर्वगः सर्वभूतेशः सर्वात्मा परमेश्वरः ॥
प्रधानं पुरुषञ्चापि प्रविश्यात्मेच्छया हरिः ।
क्षोभयामास सम्प्राप्ते सर्गकाले व्ययाव्ययौ । [विष्णुपुराणम्, 2.27,28]

स्वामिपादैरप्युक्तम् - 'परतो निरुपाधेः विष्णोः स्वरूपात् ते प्रागुक्ते प्रधानं पुरुषश्चेति द्वे रूपे अन्ये विलक्षणे मायाकृते ।' [विष्णुपुराणं, टीका, 2.24]

यच्च जडात्मिकायाः प्रकृतेः क्षोभणं परमात्मना तन्नारायणद्वारेति पुरुषक्षोभणापेक्षया विलक्षणम् । प्रकृतेः क्षोभश्च साम्यावस्थाप्रच्युतिः पुरुषस्य क्षोभश्च मायोपधानमिति । अयं पुरुषो नारायणाख्यो नारायणीतोऽभिन्न इत्येतद्विषये शिवपुराणवाक्यं प्रमाणं, तथा हि तत्र सृष्टिप्रक्रमवर्णनप्रसङ्गेनोक्तम् -

यतो वै प्रकृतिर्देवी ततो वै पुरुषस्तदा ।
उभौ च मिलितौ तत्र विचारे तत्परौ मुने ॥
आवाभ्यां किं प्रकर्तव्यं ध्यायतः स्म परस्परम् ।
एतस्मिन्नन्तरे वाणी समुत्पन्ना गुणा शुभा ॥
तदा श्रान्तश्च पुरुषस्तया सह जले स्वयम् ।
सुष्वाप परमप्रीतो बहुकालं तया सह ॥
नारायणेति वै नाम जातं तस्य महात्मनः ।
नारायणीति वै नाम प्रकृतेः सम्मतं मुने ॥
नान्यत् किञ्चित्तदा ह्यासीत् प्रकृतिं पुरुषं विना ।
एतस्मिन्नन्तरे ब्रह्मंस्तत्त्वान्यासन् महात्मनः ॥ [शिवपुराणम्, 2.22,23,28-30]

अतः प्रकृतिशब्देन चेतनात्मकनारायणी ग्राह्या । यतः 'तत्त्वान्यासन् महात्मनः । प्रकृतेश्च महानासीत् ' इत्यादिना पूर्वविलक्षणायाः प्रकृतेरभिधानं वर्णितम् । अन्यथा महात्मनः परमात्मनः तत्त्वानि आसन् उदपद्यन्त इत्यर्थकं वचनं विहन्यते ।

ततश्च एवं जातम् - परब्रह्म महाप्रलयकाले अव्यक्तभावेन अवर्तत । तदा न किञ्चित् व्यक्तमासीत् । तच्च परं ब्रह्म तदा स्वात्मनः वियुक्ताभ्यां पुरुषकालाभ्याम् अस्पृष्टतया निरवर्तत । ततो जीवकर्मणोर्घं कथञ्चिदीषदुन्मिषितं मायावृत्त्या बहुभवनादिसंकल्पं कृतवत् । ततो मायया उपहितं नारायण-नारायणीभावेन सृष्ट्युन्मुखमभवत् । ततो नारायणनारायणीद्वारा जडां मूलकारणात्मिकां प्रकृतिं क्षोभयित्वा महत्तत्त्वं समष्ट्यात्मकं प्रथमविकारमुदपादयत् । महत्तत्त्वोपहितं च चैतन्यं हिरण्यगर्भाख्यं समुत्पद्य त्रिगुणात्मकमहंकारं जनयामास । महत्तत्त्वोपहितचैतन्यं यद्धिरण्यगर्भ इत्याख्यायते स वै त्रिमूर्त्यात्मकः, सत्त्वगुणेन विष्णुः पालकः, रजोगुणेन ब्रह्मा प्रजासर्जकः, तमोगुणेन हरः संहारकः । अतएव हिरण्यगर्भाख्यः अपरपुरुषजगत्सृष्टिस्थितिसंहारकारकतया पुराणेषु ईश्वर उच्यते । यद्यपि परब्रह्मापेक्षया हिरण्यगर्भस्य अनीश्वरत्वं नारायणाख्यप्रथमपुरुषापेक्षयाप्यनीश्वरत्वं तथापि विराडादिविकारापेक्षया व्यष्टिजीवापेक्षया च स ईश्वर एव । किञ्च स परमात्मा नारायणः स्वयं हिरण्यगर्भरूपेण जात इत्यत हिरण्यगर्भस्यापीश्वरत्वमव्याहतम् । अतएव उदयनाचार्यैर्यदुक्तं न्यायकुसुमाञ्जलौ पितामह इति

पौराणिकास्तद्युज्यत एव। प्रजानां पिता मन्वादयो वा कश्यपादयो वा। तत् पिता चतुर्मुखो ब्रह्मा पितामह एव। यद्यपि चतुर्मुखस्य ब्रह्मणः समष्ट्यात्मकस्थूलोपाधिकतया समष्ट्यात्मकसूक्ष्मोपाधिकहिरण्यगर्भाद्भेदः तथापि हिरण्यगर्भ एव पृथिव्यादिस्थूलजगत्प्रपञ्चं स्रष्टुकामः स्थूलसंघातात्मकमण्डमसृजत्, तदण्डं निर्भिद्य विराडजायत इति विराडरूपेण जात एव हिरण्यगर्भः पौराणिकैरीश्वर उच्यते इति न कापि हानिः। तेन तदयुक्तमेव यद्विष्णुपुराणे उक्तम्-

पुरुषाधिष्ठितत्वाच्च प्रधानानुग्रहेण च
महदाद्या विशेषाण्डा ह्यण्डमुत्पादयन्ति ते।

तत्क्रमेण विवृद्धन्तु जलबुद्बुद्वत्सम्।
भूतेभ्योऽण्डं महाबुद्धे बृहत् तदुदकेशयम्।

प्राकृतं ब्रह्मरूपस्य विष्णोः संस्थानमुत्तमम्।
तत्राव्यक्तस्वरूपोऽसौ व्यक्तरूपी जगत्पतिः।

विष्णुब्रह्मस्वरूपेण स्वयमेव व्यवस्थितः॥ [विष्णुपुराणम्,1.2.52-54]

अथ प्रकृतमुच्यते - महत्तत्त्वात् अहंकारः समजायत। स त्रिविधः। सात्त्विकः राजसस्तामसश्च। अहंकारात् सात्त्विकात् पञ्च ज्ञानेन्द्रियाणि मनश्च अजायन्त। राजसादहंकारात् पञ्च कर्मेन्द्रियाणि प्राणाश्च अजायन्त। तामसादहंकारात् क्रमेण शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धतन्मात्राणि सूक्ष्मभूतान्यजायन्त। तेभ्यः सूक्ष्मभूतेभ्यः क्रमेण आकाशवायुतेजोजलपृथिव्यात्मकानि स्थूलभूतानि समजायन्त। आकाशे शब्दः वायौ शब्दस्पर्शौ, तेजसि शब्दस्पर्शरूपाणि, जले शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसाः, पृथिव्यां शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धाः उत्पद्यन्ते। महत्तत्त्वमारभ्य स्थूलपर्यन्तेषु संघातेषु ह्यण्डं विराट्प्रजापतेः बीजमुत्पद्यते। तेन समष्टिस्थूलाभिमानी हि विराट् इति। यद्यपि अयं सृष्टिक्रमः मूलप्रकृतितः सांख्यसृष्टिक्रमवत् प्रतिभाति तथापि सांख्यीयसृष्टिप्रक्रियायाः पौराणिकसृष्टिप्रक्रिया भिन्नेति पूर्वमुक्तम्। सांख्ये मूलप्रकृतिः पुरुषसंयोगमात्रेण स्वतन्त्रतया सर्वं सृजति। पुराणे तु ईश्वराधिष्ठितैव प्रकृतिः सृजति, न स्वातन्त्र्येण। किञ्च सांख्ये नित्येश्वरानभ्युपगमात् कार्येश्वररूपपुरुषसंयोगाद्वा यत्किंचित् तत्तत्पुरुषसंयोगाद्वा प्रकृतिस्तत्त्वान्तरं सृजति। पुराणे तु ईश्वररुपपुरुषसंयोगात् ईश्वराधिष्ठितादेव अचेतनप्रकृतिरूपात् सृष्टिर्भवति इति महद्वैषम्यम्। वेदान्ते तु सृष्टिक्रमोऽन्यथा वर्णितः, वेदान्तदर्शने वियदाद्यधिकरणेषु [वेदान्तदर्शनं, सं. सू.,2.3.1-14] मायोपहितात् ईश्वरात् प्रथमतः क्रमेण शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धतन्मात्रात्मकानि सूक्ष्मभूतान्युत्पद्यन्ते। तेभ्यः सूक्ष्मभूतेभ्यः दश इन्द्रियाणिबुद्धिमनसी प्राणाश्च पञ्च उत्पद्यन्ते। एतत्सप्तदशावयवात्मकं सूक्ष्मशरीरं लिङ्गशरीरापरनामधेयमुच्यते। एवं क्रमेण नित्य ईश्वरः सूक्ष्मशरीरोत्पादेन समष्टिसूक्ष्मशरीरोपहितं हिरण्यगर्भं कार्यब्रह्माख्यं समुत्पाद्य तद्द्वारा पञ्चीकरणक्रमेण स्थूलभूतानि भौतिकानि च कार्याणि जनयन्तीति।

नन्वेवं वेदान्तोक्तसृष्टिक्रमविरुद्धसृष्टिक्रमवर्णनेन पुराणानां वेदार्थविरुद्धपदार्थप्रतिपादनाद् अप्रामाण्यमिति चेत्। न। वेदान्तिभिरुच्यते श्रुतिषु या अन्यथा अन्यथा सृष्टिः कीर्तिता तस्याः सृष्टेस्तात्पर्यं न सृष्टौ अस्ति, अपितु सर्वासां श्रुतीनां ब्रह्मात्मैकत्वे तात्पर्यसत्त्वात् सृष्टिप्रतिपादनस्य तात्पर्यं तावत् ब्रह्मात्मैकत्वज्ञानोत्पादने। सृष्टेर्मायामात्रत्वात् नास्माकं सृष्टावादरः। तथाहि -

मृल्लोहविस्फुलिङ्गाद्यैः सृष्टिर्या चोदितान्यथा ।
उपायः सोऽवताराय नास्ति भेदः कथञ्चन ॥ [माण्डूक्यकारिका,3.15]

भाष्यं च 'मृल्लोहविस्फुलिङ्गादिदृष्टान्तोपन्यासैः सृष्टिर्या चोदिता प्रकाशिताऽन्यथा अन्यथा च स सर्वः सृष्टिप्रकारो जीवपरमात्मैकत्वबुद्ध्यवतारायोपायोऽस्माकम् ।' तट्टीका च -'सृष्ट्यादिश्रुतेः स्वार्थे तात्पर्याभावात् तत्कार्यस्य तद्व्यतिरेकेण अभावात्तदेवास्तीत्यद्वैतबुद्ध्यवतारोपायत्वेन सृष्ट्यादिप्रक्रिया कल्पिता' इत्यर्थः ।

एवं भिन्नेषु पुराणेषु सृष्टिप्रकार एकविध एव वर्णितः । तत्र यत्किञ्चिदवान्तरवैलक्षण्यं दृश्यते तत्तु सर्वत्र पुराणेषु सृष्टिप्रकरणस्य एकवाक्यतामापाद्य विरोधः परिहर्तव्यः । यथा वेदान्तदर्शने वियदधिकरणे विचारितं छान्दोग्ये 'तत्तेजोऽसृजत' इति परमात्मनस्तेजसः प्राथम्येन सृष्ट्यभिधानं तैत्तिरीये तु तस्माद्वा एतस्मादात्मन आकाशःसम्भूतः आकाशाद्वायुर्वायोरग्निरित्यादिना आकाशस्य प्रथमतःसृष्टिरभिहितेति, मुण्डके तु 'स प्राणमसृजत' इति प्राणस्य प्राथम्येन सृष्ट्यभिधानमित्येवं तत्तत् श्रुतिषु विरुद्धक्रमेण सृष्ट्यभिधानात् पूर्वपक्षिणा आकाशादेः सृष्टत्वं न युक्तमिति चोदिते भाष्यकारः सिद्धान्तितवान् - 'एकवाक्यत्वात् सर्वश्रुतीनाम्' [ब्रह्मसूत्रं, भाष्यम् 2.3.6] ।' तच्च एकवाक्यत्वं बलवत्या श्रुत्या दुर्बलश्रुतेः कल्यम्; बलवती च तित्तिरिश्रुतिः प्रकृतिपञ्चम्या पौर्वापर्याख्याक्रमस्य श्रुतत्वात् । छान्दोग्यश्रुतिस्तु दुर्बला तेजः प्राथम्यश्रुत्यभावात्, तेजःसर्गमात्रं तु श्रुतं तृतीयत्वेन परिणेयमित्येकवाक्यतेत्यर्थः । ' इति भाष्यरत्नप्रभा । एवं सर्वेषु पुराणेषु विष्णुपुराणस्य श्रैष्ठ्यात्तद्वाक्यस्य बलवत्तरत्वं पुराणान्तरवाक्यस्य दुर्बलत्वमिति बलवता विष्णुपुराणवाक्येन क्वचिद्विरुद्धमिव दृश्यमानं सृष्टं वस्तु विष्णुपुराणवाक्यार्थवस्तुना बाध्यं भवितुमर्हति । तद्बाधनेन सर्वेषां सृष्टिप्रतिपादकपुराणानां सृष्टिप्रकरणे एकवाक्यत्वमापाद्य तत्करणीयम्। विष्णुपुराणस्य प्राबल्यं श्रीधरस्वामिनोक्तं यथा - 'पुराणत्वाविशेषेऽपि उपाख्यानलघुत्वेन जगज्जीवात्मपरमात्मनामैकात्म्यप्रतिपादनाभ्यासवशादत्रैव पुराणे मुमुक्षूणां प्रवृत्तिरुचितेति।' [विष्णुपुराणं, टीका , 1.1.1]

वस्तुनि विकल्पासम्भवात् पुराणान्तरीयविरूद्धसृष्टिक्रमः एकवाक्यतया सर्वपुराणवाक्यानां बाध्य एव भवति । ननु सृष्टिस्तु क्रियैव न वस्तु; क्रियायां विकल्पः सम्भवति कर्तुमकर्तुमन्यथाकर्तुं वा शक्यते । अतस्तत्तत् पुराणेषु सृष्टिक्रमविकल्पाभिधानं न विरुध्यते इति चेत् । मैवम् । सृष्टेः क्रियात्वेऽपि सृष्टिक्रियाव्याप्यकर्मभूतपदार्थानां वस्तुत्वात्, वस्तूनां सृष्टिक्रमे विकल्पो न सम्भवति । क्रमस्य पौर्वापर्यरूपस्य वस्तुनिष्ठत्वात् । यथा कुम्भकारः मृदः पिण्डं पिण्डात् कपालं कपालाद् घटं करोति; एवंक्रमेण हि स उत्पादनक्रियां करोति । तत्र तस्य उत्पादनक्रियायां विकल्पो भवितुमर्हति । कुम्भकारः पिण्डं वा कपालं वा घटं वा उत्पादयितुम् अनुत्पादयितुमन्यथा वा उत्पादयितुमर्हति, न तु तत्क्रियाव्याप्यं कर्मपदार्थं कदाचित् मृदः प्राथम्येन कपालं, कदाचिद्वा घटं, कदाचिद्वा पिण्डमित्येवं विरुद्धक्रमेण उत्पादयितुमीष्टे । क्रमाश्रयाणां पिण्डादीनां वस्तुत्वात् वस्तुषु विकल्पासम्भवात् । एवं परमात्मा कदाचित् जडायाः प्रकृतेः प्राथम्येन महत्तत्त्वं, कदाचिद्वा प्राथम्येनाहंकारं, कदाचिद्वा महाभूतानि इत्यादिपरस्परविरुद्धतया न जगत्स्रष्टुमर्हति । तस्मात् सकलपुराणवाक्यानामेकवाक्यतया पुराणेषु सृष्टिक्रमः एकविध एव ज्ञातव्यः ।

एवं सृष्टिकर्ता परमेश्वरः स्वप्रयोजनाभावेऽपि पूर्वपूर्वसर्गादौ कृतकर्मणां प्राणिनां कर्मफलभोगाय कारुण्यात् भूतादिसर्गं महदादिसर्गं च करोति । तत्र महदादिसर्गेण प्राणिनां लिङ्गशरीरं भूतादिसर्गेण

स्थूलशरीरं तथा शब्दस्पर्शादयस्तद्वन्तश्च भोग्या पदार्थाः उत्पन्ना भवन्ति। तेन च प्राणिनः सूक्ष्मदेहैः सह स्थूलदेहभाजो भवन्ति। तत्र लिङ्गशरीरस्था इन्द्रियमनोऽहङ्कारबुद्धयः प्राणिनां भोगकरणानि। स्थूलदेहो भोगानामधिष्ठानम्। स्थूलदेहावच्छेदेन प्राणिनां भोगो भवतीत्यर्थः। भोगो नाम सुखदुःखसाक्षात्कारः। स च बुद्धिनिष्ठोऽपिबुद्ध्यादीननात्मन आत्मन्यध्यस्य प्राणिभिः आत्मनि मन्यते। एवं प्राणिकर्मफलभोगार्थं सृष्टेरीश्वरकृतत्वेऽपि न भोगार्था सृष्टिः। तत्र सृष्टौ मूढानां तात्पर्यज्ञानेऽपि न दार्शनिकानां प्राणिभोगार्थतया सृष्टौ तात्पर्यम्। यद्यपीश्वरः प्राणिकर्मभोगार्थं जगत् सृजति तथापि ज्ञानं विना कृतकर्मणां फलभोगोऽवश्यम्भावीति प्राणिकर्मसापेक्षतया ईश्वरस्य प्रपञ्चसृष्टावपि न सृष्टौ ईश्वरस्य तात्पर्यं, न वा प्राणिनः कर्मफलानि भुञ्ज्युरिति ईश्वरेच्छा भवति। ईश्वस्य आप्तकामत्वेन कस्या अपि इच्छाया अभावात्। 'आप्तकामस्य का स्पृहा' इति स्मृतेश्च। [माण्डूक्यकारिका, 1.8]

अतएव माण्डूक्यकारिकासु सृष्टेस्तात्पर्यविषये वादिनां नानामतानि अवतार्य निराकृतानि। तथा हि तत्र उक्तं - केचित् सृष्टिचिन्तका ईश्वरस्य विभूतिर्विस्तार एव सृष्टिरिति मन्यन्ते। तेषां मते ईश्वरस्य विभूतिप्रदर्शनं सृष्टेः तात्पर्यम्, अन्ये सृष्टिचिन्तकाः प्रसवं जगत उत्पत्तिमेव सृष्टिं मन्यन्ते, पदार्थस्य उत्पत्तिमेव सृष्टिं कथयन्ति इत्यर्थः। पदार्थानामुत्पत्तिरेव सृष्टिः इति। उत्पत्त्या हि पदार्था आत्मनो लभन्ते अतस्तन्मते पदार्थानामात्मलाभः सृष्टौ तात्पर्यम्। कैश्चित्तु स्वप्नसदृशा मायासदृशा सृष्टिरिति कथ्यते। तेषां मते सृष्टिरेव नास्ति, कुतस्तात्पर्यमिति। केचित्तु ईश्वरस्य सत्यसंकल्पत्वात् इच्छामात्रं सृष्टिरिति वदन्ति। एतन्मते ईश्वरेच्छैव सृष्टेस्तात्पर्यम्। अन्ये ज्योतिर्विदः कालात् भूतानां सृष्टिं वदन्ति केचित्तु जीवानां भोगार्थं सृष्टिरिति कथयन्ति। अपरे तु ईश्वरस्य क्रीडार्थं सृष्टिरिति वदन्ति। केचित्तु देवस्येश्वरस्य स्वभाव एव सृष्टिरिति कथयन्ति। स्वभावो नाम नैसर्गिकी माया। तेन एतन्मते सृष्टिर्मायामयी। अयं पक्षश्च वेदान्तिन. सिद्धान्तसिद्धः। अतोऽनेन सर्वे विकल्पाः सृष्टिविषये निरस्यन्ते। तेन उक्तम् 'आप्तकामस्य का स्पृहे' ति तत्र भगवत्पादैर्भाष्यकारैरप्युक्तम् - 'विभूतिर्विस्तार ईश्वरस्य सृष्टिरिति सृष्टिचिन्तका मन्यन्ते न तु परमार्थचिन्तकानां सृष्टावादर इत्यर्थः। 'इन्द्रो मायाभिः पुरुरूप ईयते' इति श्रुतिरिति। . . . अनयोः पक्षयोर्दूषणं देवस्यैष स्वभावोऽयमिति देवस्य स्वभावपक्षमाश्रित्य। सर्वेषां वा पक्षाणामाप्तकामस्य का स्पृहेति। न हि रज्ज्वादीनामविद्यास्वभावव्यतिरेकेण सर्पाद्याभासत्वे कारणं शक्यं वक्तुमिति।'

किञ्च न हि मुनीनां प्रवरोऽक्षपादो जीवानां भोगतात्पर्येणान्वीक्षिक्यां सृष्टिप्रक्रियां कथितवान्। कणभुग् वा वैशेषिकसूत्राणि रचयामास। पतञ्जलिर्वा योगसूत्राणि, कपिलो वा सांख्यसूत्राणि, बादरायणो वा शारीरकसूत्राणि प्रणीतवान्, तथागतो वा भगवान् विनेयान् बौद्धागममुपदिष्टवान् तस्मात् अविवेकिनो भोगार्थं सृष्टिरिति मन्यन्ते न तु दार्शनिकाः। किं तर्हि दार्शनिकाणां सृष्टौ तात्पर्यम्? श्रूयताम् - भगवती श्रुतिर्वदति - 'यस्मिन् द्यौः पृथिवी चान्तरिक्षमोतं मनः सह प्राणैश्च सर्वैः तमेवैकं जानथ आत्मानमन्या वाचो विमुञ्चथामृतस्यैष सेतुः।' [मुण्डकोपनिषत्, 2.2.5] एष आत्मज्ञानरूपोऽमृतस्य मुक्तेः सेतुरूपाय इति तदर्थः। अत्र वाक्यमदमुपलक्षणमात्मभिन्नस्य सर्वस्य। एष आत्मैव स्रष्टा, स एव सर्वस्याः सृष्टेरुपादानकारणं निमित्तकारणं च स एव। अतस्तद्विज्ञानेन सर्वं विज्ञातं भवति सर्वस्य विकारजातस्य नामरूपात्मकत्वेन मिथ्यात्वात्। तथैव श्रुतिर्वदति चान्या - 'उत तमादेशमप्राक्ष्यः, येनाश्रुतं श्रुतं भवत्यमतं मतमविज्ञातं विज्ञातमिति' [छान्दोग्योपनिषत्, 6.3]। 'आत्मेत्येवोपासीत' [बृहदारण्यकोपनिषत्, 1.4.7] 'आत्मा वाऽरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यः' [बृहदारण्याकोपनिषत्, 2.4.5] 'ब्रह्मैवेदं विश्वमिदं वरिष्ठम्' [मुण्डकोपनिषत्, 2.2.11]' यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते अप्राप्य मनसा सह। आनन्दं ब्रह्मणो विद्वान् न बिभेति कुतश्चनेति'

[तैत्तिरीयोपनिषत्, 2.8] इत्याद्याः श्रुतयोऽपि आत्मानमेव जानीत इति ब्रुवन्ति । सर्वासां श्रुतीनां आत्मैकत्वज्ञाने एवैदम्पर्यम् । अतः श्रुत्युपदर्शितानां सृष्ट्यादीनां कर्मणामुपासनानामपि आत्मैकत्वज्ञाने तात्पर्यम् । तत्र केषाञ्चित् पदार्थानां श्रुत्युपदिष्टानां साक्षादात्मैकत्वज्ञानजनने उपयोगः, केषाञ्चित्तु परंपरयेत्यवान्तरभेदः । मुख्यतात्पर्यन्तु सर्वेषामात्मैकत्वज्ञानद्वारेण मुक्तौ ।

अपिचात्मभिन्नपदार्थे भेददृष्टिमपोह्य आत्मन्येव एकस्मिन् दृष्टिं विदधाति श्रुतिः । 'मनसैवानुद्रष्टव्यं नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन । मृत्योः स मृत्युमाप्नोति य इह नानेव पश्यति ।' [बृ हदारण्यकोपनिषत् ,4.4.18] 'तमेव धीरो विज्ञाय प्रज्ञां कुर्वीत ब्राह्मणः । नानुध्यायाद्बहूञ्छब्दान् वाचो विग्लापनं हि तत् ' [बृहदाराण्यकोपनिषत्, 4.4.21] । 'मनसैवेदमाप्तव्यं नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन । मृत्योः स मृत्युं गच्छति य इह नानेव पश्यति ।' [कठोपनिषत्, 2.1.11] एवमौपनिषदां मते यथा सृष्टेरात्मैकत्वज्ञाने तात्पर्यं तथा पौराणिकाणां मतेऽपि आत्मैकत्वज्ञाने एव सृष्टेस्तात्पर्यम् । श्रीधरस्वामिपादैः बिष्णुपुराणस्य प्रथमांशस्य प्रथमाध्यायस्य टीकायां सृष्टेर्मायात्मकत्वं पुराणोक्तसर्गप्रतिसर्गादीनां आत्मैकत्वज्ञानद्वारा मुक्तावुपयोगित्वं स्पष्टतयोक्तम् । पुराणेषु परब्रह्मणः सकाशात् मायोपाध्यवलम्बनेन विष्णोर्नारायणाख्यस्य प्रधान-पुरुषकालद्वारा महदादिस्थूलभूतान्तसृष्टिकर्तृत्ववर्णनेऽपि विष्णोर्मायैव सर्वं जन्यते, अतो विश्वसृष्टेस्तथा स्रष्टव्यानां मायामयत्वमिति स्वामिपादैरुक्तम् । श्रीमद्भागवतस्य प्रथमस्कन्धप्रथमाध्याय-प्रथमश्लोकस्य टीकायामुक्तं स्वामिपादैः - ' यद्वा तस्यैव परमार्थसत्यत्वप्रतिपादनाय तदितरस्य मिथ्यात्वमुक्तम्, यत्र मृषैवायं त्रिसर्गो न वस्तुतः सन्निति । ' [भागवतं, टीका, 1.1.1] पुराणानां प्रयोजनमपि मोक्ष इति स्वामिपादैरुक्तम् । तथाहि - 'न च भागवतामृतपानं मोक्षेऽपि त्याज्यमि' त्याह - आलयः, लयो मोक्षः अभिविधावाकारः लयमभिव्याप्य, न हीदं स्वर्गादिसुखवन्मुक्तैरुपेक्ष्यते किंतु सेव्यते एव । वक्ष्यति हि 'आत्मारामाश्च मुनयो निर्ग्रन्था अप्युरुक्रमे कुर्वन्त्यहैतुकीं भक्तिमित्थंभूतगुणो हरिः ' इत्यादि । श्रीमद्भगवद्गीताटीकायामप्युक्तं तैः -'भगवद्भक्तियुक्तस्य तत्प्रसादात्मबोधतः । सुखं बन्धविमुक्तिः स्यादिति गीतार्थसंग्रहः ।' तथाहि 'पुरुषः स परः पार्थ भक्त्या लभ्यस्त्वनन्यया ' [गीता 8.22] 'भक्त्या त्वनन्यया शक्य अहमेवंविधोऽर्जुन ' [गीता 11.54] इत्यादौ भगवद्भक्तेर्मोक्षं प्रति साधकतमत्व-श्रवणात्तदेकान्तभक्तिरेव तत्प्रसादोऽथज्ञानावान्तरव्यापारमात्रयुक्ता मोक्षहेतुरिति स्फुटं प्रतीयते । [गीता, टीका, 18.78]

एवं पुराणानामपि सृष्टिकर्तरि परमेश्वरे प्रयुक्ता भक्तिर्ज्ञानद्वारा मोक्षहेतुरिति पुराणोक्तसृष्टेरात्मज्ञानमेव दार्शनिकतात्पर्यम् । सृष्टेः सृष्टपदार्थानां च कर्ता ईश्वरः परमात्मा; अतः सृष्टिचिन्तां स्रष्टव्यपदार्थचिन्तां विहाय मानवाः परमात्मानं जानीत, परमात्मज्ञानमेव अमृतस्य सेतुरिति दार्शनिकतात्पर्यं व्यक्तं भवति, एतेन दर्शनान्तराणामप्यात्मज्ञाने सृष्टेर्दार्शनिकतात्पर्यं व्याख्यातं भवति । तच्चात्मज्ञानं कस्मिंश्चिद्दर्शने आत्मानात्मविवेकद्वारा कस्मिंश्चिद्वा ईश्वरोपासनाद्वारा कस्मिंश्चिद्वा श्रुतिवाक्यार्थविचारद्वारेत्यन्यदेतत् । तदेवं -

यस्माद्विश्वं प्रवृत्तं स्याद् यस्मिंस्थितं च जीवति ।
यस्मिंश्च लीयते सर्वं तस्मा एतत् समर्पितम् ॥ इति ।

हरिः ॐ तत्सत् ॥

VI

THE FORMATIVE STAGES OF THE EARLY INDIAN CONCEPTS OF CREATION

N.N. Bhattacharyya

The existence of living beings, especially those of the human kind, presents a creation-problem which even the ancients endeavoured to solve in many ways. The problem of the origin of things naturally fascinated the mind of the Indian thinkers in different ages, as a result of which widely differing ideas centring round the cosmogonical problems came into existence. Like all other civilizations of the ancient world, in India also we find a pattern of progress from crude unconnected notions to more refined ideas and broader views demonstrating the process of a steady but multifarious advance from a concrete physical principle to the abstract, ritualistic, theistic, atheistic and psychological first principles regarded by different thinkers at different times as the cause of the world.

It seemed perfectly reasonable to the primitive peoples who saw land growing from the accumulation of river-borne silt and desert wastes rendered cultivable by irrigation, to conclude, for instance, that water was the primary element and the source of all that existed. In the famous creation hymn of the Ṛgveda[1] the question is raised whether the fathomless waters existed before the formation of the world and the answer is given in affirmative. Among the Greeks a number of cosmogonies were devised, the prime component of the universe being Ocean according to Homer; water and earth according to Hironymus and Hellanicus; water and slime according to Athenagoras; and water according to Thales.[2] The ancient Egyptians believed that at the beginning the world was water called *Nu* or *Nun*.[3] In Babylonian mythology, both *Apsu* and *Tiamat* were forms of water, the former representing the orderly framework of nature and the latter as the destructive and anarchic aspect, mythologically pictured as a dragon who was slain by *Merodach* or *Marduk*.[4] Interestingly, *Tiamat*, the water-dragon whom the Babylonian *Indra* vanquishes, actually figures in the **Atharvaveda**[5] under the very same name.

The Egyptians believed that *Ra*, the god of brightness first appeared as a shining egg which floated on the primordial waters.[6] According to the Rhapsodist cosmogony of ancient Greece we also find the idea of the cosmic Egg from which was issued the first Orphic God. Zeller points out that the said idea was directly borrowed by the Greeks from the Phonicians[7]. But exactly the same idea is found in the Indian legends. The Ṛgvedic conception of the Golden Germ or

Hiraṇyagarbha[8], emanating from the primeval waters, afterwards developed into that of the World-Egg of *Brahman*.

Full development of the concept of World-Egg theory is to be found in the post-Ṛgvedic literature in which, although elevated to the position of the world-creator, *Prajāpati* was yet conceived of as the Golden Germ floating upon waters. The Brāhmaṇa-s speak of waters as having produced after a year's favour the Golden Egg from which sprang *Prajāpati*.[9] The idea that life remains latent in egg was quite in accordance with primitive empiricism, and the various processes of growth and change constantly visible in nature might have suggested the notion of the world having gradually arisen out of a pre-existing undeveloped substance. Such an idea of the spontaneous evolution out of a primeval principle, or out of the primordial substance called *Prakṛti* became at a later period the foundation of the Sāṃkhya philosophy.

The **Ṛgveda** postulates only water as the primordial element or matter from which others gradually evolved. The Upaniṣad-s have advanced on the Ṛgvedic conception and it is in the Upanisad-s that we have practically for the first time the doctrine of five elements. Of the various properties of the forms of matter, the most important seems to be the inherent causality, that is, the capacity of generating an effect, like water hardening into ice. Only a substance of wider dimension can hold the objects of limited dimensions within it, and so we come at last to an ultimate substance with infinite extension, which is space or *ākāśa*.[10] The visible world is thus thought of as a product of five gross elements, viz., earth, water, fire, air and space. Subsequently it was felt that these gross elements might have come into existence through an organic evolutionary process from such material principles as *prakṛti*, *māyā*, etc. This original principle, rather the material cause, may be a reality possessing all the power necessary to unfold the whole universe out of itself as we find in the Sāṃkhya, or an illusory reality as we find in the Advaita Vedānta, or a power of the Supreme Being changing into a world directed by His/Her will as we find in the theistic systems. The Svabhāvavādin-s, however, do not count space as the fifth element since it is not subject of direct perception. In the Sāṃkhya the five elements are prefixed by the evolutes or *prakṛti*. In the Vaiśeṣika, the five elements belong to the nine substances intended to comprise all corporeal and incorporeal things.

The idea of the universe having arisen out of darkness and chaos is indicated in the *Nāsadīya* hymn of the **Ṛgveda** in which it is said that in the beginning only darkness enveloped in darkness existed; all this was undistinguishable water; that *One* which lay in void, and wrapped in nothingness, was developed by the power of fervour; *desire* first arose in it, which was the primal germ of mind. This creative *kāma*, the conception of which is further developed in the **Atharvaveda**[11], corresponds strikingly and curiously with the cosmogonic *Eros* of the Greeks.[12] Almost in the same language of the **Ṛgveda** Hesiod writes: From *Chaos* was generated *Erebos* or Black Night and from Night again were generated *Ehter* or Day whom she brought forth having conceived from the embrace or *Erebos*.[13] In the post-Rgvedic stage, the creative process is sometimes conceived as a procreative process in

which connection we frequently come across such terms as *jan, sṛi, garbha, retas,* etc. The principle of sexual dualism is also manifested in the conception of a sky-father and an earth-mother and this pervades many a cosmogonic myth of other civilizations. In Hebrew cosmogony *Shamayim* (heaven) is masculine and *Ādmah* (earth) is feminine. In one of the cosmogonic myths of ancient Greece, we find that *Uranus* was conceived as the sky-father and *Gaea* as the earth-mother and from them were produced three classes of beings - the *Cyclopes*, the *Titans* and the *Heacatoncheres*. The Greeks called the sky Uranus, understanding by the name the generative power of the sky, which penetrates the earth with warmth and moisture and through which earth brings forth every living things. In the **Ṛgveda** also heaven and earth are described as universal parents. In course of time evolved the idea of *prakṛti* in the place of the earth. This began to be conceived as a germinal productive principle - the eternal mother capable of evolving all created things out of herself but never so creating unless united with the eternal spiritual principle, the *puruṣa*.

In the *puruṣa-śukta* of the **Ṛgveda**[14] we have the conception of a creative spirit which is transformed or which transforms itself into the world, like the frost-giant *Yimer* of the Teutons. In the **Vājasaneyi Saṃhitā**[15], *puruṣa* is described as a resplendent principle pervading the universe. In the **Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa**[16] the word *Nārāyaṇa* is coupled with *puruṣa* and it is said that this *Being* desired to surpass all and became the entire universe. In Yāska's **Nirukta** it is stated that the universe is filled by the *puruṣa* to whom there is nothing superior and from whom there is nothing different. Further, when the idea of a world soul or *virāṭa-puruṣa* in the macrocosm came to be formulated, the individual existences in the world were looked upon as issuing from the dismembered limbs of that *purusa* in the act of primordial sacrificial immolation.

Some verses in the **Ṛgveda**[18] consider the function of creation in terms of that of the carpenter or the smith or the potter and so depending on the nature of material and the skill of the operator. This reminds us of the *Pan-ku* legends of ancient China. *Prajāpati* was destined to play this part, being made synonymous in nature and function with the earlier abstractions such as *Tvaṣṭṛ, Dhātṛ* and *Viśvakaraman*. According to a story found in the **Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa**[18] the urinary bladder of *Prajāpati* burst open and that produced the ocean, reminding us of the Hesiodic version of the story of the dissection of the bladder of *Uranus* which resulted in the creation of ocean made of fluid that gushed out.[20] In the **Aitareya Brāhmaṇa**[21] it is stated that *Prajāpati* created the three worlds: the earth, the atmosphere and the sky. From these worlds three luminaries - *Agni, Vāyu* and *Ādiyta* - were born. *Chronus* of the Greek mythology also produced from his seed Fire, Air and Water, which in their turn begot the five families of gods.[22] According to the **Taittirīya Saṃhitā**[23] *Prajāpati* as wind produced movement into waters and therein he saw the earth. Then having taken the form of a boar he seized the earth and as *Viśvakarman* he laboured upon it and thus produced the gods, *Vasu-s, Rudra-s* and *Āditya-s*.

In the hymn of the **Atharvaveda**[24] the supreme deity appears to be celebrated under the appellation of *Stambha* or 'support'. He is described as a great being, like *Puruṣa* with whom He is identified and is equated with the universe. The next creative principle of the **Atharvaveda** is *prāṇa* or breath identified with *Prajāpati* and other deities.[25] The third principle is *rohita*, probably a form of fire or sun, often identified with *Prajāpati* and *Kāla*.[26] The fourth is a Virile Bull[27] reminding us of the Cretan and Hellenic *Zeus* also conceived in the same animal form.[28]. The Ṛgvedic concept of *Kāma* or desire which is said to have caused the first movement in the Existent *One*, is celebrated in the hymns of the **Atharvaveda**[29] as a more personalised creative principle. It is well known that the Greek mythology connects *Eros* with the creation of the universe somewhat in the same way as *Kāma* is associated with it.[30] In two other passages of the **Atharvaveda**[31] *Kāla* or time is said to have generated the sky and the earth, produced, supported and set the universe in motion, and brought forth *Prajāpati* and *Kaśyapa*.

In the earlier Upaniṣad-s in which the idea of the world-egg is also found an attempt is made to envisage the existence of the world as it hangs in the space, and the emergence of the sun from primeval chaotic non-being. Secondly, we have the conception of creation ascribed to *Ātman* which on account of its lonely existence, split itself into two parts, male and female. A third theory refers to an antecedent inanimate existence in which the formless *Brahman* entered, just as a razor enters a razor case.[32] *Ātman* or *Brahman*'s association with creation has been described in different ways: (I) In the beginning there was undifferentiated darkness, but moved by the Supreme Being it became passion *(rajas)*, then purity *(sattva)* and then flowed forth as essence *(rasa)* which was the cause of creation; (II) In the beginning of the world was 'unuttered' : He (Ātman or *Brahman*) who was *Prajāpati* uttered *bhur* (earth), *bhuvas* (atmosphere) and *svar* (sky). His body then constituted the three worlds : head became the sky, navel the atmosphere and feet the earth; (III) In the beginning *Brahman* was manifested, infinite in all directions. It contemplated and from its body that was ether the universe came into being, and; (IV) The self alone existed first, but having felt the necessity of spreading itself it created four different regions. Then it created the macrocosmic *Virāj* and in order to make him animate, it created sense organs and corresponding deities.[33]

It is mentioned in the **Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad**[34] that *Kāla* (time), *Svabhāva* (inherent nature), *Yadṛcchā* (chance), *Niyati* (fate), *Bhūta* (elements), *Yoni* (female organ), *Puruṣa* and *Iśvara* (god) have been regarded by thinkers at different times as the cause of the world. But the questions which came into prominence ultimately were mainly concerned with the nature of the cause itself: whether the effect is produced out of something positive or eternal or out of mere void, whether the cause alone is real and eternal and the effect merely an illusion. But God as the efficient cause has in fact no part to play in the development of Indian cosmogonical ideas. In the Vedic literature the idea of an omnipotent God creating the world out of his own nature without any pre-existing substance is practically absent. On the basis of the main current of the Upaniṣadic thought, Bādarāyaṇa suggested that the power of creation belongs to the pure stainless *Brahman*, the material and the efficient

cause, which for its own sport develops itself into the world without undergoing the least change. This has been challenged by subsequent philosophers who held that the changing and impermanent world cannot be the effect of an eternal and changeless cause. Every real entity is a cause and also an effect, but the first cause as an effect has no cause, and as such it is no effect. This was best understood by many of our ancient philosophers.

Another theistic line of argument was offered by the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika-s. According to them the world has the atoms for its material cause and god for its efficient cause. The atoms can act only when, prior to the beginning of creation, they are controlled by an intelligent agent. God creates the world for the sake of making the beings experience the fruits of the actions of their past lives. The creation and destruction of the world follow one another in regular order. The periodic dissolution is brought about by God's desire to reabsorb the whole creation within himself. The Nyāya Vaiśeṣika arguments have been challenged not only by the Mīmāṃsaka-s but also by the Buddhist and Jain writers. The early Mīmāṃsaka-s are silent about the question of God, and the later ones reject the proofs of God. According to the Mīmāṃsaka-s, as also by the Sāṃkhya-s, perception, inference and scriptures do not provide for God. God cannot act as the supervisor of *dharma* and *adharma* since he cannot have any knowledge of them. The universe having neither beginning nor end does not require any creator. More or less the same view is shared by the Buddhists and Jains.

So far as the theistic cosmogonies of different religious sects are concerned, this much we can say that their propounders were not at all troubled regarding the question how the world of imperfection could take its rise from *Brahman*, the absolute perfection, since they were willing to accept on the authority of the *Śruti* that the finite might spring from the infinite.[35]

NOTES

1. X. 129.
2. T. Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, London 1901, I, 56 ff.
3. A. Erman, *Handbook of Egyptian Religion*, London 1907.
4. A.H. Sayce, *Religion of Ancient Egypt and Babylonia*, London 1902, II, Ch.6.
5. V. 13.3.
6. Erman, *Loc.cit.*
7. E. Zeller, *Pre-Socratic Philosophy*, London 1881, I,102 ff
8. *Ṛg Veda*. X. 121
9. Cf. *Śatapatha* XI, 1.6.1.
10. Cf. *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra* II. 1.6.7.; V.1.17-18; V.2.13; etc.
11. XI. 2, etc.
12. J.E. Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*, Cambridge 1908, Ch.XIII.
13. *Theogony*, 143 ff.

14. X. 90
15. XXXI. 18; XXXII. 2
16. XIII. 6.1.1.; cf. XII. 3.4.1.
17. II. 3.
18. X. 31.7; X. 72.2
19. II. 29
20. H. Licht. *Sexual Life in Ancient Greece*, London 1961, 1982.
21. V. 32.
22. Zeller, *op.cit.* I. 90 ff.
23. VII. 1.5.1.
24. X. 7
25. *AV*, XI. 4.
26. *AV*, XIII. 1.
27. *AV*, IV. 11
28. E.O. James, *Prehistoric Religion*, New York, 1857, 238-41.
29. IX. 2.
30. See Plato's *Symposium*, sec. VI.
31. XIX, 53; XIX. 54.
32. *Chaṅdogya* III. 15.19; *Bṛhad* I. 1-17; etc.
33. *Mait.* V. 2; VI. 5-6; *Ait.* I-III, etc.
34. *Śvetāśvatara* I. 1-2; cf. *Suśruta, Śarīra* I. 11
35. For details see the present author's, *History of Indian Cosmogonical Ideas*, New Delhi 1971.

VII

SṚṢṬI AND THE BUDDHIST THEORY OF DEPENDENT ORIGINATION

Debaprasad Guha

Phonetically speaking, for the Sanskrit word *sṛṣṭi*, there is no Pāli equivalent. The word that stands close to it in general sense is *uppada*, appearance. It reminds us of the more significant word *samuppada*, meaning 'genesis', 'origination'. This again brings to our mind the well known Pali word *paticca-samuppāda* (Skt. *pratitya-samutpāda*) which literally means 'arising on the grounds of (a previous cause)', 'happening by way of a cause'. In the *Ariyapariyesana Sutta* of the **Maḻjhi-Manikāya**, *paticca-samuppada* is characterised as *idappaccayata* which Buddhaghosa annotates as *hetupaccayata* or relatedness through cause. In Buddhist thought, the term 'cause' does not signify any significant efficient cause. It does not indicate also a mere mechanical plurality of causes. It really implies *ekikaraṇa* or unification of various causes and circumstances, that is to say *paccaya-samaggi* or conjunction of circumstances sufficient to produce an effect. It is worth mentioning here that, according to Stcherbatsky, the prefix *sam* of *samutapāda* means 'combined', and the term *pratitya samutpāda* implies 'the combined origination of some elements with regard to other elements' *(Central Conception of Buddhism,* 28). This view of the learned scholar is similar to that of Yasomitra, according to whom "*na kasciddharma eka utpadyate, sahotpadaniyamat rupadinam*" [**Sphutārtha,** 3.38].

Paticcasamuppāda is universally regarded as a fundamental concept of Buddhist thought. The **Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā**, of course a rather late work, describes it as "the chief jewel among all the teachings of the Buddha" (p.13). The term has been interpreted by scholars as a doctrine of causation or that of dependent origination or that of becoming by way of a cause, by the usual and oft-recurring formula of twelve *nidāna-s*. Possibly it was Burnouf who was the first to call it a chain, *enchainment*. This is, however, a controversial term, since the name merely means 'arising or coming into existence causally'. The term, usually rendered 'link' is *nidāna*, but each link is said to arise by having the previous one as cause (*paccaya*).

Another point which calls for attention is that the scheme with twelve *nidāna-s* is the only stereotyped form which it finally assumed. There are several other variants in the texts, and they raise the question whether they are adopted from the longer one, or whether the longer one is an inorganic combination of independent

elements. The classical form in which the formula is best known is found in the account of the Boddhisatta's attainment of *arahat*-hood when the aspirant having passed through the stages of morality and concentration reaches the knowledge of destruction of moral depravities, and comes to know pain, its cause, its cessation, and the way leading thereto. In what is probably the oldest form of this description, as found in the **Dighanikāya** [i.83], there is no mention of the chain, but merely the statement that the truths are known. But this statement is also found expanded by the insertion of the formula of causal origin, and its repetition, in which each item is stated positively as a cause, is said to explain the cause of pain, and its repetition negatively, in which case each item is said not to exist, explains the cessation of pain.

The basic formula of *paticcasamuppāda* is a simple statement as presented in the three *Boddhi Sutta-s* in the **Udāna**. It runs as follows: *Imasmim sati idam hoti, imassa uppada idam uppajjati; imasmim asati idam na hoti, imassa nirodha idam nirujjhati.* (This having been, that comes to be; from the arising of this that arises. This having not been, that does not come to be; from the cessation of this that ceases to be). This formula of twelve *nidāna-s* must be taken as a later appendage to an earlier formulation of the doctrine. The formula came in only by way of an illustration of the original formulation which has been clearly set forth in the *Bodhi Sutta-s* as referred to above as also elsewhere in the canonical Pāli texts. the aforesaid formulation may be distributed under the following heads:

a. *Anulomadesana* or a formulation to account for the forward process of genesis of phenomena;
b. *Patilomadesana* or a formulation to account for the reverse process of cessation of phenomena; and.
c. *Anuloma-patilomadesana* or a formation to account for the process of both.

It will be seen that the first form implies the second, and the third is the logical outcome of the first two. But, on the cogency of this, the teachers differ. In the *Vibhaṅgappakaraṇa* of the **Abhidhammapiṭaka**, only *anulomadesana* is taken into consideration and explained in the chapter on the exposition of *Paccayakaravibhaṅga*. The Sarvāstivādin-s again recognise *anulomadesana* only. Buddhaghoṣa was conscious of this apparent discrepancy. In the *Pannabhuminiddesa* of the **Visuddhimagga**, he rejected the views which was in favour of treating *paticcasamuppada* only under the aspect of *uppada* (genesis) on the following grounds:

i. There is no text to support it (*suttabhavato*),
ii. It militates against what is stated in the *sutta-s* (*suttavirodhato*), and
iii. Incompatibility of grammatical construction (*saddabhedato*).

We now propose to look through the pre-Buddhist literature to ascertain if the early Buddhist conception that is *paticca- samuppāda* was in any way influenced by pre-Buddhist thoughts.

The first element, *avidyā*, of the so-called Chain of Causation is found commonly used in the major *Upaniṣad-s*, Sāṃkhya texts and in *Yogadarśana* of Patañjali. In the **Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad** Śankara, while elucidating the term, says

'vasananimittah pratyaya avidyakhyah'. It is also stated that the soul, while taking up a medium after the destruction of the earlier one, is always assisted by *avidyā*. In the **Iśopaniṣad** appears the following couplet:

Anyadevahurvidyaya anyadahuravidyaya|
Iti susruma dhiranam ye nastadvicacaksire|| [*Isa.* 10]

Ācārya Śankara explains the *mantra* as : *ye acarya no asmabhyam tat karmam ca jnanam ca vicacaksire vyakhyatavantah, tesamayam agamah paramparyagata ityarthah.* In the **Kaṭhopaniṣad**, while describing Brahman as *'urdhvamula avakṣakha'*, Śankara described the criteria as *avidyā-kāma-karmavyaktabījaprabhāvaḥ.* [*Katha. Bhā.* 2.3.1]

The Sāṃkhyakāra-s introduced their theory with the purpose of destroying the three kinds of *duḥkha* (duḥkhatrayabhighatat).

In Pātañjala Yogadarśana *avidyā* and its *kārya*, that is the world that is originated from it, have been dealt with elaborately. In the **Vyāsabhāṣya** on *Sūtra* 2.3 the following statement occurs : *te syandamana gunadhikaram drdhayanti, parinamamavasthapayanti, karyakaranasrotam unnamayanti paramparanugrahatatantribhutva karmavipakam cabhinirharanti.*

The details furnished above well suggest that the people of yore were fairly conversant with the chain-like presentation of cause and effect. The texts further attest that a few of the factors that make the Buddhist Law of Causation were precisely known to the people before the advent of the Master. The factors hapen to be *avidyā, saṃskāra,, vijñāna, nāmarūpa* and *bhāva.*

On the basis of all that has been said so far, it seems possible to make the following deductions:

1. That the Buddha was familiar with certain thoughts which are universally regarded as pre-Buddhistic;
2. That the Master utilised some of them while propounding his own thoughts;
3. That he did so in his own way, without being influenced in the least by any pre-conceived notion; and
4. That thereby theory that was India became immensely enriched.

To turn to the epigraphic records. The records, numbering five, happen to be the following:

i. Kurram casket inscription ii. Gopalpur brick inscription iii. Kasia copper-plate inscription iv. Nalanda brick inscription v. Hmawza gold-leaf inscription

The peculiarity of the records lies in the fact that the text inscribed happens to be the *paticcasumuppada sutta*, otherwise known as the *Nidana Sutta*, in part or in full, and in one case with its *vibhanga*, analysis. About the records we intend to give in brief some information in the manner tabled below:

Record	Language	Script	Date	Contents
Kurram insc.	Prakrit	Kharosti	2nd cent.	Anuloma of Nidanasutta.
Gopalpur "	Sanskrit	Brahmi	c.5th "	"
Kasia "	"	"	c.5th "	"
Nālanda "	"	"	c.6th "	Anuloma of and its Vibhanga.
Hmawza "	"	Kadamba	c.6th "	"

It might be noted that the principal text on the Gopalpur bricks and the Kasia copper-plate happens to be the same. It is the *anuloma-patiloma* arrangement of the law of dependent origination, here technically termed as *acaya* (collection) and *apacaya* (loss) of *dhamma*, corresponding to the *samudaya* and *nirodha* aspects of the *sutta*. The Hmawza inscription too presents, both the aspects of the *dhamma*. The Kurram record contains only the *samudaya* aspect of the Sutta, and rightly so, since it was concerned with the Sarvāstivādin-s who recognised only the *samudaya* aspect of the *dhamma*. The Nālanda records is quite interesting, since it not only contains the *samudāya* (here called *adi*)_ aspect of the *sutta* but also its *vibhaṅga* which incidentally is not found in the other inscriptions. Further as has been pointed out by P.C. Bagchi, it was the same text which was translated by Hiuen Tsāng in A.D. 661, just three years before he passed away. Tucci has published fragments of the **Pratītyasamutpāda-vyākhyā** by Vasubaṅdhu, a work which was known through its Tibetan translation. it is interesting to note that the text on which Vasubaṅdhu wrote the commentary must have been the same as found in the Nālanda record, a fact which reveals to us the original Sanskrit text of a Sūtra which was so far known only through translation.

It is to be noted that all these documents with the **Nidānasūtra** as the text have been found in *stūpa-s*. The question that arises happens to be: what was precisely the purpose for writing down the sūtra and depositing it in *stūpa-s* ? Of course it was done for acquiring merit. But, why this particular *sūtra*. It is well-known that among the Buddhists there are four classes of worship: (i) the corporeal remains of the Buddha, (ii) objects like bowl, staff, etc. used by him, (iii) objects indirectly connected with the Buddha like the *bodhi* tree, *caityas*, and so on, and (iv) *Dhamma* as preached by the Lord. Says the Chinese pilgrim I-tsing: "The priests and layman in India make caityas or images with earth, or impress the Buddha's image on silk or paper, and worship with offerings wherever they go.,... Again when the people make images and *caityas*., they put in the images or *caityas* two kinds of *sarira-s*. 1. The relics of the Great Teacher. 2. The *Gatha* of the Chain of Causation": [I-tsing, *A record of the Buddhist Religion*, p.150]

The *gāthā* referred to above is the well-known Buddhist formula:

Ye dhamma hetuppabhave tesam hetu Tathagato aha tesanca yo nirodha evam vadi mahsamano.

supposed to have been spoken by Assaji to the venerable Sariputta. This stanza undoubtedly alludes to the **Nidānasutta**. The Sanskrit version of this stanza is extensively found on votive gifts like images, tablets, plaques, and so on. The

authentic relics of the Buddha were always scarce. That is why we find the *stūpa-s* at Nālanda and other places only tablets containing the Nidānasutta which was a part of the *Dhamma* preached by the Buddha himself. It is no wonder, therefore, that this *sutta* is considered as of paramount importance and has so frequently been found in votive *stupa-s*.

A few more words. It is well-known that with the dawn of the Christian era Hinayāna Buddhism started receding in the land of its birth yielding place to Mahāyānism. It is further known that the latter creed went on thriving till it reached the pinnacle of glory by about the fifth and sixth centuries. By then, masterminds like Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, Dignāga and Nāgārjuna flourished and were reigning supreme in intellectual arena.

The Hinayāna Buddhist knew well that it would be difficult, say impossible, for them to get back the ground lost. But they were not prepared to give up hopes so easily. They were aware that the strength of Mahāyāna lay in its philosophy. The earlier Buddhists too were fairly conscious about the profoundness of their own philosophical thoughts. So, they intended to measure strength on this score.

Now, if we are prepared to accept the aforesaid argument, it will not be difficult, so do we believe, to realise why the Hinayanists thought it wise to make *paticcasamuppāda* the topic of the epigraphic records under consideration.

To give an impression of the nature of the records, we quote below the text of the Kurram Casket Inscription as presented by Sten Konow in the *Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum*, [ii.15ff.]

L1 *(Sam 20 masa) sa Avadunakasa di 20 is(e) ksunammi Sved(r)avarma Yasuptra tanu(v)akammi ramnammi (navaviha)rammi acaryana sarvastivadana pari (graham)mi thubammi bhag(r)avatasa Sakyamunisa.*

L2 *Sarira pradithavedi yatha uta bhag(r)avada avijapracag(r)a samkara(m) samkarapracag(r)a vinana vinanapracag(r)a namaruva namaruvapracag(r)a sad(r)a(yadana)sad(r)ayadanapracag(r) phase p(h)asapracag(r)a.*

L3 *Vedana vedanapracag(r)a tasa tasapracag(r)a uvadana uvadanapracag(r)a bhava bhavapracag(r)a jadi jadipracag(r)a jaramaranasog(r)a-parideva-dukha-domanasta-uvag(r)asa evam asa kevalasa dukhak amdhasa sammudae bhavadi.*

L4 *Sarvasatvana puyae aya ca praticasammupate likhida Mahiphatiena sarvasatvana puyae.*

We would now like to present an extract from the *vibhaṅga* as found in the Nalanda Brick Inscription [Epigraphic Indica, xxi, 198] :

L5 *Avidya-pratyayah samskarah. Avidya Katama. Yat-purvvante ajnanam aparante ajna-*

L6 *Nam purvantaparante ajnanam adhyatmam ajnanam bahirdha ajnanam adhyatma-bahirdha ajnanam karmanyajnanam vipake ajnanam karmavipake ajnanam Buddhe ajnanam dharma ajnanam duhkhe.*

L7 *Ajnanam samudaye ajnanam nirodhe ajnanam marge ajnanam hetavajnanam hetusamutpannesu dharmesvajnanam kusalakusalesu savadyanavadyesu sevitavyasevi-*

L8 *Tavyesu hina-pranita-krsna-sukla-sapratibhaga-pratitya- samutpannesu dharmesvajnanam satsu va punah sparsayatanesu yathabhutasamprativedhe iti. Yat-tatra tatra yathabhu-*

L9 *Tasyajnanam-adarsanam-anabhisamayah tamah sammohah avidyandhakaram-iyamucyate avidya. Avidyapratyayah samskara iti. Samskarah katama. Trayah samskarah.*

L10 *Kayasamskarah vaksamskarah manahsamskara iti.*

VIII

SṚṢṬI IN ANCIENT INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITIONS

V.N.Jha

Sṛṣṭi or creation of the universe in which we live has been an object of fascinating enquiry perhaps from the time since man became aware of his environment. The result of such enquiries is the bulk of speculations available with all cultured societies. Although the primitive mind was not that bothered about the ultimate origin of the universe, the mind of the philosophers appears to be restless regarding this problem of ultimate origin of the universe. If one looks into the records available with us of the ancient Indian philosophical traditions one finds oneself in the ocean of confusion.

While one Vedic seer observes that there was neither positive element nor negative elemen. :rom which the world has emerged, the other came to a conclusions that the personified gods - earth, air and sky - were generated by a female principle called *Āditi* with the help of *Dakṣa* the male principle or creative force.

According to the **Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa** the universe was shaped like an enormous egg which contained the continents, the oceans, the mountains, the planets, the gods, the demons, and humanity, and which was produced in the primeval waters by Prajāpati.

In the philosophical traditions, the views range about the emergence of the universe from 'nothing' to the construction of the universe from real elements. Some philosophers have even said that the world is never created. (*Na kadācit anidaṛśaṃ jagat*).

In this small note I would like to concentrate on the description and analysis provided by the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika system of Indian philosophy mainly, though here and there I might record reflections of other Indian philosophical systems.

The physics developed by the Vaiśeṣika school conceives process of creation and destruction of this universe. The system conceptualises the universe in a set of six sub-sets of entities (*padārtha*) all being positive (*bhāva*) and later one more sub-set of negative entity (*abhāva*) was added to the six. These are substances (9), qualities (24), movements (5), universal (1), particulars (innumerable), inherence (1), and absence (4). Of the nine substances, such as earth, water, fire, air, sky, time, space, soul, and mind, the five - earth, water, fire and air - are treated as products and the rest are eternal.

Thus, the whole universe consist of these seven categories of entities. There is a creator called God (*paramātmā*) who creates the universe with these elements. Actually speaking what he creates is only a product, because the eternal elements are already in existence and will remain all through, ever after the destruction of the world. Thus, the world is not created from 'nothing' but from the existent elements available to the creator.

This creator has to be a sentient and all-knowing because without knowledge of the entire universe he cannot create the universe. Thus, by definition he is all-knowing.

No creation is possible without knowledge. Even the creation of a chair or table requires knowledge of chair and table. Since a carpenter or a scientist or you and I cannot claim to have knowledge of the whole universe none of us can claim to be the creator of the entire universe. The difference, therefore, between me as a creator and God as a creator is in the knowledge that I possess and the knowledge is without any limitation, whereas our knowledge has limitation. Not only that the God's knowledge has to be limitless, but it has to be eternal too unlike our knowledge which is temporary, because if the God's knowledge is also accepted as transient He can no longer be distinguished.

Thus, *nitya-jñānādhikaraṇa* is the God (*paramātman*, the creator of the universe and *anitya-jñānādhikaraṇa* is the individual, the creator of safety pins and the like, and of course, of atom-bombs and the like as well.

Thus, the Vaiśeṣika system needs a creator and the elements to create the universe.

The following account of creation is given in the **Praśastapadabhāṣya**:

> The moment there arises the desire to dissolve the universe, there arises action in the atoms and that results into the separation of one atom from the other and that destroys the contact between two atoms destroying thereby the *dvyānuka*, the diad, and subsequently all products like *tryānuka* 'tried' etc. get destroyed till the gross mass is destroyed. This destruction follows the principle of *kāraṇa-nāśe kārya-nāśaḥ*. Thus, all products are destroyed and in this way the universe is destroyed en mass (*pralaya*).

The God has destroyed the universe in order to allow the living being to take some rest, says Praśastapada. Now what remains with the God are the atoms of earth, water, fire and wind and the remaining all eternal elements. These constitute the materials for building the universe again by the creator.

As already pointed out before, the creator must have knowledge. This knowledge generates desire and the desire generates inclination and thereafter external activity will take place for creation. Thus, the creator God desires again to create the universe for the enjoyment of the living beings. The moment he desires the atoms of air get activated and one atoms starts coming closer to another atom forming thereby the *dvyānuka*, and the three *dvyānuka-s* a *tryānuka* and in this way the final whole, the mass of air is created. Since Air is the first product there is no other mass present in the sky and so the air moves very fast and strongly.

In that Air the mass of waters is created by the same process, of creating the *dvyānuka* from water-atoms and terminating in the final product of mass of waters. Thus created, the waters keep on moving terribly fast, since there is no solid obstruction.

In that ocean of water the mass of earth is created by the same process and it stands in un-sheltered form closely lumped together: *saṃhata - nibidāvayavā aviśiṛṇa - tayā* [Kiraṇāvali].

Then, in that ocean of water fire is created from the atoms of fire. It stands shining, illumining everything.

After these four elements (*mahābhūta-s*) are created, there arises a big egg from the atoms of fire and earth, in accordance with the desire of the God. In that the God creates the Brahman, the grandfather of all living beings along with the phenomenal world and other worlds and employs the Brahman to create people. The Brahman, then, being the possessor of extraordinary knowledge, sense of dedication, and power and being employed by the God creates his progeny namely, the Prajāpati-s, the Manu-s, the Gods, the sages, the Piṭṛ-s, and Gaṇa-s, the four castes, and the other creatures in accordance with their accumulated merits and demerits and bestows in them knowledge, sense of dedication and power as due to them. This is how the world of ours comes into existence and we start behaving with the universe.

A closer observation may reveal that this story of creation presupposes the following:

1. There is a sentient creator other than the living beings.
2. There are elements with which the creator creates this universe.
3. What is created is a product. The creation is a product.
4. A product is that which does not exist before but comes into existence when it is produced.
5. The process of creation and destruction follows the law of cause and effect relationship.

In Indian philosophical tradition a product is understood in two ways.

(1) A product may be revealed implying thereby that it was already there in the cause in a hidden form. The creator simply removes the cover and it is called produced or a product (*vyakta*). Thus the creator in this sense becomes a revealer or *vyañjaka*.

(2) The other understanding is in consonance with our normal understanding, i.e., something which does not exist prior to its production and comes into existence only after its production is a product.

The first understanding is that of the *satkāryavāda* of the Sāṃkhya system of thought, whereas the second is the idea of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school.

Another point needs our attention and that is the role of the God in creation in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika School. The role seems to be of a superintendent also. One must get only that which one deserves and this needs supervision and that is done by the God. A person is allotted only that what is earned by that person. God neither

favours nor disfavours anybody. This is how it differs from the *Bhaktimārga* - philosophy where God is requested to grant favour by his devotee.

Another aspect of creation needs our special attention. It is already pointed out by me that the underlying principle behind creation is the cause and effect relationship. As a matter of fact this relationship is the life of any analytic philosophy. The idealists therefore tried to destroy this cause and effect relationship. Dharmakirti, as a matter of fact, tried to destroy all relations - both general and specific. He categorically denies the cause and effect relationship in his **Sambandhaparīkṣā**. This is the reason that he could deny the external reality of this world.

The Mīmāṃsaka-s, though realistic in attitude preferred to maintain that there was never a time when the world of ours was not like this. Thus, the question of creation does not arise. Naturally, they did not need a creator like God, because the universe is not a creation of anybody.

The philosopher grammarian Bhartṛhari proposed that this universe is the manifestation of the *śabda brahman*. This view is also an idealistic one.

From all this what we can deduce is, various philosophical traditions have made genuine enquiry about the origin of this universe and came to the conclusions as per the need of the basic assumptions and attitude of the school of philosophy which the philosopher advocated. The realist school of ancient Indian thought tried to give an analytic picture of creation. All questions ultimately boil down to acceptance of a cause and effect relationship. Udāyanāchārya of 10th century A.D. had a tough time to answer Cārvāka's and Buddhists' d ial of that relationship. He pointed out that if the cause and effect relationships is not accepted we cannot explain any phenomenon of our universe and it will lead to accepting that anything may arise from anything at any time. The universe is not *ākasmika* he maintained.

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IX

SṚṢṬI AND ALIENATION : AN EXAMINATION OF A BUDDHIST VIEW

Ranjit Ghosh

In this paper we intend to discuss the necessary relationship of the concept of *Sṛṣṭi* and the concept of alienation in any discussion of man. We have tried to show that *Sṛṣṭi* or the very creation of man entails alienation. The Buddhists on the other hand suggest a scheme of the world and man where the man has not come into the world but has come out of the world and hence there is no alienation. If we accept the propositions of Buddhist process philosophy we have to simultaneously hold 'world is change' and 'man is a metaphysical construct of the world' which are incompatible. But, on the other hand a social construction of reality gives us a socio-centric man with its corollary, alienation. Attempts have been made to articulate man as a production bc ' of its biological and sociological heritage. Let us start with Buddhism.

I

The Buddhists advocate a process - ontology which implies that the world is a continuous change and there is no permanent enduring substance either inside or outside man. As we know, substance-ontology advocates a concept of identity in the nontrival sense. It assumes the presence of some unchanging entity to serve as an ultimate standard like the God of religions or the so-called fixed-star of Newtonian Cosmology. But the Buddhist hold, contrary to this view that there can be no ultimate standard because a particular standard may give rise to a new standard and the process goes on ad infinitum. The Buddhist doctrine of Dependent Origination denies any self-existent entity in the world and the concept of identity has to operate within the domain of 'change' or at best of a 'casual efficacy'. Hence 'self-existent' becomes a contradictory terms within this framework. It follows from this that 'existence' and 'non-existence' are like two sides of the same process and are not different. Identity in the nontrivial sense according to this analysis makes an existent identical in time self-contradictory. For all practical purposes however, the Buddhists are ready to accept identity only in a conventional sense.

Now, if the consequence of this process ontology is seriously taken and extended to the field of society and culture then the concept of identity itself becomes questionable in these sphere because, "culture is the human animal's clever and

wholly inventive way of acquiring for himself an identity"[1]. Professor Jacobson writes in this context, "man builds his tower of self because he cannot face the possibility that there is no permanent ego. He cannot face the truth that his self-concept is meaningful either in a purely conventional sense, or a mere postulate in a theoretical system having no ultimate status at all."[2] But, identity as we know, is the relation or set of relation in which man stands to something, be it a person, object, state, nation or society. Since Buddhists are not ready to accord any existential status to these entities we are at a loss to trace the social identity of man in the Buddhist framework. The Buddhists are somehow convinced that the quest for identity for the above mentioned entities not only resulted in an alienation from one's fellow men but also an alienation from oneself. This alienation according to the Buddhists is the direct result of an illusion that there exist permanent entities identical in time. According to the Buddhists the root cause of the quest for identity and permanence is ignorance (*avidyā*) and the attainment of enlightenment (*nirvāṇa*) will help us to understand the process of becoming. The creation of man can be explained from within the world process. Man has not come into this world, he is not an outsider to this creation but has come out of this created world. This is how the problem of alienation dissolves in a Buddhist framework and the primary task of Buddha in alleviating human suffering gets its prima facie justification from such an ontological support. But is it not an oversimplification of a complex issue? Process philosophy must assume some form of ontology and it can not prove to be 'being-neutral' in its explanation of becoming and probably this was the reason as to why Marx did not succumb to a process ontology. We apprehend, if we accept the propositions of Buddhist process philosophy we have to simultaneously hold, 'world is change' and 'man is a metaphysical construct of the world' which are incompatible. Further, man as a metaphysical construct of the world will try to correlate itself with others who are also metaphysical constructs of the same world. Hence, a pervasive alienation will take the place of a supposed non-alienation of the Buddhists in the ultimate analysis of it.

II

The genesis of a person may also be discussed from the frame work of a social whole which is composed not only of an existent 'I' but also of possible 'others'. One is born into the world not just as a person, but with a particular body, a particular family, a specific culture or a specific society which are both unique and fairly determinate to him. However, each individual has the capacity to encounter and transcend them in his own way because, "one is born not merely into the world but into a world that is always socially structured and to a large extent, socially interpreted. Yet whatever structuring and interpretation there may already be, one has to restructure and reinterpret it once again in one's own individual way"[3]. For a complete knowledge of one's self, the presence of the 'other' is indispensable and the paradigmatic pattern of the 'other' may be the inanimate matter or man himself. We may say, "what constitutes the 'other' is primarily the realm of persons with whom

one comes in direct contact of some sort or other and who help, obstruct, fulfil or frustrate one, in the realm of feelings or of action or both, and who are thus objects of concern on the part of most persons most of the time."[4] This 'otherness' of the 'other' in its turn becomes a necessary precondition for the feeling of alienation. We may say that man is a social construct and the very *Srṣṭi* or creation of man entails alienation. "Alienation is woven into the very texture of man. The causes of alienation may be found to range from the trauma of birth to Original Ignorance or Original Sin ... whatever the causes and however they are conceived, 'alienation' describes that feature of the human situation which provides its most fundamental structural characteristic, without which man ceases to be a man and becomes either a beast or a God"[5]. The presence of alienation involves a necessity in any human situation and even Marx was convinced that, "alienation could never be absent except in a mythical past or mythical future".[6] By extending the same logic we may say that alienation is not only a pervasive feature in created individuals, but also characterizes the groups, societies or cultures. We are however not going to discuss the implications of alienation within the scope of this paper although, "between the alienation and the overcoming of alienation lies the eternal dialectic of man, at all levels and in all dimensions".[7] But one thing is certain. In the Indian context, the concept of 'other' has been abolished completely by the Vedāntin-s and the Buddhists also have successfully sidetracked the issue.

III

The problem of alienation may however be minimized in the context of Indian culture with its associated belief of creation as the outcome of a Cosmic Order. The whole-part relationship in the context of an organic society like Indian may help to minimize alienation. Attempts may also be made to see alienation from the perspective of philosophical anthropology which studies becoming as the essence of being. Prof. J E Boodin's theory of 'Social Mind'[8] may also prove to be helpful in this context. Each person according to the theory is a product both of its biological and sociological heritage because each person not only influences its own bodily or cellular behaviour, but also the behavioral pattern of the group to which it belongs. In this scheme the pre-existence of a social mind not only helps him to interact with the group but also makes each created person unique and novel. Dr. Boodin social mind determines the personality of man in a similar manner in which he is determined by his molecular structure because Boodin considered Sociology as ultimate a science as Physics.

To conclude let us to back to the discussion of Buddhist framework. The Buddhists' rejection of alienation goes in a different direction altogether from what have been discussed just now. Instead of minimizing the problem of alienation the Buddhists have tried to dissolve it outright within the framework of a process philosophy. Here we are confronted with the consequences of momentariness in which, "the rejection of a permanent entity underlying psychological and physical states meant that persons ere assimilated in one important respect to the rest of

nature. Permanent substances having been banished from his metaphysics, the Buddha reinterpreted the transcendental goal, *nirvāṇa* not as a substance with which the saint becomes identified, but rather as a state - a permanent state".[9]

To counter this point we may say, the existence of a person from a conventional point of view also assumes some sort of a substantive notion of person. That, which is conventional is social as well. Hence a 'person' by convention is a social person and the issue of alienation still persists in the Buddhist framework.

NOTES

1. Jacobson, N.P., *Buddhism, The Religion of Analysis*, Carbodale : Southern Illinois University Press, 1970, p. 138.
2. Ibid, p. 65.
3. Daya Krishna, "Alienation : Positive & Negative", *Diogenes* No. 72, 1969, p. 41.
4. Ibid, p. 40
5. Ibid, p. 42
6. Ibid, p. 44
7. Ibid, p. 41
8. A fairly good treatment of Prof. J E Boodin's theory is available in Bahm, A.J., *Philosophy : An Introduction*, Asian Publishing House, Bombay, 1964, pp. 230-32.
9. Smart, N., *Doctrine and Argument in Indian Philosophy*. Allen and Unwin, London, 1964, p. 28.

X

A NOTE ON THE VAIŚEṢIKA THEORY OF CREATION

Amita Chatterjee

Theories concerning the genesis of the universe form part either of cosmogony or of cosmology. Both cosmogony and cosmology deal with the origin and development of the universe. But cosmogonical accounts are generally associated with mythologies whereas cosmology is a branch of philosophy, or of astronomy/ astrophysics. Thus distinguished, cosmogony and cosmology appear to be methodologically different. Cosmogony represents the primitive man's attempt at explaining the universe, and therefore usually incorporates 'symbolic narrative of the beginning of the world as understood in a particular tradition'. Cosmogonic or creation myths are thought to be accounts which are rich in imagination but particularly lacking in reason. Philosophical cosmolo_ arises out of rationalization of myths. Scientific cosmology is an outcome of the combined efforts of the astronomers and the theoretical physicists endeavouring to construct models of the physical universe as a whole.

I feel that I should add a note of caution at this point. By drawing attention to the methodological distinctions between cosmogony and cosmology I am not trying to debase the former in comparison with the latter. For cosmogonic myths are of utmost importance. All other types of myths are modelled on them. Besides, we can determine the bearing of man in the universe, the basic pattern of life and culture only by deciphering the cosmogonic myth symbols. What I want to emphasize is that cosmogony and cosmology move in two different plains, hence different techniques of interpretation and different standards of evaluation are to be employed in study of these two fields.

The above-mentioned divisions, however, fail to apply to the Indian context. In Indian cultural scene science, philosophy and mythology were rarely kept apart. That is why, in the Purāṇa-s (generally translated as mythologies) we find various accounts of the beginning and growth of the universe, poetic as well as philosophical. Moreover, we cannot rule out the possibility that some such Purāṇic accounts are derived from observations of the ancient Indian scientists though they are always presented in literary garb. Of course, I do not mean by this that there is any dearth of legends of gods and goddesses in the Purāṇa-s or all the stories are to be interpreted scientifically. But the accounts of *Sṛṣṭi* (creation) and *Pralaya* (dissolu-

tion) which I shall mentioned in this note should be included within cosmology even though these have not deviated from the Purāṇic accounts.

Amarkośa, the ancient Sanskrit lexicon of the sixth century A.D. defines a *Purana* by specifying its topic of discussion. It has been said that a *Purāṇa* should contain the following topics: (a) *Sarga* (creation), (b) *Pratisarga* (recreation of the world at the end of each cycle), (c) *Vaṃśa* (genealogies of gods, demons, sages and kings), (d) *Manvantara* (cosmic cycles each of which is ruled over by a Manu), and (e) *Vaṃśānucarita* (accounts of royal dynasties). It is no wonder, therefore, that all philosophical theories of *Srsti* and *Pralaya* are traceable to some one or the other of the Purāṇa-s.

The Purāṇa-s are diverse, so are the accounts of the genesis of the world. For our convenience, I shall group these accounts under three broad heads disregarding for the time being some points of difference. (1) The universe is created by the will of God out of eternal physical atoms. (2) The universe evolves out of *Prakṛti*, the prime matter, in proximity of *Puruṣa* or the spiritual principle. (3) The universe has always been there and there has been no beginning and there will be no end either. The rationale behind such a grouping is that these are the views backed by the leading orthodox philosophers of India. The first view has been put forward by the Nyāya - Vaiśeṣika philosophers, the second by the Sāṃkhya and the Vedānta schools and the third has been upheld by the Mīmāṃsaka-s. The second view has many variants. But I shall not enter into their details since here I propose to highlight some of the interesting features of the Vaiśeṣika account of creation.

It is, however, doubtful whether any of the above theories can be said to be the theory of creation, in the literal sense of the word 'creation'. That the answer is a clear no in cases of the second and the third view is obvious. The Vaiśeṣika view can be considered a theory of creation in-so-far as they admit a creator God. But unlike the Christian theory, here God does not create the material constituents of the universe. In Christian doctrine, on the other hand, God creates the universe out of nothing. So, according to the Christian theory the ontological dependence of the universe on God is total.

Let us now concentrate on the Vaiśeṣika account of creation and dissolution as found in Praśastapada's **Padārthadharma Saṃgraha**. It is said that at the end of one hundred years of *Brahmā*, *Brahmā* that creates all living beings in that particular cycle becomes liberated from his body. All that time Lord Maheśwara wishes to provide some respite to all living beings and that is why he wills to dissolve the universe. It so happens that the force of *adrsta* residing in all souls also ceases to function simultaneously. But *adṛṣṭa* is the binding force underlying formation of bodies, senses and the gross physical elements out of basic physical particles. Consequently, no further effects are produced, no new bodies are created. Then starts the process of disintegration of all produced objects. The atoms constituting such objects gets separated and all produced objects are destroyed, or to be more precise, reduced to the minutest particles or *paramāṇu-s*.

It is well-known that the Vaiśeṣika-s admit four types of elementary particles in their ontology - earth atoms, water atoms, fire atoms and air atoms. At the time of

dissolution, all earth is reduced to earth atoms, all water to water atoms, all fire to fire atoms and all air to air atoms in this specific order. So even during *pralaya*, everything is not destroyed. Atoms and souls being eternal, disintegrated atoms together with their *visesa-s* and disembodied souls of all *jīva-s* along with their *adṛṣṭa* and *samskāra-s* (dispositions) remain in tact. This type of *pralaya* or dissolution is, therefore, called *khaṇḍa pralaya* or partial dissolution in the Vaiśeṣika literature.

Then once again, Lord Maheśwara wishes to create the universe so that all souls can enjoy or suffer the consequences of their past deeds. This divine will to create is transmitted to the *adṛṣṭa-s* of all souls. So we find that the divine will which brought about destruction by disintegration of atoms at the time of dissolution also brings forth the universe at the time of creation by reintegrating atoms. That is, the divine will alone unaccompanied by body is responsible for creation. Now the binding force *adṛṣṭa*, whose function was suspended before, starts functioning once again. The kinetic function of this *adṛṣṭa*, moved by the will of God, establishes contact between souls and atoms and at first air atoms are activated. Air atoms come into contact with one another and thus *dvyānuka-s* (dyads) are formed and then *tryānuka-s* (triads) and so on. Thus air (*vāyu*) comes into being. Next water atoms combine to form all waters in the same manner. Then originate the solid earth and the glowing fiery bodies from earth atoms and fire atoms respectively. When four gross elements thus originate, the primordial egg is created from the elements of fire and earth. When this stage of creation is reached Lord creates *Brahmā* from the primordial egg and directs *Brahmā* to create the rest of the universe. *Brahmā* is endowed with wisdom (*jñāna*), detachment (*vairāgya*) and power (*aiśvarya*) to the fullest possible extent. As directed by Lord Maheśvara *Brahmā* then completes the creation. *Brahmā* arranges for the proper distribution of merits and demerits to all souls. In accordance with their *adṛṣṭa Brahmā* gives the souls their respective bodies. As a result, different types of living beings with their past impressions come into existence. The classification of human beings into Brāhmin, Kṣatrīya, etc. is also due to *Brahmā*. It is said in the text that the *Brāhmaṇa-s* originated from the mouth of *Brahmā*, the *Kṣatrīya-s* from his arms, the *Vaiśya-s* from his knees and the *Śudra-s* from his feet.

Let us now analyze some of the salient features of the Vaiśeṣika account of creation:

(1) The creation has been described in two stages, *Brahmā* has been deputized to supervise the distribution of pleasures and pains of different beings. But all Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika texts do not agree on this point. In most of the texts *Iśvara* alone is said to be the creator and destroyer of the universe. He brings about creation or dissolution in accordance with the accumulated merits and demerits of the *jīva-s*.

It may be asked, why did the Vaiśeṣika-s at all bring in *Brahmā*? Couldn't *Iśvara*, as conceived in their philosophy, alone create the universe? Surely, *Iśvara* could. But exclusion of *Brahmā* from the process of creation would have been a deviation from the Purāṇic tradition. *Brahmā* is a central figure in cosmogonic myths performing different functions, creation and organization of the universe, creation

by progenation, creation of death, determination of the fate of individuals, granting boons to demons, preservation of *dharma* in all world. It has also been mentioned in the Veda-s that the whole of the universe has evolved out of the primordial egg and *Prajāpati Brahmā* has created *Prajā-s* (creatures). So to remain true to this tradition, the Vaiśeṣika-s give a role to *Brahmā* which, could have easily been performed by *Iśvara*.

(2) Praśastapada has described the process of dissolution first but as there can be no dissolution if there were no creation, we have to admit that dissolution is preceded by creation and creation again is preceded by dissolution and so on *ad infinitum*. Thus according to the Vaiśeṣika-s, the process of creation is beginningless in the sense that no one can tell at what point of time the first universe came into being. The cycles of creation and partial dissolution will continue till the day of *mahāpralaya* (complete dissolution). But to bring about complete dissolution of the universe sufferings and enjoyments of fruits of actions of all *jīva-s* must come to an end. As liberation of all *jīva-s* is an attainable ideal, we have to admit theoretically that the universe will come to an end after which there will be no further creation. Even then there will be souls and atoms. But in absence of the binding force, *adrsta*, nothing will be created. In view of the above, we can conclude that the Vaisesika theory is a theory of "multiple" or "continuous creation" and not of one-time or "Unique" creation as admitted by the Christian theology.

(3) Though the Vaiśeṣika philosophers believe in universal reign of causation and a cause, to them, is always an invariable antecedent of the effect, yet their theory of creation is imbued with a purpose. Lord Maheśwara wills to create the world with a special purpose in view. The purpose is to let *jīva-s* enjoy and suffer the consequences of their actions and ultimately to get liberated.

(4) The Vaiśeṣika philosophers following *Smṛti* has specified one cycle as one hundred years of one *Brahmā*. *Brahmā* has been created by Lord Maheśvara so he will also cease to exist at a specific point of time. So we find that each cycle of creation and dissolution is of specific and equal duration. Such a theory presupposes belief in regularity in the natural process. Belief in the cosmic order was also extended to a belief in the moral order as is evident from their emphasis on nature and function of *adṛṣṭa-s* of the *jīva-s*.

(5) Another important feature of the Vaiśeṣika theory of creation is their conception of time. In Vaiśeṣika ontology time has been declared eternal and all-pervasive. So there was time before creation at a particular cycle and there will be time after partial dissolution. This point distinguishes their theory from the Church doctrine. According to the Christian theory of creation, God created time along with the world. The concept of time becomes meaningful only in the context of the world. So they rule out such questions as 'What did God do before creation?' as meaningless.

(6) Another important point will emerge if we analyze the notion of the 'Year of *Brahmā*' following the literature. The period of time considered a year by human beings is equal to one day of the gods. Three hundred and sixty days of gods constitute a year for the gods. One thousand years of gods plus twelve days make

the four epochs (*caturyugaṃ*) and thousand such *caturyuga* constitute a day of a *Brahmā*. As according to the ancient calculation, a year had three hundred a sixty days, so a year of *Brahmā* will also comprise of three hundred and sixty days of *Brahmā*. And one hundred such years constitute a cycle (*kalpa*).

This calculation was not pure fiction. They might have calculated wrongly but definitely followed a method prescribed by the then astronomy. I am not in a position to substantiate this claim but people well-versed in ancient Indian astronomical sciences will be able to cite relevant texts. Modern Western astronomy also upholds that our universe came into existence millions and millions of years ago at the Big Bang and will be destroyed at the Big Crunch. But who can guarantee that the calculation done by the western astrophysicists is the right calculation?

(7) The analysis of the notion of the year of *Brahmā* also makes it evident that to the ancient Indian sages the concept of relative time was available. Before Einstein such a notion would have appeared ludicrous but now the modern science advocates the concept of relative time. I am not claiming that Indian philosophers anticipated the *Theory of Relativity*. Such a claim will definitely be anachronistic. But it is plausible to maintain that their knowledge of astronomy helped them to arrive at such a conclusion. The ancient Indians spoke about different *loka-s*. The human beings, gods and *Brahmā* do not inhabit the same *loka*. These *loka-s* may not even be situated in the same galaxy. They were also aware that the rotation of the earth around its own axis caused day and night and duration of a year depends on the distance of the earth from the sun. The more distant planet or a galaxy is from the sun the longer will be the year for its inhabitants. This, I think, explain their theory.

(8) The Vaiśeṣika philosophers arrived at their atomic theory purely by philosophical speculation. Results arrived through experiments of nuclear physics were totally unknown to them. So their account of combination and dissolution of atoms do not tally with their western counterpart. But credit should be given to them for their concept of *adṛṣṭa* as the binding force. Modern physics recognizes four such forces and hopes ardently for their unification. To the Vaiśeṣika-s, *adṛṣṭa* was primarily a moral concept but they gave it an ontological status and considered it the force that helps in conglomeration of atoms.

(9) To a discerning mind it will be evident that for creation of the physical world the Vaiśeṣika-s really do not require God. *Adṛṣṭa* as the binding force would have made God superfluous but for God's role of the moral governor of the world. *Adṛṣṭa*, being an unintelligent force, is not capable of distributing the moral dessert equitably in accordance with the acts performed by the individual agents. So to avoid moral anarchy the Vaiśeṣika-s had to introduce God in their theory of creation.

The Vaisesika theory of creation can be given the status of cosmology, though the philosophers tried their best to propound their theory in consonance with the prevalent cosmogenic myth. No doubt it is speculative cosmology. But definitely they were trying to construct a model of the universe. The kind of model that a cosmologist usually builds is never material but conceptual. He uses such a model to interpret observational data already available. It will not be too gross an error to claim that the Vaiśeṣika-s were also trying to explain and interpret some observa-

tional data. But as they combine with it their moral and metaphysical theories, their cosmology gained a different dimension.

In modern scientific cosmology, there are varying theories of creation and varying models of the universe. There are cosmologists who support 'a unique creation' beginning at a particular time; again there are cosmologists who uphold the theory of 'continuous' creation. The second law of Thermodynamics provides support to the former theory whereas the theory of steady state universe backs the latter. Combining quantum mechanics with general relativity Hawking and Penrose offers another theory in which there would be no boundary to space-time; "The boundary condition of the universe is that it has no boundary. The universe would be completely self-contained and not affected by anything outside itself. It would neither be created nor be destroyed. It would just *be*".

But we do not know as yet which of the rival models, or whether any of them, is *the* model of creation. Nor do we know whether attainment of such knowledge is within the capability of human intellect. We can only fervently hope for the best. Till such time we shall continue to balance the pros and cons of different theories of creation and dissolution. Meanwhile, I am happy to conclude that the theories of creation and dissolution propounded by Indian philosophers are neither absurd nor ludicrous provided their mythological components can be properly reinterpreted.

XI

SṚṢṬI : A PHYSICIST'S PERSPECTIVE

Partha Ghosh

Although physics and philosophy are strongly related, they are not identical. The methods of physics and traditional philosophy are different. A physical theory has to satisfy two criterias: (i) internal consistency, and (ii) external confirmation. In other words, it must provide both a mathematically satisfactory as well as an accurate description of observed physical phenomena. In doing so, it usually raises a number of philosophical issues. It is also necessary to remember that physical theories are all tentative. The inadequacy of a particular theory, however paradigmatic it may be, cannot be used as an argument proving the inadequacy of the scientific method itself.

With these few words as a preamble, let me launch straight into the subject matter of the essay. If the observed expansion of the universe (discovered by Hubble) is extrapolated backwards in time, we arrive at the conclusion that the universe must have been denser and hotter in the past and must have begun in a catastrophic hot Big Bang with infinite density and temperature. Such a condition is called a 'singularity' because the equations of Einstein's general relativity break down or become meaningless in such a condition. It becomes impossible therefore to extrapolate beyond this singularity and ask : what happened before the Big Bang? The Big Bang acts like the edge of space- time : there is nothing beyond it. It is akin to the moment of creation. In 1981 the jesuits convened a scientific meeting in the Vatican to discuss cosmology. They were keen to avoid making the mistake they made with Galileo. At this conference the Pope gave an audience to the scientists and said that it was alright for them to investigate what happened after the Big Bang but that they should not investigate into the Big Bang itself since it was an act of God.

The Big Bang model has a number of philosophically unsatisfactory features which the Steady State model attempted to rectify. An edge to space-time makes room for God and creation out of nothing. The Steady State model postulates that the universe was never created : it has always looked exactly the same from all points within it and will continue to look the same for all times to come. Since the universe is known to expand and create voids between galaxies, it cannot look the same from all points at all times unless these voids get filled up by the continuous creation of matter (albeit at a very, very tiny rate). The one-time creation of the entire universe in a Big Bang is thus replaced by continuous creation. Unfortunately,

current empirical evidence is strongly in favour of an ever changing evolving universe with a dense, hot beginning whose fossil persists to this day as the 2.70° Kelvin micro-wave background radiation discovered by Penzias and Wilson. So we are, for the present, stuck with the Big Bang.

The Big Bang model raises a number of questions that the general theory of relativity is unable to answer:

i. What is beyond the edge of space-time?
ii. Why was the early universe so hot?
iii. Why is the universe so uniform on a large scale (large compared to inter-galactic distances)?
iv. What was the origin of the density fluctuations that resulted in the formation of stars and galaxies?
v. Why did the universe start out with so nearly the critical rate of expansion and is still expanding at nearly the critical rate? (According to general relativity, there are three possibilities : an ever-expanding universe, a reconstructing universe that will end in a Big Crunch and a border-line case with a critical rate of expansion).

Then there is the problem of the arrow of time : all fundamental theories of mechanics and all field theories are time-symmetric. They do no distinguish between the past and the future. Yet, there is a fundamental phenomenological theory of heat flow which defines the arrow of time as the direction in which the entropy of the universe increases. This is the famous second law of thermodynamics. Entropy is a measure of the amount of energy that gets transformed into an unusable form in a physical or chemical process. How does such an arrow arise? We do not have an answer as yet. Besides this 'thermodynamic arrow', there are at least two other arrows of time. We are directly aware of the progression of time : we remember the past but not the future. We may call this the 'psychological arrow'. Then there is the 'cosmological arrow', the direction in which the universe expands rather than contracts. Are these three arrows linked? What makes them all point in the same direction? We do not know for sure, but there are some tentative suggestions as we shall see later.

Now, there are several possible answers to the questions raised by the hot Big Bang model and the arrows of time. They are all partial and tentative. One possible answer is to say that God choose the laws and the initial configuration of the universe in a manner incomprehensible to man. This is essentially the Pope's view. Why did He then choose to let it evolve in a manner that we *can* comprehend? As Einstein used to ask : how much choice did God have in constructing the universe?

A second possibility is that the initial configuration was chaotic. This is because chaotic conditions are more probable than orderly ones. If you are carrying a box of chocolates nicely arranged inside it and you accidentally drop it, the arrangement will be destroyed. Someone will have to make an effort to put it back into order. So, the initial configuration of the universe was most likely to have been totally chaotic.

But then the question that arises is : why is the universe so uniform today on a large scale in spite of the increase of entropy?

A third partial answer could be the *'anthropic principle'*. How important is consciousness and intelligence for the universe as a whole? Are the laws specially designed to allow for the existence of intelligent life? Or, is consciousness and intelligence mere accidents of biological evolution? There are two versions of the *anthropic principle*. According to the *weak* principle, the conditions happen to be just right for the existence of intelligent life on earth right now. There are striking numerical relation among the fundamental physical constants (e.g., the gravitational constant, the mass of the proton, the age of the universe, etc.) some of which change very slowly with time. The present epoch coincides with the life-time of a main-sequence star like the sun. At any other epoch there would be no intelligent life around to measure these constants and discover these striking relations which hold only here and now! This is a beautiful and entirely acceptable result. Some venture to go even further and put forward the *strong anthropic principle*. They assert that if the laws and the fundamental constants had been any different, we would not be in this universe but in some other one. Here we are not talking of spatio-temporal locations that are favourable in a given universe but within the infinitude of possible universes. Scientifically this is some what dubious. It introduces more universes than are known to exist or seem to be required. So it does not satisfy the principle of Occam's razor. It also runs against the whole tide of the history of science which has consistently displaced man from the centre of the universe (Ptolemaic system) and relegated him to an insignificant position inside it. (The earth is one of the planets in the solar system which occupies an insignificant position in our galaxy which is one among billions and billions of galaxies). The upshot of all this is that it seems that the initial state of the universe must have been very carefully chosen if the hot Big Bang model is to be correct up to the beginning of time. Was it then an act of God intended to create beings like us?

A rather attractive scenario has been proposed by Alan Guth which seems to be able to explain how, many different initially configurations could have evolved to something like the present universe. His proposal is that the very early universe went through a short period of very rapid expansion called the *inflationary* phase which smoothened out all initial irregularities just as the wrinkles and irregular shapes of deflated balloons are smoothened out when inflated. This can only happened if the universe expands at nearly the critical rate. However, the density fluctuations necessary for the formation of galaxies still remain rather large in inflationary models of the universe. There is also the problem of a 'graceful exit' - the inflationary phase must end and result in the standard scenario that agrees so well with observations. There does not seem to be any natural way of ensuring this. Finally, it has been shown that not every initially configuration would lead to a universe like the one we live in. So, the question of choice in constructing the universe (also known as 'fine tuning') remains.

Finally, I would like to mention Stephen Hawking's most interesting proposal that space-time has no edge and the universe has no boundary at all. This,

according to Hawking, would be possible if one were to combine Einstein's general relativity (the basis for gravitational theories) with quantum mechanics, the theory of micro-processes. There are indications that the Big Bang singularity of general relativity might be cured by quantum fluctuations. The quantum mechanical description of the universe can be given in a space-time in which time is treated exactly on the same footing as the three coordinates of space. (This is not the case in Einstein's theory of relativity in which space-time has an indefinite metric which distinguishes time from the spatial coordinates). Space-time would then be like the spherical curved surface of the earth, only with two more dimensions, which is finite but without edges. You will not fall off the earth if you keep walking towards the horizon. So, there is no need to worry about the behaviour of the universe at the edges of its boundary because there is no boundary. With no edge to space-time, there is no need for God. The universe is completely self-contained and not affected by anything outside itself. As Hawking puts it, "It would neither be created nor destroyed. It would just *BE*".

The no-boundary proposal implies that the universe is 'closed' and will contract after expansion. If that happens and the second law holds good, then the thermodynamic and cosmological arrows will no longer point in the same direction as now : disorder would continue to increase in the contracting phase. Now, there are reasons to believe that intelligent life would not be possible without the second law. In order to survive and be able to think, human beings have to consume food which is energy in an ordered form with small entropy, and convert it into heat which is a disordered form of energy with large entropy. This suggests why the thermodynamic and psychological arrows of time must coincide. But the question that remains is: Why should we find ourselves in the expanding phase rather than the contracting phase? One possibility suggested by Hawking at one time was that the direction of time reverses when the contraction begins so that we always find ourselves in an expanding universe. (According to Hawking this is a smaller price to pay than the mathematical absurdity of a Big Bang singularity). Then the three arrows of time would always coincide.

Although Hawking's 'no boundary' hypothesis is consistent with the thermodynamic arrow of time, it does not explain how life which is a highly ordered system with low entropy evolved in a world in which the second law holds. A new insight has been offered by Ilya Prigogine and his group. They have demonstrated that the connection between entropy and disorder (once he falls, Humpty Dumpty cannot be put together again.) holds only when there is thermodynamic equilibrium. In the absence of such equilibrium, non-linear effects can become very important, and very small and almost imperceptible perturbations which would be damped out in equilibrium conditions, can get enormously magnified, leading to the formation of new structures which Prigogine calls "dissipative structures". Near equilibrium, material systems are insensitive to their environment : matter is 'blind'. Far away from equilibrium they become extremely sensitive to their environment : they begin to "see" and "feel" their environment. Think of pot of water on a heater. In the beginning heat is only slowly transferred from the bottom to the adjacent layers

above by conduction. As the hot water accumulating below is lighter than the colder water above, the centre of gravity of the water in the pot rises till it becomes highly unstable. Then the slightest rise in temperature causes it to topple - billions of water molecules suddenly begin to feel the earth's gravity most acutely and start moving together in orderly convection currents, and the transfer of heat becomes more rapid. Under certain conditions hexagonal circulation patterns called Benard patterns can also be formed. Thus order can emerge out of chaos in non-equilibrium situations. Dissipative forces underlying the law of increase of entropy can act as the agent for the creation of novel forms on earth in non-equilibrium conditions.

These dissipative structures are quite different from equilibrium structures like crystals. Crystals decay because of their interaction with their environment. If you could isolate crystals from their environment, they would live for ever. Dissipative structures, on the other hand, can only survive if they are allowed to interact with their environment. They gather matter and energy from their environment, process them and return a part of it back to the environment. If you cut them off from their environment, they would die. Here is possibly the physical principle that underlies our social and moral basis. We depend on our material and social environment for our sustenance. When we forget that and want to isolate ourselves and build up our own puny ego, we suffer and die.

So, if we put Hawking's and Prigogine's ideas together, we can say : "The universe would not only just *Be*, it would also pass from *Being* to *Becoming*" Whether the universe was created or not, creation is not a one-time affair : it goes on in the universe all the time and will go on until entropy is maximised and total equilibrium is achieved and no further processes are possible. That will be the ultimate 'heat death' of the universe. Time will then stand still. Will the whole process start all over again? If so, what will trigger it? God? Quantum fluctuations?

We do not know as yet.

XII

शब्द-सृष्टिः

अवधबिहारी त्रिपाठी

श्री गणेशाय नमः

अथ शब्दसृष्टिर्विमृश्यते । अयि भोः अनेकशास्त्राध्ययनाध्यापनपूतान्तःकरणाः विद्वन्मानस मानसहंसा विद्वद्वरेण्या महाभागाः ! माननीयाः ! नाविदितं तत्रभवतां भवतां विदतां यद् वैयाकरणा अप्यद्वैतसिद्धान्तवादिन इति । तत्र वैयाकरणसिद्धान्तनये शब्दब्रह्मण एव जगदिदं विवर्तरुपं निखिलं प्रपञ्चरूपमिति । न केवलं सृष्टेरेवापितु स्थितिसंहारकारणमपि शब्द एव । मुखं व्याकरणं स्मृतमिति वेदानां व्याकरणं मुखमिति व्याकरणदर्शनमन्तरा वेदपरिचितिरपि न स्यात् । यस्य निःश्वसितं वेदाः यो वेदेभ्योऽखिलं जगत् निर्ममे तमहं वन्दे विद्यातीर्थमहेश्वरमिति वेदानां सृष्टिमूलत्वात् तेषां च शब्दभिन्नत्वात् वैयाकरणसिद्धान्ते शब्दानां नित्यत्वं वेदानां चापौरूषेयत्वमिति सर्वैरेव स्वीक्रियते । एतच्च समर्थितं श्रीमता पतञ्जलिना महाभाष्यकारेण ' सिद्धे शब्दार्थ सम्बन्धे' इति वार्तिकव्याख्यानप्रसङ्गे वार्तिकेनानेन शब्दस्य तदर्थस्य शब्दार्थयोः सम्बन्धस्य च नित्यत्वम् एवञ्च शब्दार्थयोः स्वं रूपं शब्दस्य संज्ञीति वदता पाणिनिनापि अर्थविशिष्टस्यैव शब्दस्य बोध्यत्वमभाणि । तयोः सम्बन्धश्च अभेद एव तादात्म्यरूपः । तादात्म्यञ्च तद्भिन्नत्वे सति तदभेदेन प्रतीयमानत्वम् । अतएव श्रोत्रेण शब्दस्यैव ग्रहणं भवतीति शब्दं शृण्वन्नर्थमशृण्वमिति निर्विवादं वदति । सम्बन्धत्वञ्च - सम्बन्धिद्वयभिन्नत्वे सति द्विष्ठत्वे सत्याश्रयतया विशिष्टबुद्धिनियामकत्वम् इति नैव नैयायिकोक्ताया इच्छायाः सम्बन्धत्वम् ।

अत्र व्याकरणस्य शब्दानुशासनस्य कैयटादिसम्मतं मुख्यप्रयोजनत्वमिति स्वीकारेऽपि गौणप्रयोजनं रक्षादीनां प्रयोजनप्रयोजनानि तेऽसुरा इत्यादीनां प्रयोजनत्वमुक्तम् । महावैयाकरणेन श्रीमता भर्तृहरिणा शब्दतत्त्वस्य ब्रह्मत्वम् 'अनादिनिधनं ब्रह्म शब्दतत्त्वं यदक्षरं विवर्ततेऽर्थ भावेन प्रक्रियाजगतो यतः' इति निरूपितम्, अपि च विवर्तवादोऽपि समर्थितः । एवञ्च स्फोटवादिनो वैयाकरणाः अष्टौ स्फोटान् वर्णपद - वाक्यभेदेन, जातिव्यक्तिभेदेन, सखण्डाखण्डभेदेन च स्वीकृतवन्तः । यद्यपि पदे न वर्णा विद्यन्ते वर्णेष्ववयवा न च, वाक्यात्पदानामत्यन्तं प्रविवेको न कश्चनेति सिद्धान्तेन अखण्डवाक्यस्फोटस्यैव स्वीकृतिरिति अद्वैतवादः समर्थितो भवति तथापि एकाक्षरस्यैकपदस्यापि वाक्यत्वं वैयाकरणैः समर्थितम् । तच्च विस्तरभयादत्र नोद्घ्रियते । शब्दस्य वर्णसमुदायत्वात् वर्णस्य च नित्यत्वात् व्यपदेशिवद्भावेन तस्यापि शब्दत्वात् अक्षरं ब्रह्म परममिति आर्षवचनेन अक्षरशब्दस्य न क्षरतीति व्युत्पत्त्या ब्रह्मत्वं नित्यत्वं च समर्थितम् । अत्र श्री ॐ इत्येकारं ब्रह्मेति भगवदुक्तिश्च प्रमाणम् । महता मुक्तकण्ठेन भगवता भाष्यकारेणापि 'नित्याः शब्दा नित्येषु, नाम शब्देषु कूटस्थैर्वर्णैरविचालिभिर्भवितव्यमनपायोपजनविकारिभिरिति' सिद्धान्तितम् । 'एकमेवाद्वितीयं ब्रह्मे'ति श्रुत्या वर्णादीनामप्येकत्वम् यथा एक एव देवदत्तः कुत्रचिज्जटिलः कुत्रापि शिखी कुत्रचिच्च मुण्डी एवमेव काश्यां काशीस्थः बङ्गेषु बङ्गीयो नानाप्रान्तीयो वा भवति । तथैव तात्वादिस्थानभेदेन भेदमादाय व्यवहारे भेदो दृश्यते । एतेन व्यावहारिकीसत्तया काल्पनिको भेदः । सोऽयं

ककारः, सोऽयं गकार इत्यादि प्रत्यभिज्ञयापि समर्थ्यते । तदेवेदं कार्षापणं यत् काश्यां गृहीतमिति । तत्त्वमसि इत्यादिवाक्यवत् । एतेन एकस्यैव शब्दात्मनो ब्रह्मणो जगदिदं प्रपञ्चं भासते । यद्यपि ॐ इत्यत्र एकाक्षरेऽपि 'अकारो वासुदेव स्यात् उकारस्तु महेश्वरः अर्धमात्रामहेश्वरी' इत्याद्युक्त्या सार्द्धद्वयमात्रिकस्यापि एकाक्षरत्वं समर्थितम् । अतएव शाक्ताः 'शब्दात्मिका सुविमलर्ग्यजुषां निधानमुद्गीथरम्यपदपाठवताञ्च साम्नां, देवीत्रयी भगवती भवभावनाय वार्ता च सर्वजगतां परमार्तिहन्त्री' इत्यादिवचनैः शब्दात्मकस्यैव कर्तृत्वादिं परमार्त्तिहन्त्रीत्वादिकं समर्थयन्ति ।

तस्माद्वा एतस्मादात्मनः आकाशः सम्भूतः आकाशाद्वायुः, वायोरग्निः, अग्नेरापः, अद्भ्यः पृथिवी, पृथिव्या ओषधयः ओषधिभ्योऽन्नम्, अन्नात्पुरूषः इति तैत्तिरीयोपनिषदापि प्रतिपाद्यते ।

वागेव विश्वा भूतानीति श्रुत्या च वाच एव जगदुपादानकारणरूपेण प्रतिपादितम् । श्रीमता पतञ्जलिना भाष्यकारेणापि एक शब्दः सम्यग् ज्ञातः सुष्ठु प्रयुक्तश्चेत् स्वर्गे लोके च कामधुक् भवतीति ज्ञानपूर्वकशब्दप्रयोगस्यैव देवानां कृते मानवानाञ्च कृते कामधुक्त्वं प्रतिपादितम् । वचो मनसि प्रतिष्ठितमित्यादि । परा वाङ् मूलचक्रस्था पश्यन्ती नाभिदेशगा हृदिस्था मध्यमा ज्ञेया वैखरी कण्ठदेशगा । वैखर्या तु कृतो नादः परश्रवणगोचरः इति मूलचक्रस्थाया एव वाचः विषये सा काष्ठा सा परा गतिरित्युक्तम् ।

उपर्युक्तवचनैः शब्दस्य सर्वशक्तिमत्त्वं, कर्तुमकर्त्तुमन्यथाकर्तुं सामर्थ्यं च न तिरोहितं केषामपि । एवञ्च कारणगुणाः कार्येषु अवश्यमेव तिष्ठन्तीति या शक्तयः पुरुषे अन्नादिषु, ओषधिषु, रोगादिनिवर्तकत्वं बुभुक्षादिशान्तिकर्तृत्वं च सन्ति ताश्च अवश्यं पृथिव्याम्, इत्यत्र नास्ति सन्देहलेशोऽपि । एवञ्च पृथिव्याः कारणभूतास्वप्सु अपि सन्त्येव । येन जलचिकित्सादिना रोगादिशान्तिर्भवत्येव एवमग्नावपि केषामपि नाविदितम् । तथैव वाष्पचिकित्सया रोगादिशान्तिः दृष्टा । तत्कारणभूते वाया अपि, वायुकारणभूते च शब्देऽपि महत्त्ववयुक्ताकाशे शब्दात्मकेन मन्त्रेणाधिभौतिकाधिदैविकाध्यात्मिक-त्रिविधतापनिवृतिः भवत्येव । एवञ्च यथोत्पत्ति सूक्ष्मात् स्थूलस्य तथैव स्थितिरपि । किंबहुना स्थूलस्य सूक्ष्मे लयोऽपि भवत्येव । ब्रह्मविद् ब्रह्मैव भवतीति अद्वैतसिद्धान्तवादे ब्रह्मविदो ब्रह्मत्वं प्रतिपादितम् । तत्त्वमसीत्यादिमहावाक्यैः समर्थितम् । कस्यचित् कवेः शब्दे ब्रह्मणि निष्णातः परं ब्रह्माधिगच्छति इति साधूक्तिः प्रतिभाति । विश्वविश्रुतेन महाकाविना कालिदासेन रघुवंशमहाकाव्ये मङ्गलाचरणमाचरता

वागर्थाविव संपृक्तौ वागर्थप्रतिपत्तये ।
जगतः पितरौ वन्दे पार्वतीपरमेश्वरौ ।।

इत्युक्त्या हरविष्णू इव अर्द्धनारीश्वरपार्वतीपरमेश्वरा इव संपृक्तौ नित्यसम्बन्धौ वागर्था एव, अर्थात् अर्थविशिष्टः शब्द इव संपृक्तौ जगतः पितरौ स्तः । इत्युपमोपमेयभावेनार्थविशिष्टशब्देन सादृश्यं वर्णयता अभिन्नत्वं प्रत्यपादि । अर्थात् शब्दतत्त्वे स्फोटात्मके ब्रह्मणि कुशलः परमब्रह्माधिगच्छति । एतेन न ब्रह्मणि भेदः । स्फोटात्मन शब्दस्य एव परं ब्रह्मत्वं स्फुटति अस्मादिति अपादाने घञा स्फोटशब्दस्य निर्वचनीयत्वात् अत एव वैयाकरणाः स्फोटायनाः । ज्योतिर्वज्ज्ञानानि भवन्ति, इति भोष्योक्त्या ज्ञानस्य ज्योतिः स्वरुपतया अज्ञानान्धकारविनाशकत्वमपि सूचितम् । जगदिदम् - अग्नीषोमीयम्- चन्द्रमा मनसो जातः वचो मनसि

प्रतिष्ठितम् । वाचः ज्ञानस्वरूपत्वात् ब्रह्मणश्च ज्ञानस्वरूपत्वात् उभयत्राणि बृंहणत्वात् ब्रह्मत्वमिति हरिणाप्युक्तम्-

न सोऽस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके यः शब्दानुगमादृते ।
अनुविद्धमिवज्ञानं सर्वं शब्देन भासते ॥

अर्थात् शब्देनैव ज्ञानस्य प्रतीतिः भवति । ज्ञानमात्रं शब्दादेव भासते । यथात्मात्मनात्मानं वेत्तीत्यत्र शरीरावच्छिन्नकर्तृ अन्तःकरणावच्छिन्नं करणं, निरवच्छिन्नं निरीहं कर्म । एकस्यैव शब्दभेदाद् भेदः । असत्यपि लौकिकार्थे बन्ध्यासुतादिपदार्थानां बौद्धार्थमादायैवार्थवत्वात् प्रयोगाः भवन्ति तथा च कारिका -

अत्यन्तासत्यपि ह्यर्थे ज्ञानं शब्दः करोति च
अबाधात् प्रमामत्र स्वतः प्रामाण्यनिश्चताम् ।

तस्मात्-

करिणां शतमङ्गुल्या अग्रे क्रीडति नित्यशः
कर्णयोर्विवरं सिंहः प्रविश्य प्रतिगर्जति ।

इत्यादिशब्दानामुत्पद्यमानस्य शाब्दज्ञानस्यानुभवसिद्धतया नैव कदाचित् बाधसम्भवः किन्तु तज्ज्ञानविषयीभूतबाह्यार्थस्य बाधादप्रामाण्यं विषयस्याबाधाच्च सर्वत्रैव प्रामाण्यमिति तत्त्वम् ।

'नित्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म' इति शब्दस्य नित्यत्वं ज्ञानस्वरुपत्वम् अनन्तत्वञ्च इति । अत एव श्रीमता महाभाष्यकारेण 'वेदान्नो वैदिकाः शब्दाः सिद्धा लोकाच्च लौकिकाः' अनर्थकं व्याकरणमिति विप्रतिपन्नबुद्धिभ्यः सुहृद्भूत्वा आचार्यो शब्दशास्त्रमन्वाचष्टे यथा वेदमधीत्य त्वरिताः वकारो न भवन्त्विति शब्दशास्त्राध्ययनस्य प्रयोजननिरुपणावसरे चत्वारि, सुदेवोऽसि, वरुण इति इत्यादि महता कण्ठेन भाष्यकारः प्रावोचत् ।

1. चत्वारि शृङ्गाः त्रयोऽस्य पादा द्वे शीर्षे सप्त हस्तासोऽस्य ।
त्रिधा बद्धो वृषभो रोरवीति महो देवो मर्त्यां आ विवेश ।

2. चत्वारि वाक् परिमिता पदानि तानि विदुर्ब्राह्मणा ये मनीषिणः
गुहात्रीणि निहितानेङ्गयन्ति तुरीयां वाचो मनुष्या वदन्ति ।

3. सुदेवोऽसि वरुण यस्यते सप्तसिन्धवः
अनुक्षरन्ति काकुदं सूर्यं सुषिरानिव ।

1. चत्वारि - नामाख्यातोपसर्गनिपाताश्च, एते शृङ्गभूतानि । त्रयः कालाः - भूत - भविष्यद् - वर्तमानाः - अस्य पादाः । द्वे शीर्षे - शब्दात्मानौ नित्यः कार्यश्च । सप्त हस्तासो अस्य - सप्तविभक्तयः प्रथमादि सप्तमीपर्यन्ताः विभक्तयः अस्य शब्दब्रह्मणः । त्रिधा बद्धः - त्रिषु स्थानेषु बद्धः - उरसि-कण्ठे-शिरसि च इति । वृषभः वर्षणात् । रोरवीति - शब्दं करोति अयं महान् देवः शब्दस्वरुपः मर्त्यान् मरणधर्मशीलान् मनुष्यान् आविवेश अर्थात् मनुष्येषु एकत्वमवाप ।

2. वाचः चतस्रो वर्तन्ते । परा-पश्यन्ती-मध्यमा-वैखरी इत्यादयः । संयमनशीलः पुरुषः एताः चतस्रः दशाः वेत्ति, तिस्रः गुहायां प्रच्छन्नाः भूत्वा तिष्ठन्ति, परा-पश्यन्ती-मध्यमा- इति तिस्त्रः। अतः न चेष्टन्ते - निमिषन्ति अर्थात् निमेषशून्याः तिष्ठन्ति।

यद्यपि मध्यमा वाक् स्वसंवेद्या - जपादिकालगम्यास्ति, तथापि परश्रवणागोचरत्वात् परेषां कृते चेष्टारहिता एव। वाचस्तुरीयं चतुर्थम् -वैखरीनादमेव परे शृण्वन्ति , वदन्ति च मनुष्याः । अतएव अस्यां निखिले जगति मनुष्यसृष्टेरेव पूर्णत्वं प्रतिभाति, स्पष्टोच्चारणासम्भवात् अन्येषां तिरश्चां पश्वादीनां सृष्टिः नैव पूर्णतां भजते। नापि ते स्वाभिप्रायं प्रकाशने समर्थाः इति बोध्यम्। एवं च -

3. मालिन्यदूरीकरणार्थं वाग्वन्यपां सामर्थ्यं शास्त्रेषु प्रतिपादितम् इति नाविदितं तत्रभवतामपि । अत्र जलाधिष्ठातृत्वं वरूणत्वसम्पादनेन वरुणस्य सुदेवत्वम्, अग्नेश्च सुदेवत्वं, वायोरपि सुदेवत्वम् । यथा अग्निः अन्तश्छिद्रां लोहमयीं प्रतिमां दाहद्वारा निर्मलां करोति, वरुणः जलैः निर्मलतां प्रापयति यतो हि जलाधिष्ठातृत्वात् तस्य सप्त सिन्धवः आयत्तभूताः तथैव सप्तविभक्तिरुपाः शब्दस्वरुपायाः सप्तनद्यः सूर्म्यां सुषिरामिव प्रबाल्य अनेकजन्मान्तरीयाज्ञानान्धकारादीन् विनाश्य प्रबालयन्ति, ज्ञानतेजोभिः योजयति इति, अस्मासु सुदेवत्वं यथा स्यात् - ब्रह्मविद् ब्रह्मैव भवति शब्दशब्दज्ञयोरैक्यं सम्पद्यते । शब्द एव शब्दस्य ज्ञानस्वरूपत्वं देवस्वरूपत्वञ्च द्योतनात् देवः । मनुष्येषु बुद्धिरिन्द्रियाणि द्योतयति, बुद्धिमपि अहन्तत्त्वं द्योतयति तत् अहन्तत्त्वमपि यो देवो द्योतयति स शब्दब्रह्म एव तस्मात् शब्ददेवः महादेवः परमो देव इति । तथा च छान्दोग्योपनिषदि-देवा वै मृत्योर्बिभ्यतस्त्रयीं विद्यां प्राविशन् ते छन्दोभिरात्मनयाच्छादयन्। पदेभिराच्छादयँस्तच्छन्दसां छन्दस्त्वम्। [छान्दोग्योपनिषत् , 3.1.4.2] एतदुद्धरणेनापि एतदेव सुस्पष्टतया ज्ञायते यत् शब्दमय्यास्त्रयीविद्यायाः शरणापन्ना देवा आत्मरक्षायै समर्था निर्भयाश्चाभवन्।

वाग्देवता च द्विविधा - व्याकृता अव्याकृता च। अव्याकृता वाक्चित्स्वरूपा निर्गुणा नित्यानन्दमयी सत्स्वरूपा च। सैव वाक्यदा व्याकृता भवति तदानन्तकार्यकरी बहुशक्तिमन्मन्त्रेषु अक्षरात्मकं रूपं विभर्ति सुरासुरादीनामुपकारिणी च भवति । अमन्त्रमक्षरं नास्तीत्युक्त्यापीदमेव समर्थ्यते । अव्याकृता वागपि द्विविधा दिव्या लौकिकी च। दिव्या नादविरहिता लौकिकी तु तिर्यङ्क्षु परवादिषु च। 'वाग्वैपराच्याव्याकृता अवदत्। ते देवाः इन्द्रमब्रुवन् इमां नो वाचं व्याकुरु इति। सोऽब्रवीत - वरं वृणै मह्यं चैवेष वायवे च सह गृह्यातावाति। तस्मादैन्द्रवायवः सह गृह्यते। तामिन्द्रो मध्यतोऽवक्रम्य व्याकरोत्। तस्मादियं व्याकृता वागुद्यते' इति [तैत्तिरीये षष्ठ काण्डे] अस्यायमाशयः - यथा पश्वादीनां वागसंस्कृता अविभक्ता [अव्याकृता] न हि तत्र पदवाक्यादिविभागः कथमप्युन्नीयते। तथैव आदौ प्रकृतितः मनुष्याणामपि वाक् पदवाक्यादिविभागरहितैवोत्पद्यते । ज्ञानस्याधिष्ठाता प्राणरूपो देव इन्द्रस्तु तां वाचं मध्यतः आक्रम्य व्याकरोत् - पदवाक्यादिरूपेण प्रविभक्तामकरोत्। वाचि योऽयं पदवाक्यादिविभागः स हि ज्ञानस्वरूपः पश्वादीनां तादृशज्ञानाभावात् तादृशः वाग्विभागो न जायते इति। अतएव मनुष्याणां वाक् संस्कारयुक्ता सुविभक्ता परिष्कृतेति सुस्पष्टमेव।

दिव्या अव्याकृता वागेवास्य जगतो जनयित्री परापश्यन्ती रूपे योगिभिर्निर्विकल्पकसमाधौ च विज्ञातुं शक्ये । सैव पार्थिवपदार्थानां परमाणुषु केन्द्रीकृत्य शक्तिरूपेणावस्थायेमां स्थावरजङ्गमरूपां

चराचरमयीं सृष्टिं पिपर्ति विभर्त्ति जगज्जीवान् प्राणयति शक्तिदानेन अन्नमयी भूत्वा जीवयति, वायुमयी भूत्वा प्राणयति । अग्निरूपेण पाचयित्वा रसादिरूपेषु परिणमयति सर्वेषां पालनं पोषणञ्चकरोति । द्रव्यविशेषपरमाणुनिहिता सैवाद्या वाक् शक्तिः अतिशयेन विक्षुब्धा विस्फोटरूपेणाखिलानपि परमाणून् परस्परं संघर्षयन्तीमां जीवाजीवभूतामखिलामपि सृष्टिं संहर्तुं क्षमा।

मन्त्रादिभिः मन्त्रबलेन, वाचः शक्त्यायः कोऽप्युपासितो वाक्देवः प्रसन्नो भूत्वा वरदो भवति। अस्य जगतो हेतुभूता सा सनातनी विद्या सम्यगुपासिता नृणां मुक्तयेऽपि प्रभवति सैषा स्वरात्मिका वाग्देवी स्वाहा स्वधा वषट्काररूपेण देवान् प्रीणयति पितॄन् तर्पयति आहुतिषु संभृतोपहारान् अग्निरूपेण तांस्तान् प्रापयति। सैषा वाक्अस्मिन् जगति सुकृतिनां भवनेषु श्रीर्भूत्वा विराजते दुष्कृतिनाञ्चगेहेषु दरिद्रतारूपे नरीनृत्यते। वाचो बलेनैव विद्वान् सर्वेषां पूजितस्तथा च तस्या दुरुपयोगेण कुप्रयोगेण असक्लिश्यते। इयमेव वाक्शक्तिः पूर्वाचरितपुण्यापुण्यकर्मविपाकात् सुमतिकुमतिरूपाभ्यां बुद्धावस्थायोन्नतये चावनतये तत्तज्जनान् तत्तत्कर्मसु प्रेरिका। किं बहुना यत् किञ्चित् जगत्यां दरीदृश्यते येन केनापि रूपेण परिणम्यते, यां कामप्यवस्थां प्रियाप्रियां भजते तत्र परोक्षापरोक्षरुपेण वाक् शक्तिरेव निमित्तभूता। समुपास्यैवैनां जनो वाग्मी भवति, मननेन च मुनिर्भवति जल्पनेन च जल्पाकः। इयममूर्तापि मूर्तिमत्सु व्याप्ता, निर्गुणापि गुणवतां गुणभूता, सर्वथा नित्यापि जलबुद्बुदवत् क्षणभङ्गुरा सर्वव्यापिकाऽपि स्वल्पदेशव्याप्ता निरपेक्षा अपि अनेकशः सापेक्षा इव प्रतिभाति। आधुनिकवैज्ञानिकैः दूरदर्शनयन्त्रेण वाचो व्यापकता नित्यता च निःसंशयं समर्थिता। नश्यत्सु या न कर्हिचित् विनश्यति, विभजत्सु या सदा अविभक्ता एवं सान्तेष्वनन्ता शब्दशक्तिः जगतः प्रक्रियां विधत्ते । इदञ्च बाह्यजगत् यावत् महत् विस्तृतञ्च ततोऽप्यधिकं विस्तृतं सुमहत् चित्तस्थं विकल्परूपात्मकमन्तर्जगत् भासते। 'शब्दज्ञानानुपाती वस्तुशून्यो विकल्पः' इति योगसूत्रेण प्रमीयते। तत्रैव 'तस्य वाचकः प्रणवः' 'तज्जपस्तदर्थभावनम्' इति योगसूत्राभ्यां च प्रणवशब्दस्य वाच्यवाचकयोरभेदात् ब्रह्मत्वं सिद्धम्। साधकानांच कृते सिद्धौ प्रणवजपस्य प्रणवशब्दार्थभावनायाश्चावश्यकता प्रतिपादिता।

साम्प्रतमिदं विचारणीयं यत् वाचि स्वतः कर्तृत्वं विद्यतेऽथवा न । तत्र-'पथि प्रग्रहिणं कंसमाभाष्याहाशरीरवाक् अस्यास्त्वामष्टमो गर्भो हन्ता यां वहसेऽबुधा'। 'वागेवाहाशरीरिणी' 'व्योमवाणी तदैवाभूत् मा ऋषे खिद्यतामिति' 'उद्यमः सफलोऽयं ते भविष्यति न संशयः' इत्यादिवचनैः सुस्पष्टतयेदं सिध्यति यत् अनन्तशक्तिमय्यां वाचि कर्तृत्वमपि विद्यत एव । वागेव विश्वा भूतानि । कल्पक्षये 'एकमेवाद्वितीयं ब्रह्म' कल्पादौ सुप्तशक्तिरसुप्तदृक् आत्मानमसन्तमिव मेने। 'एकोऽहं बहुस्यां प्रजायेय' इति शब्दात्मिकेश्वरेच्छा माया नाम। ययेदं जगत् विभुः निर्ममे। गुणमय्यां मायायां कालक्रमेण आत्मभूतेन पुरुषेण वीर्यमाधत्त । ततो महत्तत्त्वमभवत् । जगतः सिसृक्षयात्मात्मनम् व्यकरोत् । विकुर्वाणात् महत्तत्त्वात् अहंतत्त्वं व्यजायत । विकुर्वाणात् अहंतत्त्वात् पञ्चतन्मात्राः इन्द्रियाणि मनश्च - ततो पञ्चमहाभूतानीत्यादि तु संक्षेपतः पूर्वमुक्तमेव यथा सूक्ष्मात् आकाशादितः तत्तद् गुणविशिष्टाः पूर्वतो एकैकगुणवृद्ध्या स्थूलात् स्थूलतराः पृथिव्यादयः सृष्टाः तत्र सर्वेषु च भूतेषु शब्दगुणोऽनुवृत्या भासते। स्वेच्छया पाञ्चभौतिकं मायाशरीरं धारयता भगवता श्रीकृष्णेन स्ववाङ्मयीमूर्तिभूते श्रीमद् भागवतमहापुराणेऽनेकत्रस्थले विशदीकृतमेतत्।

जयन्ति वाचः फणिभर्तुरान्तरस्फुरत्तमस्तोम निशाकरत्विषः
विभाव्यमानाः सततं मनांसि याः सतां सदानन्दमयानि कुर्वते ॥

इतिवागेव विश्वाभूतानि, इति शम् ।

XIII

THE THEORY OF CREATION AND PAÑCIKARAṆA ACCORDING TO ADVAITA VEDĀNTA

Dinesh Chandra Shastri

Vedic thinkers hold that there is nothing like the first creation. Creation is *anādi*. The Ṛgvedic hymn - *Sūrya candrāmasou dhātā yathāpūrvamakalpayat* - clearly declares that the creator conceived, i.e. created the Sun and Moon just like before - just like they were in the previous creation. It is known to Indian Philosophers that the Vedāntin-s specially the Advaitin-s have formulated their philosophical system and their views according to the dictum of the *Upaniṣad-s* as far as possible. With regard to the theory of creation also, they adhere to the view of the **Taittirīya Upaniṣad** stating that from the *Ātman* which is the same as *Brahman* of the nature of truth (existence) and unlimited consciousness, all the basic *bhūta-s* were gradually born. From *Ātman Ākāśa* was born from *Ākāśa Vāyu* from *Vāyu Agni* (fire or heat), from *Agni Āp* or water, and from *Āp Anna* or earth was born.

Tasmādvā etasmādatmanḥ Ākāśa sambhūṭh ākāśad vāyu, vāyoragni, etc. **[Taittirīya Upaniṣad]**.

The **Chāndyogyopaniṣad**, however, differs a little in its description of the creation of the *bhūta-s*. Instead of starting with *Brahman* or *Ātman* it starts with *'Sat'* or undifferentiated existence, which before creation was one without a second. *Ṣadeva somya idamagra āsidekamevā dvitiyaṃ*. In his treatise called **Pañcikaraṇa** Śankara states that here the word *'sat'* (existence) means *Brahman* with *māyā śakti*, its magical power. *'Māyā śavalaṃ Brahma sadśabdavācyaṃ'*. Though this text is considered to be interpolated by some, still it is very fine and has been emphasized by (a verse) of the **Pañcikaraṇa Vārttika** of Ācārya Sureśvara. The verse states clearly that the Supreme *Brahman* was eternally free and changeless. But, due to false identification with it's own *māyā* it became the unmanifested seed, i.e. the changing material cause.

Āsidekam paraṃ Brahma nityamuktamavikriyaṃ Tat svamayay Samavi-sad-vijamavyākṛtātmakam.

Since this manifold universe cannot be born of homogenous pure Existence so there must be the *bīja* (seed) or potency of this universe in that existence or *'Sat' Bīja* or potency means the unmanifested (*avjākṛta*) state of the effect itself.

The **Chāndyogya Upaniṣad** then narrates creation from that '*Sat*' in this way - 'That *Sat* (Existence) visualised (*aiksta*), i.e. pondered 'let me be born and become many'. Now, this 'becoming many' is like the earth-material becoming many as jars and plates etc., from the stand-point of the pure changeless existence it is like a 'rope' being born as a snake or stick, etc. This creation or 'being born' is appearance or *vivarta* or apparent transformation.

Leaving aside the question of the root of creation, let us now proceed to the process of creation of the *bhūta-s*. The five *bhūta-s* already discussed from the **Taittirīyopaniṣad** are *śūkṣma bhūta-s* or subtle matters which are also called as *tanmātrā-s* or the basic material principles. From these *śūkṣma bhūta-s*, the subtle sense-organs including the inner mind are created, and also the principle of life (*prāṇa*) is created. *Māyāśakti* being constituted of the three *guṇa-s sattva, rajas,* and *tamas*, all its products also possess these three *guṇa-s*. As a rule *sattvaguṇa* helps revelation, or cognition while *rajas* tends towards activity and *tamas* causes veiling and inertia. From the *sāttvika* portion of each of the subtle *bhūta-s* the cognizing organs or the sense-organs like the ear, the organ of touch, the eyes, the organ of testing, and the sense organ of smelling are created. All these *sāttvika* portion of the five *bhūta-s* combine to create 'mind' or *antaḥkaraṇa*, which, it is important to notice, can take all the objects like sound touch, colour, taste and odour, taken severally by the external sense-organs.

These *śūkṣmabhūta-s* again produces the *sthūlabhūta-s* or the gross materials being combined in definite proportions. This process of combination or mixing is called *pañcikaraṇa* or fivefold mixture which produces five different kinds of *sthūlabhūta-s* possessing distinctive attributes. These attributes manifest in the gross matters, of course, were manifest in the subtle *bhūta-s* also, abiding in them in a dormant state. Evidently, this combination must be in different proportions '*guṇapradhāna bhāvena*' to produce five different kinds of *bhūta-s* like the gross ones known as *ākāśa, vāyu, tejas, jala* and *pṛthivi*, possessing the attributes of sound, touch, colour, taste, smell (and the five attributes sound, touch, colour, taste and odour) respectively. The proportions of mixture are as follows - taking the whole of each of the *tanmātrā-s* or *śūkṣmabhūta-s* and dividing each into two equal parts and again dividing each half into four equal parts, add the four parts to the remaining halves of each *śukṣmabhūta-s*. Thus each half *śūkṣmabhūta* receives the four one-fourths of the other half, i.e., one eight of the other *bhūta-s*, to make each of them five-fold or *pañcikṛta*, containing half of itself, and four other parts of one eights of the other four *bhuta- s*. This subtle process has been described wonderfully by a single small verse by the great Vedāntin Vidyāraṇya stating:

'Dvidhā vidhayā caikaikam caturdhā prathama punaḥ svasvetara - dvitriyamśaih yojanāt pañca pañca te.'

Ācārya Sureśvara states the same process in his **Pañcikaraṇa Vārttika**, a commentary in verse of the treatise **Pañcikaraṇa** of Śaṃkara in somewhat different languages meaning the same combination in same proportion of 1/2 of each + 1/8 of the other four *bhūta-s* to make each one five-fold. The word *bhūta* exactly means

basic matters of elements possessing perceptible special attributes like sound, touch colour, taste and odour.

Sadānanda, the author of the **Vedāntasāra**, narrates that same process of *'pañcikaraṇa'* and adds moreover that it cannot be contended that this process of creation of the gross *bhūta-s* has got no Vedic support. **Chāndyogyopaniṣad**, where the creation of only three *bhūta-s*, viz. *tejas, āp* and *anna* (heat, water and earth) the creator Lord made each of them three-fold *'Trivṛtaṃ trivṛtaṃ akarot'*. This *trivṛtkaraṇa* text means something more, as *pañcikaraṇa* taking into account the other two *bhūta-s ākāśa* and *vāyu*. Therefore this theory of *pañcikaraṇa* is not *apramāṇika* or bereft of Vedic support, being supported by Upaniṣadic text, and also by fitness of things.

Again, if each of the gross *bhūta-s* is five-fold, a mixture of the five subtle *bhūta-s*, why different names like *ākāśa, vāyu* etc. are ascribed to them. The solution is that it is due to the excess of, i.e., major half portion of *ākāśa*, and *vāyu* etc., that those different names are given to the *sthūla bhūta-s*, which is declared in the **Brahamasūtra** of Vyāsa stating *Vaiśeṣyattu tadvādaḥ* [2.4.22] that it is due to the excess of proportion that such names have been ascribed.

XIV

AN ANCIENT INDIAN THEORY OF ORIGINATION : TRIVṚTKARAṆA

Piyali Palit

In the search of Truth reason/logic and realisation simultaneously work in human mind; actually, in the workhouse of imagination reason moulds experience into science or philosophy, though there is a continuous attempt to set them on two poles, since their techniques are different. Anyway, ancient Indian philosophers developed a unique system of thought which embraced physical science, so to say, while explaining relationship between matter and the whole chain of the universe. Obviously while deducing the theories of origination there were difference of opinion which was quite natural and essential for this purpose.

Basically all the systems were very much aware of the fact that the world before us is a balanced and systematic conjuncture of gross matter as well as an extensive energy or power, or consciousness. Energy or consciousness, being an inherent and eternal property, was supposed to be the actual basic factor for the composition of gross material world. There seems to be a paradox that how gross matter could spring out of a state, which is apparently beyond one's regular sensations. Vedānta picturises a series through which they have successfully examined this paradox and set a logical base for it.

In sixth chapter of **Chāṅdogya Upaniṣad** *ṛṣi* Āruni illustrates the formation of matter to his son Śwetaketu as to how the whole perceptible world, which is not everlasting by nature, originates from the eternal *Brahman* or *sadvastu*. While describing this system of origination he says - *"tadaikṣata bahu syām prajāyeyeti tattejo asṛjata, tatteja aikṣata bahu syām prajāyeyeti tadapo - asṛjata ..... tā āpa aikṣanta bahvyaḥ syaṃ prajāyemahīti, tā annamaṣrjanta* : then he realised that he would turn into many to procure a creation; then he created *tejas*; that *tejas* realised to form into many, then he created *apaḥ*; those *apaḥ* realised to form into many, so they created *anna*". These three basic materials were conjugated to form the gross matter defined by *nāma* and *rūpa*, taking one part from each of them. This system has been famous as *trivṛtkaraṇa*. According to this theory, nature of each and every matter can be explained by this kind of synthesis. Thus, the *rohita rūpa* of Āditya being the *rūpa* of *tejas*, *śuklarūpa* being that of *apaḥ* and *kṛṣṇarūpa* being that of *anna*, the actual existence of Āditya is nothing but the *vikāra* of the original states. The same happens to be in the cases of *candramās* and *vidyut*, too. From the anthropological point of view, it is hard to believe that at the dawn of human

civilisation, how these people could propagate such a firm and scientific doctrine that divides state of matter into three which are very roughly analogous to the three states of gas, liquid and solid.

That very Indian text eventually states that on formation of a human body these *anna - āpa - teja* trio act in another way. *Anna*, being eaten up, is extracted into three states; the gross part of it is excluded from the body, medium-gross turns into flesh, while the finest part helps to develop the mind. *Apaḥ*, being drunk, is extracted into three parts : the gross part is excluded from the body in the form of urine, medium-gross turns into blood and the finest helps in development of *prāṇa*. *Tejas* thus, being eaten up, is extracted into three parts : the gross part forms the bones, medium-gross the bone-marrows and the finest one helps in development of *vāk* or talent. The sage, then, also arranged an experiment with Śvetaketu, to prove this theory. These *anna-apaḥ-tejas* are extracted from the normal, natural diet one would take, since all the food materials are also conjuncture of those basic three materials.

The biological world also has been grossly divided into three as *aṇḍaja, jīvaja* and *udvijja*, and, three primary elements, conjugated variously, happens to work there as they do in all other matters. In fact, the characterising factors, differentiating numerous classes of articles and each and every individual article, are traceable through combination of these three basic factors.

Now, they may be questioned as to what was the reason that led them to such a conclusion that there would be only three kinds of basic materials, neither more then that nor less! The only standing answer is : this spectacular world of sensation can be classified as *śabda, sparśa, rūpa, rasa, gandha* according to human capacity; these five sensations must have come out of some particular kind of objects, which are defined as *ākāśa, vāyu, agni, apaḥ* and *pṛthivi*. Be there only one unitary basic material, it would have been difficult to explain the origination of this world, full of contradictions. But, what about those three materials while you deduce them as five in number? To avoid this controversy, we should either prove that the first two materials, i.e., *ākāśa* and *vāyu*, were not familiar to them, or, they submerged them with later ones. In a latter part of the same text, we find, *ākāśa* and *vāyu* are narrated to hold on *saṃkalpa*, i.e., the determination of intensive actions; hence, it is quite clear that the concepts of *ākāśa* and *vāyu* were very much in practice with them.

Advaita Vedāntin-s tried their own way to solve this controversy. They hold the famous *pañcīkaraṇa* theory of origination whereby they count basic materials as five and hence face the criticism of contradicting the **Chāndogya śruti** of *trivṛtkaraṇa*.

They hold up the **Taittirīya śruti** in their favour, as to, *'tasmād vā etasmādātmana ākāśaḥ saṃbhūtaḥ, ākāśadvāyu, vāyorgniḥ, agnerāpaḥ, advyaḥ pṛthivi'*. Āchārya Śaṃkara defends himself by stating that - there is no controversy at all; since we can say that after the creation of *ākāśa* and *vāyu*, *tejas* was created (though we do not find any such statement in the original text); secondly, according to him, the *sṛṣṭikrama* is not the topic of discussion here, but, *advitiyatva* of *sadvastu*, i.e., this world is nothing but a *vikāra* of that *ekamevadvitiyaṃ*; or, thirdly, *teja-apa-anna* are much more familiar to us being object of common perception, hence it is only

an attempt to clarify the theory of origination through these three popular norms. These reasons, however, can not satisfy a rational mind due to divergence of facts and lack of deeper insight or firm logic. On the other hand, Sāṃkhya theory of origination gives us a clearer picture. Sāṃkhya defines *mūlaprakṛti* as one prosperous with *lohita*, i.e., *sattvaguṇa, śukla; i.e., rajoguṇa* and *kṛṣṇa*, i.e., *tamoguṇa*; these three *guṇa-s* have been described as expressions or perspectives or *rūpa* to *tejas, apaḥ* and *anna* respectively in **Chāṅdogya**. The *sāmyavasthā* of those three *guṇa-s* have been defined as *pradhāna* or *prakṛti* and *vikāra* of the same three have been defined as 'creation'. This *vikāra* has been picturised as giving rise to *mahāttatva, ahaṃkāra tattva, pañcatanmātrā* and *ekādaśendriya*, in series, which combined to form the *śūkṣma śarīra* or *liṅga śarīra*. In **Chāṅdogya śrutI** too we have seen that the finest parts of those three materials form the finest part of body, while other two constitute the gross parts. So, from the text in our hand, could we drive that, unlike Samkara, the purpose of *trivṛtkaraṇa* was only to explain these three *sūkṣmatattva*, from which *pañcatanmātrā* and *ākāśa*, etc., five *apañcikṛta mahābhūta-s* (non-combination form of basic five materials) came into existence.

Problem here rises with the Advaita Vedānta view that Sāṃkhya-s allowed *pradhāna* to instrument this creation by itself, independent of *puruṣa* or any other conscious factor, while Vedāntin-s, proved that *pradhāna*, being *'jaḍasvabhāva'*, could not be the only cause of this creation without the help of any *'cetanā padārtha'* or conscious entity. Practically, whenever we find *pradhāna* being prone to creativity, we should infer some kind of consciousness conferred upon it to explain its motive and chain of actions. We may quote from **Siddhāṅtabindu** of Madhusudan Saraswati to support this thought as : *'Sā ca swayaṃ jaḍāpyajadena cidābhāsenojjwalitā pūrvāpūrva-saṃskāra-jīvakaramaprayuktā sati śabda-sparśa-rūpa-rasa-gaṅdhatmākānyā-ākāśa-vāyu-tejo-jala- pṛthivyākhyāni pañca mahābhūtānī janayati'*.

Moreover, Advaitin-s hold the view that *Brahma* is both material and efficient cause to creation of this world, and *avidyā* is nothing but an assistant to it. They place different examples to clarify this notion like famous rope-snake or shell-silver criteria. We may counteract to this idea since existence of snake in a rope is totally an illusory one, this perceptual world also would be taken as an illusion, and, hence, non-existent in nature. Acharya solves the problem by simply saying - *'na, sata eva dvaitabhedan anyathā gṛhyāmanatvāt nāsattvaṃ kasyacit kvaciditi brumah yathā sato-anayad vastvantaraṃ parikalpya punasta-syeiva pragutpatteḥ pradhvaṃsaccordhavamasattvaṃ brubate tarkikaḥ, na tathāsmabhiḥ kadācit kvacidapi satoanyadabhidhānama bhidheyaṃ va vastu parikalpyate; sadeva tu sarpadhaddhya sarpa ityabhidhiyate...'*

From this point of view, this world happens to be only a *vivārta* or illusory alternative procreation of the only one existing factor, i.e., *Brahma*, and from the Sāṃkhya point of view it is nothing but a *pariṇāma* or revealed form of *pradhāna*. Statement of **Chāṅdogya śrutI** to be discussed here throws certainly a different light on this controversial subject, where we could relax our views on the original thoughts; that is, at the very first stage of creation, we find a conscious agent

considering (*aikṣata*) on creation, where the stated rope-snake illusion is very much possible since at that state *avidyā* works as a *'upādhi'* to the absolute consciousness. After that *teja-apa-anna* come into existence as *pariṇāma* of the same *avidyā*, and, then comes forth the whole creation in a system, which has been described before. Even then, a question sets in as - if *avidyā* carries out such a big role in the process of origination, what would be the reason for such an amusing relationship between the Absolute state and *avidyā*, recurring to such a reformative state. The tradition answers that this *'cidacidgranthi'*, i.e., conscious-non-conscious tie is *'naisargika'* (by nature), *'anādi'* (beginning-less), *'anaṅta'* (endless as a system) and *'anirvacanīya'* (beyond explanation); this much can be said that there is some kind of affinity between them which rolls the process of origination on its way.

One more thing we should note here that according to the illustrations of this system, the parts of *apañcikṛta śūkṣma bhūta-s*, affected by *tamoguṇa*, give shape to *pañcikarta bhūta-s*, i.e., gross matter, while the parts affected by *sattva* and *rajoguṇa* give shape to *śūkṣma* or finest body particles. An attempt has been made here to clarify the whole thing through a table at the end of this writing.

This Indian philosophical thought, as we have earlier commented, consists also of the same material which modern physical science is concerned about. Modern scientific concept of state of matter, i.e., gas-liquid-solid is somewhat analogous to the ancient concept of *teja-apa-anna*, though it is very difficult for us to clarify what is really meant by these three technical terms. But, we can undoubtedly conclude that this concept was not merely a colourful meta-physical balloon, full of escapism, but a firm, decisive, practical doctrine, derived out of *bahu darśana*, i.e., both experiments and hypothesis. As the concept of other has led the physical science to explain the static relationship in this universe in a modified way, nuclear physics has led to conceive of minute formation of matters and to give a probable proposition for origination of the universe, those ancient Indian people also were prone to explain the same in their own way, overcoming gross instinctive drawbacks, which may be a headache for anthropologists. However ridiculous it may sound, it is a bare fact that scientists have come to a conclusion that this universe is found to be in a very systematic discipline of a pervading energy, revealed in different state and manner, though very complex and sophisticated for commoners to understand, Indian philosopher should be appreciated of their rational representation of the same parallel thoughts, which not only explained the nature of human being and their relationship with the whole universe, but crowned this spatio-temporal limited beings by identifying them with the universal, absolute everlasting Truth.

NOTES

1. *Elementary Physical Chemistry*, Dr. S.R. Palit.
2. *Chāṅdogyopaniṣad* : Ed. by Durga Charan Sāṃkhya Vedāntathīrta.
3. *Siddhāṅtabindu* : Ed. by Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute.
4. *Viveka Cuḍāmaṇi* : Ed. by Swami Vedantananda.
5. *Advaita Siddhi* : Ed. by Pt. N S Ananta Krishan Shastri.
6. *Vedāṅta Darśana* : Ed. by Kalivar Vedāntavāgiṣa.



bhuta-s		guna-s
ākāśa	=	śabda
vāyu	=	śabda + sparśa
teja	=	śabda + sparśa + rūpa
āp	=	śabda + sparśa + rūpa + rasa
pṛthivi	=	śabda + sparśa + rūpa + rasa + gaṅdha

2. Origination through Trivṛtkaraṇa/Pañcikaraṇa

	Śūkṣma/Liṅga		Sthūla-jaḍa		
Tejas	Sattva		Rajas		Tamas
Apaḥ	Sattva		Rajas		Tamas
Anna	Sattva		Rajas		Tamas
	Jñānendriya		Karmendriya		Sthūlendriya
	Vyasta	Samasta	Vyasta	Samasta	Jīvaśarīra
ākāśa	srotra	manaḥ	vak	prāṇa(*)	½+4*(1/8)
vāyu	vāk	buddhi	pani	apāna(*)	½+4*(1/8)
tejah	cakṣu	ahaṃkāra	pada	vyāna(*)	½+4*(1/8)
ap	resana	citta	payu	udāna(*)	½+4*(1/8)
pṛthivi	ghrana		upastha	samāna(*)	½+4*(1/8)

(*) prāṇa (nāsa)
(*) apāna (payu)
(*) vyāna (visvag)
(*) udāna (Kantha)
(*) Samāna (nabhi)

XV

श्रीमध्वस्य सृष्टिदृष्टिः

डी. प्रह्लादाचार्यः

विवेचनशीलानां मनुकुलजनुषाम् अनादिकालादियं जिज्ञासा निरन्तरं प्रवहन्ती मनः क्षोभकरी च दृश्यते यदस्य जगतः सृष्टिः किंस्वरुपिणी ? किमस्ति कश्चित् स्रष्टा? उत नास्त्येव ? अस्ति चेदपि कथं स ससर्ज ? इत्यादिः। जिज्ञासामेतां समाहितुं प्रयतमानाः विभिन्ना दृष्टयः भारतीयेषु विविधदर्शनेषु दृश्यन्ते। प्रायशस्तासु प्रमुखाः काश्चन दृष्टयः माण्डूक्योपनिषदि उल्लिखिताः सन्ति। यथा -

विभूतिं प्रसवं त्वन्ये मन्यन्ते सृष्टिचिन्तकाः।
स्वप्नमायासरूपेति सृष्टिरन्यैर्विकल्पिता ॥
इच्छामात्रं प्रभोः सृष्टिरिति सृष्टौ विनिश्चिताः।
कालात् प्रसूतिं भूतानां मन्यन्ते कालचिन्तकाः ॥ इति ।*

उपनिषदोऽयमभिप्रायः। केचन सृष्टिचिन्तकाः ब्रह्मैव जीवजडात्मना विविधतया भवति। सेयं ब्रह्मणो विभूतिः, विविधतया भवनमेव सृष्टिरिति मन्यन्ते। भास्करादीनामयमेवाभिप्रायः। अन्ये केचन स्वप्ने यथा स्वाप्नाः पदार्था मायानिर्मिता भवन्ति तथा सर्वमिदं जगत् मायानिर्मितम्, अर्थात् मिथ्येत्यभिप्रयन्ति। बौद्धानामद्वैतिनां चायमभिप्रायः। काल एव परं तत्त्वमिति मन्वानाः केचित् कालचिन्तकाः सर्वस्यव्युत्पत्तिः कालाद्भवतीति वदन्ति। सृष्टिविषये एवं विविधान् वादान् प्रस्तुवन्ती श्रुतिः स्वाभिप्रायमप्यत्रैव प्रकटयति। यथा - सृष्टिविषये तत्त्वदर्शिनस्तु ईश्वरस्य इच्छामात्रेण जगदिदमुत्पद्यत इति मन्वत इति।

माण्डूक्योपनिषदाऽतया प्रकटितोऽभिप्राय एव श्रीमध्वसम्मतः। इयमत्र मध्वाभिमता सृष्टिप्रक्रिया परमार्थसत्यभूतस्य जीवजडात्मकस्यास्य विश्वस्य ईश्वरो निमित्तकारणम्। प्रकृतिरूपादानकारणम्। जडात्मिका प्रकृतिरियं कालस्य सत्त्वरजस्तमोरुपस्य गुणत्रयस्य च साक्षादुपादानकारणम्। महदादिकं प्रति तु परम्परयोपादानकारणम्। प्रकृतिश्चेयमनादिनित्या व्याप्ता च। सर्वजीवानां लिङ्गशरीरभूता तद्भिन्ना चेतीयमनेकविधा। बन्धकाले सर्वेषां जीवानां किमपि सूक्ष्मशरीरमवश्यमङ्गीकर्तव्यम्। बद्धानां जीवानां स्थूलशरीररहितस्थितिसद्भावेऽपि तदानीं सूक्ष्मशरीरस्याप्यभावे सर्वथाऽशरीरत्वेन मुक्तत्वप्रसंगः। तेषां पुनः सृष्टयनुपपत्तिश्च। अतः स्थूलशरीरापादकं किमपि सूक्ष्मशरीरं सर्वथा स्वीकर्तव्यम्। तच्च प्रकृत्यात्मकमेवेति भावः। गुणत्रयस्य प्रकृतिकार्यत्वे च 'सत्त्वं रजस्तम इति गुणाः प्रकृतिसम्भवाः' इति भगवद्गीता, 'यत्तत् त्रिगुणमव्यक्तं नित्यं सदसदात्मकम्' इत्यादितृतीयस्कन्धभागवतवाक्यं च प्रमाणम्।

महाप्रलये प्रकृतिरेकैवासीत् । नासीच्च महदादि किमपि कार्यम् । सिसृक्षुरीश्वरः तदा प्रकृतिमुपादानीकृत्य सत्त्वराशिं रजोराशिं तमोराशिं चासृजत् । गुणत्रयमेतदुपादानीकृत्य च महदादि सृष्टवान् । सृष्टिकाले चैते गुणाः विभिन्नपरिमाणवत्तया सृष्टाः । तमसो द्विगुणं रजो, रजसश्च द्विगुणं सत्त्वमिति । यदा च प्रकृतेः सत्त्वगुणः समुद्भूतः तदा रजस्तमोभ्याममिश्रः शुद्ध एव स उत्पन्नः । रजोगुणस्तु सत्त्वतमोभ्यां तथा तमोगुणोऽपि सत्त्वरजोभ्यां मिश्र एवोत्पन्नः । एवं रजस्तमोगुणयोर्मिश्रितत्वेऽपि प्राचुर्याभिप्रायेण रजोगुणत्वादिना व्यवहारो युक्तः । गुणत्रयमिदं सृष्टिहेतुरित्यत्र च 'सत्त्वं रजस्तम इति निर्गुणस्य गुणास्त्रयः । स्थितिसर्गनिरोधेषु गृहीता मायया विभोः' इति द्वितीयस्कन्धभागवतवाक्यं प्रमाणम् ।

साक्षाद् गुणत्रयोपादानकं महत्तत्त्वम् । तत्र सर्वस्यापि गुणत्रयस्य न महदात्मना परिणामः । किन्तु तदंशानामेव केषाञ्चित् । महत्तत्त्वमिदं चतुर्भागात्मकम् । तत्र रजोभागास्त्रयः । एको भागस्तमः । न च महत्तत्त्वे सत्त्वांशस्यैवाभावः । रजोभागानां प्राचुर्येण सत्त्वमिश्रितत्वात् । साक्षान्महत्तत्त्वोपादानकम् अहङ्कारतत्त्वम् । तत्रापि न सर्वस्य महत्तत्त्वस्याहङ्कारतत्त्वात्मना परिणामः । किन्तु तदंशानामेव । महत्तत्त्वगततमोभागादेवाहङ्कारतत्त्वस्योत्पत्तिः ।अहङ्कारतत्त्वं चेदं वैकारिकतैजसतामसभेदेन त्रिविधम् । तदुक्तं तृतीयस्कन्धभागवते -

महत्तत्त्वाद्विकुर्वाणादहंतत्त्वमजायत ।
वैकारिकस्तैजसश्च तामसश्चेत्यहं त्रिधा ॥ इति ।

अहङ्कारतत्त्वानन्तरं बुद्धितत्त्वस्य सृष्टिः । बुद्धिर्द्विविधा । एका तत्त्वरूपा । अपरा ज्ञानरूपा । तत्र तत्त्वरूपाया बुद्धेः महत्तत्त्वेन जन्यत्वं, त्रिविधाहङ्कारेषु तैजसाहङ्कारेणोपचितत्वं च । विज्ञानतत्त्वं महतः समुत्पन्नं चतुर्मुखात् । इति भाष्योक्तिस्तत्र प्रमाणम् । तदनन्तरं मनस्तत्त्वस्य सृष्टिः । मनोऽपि तत्त्वरुपं तद्भिन्नं चेति द्विविधम् । तत्त्वरूपस्य मनसः वैकारिकाहङ्कारः उपादानकारणम् । तदिदमुक्तं तृतीयस्कन्धभागवते -

वैकारिकाद्विकुर्वाणान्मनस्तत्त्वमजायत । इति ।

तत्त्वभिन्नं मन इन्द्रियम् । तदपि द्विविधम् । नित्यमनित्यं चेति । ईश्वरमारभ्य सर्वेषां जीवानां स्वरूपभूतं मनोरूपमिन्द्रियं नित्यम् भगवतोऽपि स्वरूपभूतं मन अस्तीत्यत्र 'चन्द्रमा मनसो जातः', 'तन्मनोऽकुरुत' इत्यादिश्रुतिरेव प्रमाणम् । ब्रह्मादीनां सर्वेषामपि जीवानां स्वरूपभिन्नं मनोरूपमिन्द्रियमनित्यम् । अनित्यं चेदं मनः मनो बुद्धिरहङ्कारश्चित्तं चेतनेति पञ्चविधम् । 'पञ्चवृत्तिर्मनोवद् व्यपदिश्यते' [ब्रह्मसूत्रम्] इति सूत्रं, 'यथा हवै मनः पञ्चधा व्यपदिश्यते मनोबुद्धिरहङ्कारश्चित्तं चेतनेति' इति भाष्योक्तस्मृतिश्च तत्र प्रमाणम् । इन्द्रियाणि च द्विविधानि । तत्त्वभूतानि तद्भिन्नानि चेति । एवं ज्ञानकर्मेन्द्रियभेदेनापि तानि द्विविधानि । तथा नित्यानित्यभेदेन च । तत्त्वरूपाणि नित्यानि च ज्ञानकर्मेन्द्रियाणि तैजसाहङ्कारोपादानकानि तत्त्वभिन्नानि यानि नित्यानि ज्ञानकर्मेन्द्रियाणि तानि साक्षीत्युच्यन्ते । तानि चेतनस्वरूपाणि । संसारावस्थायां चेतनस्वरूपेन्द्रियस्य साक्षिणः आत्मा, मनः, तद्धर्माः ज्ञानसुखादयः, अविद्या, कालः, अव्याकृताकाशश्च साक्षाद्विषयाः । बाह्येन्द्रियद्वारा तु शब्दादयो विषयाः । ज्ञाततया अज्ञाततया वा सर्वेऽप्यतीन्द्रिया विषयाः । साक्ष्यनङ्गीकारे कालाव्याकृताकाशाद्यसिद्धिरितिसोऽङ्गीकृतः ।

अनन्तरं च मात्राणां सृष्टिः। मीयन्त इति मात्रा विषयाः। ते च शब्दादयः पञ्चविधाः। ता द्विविधाः। तत्त्वरूपास्तद्भिन्नाश्चेति । तत्त्वरूपाणां शब्दादिविषयाणां तामसाहङ्कारादुत्पत्तिः । तत्त्वभिन्नाश्च शब्दादयः पञ्च गुणा इत्युच्यन्ते। शब्दादितन्मात्राद्वारा तामसाहङ्कारजन्यानि आकाशादीनि पञ्च भूतानि।

सर्वाण्यपीमानि तत्त्वानि तद्भिन्नानि च इन्द्रियादीनि चतुर्मुखादिभिः अभिमानि-देवताभिरधिष्ठितानि सन्ति स्वस्वकार्यनिर्वहणशीलानीति श्रीमध्वस्याभिप्रायः। साङ्ख्यसिद्धान्ते प्रसिद्धानि महदादीनि तत्त्वानि सर्वैरपि वेदान्तदर्शनैरंगीकृतान्येव । माध्वदर्शने तु साङ्ख्यदर्शनादयं विशेषः । साङ्ख्यदर्शने मनः, इन्द्रियाणि, मात्राश्च तत्त्वरूपास्तद्भिन्नाश्चेति विभागो न दृश्यते। माध्वदर्शने तु तथा विभागो दृश्यत इति।

श्रीमध्वः सृष्टिं चतुर्विधां मनुते । शुद्धसृष्टिः, पराधीनविशेषावाप्तिरूपा सृष्टिः, मिश्रसृष्टिः केवलसृष्टिश्चेति। देहस्य, इन्द्रियाणाम् अन्तःकरणादेश्च ईषद्विकाराभावेऽपि केवलं लीलया जगदुपकाराय ईश्वरस्य स्वमूलरूपाद् बहिरागमनमेव शुद्धसृष्टिः । तैत्तिरीये 'सोऽकामयत बहु स्यां प्रजायेयेति . . . सच्च त्यच्चाभवत्' इति यदीश्वरस्य बहुभवनमुच्यते तदेवेयं शुद्धसृष्टिः । ईश्वरः बहुरूपाणि स्वीकृत्य सृष्टानि सर्वाणि वस्तूनि प्रविश्य तेषामन्तर्यामी सन् तैः तत्तत्कार्यं कारयतीत्येतदेव शुद्धसृष्टेः प्रयोजनम्। स्वरूपतः उत्पत्तिरहितानामपि या सृष्टिः सा पराधीनविशेषावाप्तिरूपा सृष्टिरूच्यते श्रीमध्वेन। ईश्वरवत् नित्यमुक्ता लक्ष्मीः ईश्वरेच्छामनुसृत्य सृष्टिकाले सिसृक्षुत्वरूपं विशेषं लभते । अयं च विशेषः भगवदधीन इति ईदृशपराधीनविशेषावाप्तिरत्र नित्यमुक्तायाः सृष्टिरूच्यते। तथैव जडप्रकृतेरनादिनित्याया या विकारावाप्तिः सा तस्याः पराधीनविशेषावाप्तिरूपा सृष्टिः । एवं मूर्तपदार्थसंबंधः यः सृष्टिकालेऽव्याकृताकाशस्य भवति स तस्यानादिनित्यस्य पराधीनविशेषावाप्तिरूपा सृष्टिः । अनादि - नित्यानामपि वस्तूनां एतादृशी सृष्टिरस्तीति कथने 'स इदं सर्वमसृजत' इति श्रुतिरेव मानम् । एवं मिश्रसृष्टिर्नाम स्वरूपतोऽनुत्पन्नानां जीवानां केवलं बाह्यदेहेनोत्पत्तिः । केवलसृष्टिस्तु प्रागविद्यमानानां घटादीनां स्वरूपेणैवोत्पत्तिः।

इदं हि श्रीमध्वमतानुसारेण सृष्टिप्रक्रियायाः स्थूलतो निरूपणम् । किन्त्वत्र विद्यमानानां केषाञ्चिदंशानां सूक्ष्मेक्षिकया परिशीलनं विना एतन्निरूपणं सर्वथाऽपर्यवसितं भवतीति तेऽवश्यं परिशीलनीयाः।

यदस्मिन् सिद्धान्ते प्रकृतेः विश्वोपादानकारणत्वमुक्तं तत् सर्वेषामपि वेदान्तदर्शनानामभिमतमेवेति नात्र बहु विचारणीयमस्ति । परन्तु यदीश्वरः केवलं जगन्निमित्तकारणमुक्तं तत्रास्ति विवादः । यद्यपि न्यायनयेऽपि ईश्वरः केवलं जगन्निमित्तकारणम् । तथापि अपरिमितज्ञानानन्दबलाद्यसङ्ख्य-कल्याणगुणाश्रयो भगवान् अनन्तान्यप्राकृतदिव्यरूपाणि स्वीकुर्वन् प्रकृत्यादौ स्वसृष्टे सर्वस्मिन् अन्तरो भूत्वा तत्तत्कार्यं कारयतीत्यादि नैयायिकानामसम्मतं बह्वत्र विद्यत इत्येतदेतद्दर्शनपरिचयवतां नाविदितम्।

केचिदेवमभिप्रयन्ति - ईश्वरोऽस्य जगतो न केवलं निमित्तकारणम्, अपितु उपादानकारणमपि। तथाहि - 'यतो वा इमानि भुतानि जायन्ते' इत्यादिश्रुतिषु, 'जन्माद्यस्य यतः' इत्यादि सूत्रादिषु च यद्ब्रह्मणो जगत्कारणत्वमुक्तं तत् न केवलं जगन्निमित्तकारणत्वमपितूपादानत्वमपि । तदिदं 'प्रकृतिश्च

प्रतिज्ञादृष्टान्तानुपरोधात्' इति ब्रह्मसूत्रे 'प्रकृतिश्च' इत्यनेनोक्तम्। अत्र 'प्रतिज्ञा दृष्टान्तानुपरोधो' नाम 'येनाश्रुतं श्रुतं भवति' इति ब्रह्मविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानप्रतिज्ञायाः तथा 'यथा सोम्येकेन मृत्पिण्डेन सर्वं मृण्मयं विज्ञातं स्यात्' इति मृत्पिण्डदृष्टान्तस्यानुपरोधः। अत्र हि प्रतिज्ञायां यद् ब्रह्मविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानमुक्तं तत् ब्रह्मणो जगदुपादानत्वे एव नोपरुध्यते। कार्यस्योपादानाव्यतिरेकात् एकविज्ञानेनान्यविज्ञानसंभवात्। केवलं निमित्तकारणत्वे तु कार्यस्य निमित्तकारणादन्यत्वेन एकविज्ञानेनान्यविज्ञानकथनं सर्वथाऽनुपपन्नं स्यात्। एवं दृष्टान्ताश्च उपादानगोचरा एवेति ब्रह्मणो जगदुपादानत्वमेव श्रुत्यभिप्रेतं वाच्यम्। अपि च 'यतो वा इमानि भतानि जायन्ते' इत्यत्र 'यतः' इति पञ्चम्यापि ब्रह्मणो जगदुपादानत्वं सिद्धयति जायमानस्य प्रकृतिः उपादानम् अपादानसंज्ञां लभत इत्यर्थकात् 'जनिकर्तुः प्रकृतिः' इति पाणिनिसूत्रादत्र यच्छब्दवाच्यस्य ब्रह्मणः अपादानसंज्ञा, ततश्चापादाने पञ्चमी योगात् यच्छब्दात् च पञ्चमी वाच्या। ततश्च ब्रह्मणो जगदुपादानं सिद्धयति। किंच 'सर्वाणि हवा इमानि भूतान्याकाशादेव समुत्पद्यन्ते आकाशं प्रत्यस्तं यन्ति' इति श्रुतौ जगतः ब्रह्मणः प्रभवः ब्रह्मण्येव च प्रलयः प्रतिपादितः। यद् यस्मात्प्रभवति यस्मिंश्च लीयते तत्तस्य उपादानं दृष्टमिति ब्रह्मणो जगदुपादानत्वमङ्गीकर्तव्यम्। अपि च 'यद्भूतयोनिं परिपश्यन्ति धीराः' इति काठके ब्रह्म जगद्योनिः कथितम्। योनिशब्दश्चोपादानवाची प्रसिद्ध इति ब्रह्म जगदुपादानं स्वीकरणीयमिति।

श्रीमध्वनिरूपितायां सृष्टिप्रक्रियायां ब्रह्मणो जगदुपादानत्वस्य नास्ति सर्वथाऽवकाशः। तत्रेमानि कारणानि तेन निरूप्यन्ते - उपादानं हि परिणामिकारणम्। परिणामश्च विकारः। विकारश्च द्विविधः। विशेषाप्तिः विशेषिपरिवृत्तिश्चेति। विशेषाप्तिर्नाम धर्मिणस्तादवस्थ्येऽपि धर्ममात्रस्य परिवृत्तिः। धर्मिस्वरूपस्यैव परिवृत्तिस्तु विशेषिपरिवृत्तिरूच्यते। द्विविधोऽयं विकारः प्रत्येकं द्वेधा। अनिवर्त्यः अन्यथाभावः निवर्त्यः अन्यथाभावश्चेति। तत्र प्रथमस्योदाहरणं इयामस्य फलस्य पीतत्वापत्तिः। अत्र धर्मिणः फलस्य तादवस्थ्ये सति धर्मस्य इयामत्वस्य अन्यथाभावः अनिवर्त्यो विद्यते। सुवर्णस्य कुण्डलाकारस्य कटकादित्वापत्तिः द्वितीयस्योदाहरणम्। अत्र धर्मिणः सुवर्णस्य तदवस्थात्वेऽपि कटकादित्वरूपः अन्यथाभावः निवर्त्यः। कुण्डलीकरणस्य पुनः कर्तुं शक्यत्वात्। क्षीरस्य दधिभावः विशेषिपरिवृत्तौ अनिवर्त्यान्यथाभावस्योदाहरणम्। धर्मिणः क्षीरस्यैवात्र परिवृत्तिर्भवति, सा च अनिवर्त्येति। शुल्बस्य तारत्वं तु विशेषिपरिवृत्तौ निवर्त्यान्यथाभावस्योदाहरणम्। औषधिवशात् जातं तारत्वं पुनः प्रबलौषधिबलान्तारतानिवृत्त्या शुल्बं कर्तुं शक्यत इति। सर्वोऽप्ययं विकारः पराधीन एव न हि क्वचित् किञ्चित् विना निमित्तं विकारो दृश्यते। तथात्वे विकारस्य सार्वकालिकत्वप्रसङ्गात्। नास्ति च ब्रह्मणो विकारनिमित्तं किञ्चित्। सृष्टिकाले 'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्' इति ब्रह्मव्यतिरिक्तस्य निषेधात् ततश्चाविकारस्य ब्रह्मणः कथं वा विकारः स्यात्,?

ननु जडेष्वेव विकारः पराधीनो भवति। ब्रह्म तु चेतनं स्वेच्छयैव जगदात्मना विक्रियते। तत्र च 'तदात्मानं स्वयमकुरुत' इति श्रुतिरेव मानम्। ततश्च न दोष इति चेन्न प्रेक्षावतः तस्य परमचेतनस्य नानाविधानर्थरूपप्रपञ्चात्मना परिणामे इच्छाया एवानुपपन्नत्वात्। न च प्रपञ्चस्यानर्थरूपतां ब्रह्म न जानातीति युक्तम्। ब्रह्मणोऽसर्वज्ञत्वप्रसङ्गात्। एवं च न सर्वथा ब्रह्मणो विकारितं युक्तम्।

किञ्च प्राङ्निरूपिता विकारविशेषा अपि ब्रह्मणो नोपपद्यन्ते। न तावत् धर्मिणस्तादवस्थ्ये सति धर्माणामन्यथा भावः निवर्त्योऽनिवर्त्यो वा ब्रह्मणि युक्तः। 'अस्थूलमनणु' इति श्रुतिविरोधात्। नापि धर्मिस्वरूपस्यैव प्रच्युतिरूपो विकारः निवर्त्योऽनिवर्त्यो वा युक्तः। प्रपञ्चस्थितिसमये ब्रह्माभावप्रसङ्गात्।

केचित्तु परमसूक्ष्मं अचिद्रूपं प्रधानं ब्रह्मणः शरीरम् । ततश्च ब्रह्माधिष्ठितं ब्रह्मात्मकं प्रधानं जगदुपादानमिति हेतोः ब्रह्मैव जगदुपादानमिति कथ्यत इति ब्रुवन्ति किन्त्वनया रीत्या न कथञ्चिद् ब्रह्मणो जगदुपादानत्वसिद्धिः । अपितु पितुः पुत्रजन्मनि अपायावधित्वरूपं अपादानत्वं तथा ब्रह्मणोऽपि जगदुत्पत्तौ अपादानत्वमेव स्यात् । न च पितापुत्रयोरपि उपादानोपादेयभाव एवेति वाच्यम् । यदि पितापुत्रशब्दाभ्यां पितृचेतनस्य पुत्रचेतनस्य च परिग्रहस्तर्हि पितापुत्रौ नोपादानोपादेयभूतौ चेतनत्वात् देवदत्त-यज्ञदत्तवदित्यनुमानविरोधः । यदि च ताभ्यां पदाभ्यां अचेतनस्य शरीरस्य परिग्रहस्तर्हि नानेन दृष्टान्तेन चेतनस्य ब्रह्मणः उपादानत्वसिद्धिः ।

किंच यदि महदादि कार्यं ब्रह्मविकारः स्यात् तत्र ब्रह्मस्वरूपानुगमः स्यात् । उपादेये उपादानकारणस्वरूपानुगमस्य मृद्विकारे घटादौ दृश्यमानत्वात् । न च ब्रह्मस्वरूपानुगमः जगति दृश्यत इति न जगतो ब्रह्मविकारत्वं युज्यते ।

यच्चोच्यते 'जनिकर्तुः प्रकृतिः' इति उपादानस्यापादानसंज्ञायां विहिता पञ्चमी 'यतो वा' इत्यत्र यच्छब्दवाच्यस्य ब्रह्मणः उपादानत्वं गमयतीति तत्र । 'जनिकर्तुः प्रकृतिः' इति सूत्रस्य जायमानस्य या प्रकृतिः सैवापादनमित्यर्थाभावात् । अपितु, जायमानस्य या प्रकृतिः उपादानसंसृष्टम् अपायावधिभूतं द्रव्यं तत् कारकमपादानसंज्ञां लभत इत्येव सूत्रव्याख्यानकरणात् ।

'शृङ्गात् शरो जायते' इत्यादितत्सूत्रोदाहरणेषु हि न सर्वस्य शृङ्गस्य शरोपादानत्वं दृश्यते । अपितु शृङ्गसंसृष्टस्यैकदेशस्यैव । तथा च जायमानस्य शरस्य उपादानभूतः यः शृङ्गैकदेशः तत्संसृष्टस्य शृङ्गैकदेशान्तरस्य अपादानत्वमनेन सूत्रेणोच्यते । ननु तर्हि 'प्रकृतेर्महान् महतोऽहङ्कारः' इति कथं प्रयोग इति चेन्न । तत्रापि सर्वस्या अपि प्रकृतेः, सर्वस्यापि महतः परिणामानंगीकारात् । परिणतभागसंसृष्टस्य अपरिणतभागस्य तत्र विद्यमानत्वात् । तस्यैव च प्रकृतसूत्रेणापादानसंज्ञायां तद्वाचकात् पञ्चमीसम्भवादिति ननु एवं तर्हि 'शृङ्गावयवात् शरो जायते' इत्येव प्रयोगः स्यात् । अपरिणतभागस्य एकदेशत्वेन तत्र शृङ्गशब्दप्रयोगोऽनुपपन्न एवेति चेन्न । कतिपयानामेव अवयवानां शरात्मना परिणतत्वेन बहूनां च शृङ्गावयवानामपरिणतानामवशिष्टत्वेन बाहुल्यापेक्षया तत्र शृङ्गशब्दप्रयोगोपपत्तेः ।

किञ्च महाभाष्यकारेण आद्यस्य चतुर्थपादेऽपादानसंज्ञाप्रकरणे 'भीत्रार्थानां भयहेतुः, 'पराजेरसोढः', 'वारणार्थानामीप्सितः', 'अन्तर्धौ येनादर्शनमिच्छति', 'आख्यातोपयोगे', 'जनिकर्तुः प्रकृतिः', 'भुवः प्रभवः' इति सप्त सूत्राणि 'ध्रुवमपायेऽपादानम्' इति सूत्रेण गतार्थानीति हेतोः अनारभ्याणीति निराकृतानि। एवञ्च उपादानस्यापादानसंज्ञाविधानपरत्वेऽस्य सूत्रस्य निराकरणमनुचितं स्यादिति भाष्यकारस्यापि अयमेव सूत्रार्थः सम्मत इत्यवश्यमङ्गीकार्यम् । ततश्च 'यतो वा' इति श्रुत्यापि न ब्रह्मणः उपादानत्वसिद्धिः ।

यदप्युच्यते ब्रह्मण उत्पद्यमानस्य ब्रह्मण्येव लीयमानस्य जगतः ब्रह्मैवोपादानमिति युक्तमिति तदपि न ऊर्णनाभेरूत्पद्यमानस्य तत्रैव च लीयमानस्य तन्तोः ऊर्णनाभ्युपादानकत्वाभावात् । तदुपभुक्तान्नस्यैवोपादानत्वात् । एवं च नानेन ब्रह्मणो जगदुपादानत्वसिद्धिः । यच्चोक्तं 'यद्भूतयोनिं परिपश्यन्ति' इत्यादिश्रुतौ ब्रह्मणि योनिशब्दप्रयोगात् तस्योपादानत्वसिद्धिरिति, तदप्ययुक्तम् । योनि -

शब्दस्य उपादानार्थकत्वमेवेति नियमाभावात् । 'योनिष्ठ इन्द्र निषदे अकारि' इति श्रुतौ योनिशब्दस्योपादानपरत्वाभावात्। 'हे इन्द्र ते निषदे उपवेशनाय योनिः स्थानमकारि' इति खलु तदर्थः। अतो न सर्वथा ब्रह्मणः जगदुपादानत्वमिति श्रीमध्वस्याभिप्रायः।

अपरे तु, न ब्रह्म जगतः परिणाम्युपादानम्, अपितु विवर्तोपादानम् । विवर्तोपादानत्वं च अविद्यापरिणाममृषाविश्वभ्रमाधिष्ठानत्वम् । ततश्च ब्रह्मणोऽस्मिन् पक्षे विकारानभ्युपगमात्, अभ्युपगमाच्चोपादानत्वस्य श्रुत्याद्यविरोध इत्यभिप्रयन्ति। तदिदमपि श्रीमध्वस्य नाङ्गीकारार्हम्। यतो हीयं सृष्टिप्रक्रिया अविद्याया जगदुपादानत्वमभ्युपगम्य प्रवृत्तम्। तत्र कस्येयमविद्येति प्रश्नः। न च ब्रह्मणः तस्य सर्वज्ञत्वात् । यदि च ब्रह्मणि न सार्वज्ञ्यं तर्हि तत्कस्येति वाच्यम् । न च जीवस्य तदंगीकर्तुं शक्यम् । अनुभवविरोधात्। नापि जडस्य। जडे ज्ञानमात्रस्यासम्भवात्। तथाच ब्रह्मण एव सर्वज्ञत्वमंगी करणीयमिति न तस्याविद्या । यदि च जीवाश्रिता अविद्या उच्यते तदाप्यनुपपत्तिः । यथासति जीवब्रह्मणोर्भेदस्य स्वाभाविकत्वापातात् । यदि जीवब्रह्मभेदोऽपि अविद्याकल्पित इत्युच्यते तर्हि अन्योन्याश्रयता । अविद्यासिद्धौ जीवब्रह्मणो भेदसिद्धिः। तत्सिद्धौ च जीवरूपाश्रयसंभवात् अविद्यासिद्धया भेदसिद्धिरिति।

अयमत्र संक्षेपः । ब्रह्मणः जगद्विवर्तोपादानत्ववादिमतं जगन्मिथ्यात्वमङ्गीकृत्य प्रवृत्तम् । जगन्मिथ्यात्वं श्रीमध्वदृष्टौ निष्प्रमाणमिति न ब्रह्मणः विवर्तोपादानत्वं युक्तमिति। तथाच श्रीमध्वसम्मतायां सृष्टिप्रक्रियायां ईश्वरः जगतः केवलं निमित्तकारणं, प्रकृतिस्तु परिणाम्युपादानकारणमिति।

संकेतः

*श्लोकाविमौ न माण्डूक्योपनिषत्, किन्तु गौडपादविरचितमाण्डूक्यकारिकागताविति केषाञ्चिदभिप्रायः । मध्वस्तु श्लोकावेतौ माण्डूक्योपनिषद्भागभूतावेवेति मनुते । अनयोर्माण्डूक्यकारिकाभागत्वे जगदिदं मायानिर्मितमिति वादः केषाञ्चिदभिप्रायत्वेन कथमत्रोपवर्णित इति प्रश्नस्तु समाधानमर्हति। जगन्मायानिर्मितमिति खलु गौडपादसिद्धान्तः।

आधारग्रन्थाः

1. श्रीमध्वविरचितम् अनुव्याख्यानम्, भागवततात्पर्यनिर्णयः, महाभारततात्पर्यनिर्णयः, ब्रह्मसूत्रभाष्यम्,
2. श्रीजयतीर्थविरचिता न्यायसुधा, तद्टिप्पणी परिमलः,
3. श्रीवेदगर्भपद्मनाभाचार्यविरचितः मध्वसिद्धान्तसारः इत्यादयः।

XVI

CAN DISEMBODIED GOD BE THE CREATOR OF THE WORLD

(An attempt to answer the question from the Nyaya view point)

CAN GOD CREATE?

Ratna Datta Sharma

I : CLASSIFICATION OF THE CONCEPT OF CREATION WITH THE HELP OF AN ORDINARY EXAMPLE

In our everyday language we often use the sentence of the form "This particular pot is created by the potter". What does it actually mean? This particular assertion indicates that the pot has come into being. The assertion would be meaningless if the pot was already there. Thus the assertion implies that the 'pot' was not there before its creation. In other words the prior non-existence of the 'pot' was there. The 'pot', in our example may be made of clay. The effort of the potter renders the creation of the pot to be possible. It is due to the activity of the potter that the pot gets originated out of clay.

So the conception of creation involves - (1) a Creator, and (2) a created object which was not there or was absent before its creation. It also involves, in case the created object is a material thing, a reference to the material out of which the thing, in question, is created. The material, the clay, in the context of creation of an earthen jar, is given. The creator of the jar does not create the clay. But he creates the 'pot' by his own effort. Through his effort he brings a change in the nature of the given material clay so that it gets transformed into a pot. Thus the concept of creation involves the concept of change so far as the material of creation is concerned. The change is the result of the effort rendered by the causal agent, the creator. The material clay is ultimately made of earth atom which is eternal in nature. The creator in creating the pot takes help of stick, wheel etc. which are also products in nature. So the situation which involves creation of something comprises of two different types of things both, (1) which are of the nature of an effect, and (2) which are not so. The thing which is created emerges through the effort of the agent which, again, does so through the utilisation of all the things mentioned.

The question is whether we are permitted, in the light of the discussion, to conclude that creation means bringing about something which was not there out of something present or existing there. In other words whether creation can be treated

as nothing but a change brought into the nature of the given material out of which the creation emerges. If so, then 'creation' cannot be taken to mean the occurrence or emergence of something out of nothing.

II : THE ROLE OF CREATOR

In this section we want to clarify the nature of the role which the creator plays in the creation of the pot. As distinct from other conditions inevitable for the creation of the pot the potter renders it to be possible as he possesses some special features. They are as follows:-

i. Having a direct cognition of the material out of which he creates the thing in question.

ii. He has the desire to create the particular thing in question.

iii. He must have the volition to create the thing.

iv. He must be active enough to bring the pot into being.

Each of the last three features is causally related to the preceding one. One cannot have the desire to create something out of the given material unless he has got the immediate cognition of it. The desire creates the required volition in him which leads him to physical operation.

The person, who creates the pot cannot have the desire to create the thing under consideration unless he believes that he has the capacity to bring the pot into being (*kṛtisādhyatā jñāna*). In addition to this he must believe that the action is capable of rendering some results that would be good for him (*iṣṭasādhanatā jñāna*).

III : HOW GOD CAN BE THE CREATOR AS HE IS DISEMBODIED

The Naiyāyika-s believe that the world is created. Thus it was not there before creation. They believe that God is the creator of the world. The ultimate constituent of the world, according to them, are atoms. God creates the world, out of the eternal atoms. They accept a definite order in which the world has come into being from the eternal atoms. Though it is a very interesting one to discuss we are not at present interested in this. The Naiyāyika-s believe that '*adṛṣṭa*' is the auxiliary cause of creation. They have reasons of their own for the acceptance of the role of *adṛṣṭa* in creation. But these reasons are not our present concern. '*Adṛṣṭa*' is an effect in nature; it is nothing but the merit or demerit that results from the actions performed by the finite beings. So, the situation of the creation involves such a thing as one of its causes which is effect in nature. This brings an important point to us. As *adṛṣṭa*, the merits and demerit of the actions performed by the finite being has been accepted as the auxiliary cause of creation, so it must be there before creation. But '*adṛṣṭa*' in this sense, presupposes the existence of the finite beings. Thus it in turn refers to another creation preceding the present one. In the same way the second

one would refer to the previous one and so on. In this sense creation is beginningless. If the world is already created then no question of its being created is meaningfully there. There is scope for a second creation if and only if the previous creation is already dissolved. So, every new creation is preceded by the dissolution of the previous creation.

On the basis of this discussion, another important point gets revealed that God cannot be regarded as the creator of every thing. He cannot be regarded as the create of the atoms, the finite selves etc. The act of creation presupposes their pre-existence. Our account indicates to another aspect of creation,namely, that finite selves also contribute in a very definite sense in creation.

IV : ANSWER TO THE OBJECTION FROM THE NYĀYA VIEWPOINT

In this concluding section we shall discuss the question that whether God can be considered as the creator of the world as the Naiyāyika-s believe that God is disembodied.

The world is not something eternal. It is created. There must be some creator. Finite beings like us cannot be the creator. Thus there must be some infinite being who creates the world, he is God. We, the finite beings cannot be regarded as the creator of the world as we fail to fulfil the very first condition for being regarded as *kartā*. The atoms are imperceptible to the finite beings. Hc.. it would be possible for us to create something out of these imperceptible atoms. But God is all perceiving and his cognition is eternal. Thus it does not result from the sense object contact which, however, is true, with the cognition, which are perceptual in nature of the finite beings. God has the desire to create the world. The desire to create something on the part of the finite beings is caused by the immediate cognition of the ultimate constituent material. Thus there results the volition of creation in him. But God's desire is not created by the immediate cognition of the atoms from which he creates the world. The volition of creation also does not result in him from the desire of creation. But normally we find that an agent involves himself in physical operation to do something. But how it would be possible for God to be involved in such action which would render the creation of the world to be possible?

As he is disembodied thus it would be impossible on his part to be involved in physical operation which is inevitable to bring something into being. We know that how the physical operation of the potter renders the creation of the pot to be possible.

In short, the objection stands thus action, in general, involves physical operation, including body movements. The act of creation also must involve physical operation. But the Naiyāyika-s do not accept the existence of the body of God on different grounds. Thus it is not possible for him to create the world. Let us try to meet the objection from the point of view of a Naiyāyika.

1. The first assumption on which the objection rests is that every action involves the operation of body. The paradigm case of such an act is the act which the potter

performs to being the pot into being. Thus by action, here such actions are considered which involve the involvement of the body. But we can say that the volition which results from the desire to create the pot in the potter does not result from the operation of the body in this sense. Thus performance of an act may mean - (1) performance of an act of volition, or (2) performing some physical operation. Then one can be regarded as an agent performing an action in the sense (1) also. God also can very well be regarded as an agent in the sense (1), that is in having the volition to create the world.

2. There are different instances of creation which do not involve the activity of the body. For instance, we find that the creation of the body of Droṇa, Draupadi and other prominent figures in the Mahābhārata,does,in no way,depend on the operation of the body. Now one may challenge the position on the ground that there is no rational ground for the acceptance of these episodes. To such a person we can state an example from our ordinary experience also.

The conceivability of egg, on the part of turtle, can be stated as such an example. The most unusual aspect of turtle reproduction is the ability of female to lay fertile eggs for years after a single mating. It is a fact of experience. Thus there can be no question of its unacceptability. If such a single instance is accepted then 'creation involves the activity of the body' this general statement cannot be taken for granted.

3. The objection which we are trying to answer from the point of view of the Naiyāyika-s rest on the assumption that usually in most of the cases we find an agent not only have a body but the involvement of the body is inevitable for performing an act. Thus, this points to a point of agreement of the different agents. But the point is that if the point of similarity of the different agents are taken into account then the dissimilarities of the agent should not be taken lost sight of if the objection is to be an acceptable one. Actually the dissimilarities among the different causal agent is glaring. For instance, an individual may be strong enough to lift an object the weight of which is about 5 Kg. by a single finger. But the weak man has to employ the force of the whole body to lift it. So, how a person will act depends largely on the individual capacity of the agent. God, being most powerful may act in a way which is different from the way in which the finite individuals act. So there is no necessity that God is to create the world in the same way in which the causal agent usually create. For,as the cognition of God the desire and volition of God in being eternal are also different in nature from those of the finite beings.

4. It is true that usually in everyday experience we find that physical operation is involved in creation. In most of the cases where something is created the body of the agent is involved in the act of creation. But why the activity of the causal agent is necessary at all? If the volition to create something is enough for creating that thing then no one would take the trouble of operating the body to bring the thing into being. If the volition to create the pot is enough for the creation of the pot then why the potter would take the trouble of operating his body to bring the thing into being? God's volition for creation of the world is enough for the creation, thus there is no

necessity on the part of God, to be involved in the physical operation to bring a successful end of the volition.

5. In the case of finite being the body is involved in different senses in the whole act of creation. The immediate cognition of the material out of which he creates the thing in question, result from sense object contact. His sense organs cannot function unless being associated (*āśtria*) with the body. But God's cognition of the atoms, the ultimate constituent of the world is eternal. Thus it does not result from sense object contact. So, the question of the operation of the sense organ being associated with the body does not arise at all. In the case of finite beings the desire is caused by the cognition that results from the operation of sense organ. That again in turn leads to volition. The finite senses posses these qualities - cognition, desire, volition - only when they are associated with the body. But this is not true with the qualities of the infinite being.

6. One of the basic assumptions,on the basis of which the objection is brought is as follows:

Who ever is an agent must have a body in other words wherever there is *kaṭṛtva* (agency) there is *śarīravatva* (possession of the body). Thus *śarīravatva* is *vyāpaka* in respect to *kaṭṛtva* in the sense that *kaṭṛtva* does not exist where there is the absence of *śarīravatva*. But for the establishment of this *vyāpya vyāpaka saṃbandha* mere abundant experience of the association between *kartṛtva* and *śarīravatva* would not do. If it were possible then fire also can be said to be invariably related to smoke. What is required is uncontradicted experience. To establish the rule the suspicion of possible exception is to be removed. But how it is possible? It can be done by showing that the denial of the proposed rule would lead to the denial of a causal law. If one suspects the proposed rule that smoke is invariably related to fire then for the removal of the suspicion one may argue in this way - if smoke were not invariably related to fire then it could not be produced by fire. But fire causes smoke is an established law. Thus the denial of the suggested invariable relation entails a violation of the causal law. Thus the proposed invariable relation between *kaṭṛtva* and *śarīravatva* is to be established by uncontradicted experience. To have uncontradicted experience one is to have observation of such association without the awareness of any instance to the contrary. But if any one suspects that whether *kaṭṛtva* can be said to be invariably related to *śarīravatva* to establish the proposed *vyāpya vyāpaka saṃbaṅdha* the suspicion of the contrary instance is to be allayed. The suspicion of possible exception can be removed if it can be shown that the denial of the proposed rule entail the violation of an established rule. It may take the form - 'If *kaṭṛtva* is not invariably related to *śarīravatva* then *kaṭṛtva* cannot have *śarīravatva* as its essential condition'. But the denial cannot be said to violate any established rule. As it is not an established rule that *śarīravatva* contributes to the essential condition for *kaṭṛtva*. But the Nyāya position is that *kaṭṛtva* consists in *kāryānukūla kṛtimattva* that means 'agency' consists in having the volition leading to the effect. *Kṛti* means *prayatna*. So an agent is one who has *kāryānukūla prayatna*. Phāni Bhuṣaṇ Tarkavāgiṣa suggested this sense to be the primary

(*mukhya*). As the person who is considered as an agent in performing act meaning thereby performing physical operation cannot be involved in such act unless he has got the volition leading to the performance of the act. But on the basis of our previous discussion it is clear that one may very well be a *kartā* in this sense without performing some physical operation. So to be a *kartā* one must have volition leading to the particular effect. If so then the suspicion of this position would lead to the denial of an accepted position. It would be of the form if *kaṭṛtva* is not invariably related to *kāryānukūla kṛtimattva* then *katrtva* would not be conditioned by *kāryānukūla kṛtimattva*. But this is actually the case which is accepted.

Kaṭṛtva and *kāryānukūla kṛtimattva* are synonymous expressions. Thus one can be replaced by the other. Thus by substituting *kāryānukūla kṛtimattva* for *kṛtimattva* the denial of the proposed rule would lead to the contradiction of the form - *kaṭṛtva* does not consist in *kaṭṛtva*. So, the suspicion can be alleged in this way if *katrtva* is not invariably related to *kāryānukūla prayatnavattva* then *kaṭṛtva* cannot be said to be consisting in *kāryānukūla kṛtimattva*. But this actually leads to the denial of the accepted rule and involves a contradiction. This constitutes the ground for the acceptance of the position that *kaṭṛtva* consists in *kāryānukūla prayatnavatta*. This is quite consistent with the different assertions in regard to the agency of God's '*viśvasya kartā bhuvanasya gopta*' for instance, which are contained in the *Śruti*. If God is not the creator of the world then God would not have been described as such in the *āgama*.

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XVII

GAṄGEŚA'S ARGUMENT FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

John Vattanky

Scholars in Nyāya Vaiśeṣika used to hold that everything that could be said about the concept of God has already been discussed by Udāyana in his **Nyāyakusumañjali**. Thus Jacobi stated that there is nothing new in Gaṅgeśa's *Iśvaravāda*, probably without really analyzing and interpreting in detail the text of Gaṅgeśa.[1] Recent studies have shown conclusively that it is no longer possible to hold such a view. On the contrary, they establish rather conclusively that Gaṅgeśa shows considerable originality not only in the organisation of the matter that was available to him in the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika tradition but in some respects even in the development of thought itself.[2] The present essay discusses the syllogism which Gaṅgeśa brings forward to establish the existence of God. However, the objections which actual opponents or Gaṅgeśa himself brings forward against this syllogism and the answers he gives to them are philosophically more significant than the syllogism itself. Hence special attention will be given to the treatment of this point by Gaṅgeśa.

First, let the syllogism itself be stated. An early form of the syllogism, which can already be seen in Uddyotakara's work around 5th century A.D., is that - the earth and so on have an agent because they are an effect like a jar: *kṣityadikam sakartṛkam karyatvat ghatavat*. Here of course the syllogism is in its simplest form.

But this syllogism does not answer the difficulties of the Mīmāṃsaka-s and the Buddhists. Therefore Gaṅgeśa reformulates the syllogism in such a way as to be able to answer the difficulties of the opponents. He is able to do so chiefly by the care with which he formulates the subject and *sādhya* of the inference. All the things existing by the relation of inherence and produced (but not through the unseen and also not by an effort which is produced) and whose object is the material cause, are considered to be the subject. This simply means all those things which are not directly produced by individual souls. The argument is that since these things are not produced by men, but are nevertheless actually produced, they must be produced by someone. This someone is God. The full syllogism itself runs as follows:

"Things produced, but not through the unseen, and existing by the relation of inherence, which are not produced by an effort that is itself produced and whose object is the material cause. (These things) are produced by someone having effort, desire to do, and direct knowledge of the materials cause, (and which effort, knowledge and desire to do) are not the counter-positive of a prior absence which is pervaded by the prior absence of the unseen.

Or these things are produced by someone having effort, desire to do and direct knowledge whose object is the material cause, which are later than the unseen which produces the things in question.

Or these things have the material causes which are the object of effort, desire to do and direct knowledge.

Since these things being inherent are the counter-positive of prior absence. Whatever is thus (having - reason) is so (having *sādhya*) like a jar. These are so, (i.e., having the reason), is so (i.e. having *sādhya*), like a jar. These are so (i.e., having the reason). Therefore (since this has reason) they are so (i.e., have the *sādhya*)." [3]

This is the full syllogism which Gaṅgeśa gives to establish the existence of God. As already noted Gaṅgeśa carefully formulates the subject, reason and *sādhya* of the syllogism in such a way as to be able to meet the objections of the buddhists and the Mīmāṃsaka-s.

The subject is enunciated in only one way; but the *sādhya* in three different ways. The subject is said to be those things existing by the relation of inherence and produced, but not through the unseen and also not by an effort which is produced and whose object is the material cause. Commentators like Jayadeva, Pragalbha and Rucidatta have explained in detail the purpose of the qualifications of the subject, reason and *sādhya*. Often these qualifications are used to avoid or to include instances from the peculiar standpoint of Nyāya Vaiśeṣika world view and therefore they need not detain us here. It suffices to say that Gaṅgeśa was very much conditioned by the cosmology of his times almost in the same way as Aristotle was by the physics of his time.

Gaṅgeśa's formulation of the inference shows the carefulness and accuracy with which he fought against the Buddhists and the Mīmāṃsaka-s. For, according to them the world is produced by ordinary individuals by means of the unseen which they have acquired. This only means that the world comes into existence because of our merit. The formulation of the inference, particularly the enunciation of its subject and *sādhya*, is aimed against the Buddhists and the Mīmāṃsaka-s. They hold that the world is produced by individuals souls by means of the unseen; it is not the case that we actually make the universe, for one who makes anything should have knowledge of its material cause. We do not have the knowledge of the material cause of the earth and so on, viz. atoms and so we cannot make them. They need a maker who knows their material causes. It should be noted that within the tradition of Nyāya Vaiśeṣika system, Gaṅgeśa shows considerable originality in the formulation of the syllogism for it was his purpose to meet the arguments of the Buddhists and the Mīmāṃsaka-s. Even from a purely philosophical and logical point of view

the significance of Gaṅgeśa cannot be under-rated. He had the correct intuition that the heart of the problem of the proof for the existence of God lies in the nature of the invariable concomitance of 'having-a-maker' with 'being-an-effect'. It is such an invariable concomitance in which Gaṅgeśa rightly puts content.

It may be objected that there is the fault of establishing something already established because it may be said that the very knowledge whose object is jars and so on, could produce the world. This is simply impossible because in order that something may be produced, the person who produces should know the material cause of the thing in question and not of something else. Therefore, there is no room for the fault of establishing something other than what is to be established, since human souls do not have the knowledge of the material cause of the earth and so on and so they are unable to produce them.

Further, it may be objected that God has no direct perception and that he produces the world and so on by means of a knowledge similar to the one arising from the apprehensional connection in the form of universals. This objection has also to be rejected because, in our experience, we do not say that someone is an agent of something because he has the knowledge of the material cause of that thing by means of the apprehensional connection in the form of universals; we affirm that someone is an agent of something only when he has direct perception of the material cause of the thing in question.

Another objection is as follows. It may be said that knowledge and so on produce the effect in question and not the individual who has knowledge and so on, for, according to the opponent, the invariable concomitance is in the form: Wherever there is knowledge and so on there is effect, and not in the form: Wherever there is one who has knowledge and so on, there is effect. This objection also cannot be accepted because the cause of effects like jar and so on is the conjunction of soul having effort with the body. Such a conjunction produces bodily action which in turn produces the effect. It may further be objected that effort itself is the cause since although there is conjunction of soul with the body, without effort, there is no bodily action. This also has to be rejected because without the non-inherent cause, there cannot be any effort and therefore the conjunction of the soul with the body is to be considered a cause of effect like jar and so on. Therefore the soul has to be considered as a cause. Hence with regard to the earth and so on, it should be admitted that it is not merely the knowledge of God which is their cause, but God Himself, in whom such a knowledge inheres, is the cause.

It is again pointed out that there is the fault of the absence of *sādhya* in the example. Jars and so on, which are taken as examples, are brought about by a knowledge that such things are both possible and desirable to be produced. Such a knowledge is in the form of inference and not in the form of perception. Hence jars and so on are produced by inferential knowledge, and not by perceptual knowledge. Since the example does not have the *sādhya*, technically there is the failure of the absence of *sādhya*. The answer to this objection is that although we may have inferential knowledge that something is both possible and desirable to be produced, still, without direct perceptual knowledge of the material cause of the thing to be

produced, no effect can be brought about. As, for example, even if we know by inference that a dyad is both possible and desirable to be produced, we cannot produce it since we do not have direct perception of atoms which are the material cause of dyads. But this does not mean either that God produces the world by means of the inference that it is possible and desirable to produce the world, for, in God there is no inference at all, since God has neither merit nor demerit, he has neither happiness nor sorrow. Therefore any inference which asserts that something brings happiness or sorrow to God is erroneous.

Now Gaṅgeśa turns his attention to one of the often repeated objections: What is not directly perceived does not exist. Thus God is not directly perceived by any human being and so he does not exist. The answer to this is obvious: if something is a proper object of perception and if it is not perceived, then it may be concluded that it does not exist. But nobody says that God is a proper object of perception. Therefore even if he is not directly perceived, it cannot be concluded that he does not exist.

Gaṅgeśa then takes up a fundamental objection which comes up again in different forms. The main point of the objection is that the invariable concomitance of an invisible agent cannot be cognized in 'being-an-effect'. This is the basic objection of the Buddhists. And the heart of the answer is that the Naiyāyika does not affirm an invariable concomitance of an invisible agent in 'being-an-effect' but from positive and negative concomitances of particular instances of agent and effect. Gaṅgeśa concludes that all instances of effects are pervaded by an agent. This means that we know that individual instances of effects have an agent and from this we can conclude legitimately that all instances of effects have an agent, if there is nothing to prove to the contrary. If this is not admitted then no inference will be valid since to have the cognition of the invariable concomitance of fire in the mountain with smoke in the mountain, we need only to have the cognition of the invariable concomitance of fire in the smoke. If this latter form of invariable concomitance is not enough to make an inference, then no inference at all is possible.

Further, it is not correct to object that the *sādhya* of being-produced by knowledge, desire and effort has useless qualifications in the sense that the absence of any one of these - knowledge, desire or effect - brings about the absence of the reason of 'being-an-effect'. Therefore, by the general rule that, that which is the counter-positive of the absence which is the pervader of the absence of *sadhya*, establishes the *sādhya*, one can establish only being-produced-by-knowledge, being-produced-by-desire or being-produced by effort, and not all the three together by the reason of being an effect. This argument is not quite true. Although the general principle mentioned is valid, it is equally valid that just as the absence of 'being-an-effect' can be governed by the absence of knowledge, absence of desire or absence of effort, it can also be governed by all the absences together. Therefore, it is possible to establish also 'being-produced-by-knowledge-desire-effort' by the reason of 'being-an-effect'.

Gangesa then answers the objection that there is the fault of contradiction of the particular (*viśeśavirudhatva*) *sādhya* in the inference establishing the existence of God. The argument implied in the objection is that - in the example of a jar and so on, an agent with non-eternal knowledge cognizes: This is considered to be a contradiction, i.e., it is contradictory to the usual kind of *sādhya* that is established by the reason of 'being-an-effect'. Such an objection is to be found also in earlier authors like Vallabha, Saśidhara and Udāyana. Gaṅgeśa's answer to this objection is that there is no such contradiction. The invariable concomitance of an agent as such (and not that of an agent with non-eternal knowledge) is cognized in the reason of 'being-an-effect'. Therefore, there is no contradiction in establishing an agent with eternal knowledge and so on by the force of the relation of the reason to the subject. Further, as long as the existence of God is not established, one cannot speak of a contradiction between 'being-knowledge' and 'being-eternal'.

It may further be objected that God cannot be the maker of the universe since he has no bodily operation. This objection has also to be rejected because all effects need not be produced by bodily action. A further conclusion from this answer is that a cause should not be defined as that which invariably exists prior to the effect, and at the same time, is perceived as existence together with the effect. The reason is that not all causes need be perceived together with the effect as, for example, mental effort (*kṛti*) which is a cause of effects need not be perceived together with the effect. Therefore God's effort (*kṛti*) which is a cause of the universe need not be perceived together with the effect, i.e., the universe.

Gaṅgeśa then tackles the objection that it is not possible to establish an agent whose knowledge is eternal and who has no body because this is against our normal experience that an agent has only non-eternal knowledge and that he has a body. The first answer given to this objection is that of the old Naiyāyika-s : There is no invariable concomitance of non-eternity in knowledge-ness, for in the absence of such an invariable concomitance no normal activity is hindered. Further, it has already been established that there is the invariable concomitance of 'having-an-effect' in 'being-an-effect'. However, the reason of 'being-an-effect' which is in the earth and so on is such that it could not have been brought about by any operation of the body. Therefore the knowledge which brings about these things must be eternal. Hence the invariable concomitance of non-eternity cannot be accepted in 'being-knowledge'. If this is not accepted no inference would be possible. Gaṅgeśa then gives his own answer to the objection. There is no difficulty if certain instances of a particular substance are eternal, and some other instances of the same substance are not eternal as, for example, according to Vaiśeṣika, the atoms of earth substance are eternal while its dyad is not eternal. Similarly, there is no difficulty if certain instances of knowledge are eternal and certain other instances are non-eternal.

The same objection is again taken up from a different point of view : There is no invariable concomitance of 'having-an-agent' in 'being-an-effect' since the limitor of 'being-produced-by-an-action' is also rejected because there is the relation of cause and effect between agent and effect and so 'being-produced' and not

'being-jar' and so on is the limitor of 'being-produced-that-is-governed-by-an-agent'. And when invariable concomitance is not admitted, even while there is a supporting reason and no disproving factor, as for instance as an additional condition, then it would come about that the *sādhya* is only in something other then the subject. This means that no inference at all would be possible. Gangesa does not seem to favour the answer of the moderns *(Navya-s)* to this difficulty. They assert that just as 'being-an-effect' in a pot establishes a potter who has only non-eternal knowledge and so on, 'being-an-effect' in the earth and so on establishes an agent with eternal knowledge and so on. There is no contradiction before an agent with eternal knowledge and so on is established, and after an agent is established, the very argument which establishes his existence establishes also that his knowledge and so on are eternal and so there is no contradiction either.

Gangesa then proceeds to answer the objections against the reason of 'being-an-effect' in the establishing inference. And the two main objections against the reason are that it is vitiated by the presence of an additional condition (*upādhi*) and that it has a counter-thesis (*satpratipakṣā*). The discussions concerning both the objections are very intricate and technical, often involving a series of *purvapaksa-s* and their answers.

First of all the opponent tries to show that there is the additional condition of 'being-produced-by-body'. Thus it does not pervade the reason, hence 'being-produced-by-body' is an additional condition. But the *siddhāntapakṣi* argues that 'being-produced-by-body' cannot be considered an additional condition because it serves only to differentiate the subject, because it is qualified and because it is not certain that it has the pervasion of *sādhya*. Naturally, the *pūrvapakṣi* rejects all these arguments : In our experience all effects except bodily action are produced by an agent through the operation of the body. Nor can bodily action be brought about by another body because of infinite regress. Therefore 'having-an-agent' is pervaded by 'being-produced-by-body'. Further, a qualification that serves only to differentiate the subject, can also be an additional condition, when it is certain that there is no *sādhya* in the subject. Similarly, even when the reason is qualified, there could be additional condition.

Gaṅgeśa rejects all these arguments and establishes that 'being-produced-by-body' is not an additional condition. The opponent cannot say that 'being-produced-by-body' is an additional condition only in some instances of effects. This would be acceptable also to the *siddhāntapakṣi*, for he also admits that such things as jars and so on are produced through the instrumentality of the body. On the other hand, the opponent cannot admit that 'being-produced-by-body' is an additional condition in all instances of effects; this means that all effects are produced through the operation of the body. This would be against the position of the *pūrvapakṣi* himself who admits that the earth and so on are effects, but does not admit that they are brought about by an agent through the operation of his body. Therefore, it is concluded that in no case 'being-produced-by-body' is an additional condition.

Now the same objection is proposed in another way : The *siddhāntapakṣi* admits the general principle that when there is the relation of cause and effect

between two particulars, there could also be the relation of cause and effect between the corresponding universals if there is no contradiction; according to this principle it follows that whatever is produced by body only, is produced by an agent since we see that particular things like jar and so on are produced by potters who have body. Hence 'being-produced-by-body', is an additional condition. About this objection also, Gaṅgeśa gives a series of arguments and counter-arguments, but the main answer he gives seems to be the following : It may be that 'being-jar', 'being-produced' and 'being-produced-by-body' are the limitors of 'being-produced-that-is-governed-by-an-agent'. But there is no argument to show that 'having-an-agent' is pervaded only by 'being-produced-by-body' and not also by 'being-jar' and 'being-produced'. This obviously is false and cannot be admitted. Further, in order to cognize that 'being-produced-by-body' is a limitor of 'being-produced-that-is-governed-by-an-agent', one has first of all to cognize 'being-produced' and this is an integral part of 'being-produced-by-body'. After such a cognition, it is impossible to cognize 'being-produced-by-body' also as a limitor, because this would contradict the previous cognition. Hence 'being-produced-by-body' is not a limitor of 'being-produced-that-is-governed-by-an-agent'. Therefore 'being-produced-by-body' is not a pervader of 'having-an-agent'. In other words 'beings-produced-by-body' is not an additional condition.

The next important objection which Gaṅgeśa treats is that the reason for the establishing inference has the fault of having-a-counter-reason. The counter-inference itself is as follows: The world and so on are not produced by an agent because they are not produced by body. Gaṅgeśa naturally rejects this inference on the ground that it tries to establish an absence whose counter-positive is not yet cognized. And an absence whose counter-positive is not known is not at all an absence. To this the *pūrvapakṣi* objects that the logical consequence of this is that one cannot any more speak of a fault of counter-thesis, since the *sādhya* is not known before it is established by the inference which establishes it. This however is rejected on the ground that where the *sādhya* is already established, e.g., where the *sādhya* is 'cow-ness' and so on, there is the possibility of counter-thesis.

Further, the *siddhāṅtapakṣi* argues that the reason in the counter-thesis has the fault of the absence the reason in the subject (*svarūpasiddha*), because earth and so on which are taken as the subject do not have the characteristic of 'not-being-produced-by-body' since through the unseen, the earth and so on are also produced by body. To this the *pūrvapakṣin* replies that the reason of 'not-being-produced-by-body' means 'not-being-produced-by-a-knowledge-which-is-produced'. Such a reason exists also in the subjects and so there is no fault of the absence of the reason in the subject. But the *siddhāṅtapakṣi* then insists in his objection and points out that in that case, the qualification of 'produced-by-knowledge-that-is-produced' is useless, since it is not yet established that there is a knowledge which is not produced. Hence the reason has useless qualification and so it does not have the required invariable concomitance.

Now the main objection against the reason of 'not-being-produced-by-body' is proposed : in comparison with this reason, 'being-not-produced' is simpler and so

it has the real invariable concomitance of 'having-no-agent'. The *pūrvapaksi* tries to answer this objection trying to show that there is actually no useless qualification since the qualification here is helpful for producing the knowledge that the reason actually exists in the subject. Further, it is objected that only when the limitor of qualificandness is not the limitor of invariable concomitance in the qualification of such a limitor. In the case of instances such as 'not-produced-by-body' 'blue-smoke' and so on, the qualificandness alone could be the limitor of the invariable concomitance in question. The *pūrvapakṣi* rejects this and says that even in the instances mentioned, there is invariable concomitance in the sense of 'having-no-deviation', or 'having-no-additional-condition'.

All these objections of the *purvapaksi* are rejected and the *siddhāṅtapakṣi* establishes that such reasons as 'not-being-produced-by-body' and 'blue-smoke' cannot be used as valid reasons, though they have the invariable concomitance of the respective *sādhya*-s. They cannot be used as valid reason because of the general principle that the limitor of pervasion is itself the limitor of 'being-reason'. Accordingly, in reasons such as blue-smoke, the limitor of pervasion is itself the limitor of 'being-reason'. Thus in reasons such as blue-smoke, the limitor of pervasion is not 'being-blue-smoke', but simply 'smoke-ness' because of logical complexity and so blue smoke cannot be used as valid reason. Similarly, in the reason of 'produced-by-body' the limitor of pervasion is only 'being-produced' and not 'being-produced-by-body'. Therefore 'being-produced-by-body' cannot be used as a valid reason.

Gaṅgeśa answers also some other general questions that are raised in the context of the existence of God. Thus he shows that by the law of simplicity the inference establishes the existence of only one God. Such a law of simplicity is accepted by philosophers of all schools in determining the exact nature of the *pramāṇa*-s. Gaṅgeśa shows also that God's knowledge is eternal since the beginningless flow of all things are the object of his knowledge. Since his knowledge extends to all things, he is also maker of everything. And when all the causes for creation such as the unseen are ready, then God creates.

Such are the arguments for the existence of God which Gaṅgeśa proposes. And it could be said without exaggeration that his arguments in their spirit and intent have gone as far as human spirit has ever gone in search of an answer to these problems and objections. He has established the existence of God with arguments as exact as it has been so far possible for human thinking. And this should evoke the admiration of all objective historians of ideas.

NOTES

1. cf. *Die Entwicklung der Gottesidee bei den Indern*, by H. Jacobi, Kurt Schroeker Verlag: Bonn und Leipzig, 1923, p. 63.
2. *Gaṅgeśa's Philosophy of God*, by John Vattanky, S.J., The Adyar Library and Research Centre, Madras, 1984.
3. Ibid, pp. 183-184.

XVIII

RAGHUNĀTH ŚIROMAṆI ON SṚṢṬI WITHOUT KĀLA

Chandan Goswami

I

Yadasandigdhamaprayojanaṃ ca, na tat prekṣāvatpratipitsāgocaraḥ, yathā samanaskendriy sannikṛṣṭaḥ sphīṭalokamadhyavasttīghaṭaḥ,karatadanto vā.[1] That which is not the object of doubt and which serves no purpose can not be the subject of discussion to a rational person. If there is a jar in sufficient light and if it is connected with the attentive senses or *indriya-s*, the question regarding the existence or perception of that jar does not arise - as there is no scope of doubt. Similarly, nobody undertakes the task of counting the teeth of a crow, i.e., none considers the fact how many teeth a crow have - since it serves no purpose. So anything to be the subject of discussion must both be object of doubt and conducive to the attainment of some purpose.

The subject with which we are concerned here is *Sṛṣṭi*. So very reasonably the question of relevancy about the discussion of *Sṛṣṭi* arises. According to the Indian orthodox philosophical systems the ultimate aim of our life is liberation or to be liberated. But there are so many divergences of opinion regarding the nature of liberation among them. Whatever is the case, all of these systems agree with liberation as a final goal.

Philosophy, in the Indian sense, is conducive to the attainment of liberation. But it helps only in an indirect way. Immediate right knowledge about self is a direct cause (*sākṣātkaraṇa*) for liberation. Philosophy, in Indian sense, producing this immediate right knowledge about self helps us indirectly for the attainment of liberation. Regarding the nature of self there are so many controversies - nevertheless immediate right knowledge about self is regarded as subservient to the cause of liberation.

But just after this sort of knowledge, i.e., *ātmasākṣātkār* liberation may not be attained. Because by *ātmasākṣātkār* one may relieve himself from the attainment of the result of *sanchita* and *sanchīyamāna karma*. Since we get rid of *sanchita* and *sanchīyamān karma* by knowledge itself. In that case if the result of *prārabdha karma* is not acheived then one may have to wait for sometime.

But what this 'right knowledge about self' means? The knowledge in which 'I' or *aham* is the *viśeṣya* and *ātmatva* is the *prakāra*, i.e., *ātmatva-prakāraka ahaṃ-viśeṣyaka-buddhi* is regarded as the knowledge about self or *ātmajñāna*. But for this we have to eliminate or remove the obstructing factors (*pratibandhaka-s*) which prevent us from attaining that kind of knowledge. The knowledge of gross body (*bhogāyatan*), the knowledge of the objects of enjoyment etc. are the obstructing factors. To have the knowledge about self means to have the knowledge that neither the gross body, nor the objects of enjoyment, nor the enjoyment itself is self or *atman*, i.e., one must have the power of discriminating the self from all the obstructing factors. In other words, it can be said that *śarīrādivyatiriktabuddhi* or the absence of the knowledge of body etc. is one of the requirement for self-knowledge or *ātmajñāna*. But for the knowledge of absence, the knowledge of the negatum (*pratiyogi*) is required. That is, we have to know about 'body etc.' or *śarīrādi*. By 'body etc.', or *śarīrādi* is meant gross body, table, jar etc., i.e., world as a whole except self. For this *tattvanirṇaya* is necessary, i.e., *lakṣaṇa, pramāṇa* etc. all these are required. In other words for the knowledge of world, the knowledge of creation or *Sṛṣṭi* is relevant. So the discussion of *Sṛṣṭi* serves some purpose. These are some technical Nyāya concepts.

II

But is the topic *Sṛṣṭi* object of doubt at all, i.e., is there any 'scope of doubt' for which it should be discussed? The phrase 'scope of doubt' has, at least, two implications : (a) scope of doubt regarding the *existence* of *Sṛṣṭi*, and (b) scope of doubt regarding the *nature* of *Sṛṣṭi*. But everybody admits the existence of *Sṛṣṭi*, i.e., it is *sarvānubhavasiddha*, in spite of that there is controversy regarding the exact nature of *Sṛṣṭi*. So here doubt refers not to the first type, but to the second type.

Regarding the nature of *Sṛṣṭi* four possibilities may be raised:

a. *Sṛṣṭi* is beginningless but has an end, i.e., *anādi* and *sānta*;

b. *Sṛṣṭi* is both beginningless and endless, i.e., *anādi* and *ananta*;

c. *Sṛṣṭi* has both beginning and end, i.e., *sādi* and *sānta*;

d. *Sṛṣṭi* has beginning but is endless, i.e., *sādi* and *ananta*.

I shall concentrate myself on (a). Because I want to discuss the subject from Nyāya point of view and this is the standard view of the Naiyāyika-s.

If, above mentioned case is the well admitted Nyāya view then considering our above mentioned presuppositions it may be asked why the question of discussion about it arises? Is there really any conformity of opinion? If, it is, then what this conformity actually mean? Is this conformity a unity in diversity? The point, which

I want to bring into notice, is that though there is unity or uniformity in opinion yet among the Naiyāyika-s themselves there are so many differences of opinion.

We perceive that positive categories like table, chair, jar etc. have beginning and they also have an end. If we take so many positive categories into consideration we shall find that they have beginning as well as end, i.e., whatever positive category has beginning has also an end. On the basis of this we may think that *Sṛṣṭi* has also an end, i.e., *Sṛṣṭi* it *sānta*. The corresponding inference will be something like this: *Vimatam sāntaṃ bhāvatvesati utpattimattvāt ghatādivat.*

Now the same thing can be viewed from the other side. Every positive category which has an end has also a beginning, i.e., that (positive category) which is *sānta* is *sādi* also.

Sṛṣṭi being a positive category and having an end also should have beginning, i.e., *Sṛṣṭi* should be called *sādi* and *sānta*, i.e., to put it otherwise: *Sṛṣṭiḥ sādi bhāvatve sati sāntatvāt patādivat.*

Here one may raise the charge of the fallacy of *anyonyāśraya*[2] - since endness or *sāntatva* of *Sṛṣṭi* has been established in terms of beginningness or *sāditva* and beginningness or *sāditva* of *Sṛṣṭi* has been established by means of endness or *sāntatva*. But this charge is not genuine. Because we have explained endness or *sāntatva* by means of that which is positive and also has a beginning and beginningness or *sāditva* has been explained in terms of that which is both positive and has an end. Nevertheless anticipating such a misconception I can try to formulate the corresponding inference thus: *Sṛṣṭiḥ sādi sāvayavatvāt patādivat*, i.e., *Srsti* has beginning because it has parts and whatever has parts has also a beginning, viz. pot. So what has been established here is that *Sṛṣṭi* is both *sādi* and *sānta*, i.e., it has both beginning and end.

But the Naiyāyika-s maintaining it as *sānta*, call it *anādi* or beginningless. Nyāya theory is inconsistent here because it attributes two incompatible properties on *Sṛṣṭi*. How these two incompatible features can be reconciled? The solution lies in properly understanding the *anāditva* of *Sṛṣṭi*.

Sṛṣṭi is called *anādi* as stream or flow or *pravāha*. But what does it mean by saying *Sṛṣṭi* is *anādi* as a *pravāha*? If we describe *Sṛṣṭi* as *prāgabhāva pratiyogi*, i.e., negatum of its prior-absence, will our purpose be served? No. Because in that case *one Sṛṣṭi* may be established. And as an individual *Sṛṣṭi* and as *sadi, Sṛṣṭi* may be established but its *anāditva*, which is the view of the Naiyāyika-s, will not be maintained. So to explain its *anāditva* we have to admit series of *Sṛṣṭi-s* in which every individual *Sṛṣṭi* is *sādi*. In this series between two *Sṛṣṭi-s* a break or gap is to be maintained. This state of gap or break is the state of dissolution or *pralaya* - which is the time of destruction of one *Sṛṣṭi (sṛṣṭyantara-dhvaṃsakāla)* and the stage of prior-absence or *prāgabhāva* of another *Sṛṣṭi*. So we can say that every *Sṛṣṭi* is the negatum of its own prior-absence or *prāgabhāva* which *prāgabhāva* exists at the time of destruction of another *Sṛṣṭi*, i.e., to put it otherwise: *Sṛṣṭiḥ sṛṣṭayantaradhvaṃsasamakālīna sva-prāgabhāva pratiyogi.*

So *pralaya* is the stage of the destruction of one *Sṛṣṭi* and the stage of *prāgabhāva* of another one. By this it is proved that before *Sṛṣṭi pralaya* is there and before

pralaya Sṛṣṭi is there. In order to maintain *bhāvatva, anāditva* and *sāntatva* of *Sṛṣṭi* we may formulate the subject in a following way: *Sargaṃ pravāharūpeṇa anādi sargāntara dhvaṃsa samakālīna-svā- prāgabhāva pratiyogītvāt, idānīntana sargavat.*

Thus *Sṛṣṭi is anādi. Anāditva* as a *pravāha* is not only admitted here but also it has been admitted by so many Indian philosophers. For instance, I can mention the name of Udāyanācārya. As an evidence some portions of the verse, where such an *anāditva* has been admitted, from his book of the type of *prakaraṇa* **Nyāyakusumañjali** can be produced - *pravāhonādimāneṣa*.[3]

III

In the preceding sections I have tried to show that the discussion of *Sṛṣṭi* serves some purpose and it is also an object of doubt. In order to explain that I have tried to show that the concept of *pralaya* is involved in the subject *Sṛṣṭi*. Now I want to show that not only *pralaya* is involved in *Sṛṣṭi* but time is also involved.

Sṛṣṭi means 'becoming' or 'having come to be' and destruction means 'cease to be'. But 'to be' is 'to be' in a particular moment and 'ceasing to be' is also 'ceasing to be' in a particular moment. By difference in these moments series of *Sṛṣṭi*-s become differentiated and distinguished. Besides, in case of production of effect, of whatever kind includ...g *pralaya* it may be, time is necessary. Since every effect is *kadācitka* and *kadācitka* is that which is related to some time and which is not related to some other time and which is different from prior-absence: *"Prāgabhāvabhinnatve sati kincitkālasambandhitve ca sati kincit kālāsambandhitvam."*

Now effect is that which is the negatum of prior-absence - *prāgabhāva pratiyogi*. *Pratiyogi* is that whose absence it is, and *prāgabhāva* is the absence before creation, i.e., 'before' the production of it a thing had absence and 'after' the production the absence of that thing becomes annihilated and the product comes into being. We can find that here 'before'and 'after' terms have been used to explain effect. Such terms refer to time, i.e., without the notion of time our usages of such type would not be possible. So the existence of time can not be ignored. But here I am talking of time external to the thing as Navjyoti Singh was saying.

The time is invariably pre-existent (*niyata pūrvavṛtti*) of every effect. It is not also *anyathāsiddha* or irrelevant. For, to have the knowledge that time is pre-existent to some effect, there is no need to have that knowledge as pre-existent to some other effect. So, for being *niyata pūrvavṛtti* and *ananyathāsiddha* it should be regarded as *karana*. But it is not the *samavāyikāraṇa* since in which an effect on production inheres is regarded as *samavāyikāraṇa* of that effect. But no effect on production inhere in time or *kāla*. That's why time is not the *samavāyikāraṇa*. Time also cannot be the *asamavāyikāraṇa*. *Asamavāyikāraṇa* is that cause which exists in the *samavāyikāraṇa* of the effect along with that effect or along with the cause (*samavāyikāraṇa*) of that effect. That is, the *asamvāyikāraṇa* must exist by the

relation of a inherence in the *samavāyikāraṇa* of the intended effect. But *Kāla* or time does not inhere in anything being an eternal *dravya*: *Kālamasamavetaṃ niravayavadravyatvat paramanuvat.*

Besides quality and action, i.e., *guṇa* and *karma* can only be the *asamavāyikāraṇa*. Kala is neither *guṇa* nor *karma*, but *dravya* - that's why also time cannot be the *asamavāyikāraṇa*. But it is regarded as *nimittakāraṇa* not for the reason that it is neither *samavāyikāraṇa* nor *asamvāyikāraṇa* and that's why *nimittakāraṇa*. As time has *kāraṇatva* and as it is neither the other two therefore, *nimittakāraṇa*, i.e., *"Kāraṇatve sati samavāyi asamavāyikāraṇaṃ bhinnaṃ kāraṇa nimittakāraṇaṃ..."*

The point which I want to bring into notice is that in *Sṛṣṭi* time is not only indispensable but its indispensability is established as a *nimittakāraṇa*.

According to the Naiyāyika-s in *Sṛṣṭi* God is also involved as a *nimittakāraṇa* - *'saṃsāramahīrūhasya vījāya'*: this very phrase of the **Bhāṣāparicceda**, specially the word *'vīja'* approves this (i.e., *nimittakāraṇatva*). An argument by which the existence of God is proved in this. *Kṣityankurādikaṃ sakartṛkaṃ kāryatvāt ghaṭādivat*, i.e., whatever is an effect that must have an agent as cause. As for instance, jar is an affect and it also has an agent as cause. Similarly, *kṣityankurādi*, i.e., the dyads of earth etc. are effects, so they also might have an agent as cause. This agent cannot be the limited beings like us. Since whoever will be agent he must have the direct knowledge of the *upādāna* of the effect, must have the right sort of desire for producing an effect and also must have the will/volition to produce that, i.e. to put it otherwise - *upādānagocarāparoksajñānacikirsā kṛtimattvaṃ.*

Here our effect is dyads of the earth etc. and the *upādāna* is the atoms of dyad. But limited beings like us have no direct knowledge of the atoms - *na ca tatkattṛtvaṃ asamadādināṃ saṃbhavatītyatastat kattṛtvenesharasiddhih.*[4]

So God or *Iśvara* should be admitted as the agent. Now it can be stated that as an agent is one who has direct knowledge of the *upadana* of an effect, has the right sort of desire for producing that effect and also has the will/volition to produce that - so God is the *nimittakāraṇa* by his knowledge, desire and activity (*jñāna, icchā, prayatna*).

IV

Now we can say that in *Sṛṣṭi* time as well as God is involved (many other things are involved but here I am not considering those factors). All these form the background of my idea which now I want to point out.

Raghunāth Śiromaṇi, a great Naiyāyika, does not admit *Kāla* or time as a distinct entity within the category of substance. Raghunāth Śiromaṇi's denial of time implies two possibilities : either the facts, to explain which time is thought to be required, are not to be admitted or if those facts are admitted, they are to be explained by some other means. Raghunāth accepts this second possibility since he admits the facts or usages for which time was thought to be necessary by others. He thinks that by God alone all these facts or usages can properly be explained.

Because time is essentially nothing but God and there is no proof for admitting time as a distinct entity within the category of substance. He says : *Dikkālau neśvarādatiricyete mānābhāvāt.*[5]

Now the problem is that *Sṛṣṭi* is regarded as *kādācitka* and the notion of *kādācitkatva* refers to time. But if time is not admitted then how it is possible to maintain its *kādācitkatva*?

According to Raghunāth God or *Iśvara* is cause or *kāraṇa* or *janaka* of *Sṛṣṭi*. In the two phenomena which are connected by cause-effect relation or *janyajanakabhāvāpanna* the notion of *pūrvavṛttitva* must be involved in them. But is the notion of *pūrvavṛttitva* intelligible without the admittance of time? And how in terms of God the notion of *pūrvavṛttitva* becomes intelligible?

Again those who admit both time and God as separate entities according to them time or *Kāla* is the locus or *ādhāra* of the world and God is the locus of *kṛti* relating to the production of *jagat*. Time or *Kāla* is the locus of world by temporal relation or *kālika saṃbaṅdha* and 'God is the locus of *kṛti*' means 'God is the *samavayi* of *kṛti*', i.e., *kṛti* inheres in God. Creator or *sraṣṭa* is generally not regarded as the locus of effect. If we consider *Sṛṣṭi* as a whole then the locus of it is time or *Kāla*. It is not generally called that the God or *Iśvara* is the locus of *Sṛṣṭi*. But if time is not admitted and by God its (time) independent existence is removed then God should be admitted as the locus of *Sṛṣṭi*. Raghunāth himself has admitted God as the locus of the world.

Oam namaḥ sarvabhūtāni viṣtabhya paritiṣtha|
Akhaṇḍanandavodhāya pūrṇāya paramātmane ||[6]

The very term '*viṣtbhya*' in the verse specially signifies that.

But God can not be the locus of world or *Jagatādhāra* and time can not be the locus of *kṛti* or *kṛtyāśraya*, i.e., *jagatādhāratva* can not be explained in terms of God and *kṛtyāśrayatva* can not be explained in terms of time or *Kāla*. Either in terms of God alone or in terms of time alone both *jagatādhāratva* and *kṛtyāśrayatva* cannot be explained. Now if the concept of *'jagatādhāratva'* is ignored then there will be no problem. But Raghunāth himself also admits this - it has already been mentioned above. So to make the position intelligible time must have to be admitted.

But it should be noted that the world 'locus' has two types of meanings : (a) Substratum or *āśraya*, and (b) Sustainer or *dhāraka*. Then Raghunāth says that God is the locus of the world: he means God as the sustainer of the world, i.e., *dhṛtyanukūlaprayatnavat (dhāraka)*.[7]

So in his sense *'jagatādhāratva'* means *dhṛtyanukūlaprayatnavattva*. Consequently to explain it postulation of time is not necessary.

But what about the other two problems? Here Raghunāth will say that he has admitted moment or *kṣaṇa*, which is a separate category. It is separate means separate from both the positive categories and the negative category. The distinctive feature of this *ksana* is that it is itself momentary and it is *upādhi* of *Kāla* - *kṣaṇañca kṣaṇiko atiriktaḥ kālopādhiḥ.*[8]

The category *kṣaṇa* is the determinant for our usages of *kṣaṇa*. Therefore, by it the notion of *kādācitkatva* and *pūrvavṛttitva* can be explained.

NOTES

1. Vācaspati Miśra, *Bhāmati*, in *Vedānta Darśanaṃ*, (ed.) Kalivar Vedāntavāgiśa, Calcutta, p.2 .
2. *Anyonyāśrayatvaṃ parasparāpekṣatvaṃ.*
3. Udāyanāchārya, *Nyāyakusumañjalih*, elucidation and Hindi Translation by Viśveswar Siddhānta Śiromaṇi, Chawkhamba,Delhi.
4. Viśvanath, *Bhāṣāpariccheda*, elucidation and Bengali Translation by Pañchānan Shastri, Calcutta.
5. Raghunāth Śiromaṇi, *Padārthatattvanirūpanaṃ*, ed. with Bengali Translation and elucidation by Madhusudan Nyāyāchārya, Sanskrit College, Calcutta, 1976.
6. *Ibid.* p.3.
7. *Ibid.* p.1.
8. *Ibid.* p.51.

XIX

न्यायमते सृष्टिः

श्यामापद करः

श्री श्री गुरवे नमः

समवेतानां पूज्यपादानां महागुरूनिभानां कृते सविनयप्रणतिं सोदरकल्पानां मातृणां स्वसृणाञ्च कृते स्वात्मानुकूलवेदनञ्च विनिवेद्य सृष्टिविषयमवलम्ब्य किञ्चिद् वक्तव्यमुपस्थाप्यतेऽस्माभिः।

सृष्टिस्तु क्रियापदार्थः, 'सृज्' धातोः क्तिन् - प्रत्ययनिष्पन्ना, तस्या उत्पत्तिरित्यर्थ : समवगम्यते। सा चोत्पत्तिः आद्यक्षणसम्बन्धः। असौ सम्बन्धः घटपटादिजन्यपदार्थमात्रे वर्तते। उत्पत्त्यनधिकरण-कालावृत्तित्वरूपमयं सम्बन्धः यत्र पदार्थे वर्तते, स पदार्थः तादृशसम्बन्धाश्रयतया सृष्ट इत्याख्यया अभिधीयते। स चायं सम्बन्धः यथा जन्यभावपदार्थे वर्तते तथैव जन्याभावपदार्थेऽपीति। अतएव अस्ति नास्ति इत्यादि व्यवहारविषयो हि सृष्ट इत्याख्यां लभते। द्रष्टारमन्तेरण यथा दृष्टिः न सम्भवति तथा स्रष्टारं विनापि सृष्टिः न सम्भवति इति अनुभवसिद्ध एव। येन विना यन्न भवति तत्तस्य कारणमुच्यते, यत् समुत्पद्यते तत् कार्यमित्युच्यते। नियतपूर्वभाविपदार्थस्य कारणत्वसंज्ञा, नियतपश्चाद्भाविपदार्थस्य च कार्यत्वसंज्ञा भवति इति कार्यकारणपदार्थयोः भिन्नत्वमुपगन्तव्यम्। सेयं सृष्टिः किञ्चित् कालासम्बन्धित्वविशिष्टकिञ्चित्कालसम्बन्धिनीति प्रतीतिसिद्धतया तस्याः किञ्चित् कारणमवश्यमेव अस्ति इति विभाव्य किं तत् कारणम् इति जिज्ञासानिवृत्त्यर्थं यैः खलु सृष्टिः स्वीक्रियते तैरेव सृष्टिकारणमन्वेषणाय प्रवर्त्त्यते।

भारतीयदार्शनिकानां विस्तरमतवैषम्यसत्त्वेऽपि सत्यान्वेषणे संसारदुःखनिवृत्तौ, आत्यन्तिक-सुखप्राप्तौ चैकमत्यम्। अतएव भारतीयास्तिकदर्शनमात्रमेव 'तमेव विदित्वाऽतिमृत्युमेति नान्यः पन्था विद्यते अयनाय' इति श्रुतितो 'नवाऽऽरे पत्युः कामाय पतिप्रियो भवति' इत्याद्यारभ्य 'तस्माद्वाऽऽरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्य' इति उपनिषदतो वा प्रवर्त्तितम्।

आस्तिकदर्शनेषु वेदान्तदर्शनमीमांसादर्शनयोः, सांख्यदर्शनपातञ्जलदर्शनयोः, न्यायदर्शन वैशेषिकदर्शनयोः समानतन्त्रता। सममनोभावापन्नयोरनयोः दर्शनयोः मूलप्रतिपाद्यविषये विषय-विशेषमन्तर्भाव्य मतानैक्यस्थितावपि अधिकांशे मतैक्यदर्शनात् समानतन्त्रत्वम्। न्यायवैशेषिकदर्शनयोः हेत्वाभासपाकप्रक्रियाप्रमाणादिकतिपयविषये अनैक्योऽपि सृष्ट्याद्यधिकविषये मतैक्यमस्ति, प्रत्युत ताभ्यां सृष्टिस्थितिलयकर्तृत्वेन भगवान् परमेश्वरः एव सृष्टेः कारणमिति अभिहितम्। कार्यकारणभावनिरूपणपरस्य न्यायवैशेषिकसमानतन्त्रत्वसिद्धमतस्य परमसमीचीनता लक्ष्यते, अन्येषु दर्शनेषु सृष्ट्यादिविषये बहुतरानुपपत्तिदर्शनात् तन्मतसिद्धलाघवसहकृतस्य एकस्यैव परमेश्वरस्य प्रतिपादनद्वारा सृष्ट्यादिकारणनिरूपणं आसंसारसकलजीवानां जिज्ञासानिवृत्तिसाधनञ्च भविष्यतीति

तन्मतावलम्बनमेव समीचीनम्।

आधुनिकाः वैज्ञानिकाः कार्यकारणभावं स्वीकुर्वन्तोऽपि क्षित्यप्तेजोमरूतामुत्पत्त्यादिकं स्वाभाव्यादेवेति मतं पोषयन्तः दृश्यमानसंसारस्योत्पत्तौ स्वभावो विवर्त्तनं वा कारणमिति वदन्ति, एतेऽदार्शनिकाः स्थूलदृष्टिसम्पन्नाः अलौकिकाद्यस्वीकृतत्वे सति स्वभावस्य दृश्यमानसंसार-कारणत्वमभ्युपगमत्वात्, एतेषां मतं स्वभावकारणत्ववादिनां नास्तिकचार्वाकाणां मततुल्यम्। अतएव तन्मतम् अत्यन्तमसत् तच्चाग्रे परिक्ष्यिते।

सृष्टिश्चौत्पत्तिः क्रिया एव, सा चेतनाधिष्ठाने ज्ञानेच्छाकृतिमति वर्तते। उत्पत्तेः प्राक् तादृश कश्चनः सचेतनोऽपेक्षितव्यः अन्यथा तादृशोत्पत्तिरसम्भवः स्यात्। आश्रयाभावात्। भारतीयाः बह्वः दार्शनिकाः कस्यचिज्ज्ञानेच्छाकृतिमतः अस्तित्वं स्वीकृत्य संसारोत्पत्तिं व्याख्यायन्ते। उक्तञ्च -

आरम्भवादः कणभक्षवादः संघातवादस्तु भदन्तपक्षः।
सांख्यादिपक्षस्तु परिणामवादो वेदान्तपक्षस्तु विवर्त्तवादः॥

न्यायवैशेषिकमते कार्यमसदेवोत्पद्यते द्व्यणुकादिप्रपञ्चोऽयं ब्रह्माण्डः, प्रथमोत्पत्तिर्द्व्यणुकानां, सा चोत्पत्तिः भगवतो नारायणस्य इच्छामात्रेणैव भवति। सांख्यपातञ्जलास्तु परिणामवादिनः, ते कार्यकारणयोरभेदं स्वीकुर्वन्ति। एतेषां मते कारणस्य परिणामो विकारो अवस्थान्तरं वा कार्यमिति। कार्यं स्वीकृत्यापि ते कार्यस्योत्पत्तिं विनाशं नाभ्युपगच्छन्ति। प्रतीतिश्च कारकव्यापारेण कार्यं व्यक्तं भवति। तच्चाविर्भाव इत्यनेन एवं प्रतीत्यभावे तिरोभाव इत्यनेनभिलप्यते। तथा च घटादिकार्यं सदैव अस्ति अनभिव्यक्तावस्थायां मृदादौ। क्रियागुणात्मिका प्रकृतिपरिणामेन विकारेणावस्थान्तरेण वा घटादिकार्यं व्यक्तावस्थां प्राप्नोति। नायं संसारः सृष्टः परन्तु नित्यः शाश्वतश्च, अतएव 'नासतो विद्यते भावः नाभावो विद्यते सतः' इत्यादि गीतोपनिषदोऽपि प्रमापयन्ति इति वदन्ति।

अद्वैतवादिवेदान्तिनश्च कार्यं स्वीकृत्यापि कार्यस्य सत्तां नाभ्युपगच्छन्ति। एतेषां मते कारणातिरिक्तं कार्यं नास्ति, एते जगन्मिथ्यात्ववादिनः, कारणान्तवत् ब्रह्म एव, उत्पत्तिश्च विवर्त्यः, कारणेषु एव कार्यस्य प्रतीतिः भ्रमरूपा जायते। दृश्यमानसंसारस्य पारमार्थिकसत्ता नास्ति, घटपटपितापुत्रादि प्रतीतिस्तु अनादिसंस्कारवशात्। रज्जुषु यथा सर्पत्वप्रकारकतदभाववतितत्प्रकारकत्वरुपा प्रतीतिर्जायते तथैव घटपटपितापुत्रत्वाभाववतिघटपटपितात्वप्रकारकं मिथ्याज्ञानं जायते। वस्तुतः ब्रह्म सत्यं जगन्मिथ्या।

संघातवादिजैनबौद्धानां मते परमाणुसंघात एव जगत्सृष्टेः कारणं, शून्यवादिबौद्धमते सर्वं शून्यं, कार्यकारणयोः नास्ति सत्ता। विज्ञानवादिबौद्धमते ज्ञानातिरिक्तं किमपि नास्ति। ज्ञानस्य विषयः ज्ञानमेव। बाह्यास्तित्ववादिबौद्धमते ज्ञानस्य ज्ञेयस्य चास्तित्वं स्वीकृतमभवत्। परमाणुपुञ्ज एव संसारः। तत्र कस्यचित् कर्त्तुरपेक्षा नास्ति। एतेष्वधिका एव संसारकारणरुपेण किञ्चित् सत्ताविशेषं स्वीकृतवन्तः। एतेषां च भाषावैलक्षण्यमात्रेण विभिन्नप्रकारकसत्ताविशेषप्रतीतावपि लाघवादेकमेव कारणं बुद्धः प्रकृतिः ब्रह्म नृपति ईश्वरः इति नाम्ना चाभिहितं सन् न्यायमते ईश्वर संज्ञां लभते। अतएव हरिदासपादैरुक्तं न्यायकुसुमाञ्जलौ - 'इह यद्यपि यं किमपि पुरूषार्थमर्थमाना' इत्यारभ्य 'किं बहुना यं करणेऽपि विश्वकर्मेत्युपासते। तस्मिन्नेवं जातिगोत्रप्रवरचरणकुलधर्मादिवदासंसारं सुप्रसिद्धानुभवे भगवति भवे सन्देह

एव कुतः' इत्यन्तम्।

न च न्यायवैशेषिकयोः पदार्थनिरुपणे प्रथममेव वैमत्यदर्शनात् न्यायमते षोडशपदार्थोल्लेखतया वैशेषिकमते च षट्पदार्थोल्लेखतया न समानतन्त्रता इति वाच्यम् । पदार्थोल्लेखे वैमत्यदर्शनेऽपि न्यायमतसिद्धषोडशपदार्थाः वैशेषिकस्वीकृतसप्तपदार्थेष्वन्तर्भावाः भवन्ति इति 'कारणाभावात् कार्याभावः' इत्याद्यभावपदार्थघटितसूत्रमालोक्य तयोः समानतन्त्रत्वं विश्वनाथेन मुक्तावल्यां प्रकटीकृतम् 'एते च पदार्थाः वैशेषिकप्रसिद्धाः नैयायिकानामप्यविरुद्धा' इत्यनेन । केवलं पृथिवीनिष्ठ पाकजरुपरसादीनां पाकप्रक्रियायां भिन्नमतं पोषयतः इमौ न्यायमते आसघटादौ अग्निसंयोगे कृते अग्निपरमाणुः सच्छिद्रघटाभ्यन्तरं प्रविश्य घटस्य बाह्यान्तरभागे पाकं करोति । अतः घटस्यांशप्रत्यंशानि पाकात् रुपान्तरं प्राप्नुवन्ति, तस्मिन्नवसरे घटारम्भकसंयोगस्य नाशो न भवति इति । सोऽयं घटः इत्यादि पाकादपि प्रतीतेः सत्त्वात्। तथा च जयन्तभट्टः -

यादृगेव हि निक्षिप्तो घटः पाकाय कन्दुके ।
पाकेऽपि तादृगेवासावुद्गतो दृश्यते यतः ॥

वैशेषिकास्तु तेजः परमाणुः सच्छिद्रघटाभ्यन्तरं गन्तुं न शक्यते यतः निरवयवपरमाणूनां मध्ये कदापि छिद्रं न सम्भवति । द्वयणुकयोर्मध्ये तादृशछिद्रस्वीकारे निरवयपरमाणुद्वयस्य तथाविधसंयोगस्य अत्यन्तसम्भावितत्वात्। अतः परमाणुद्वयसंयोगजन्यद्वयणुकाभ्यन्तरे निश्छिद्रत्वकल्पनं युक्तम्। अन्यथा द्वयणुकोत्पत्तेरसम्भवात् । सावयवपदार्थद्वयसंयोगस्यैवाव्याप्यवृत्तित्वनियमात् निरवयवपरमाण्वोः द्वयोः अव्याप्यवृत्तित्वविशिष्टसंयोगस्य असम्भवात्। अतएव अग्निसंयोगजन्यपाकः घटादीनां विभक्तपरमाणौ कल्पनीयः। तेन अग्निसंयोगादादौ क्रिया-क्रियातो विभागः - विभागात् घटारम्भकसंयोगनाशः ततः कार्यघटस्य नाशः, तदनन्तरं तद्गतरुपादीनां नाशः, तदनन्तरं विभक्तपरमाणुषु अग्निसंयोगान्तरेण पाकस्ततः रुपान्तरोत्पत्तिः।

अत्रापि विनाशकसंयोगोत्पादकसंयोगयोर्वैलक्षण्यं कन्दलीकारेण प्रकटीकृतम् - तच्च, 'न च यदेव रुपादीनां विनाशकारणं तदेव तेषामुत्पत्तिकारणमिति अवगन्तव्यम्। तन्तुरुपादीनामन्यतः उत्पत्तेः अन्यतश्च विनाशदर्शनात् । तेन परमाणुषु रुपादिनामन्यस्मादग्निसंयोगात् उत्पत्तिः । अन्यस्मादग्निसंयोगाद्विनाश इत्यवसीयते।परमाणुरुपादिविनाशोत्पादौ एककारणकौ न भवतः रुपादिविनाशोत्पादत्वात्, तन्तुरुपादिविनाशोत्पादवत्' । अनया रीत्या स्वतन्त्रपरमाणुषु पाकानन्तरं पुनः पच्यमानघटस्य परमाणुनामुपभोक्तृजीवात्मविशेषस्यादृष्टेन तथा व्यापकजीवात्मासह संयोगे सति पक्वघटारम्भकपरमाणुषु क्रियोत्पत्तिर्जायते। ततः द्वयोः परमाण्वोः संयोगे सति द्वयणुकादिक्रमेण स्थूलस्य स्थूलतरतमस्य चोत्पत्तिः। सोऽयं घटः इत्यादिप्रास्तु प्रतीतिः । मैवम्, विजातीयवेगाधीनक्रियावशात् क्षणभेदाज्ञानात् न पूर्वव्यूहनाशयदुपलब्धिः, पूर्वव्यूहसाजात्यदोषात् पूर्वव्यूहभेद्यनुपलब्धिवशाच्च जायते तत् प्रतीतिरिति वदन्ति।

अनयोः चरमवैमत्यं प्रमाणनिरुपणे दृश्यते । नैयायिकास्तावत् प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमानशब्दा इति चत्वारि प्रमाणानि स्वीकुर्वन्ति वैशेषिकास्तु द्वे प्रमाणे प्रत्यक्षानुमाने, उपमानशब्दयोः न प्रमाणान्तरत्वं, तेषां मते उपमानं यथा नानुमानातिरिक्तं तथा शब्दोऽपीति।

अयं भावः - शाब्दबोधे वाक्यप्रयुक्तपदनिचयात् पृथक् पृथक् पदार्थाः उपस्थिताः भवन्ति । वाक्यार्थे विसंकलितपदार्थातिरिक्तानां संसर्गाणां प्रतीतिश्चाप्तवाक्यादेव भवति । अतः पदपदार्थयोः संसर्गस्वरुपवाक्यार्थप्रतीति अनुमानादेव जायते, नान्यात् । यथा रामः पुस्तकमानयतीत्यत्र पुस्तक-कर्मकानयनानुकूलकृतिमान् रामः इत्यादि बोधे एते पदार्थाः वक्तृतात्पर्यविषयीभूतपरस्परसंसर्गवन्तः आप्तोक्ताकांक्षादिमत् पदस्मारितत्वात् गामानय इत्यादि आप्तोक्ताकांक्षादिमत् पदस्मारितवत् अथवा एतानि पदानि स्वस्मारितवक्तृतात्पर्यविषयीभूतपदार्थपरस्परसंसर्गज्ञानपूर्वकाणि, स्वस्मारितवक्तृतात्पर्य-विषयीभूतपदार्थपरस्परसंसर्गज्ञानपूर्वकोच्चारणविषयाणि वा आकांक्षादिमत्वे सति आप्तोक्तपदत्वात् गामानय इत्यादि पदनिचयात् इत्याद्यनुमानेन बोधविषयत्वोपपत्तौ शब्दे न प्रमाणान्तरम्, एवञ्च शाब्दधीरनुमितिः लिङ्गजत्वात् इत्यादिना शाब्दबोधस्यानुमितित्वसिद्धौ शब्दस्य प्रमाणान्तराभ्युपगमोऽयुक्त इति वदन्ति । तन्न, महामतिजगदीशपादैः शब्दशक्तिप्रकाशिकायां निपुणतया वैशेषिकमतं निरस्तम्, साकांक्षशब्दैरर्थबोध इत्यादिश्लोकेन तथा च शब्द यदि प्रमाणान्तरं न स्यात् तर्हि अनुमितेरपि अपलापापत्तिः स्यात्, 'अस्तित्वेन घटं शृणोमि' इत्याद्यनुव्यवसायात्मकविशिष्टानुभवः यदि वैशेषिकैः न स्वीक्रियते तर्हि पर्वतो वह्निमान् इत्यादि स्थलेऽपि वह्निमत्तया पर्वतं जानामि इत्यादि विशिष्टानुभवः न भवतु, प्रत्युत् वह्निं जानामि पर्वतं जानामि इत्याद्यनुभवम् इति वस्तुतस्तु वैशेषिकमते यदि वाक्यार्थबोधः अनुमितिः स्यात्तर्हि अयं बोधः किञ्च लिङ्गजन्योऽनुमितित्वात् इत्याद्यनुमानात् लिङ्गजन्यत्वं साधनीयम् । लाघवज्ञानादिवशात् पदस्मारितत्वादिलिङ्गजन्यत्वं विहाय अनुमितित्वहेतुग्रहणे स्वरुपासिद्धि स्यात् एवञ्च अस्तित्वेन घटमनुमिनोमीत्याद्यनुव्यवसायः तत्र प्रमाणमित्यपि वक्तुमशक्यत्वात् अस्तित्वेन घटोऽनुमितः इत्यननुभवात्, अस्तित्वेन घटः श्रुतः इत्यनुभवाच्च श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यः इत्यादि प्रयोगदृष्ट्या शाब्दत्वस्यापि शृणोतेः शक्यतावच्छेदकत्वात् ।एतेन शाब्दबुद्धिरनुमितिः लिङ्गजत्वात् इति लिङ्गजत्वहेतुना अन्वयबुद्धेरनुमितित्वसिद्धौ वैशेषिकाः शाब्दान्यानुमितौ शाब्दसामग्र्याः प्रतिबन्धकत्वं प्रकल्प्य सामञ्जस्यं कुर्वन्ति, तत्र समीचीनमिति योग्यतार्थागताकांक्षा . . . नैते लिङ्गमसिद्धितः इत्यादिना जगदीशपादाः तन्मतं निराचक्रुः ।

मुक्तेः स्वरुपविषये अनयोर्मतवैषम्यञ्च दृश्यते, तथापि संसारतत्कारणनिरुपणे अनयोर्मतवैषम्याभावात् समानतन्त्रत्वम् । अथ न्यायवैशेषिकाः सृष्टेर्कारणं भगवान् परमेश्वर एव इति स्वीकुर्वन्ति । अत्र सृष्टिनिरुपणे यन्निरुपणाभावे यन्निरुपणं न सम्भवति, तन्निरुपणमेवादौ समीचीनमिति सृष्टिकारणरुपपरमेश्वरनिरुपणं समीचीनमिति मत्वा तन्निरुपणं क्रियते न्यायमते । न्यायवैशेषिकाः वेदस्य तद्वाक्यस्य च प्रामाण्यं स्वीकुर्वन्ति । अतएव य सर्वज्ञः सर्वविद् द्यावाभूमिविश्वस्य कर्ता आदिकर्ता सर्वभूतानां अपाणिपादो यवनो ग्रहीता पश्यत्यचक्षुः स शृणोत्यकर्णः, स वेत्ति वेद्यं न च तस्यास्ति वेत्ता तमाहुरग्रं पुरुषं महान्तम् । [श्वेतः] वायुर्यथैक [कठ] अज्ञोजन्तुरनीशोऽयमात्मनः सुखदुःखो इत्यादिसर्वाणि वाक्यानि प्रमाणानि । निरुक्तवाक्यार्थप्रतिपाद्यविषयस्य प्रामाण्यं ये नाभ्युपगच्छन्ति । तेषां मतनिराकरणपूर्वकम् अभ्युपगमवादिनां मतस्थापनाद् भवति हि सृष्टिकारणनिर्णयं यतः उपपादनञ्च स्वपक्षसाधनपरपक्षनिराकरणाभ्याम् इति अद्वैतसिद्धिः ।

सच भगवान् परमेश्वरः सर्वज्ञः, सर्वशक्तिमान्, नित्यः शुद्धः बुद्धः मुक्तश्चापि मायावीवत् स्वात्मलीलेच्छया निखिलजगतप्रपञ्चं संसृजति, संरक्षति संहरति चेति नानास्मृतिश्रुतिपुराणादिषु शास्त्रेषु

दृश्यते । अतः आप्तवाक्यत्वेन तादृशवाक्यानां प्रमाणत्वात् तेनैव प्रमाणेनानुमानेन ईश्वरं प्रमापयन्ति नैयायिकाः।

अथ न्यायमते तत्रैव न्यायप्रवर्तनं भवति यत्र संशयो विद्यते तथा च नानुपलब्धे न निर्णीतेऽर्थे न्यायः प्रवर्त्तते किन्तु संशयितेऽर्थे इति न्यायभाष्यम्। तेन सत्येव संशये न्यायेन निरुपणं कर्तव्यम् ।संशयश्च साधारणधर्मवद्धर्मिज्ञानतो . . . जायते । 'उपपादनञ्च स्वपक्षसाधनपरपक्षनिराकरणाभ्याम्' इति । [अद्वैतसिद्धिःमधुसूदनसरस्वती]

अथ न्यायमते धर्मवद्धर्मिज्ञानतोऽसाधारणधर्मवद्धर्मिज्ञानतो विप्रतिपत्तिः उपलब्ध्यवस्थातः अनुपलब्ध्यवस्थातो वा जायते । साधारणधर्मवद्धर्मिज्ञानञ्च- निश्चिततसाध्यः तदभाववद्वृत्तिर्यो धर्मस्तद्धर्मविशिष्टधर्मिज्ञानं यथा धूमस्तदभाववद्वृत्तिवह्निमानयं पर्वतः इत्याकारकज्ञानम् । तथा च धूमवान्वह्नेः पर्वतः इत्यादिस्थले वह्निरूपधर्मः निश्चितसाध्यधूमवान् वह्नेः पर्वतः इत्यादिस्थले वह्निरूपधर्मः निश्चितसाध्यधूमवान्महानसादिवृत्तिः निश्चितसाध्यभावधूमभाववदयोगोलकादिवृत्तिः, तादृशवह्निरूपधर्मविशिष्टं यत् ज्ञानं धूमस्तद्भावसहचरित वह्निमान् पर्वतः इत्याकारकज्ञानम् । य संशयजनकः एतादृशज्ञानसत्त्वे भवति हि पर्वतो धूमवान् न वेत्यादि संशयः । असाधारणधर्मवद्धर्मि-ज्ञानञ्च-निश्चितसाध्यतद्भाववद् व्यावृत्तधर्मवद्धर्मिज्ञानम् । तच्च शब्दोऽनित्यः शब्दत्वादित्यादिस्थले निश्चितसाध्यनित्यवदात्मव्यावृत्तशब्दत्वरूपधर्मः, तद्विशिष्टधर्मिशब्दः, एवं निश्चितसाध्याभाव-नित्यत्वाभाववद्घटपटादिव्यावृत्तशब्दत्वरूपधर्मवद्धर्मिज्ञानं शब्दे पर्यवसति । एतादृशज्ञानसत्वे शब्दो नित्यः न वेत्यादि संशयो जायते । किन्तु निरूक्तप्रकारेण ये संशयाः भवन्ति ते न विचारनिवृत्त्याः केवलं विप्रतिपत्तितो यः संशयः जायते स एव विचारनिवृत्त्यः । अन्येनापि प्रकारेण अर्थात् उपलब्ध्यवस्थातः अनुपलब्ध्यवस्थातो वा ये संशयाः जायन्ते ते न विचारनिवृत्त्याः इति । अतएव विप्रतिपत्तिजन्य-संशयस्यानुमित्यनङ्गत्वेऽपि विचाराङ्गत्वमस्त्येव इति [अद्वैतसिद्धिः] । विप्रतिपत्तिश्च विरूद्धार्थप्रतिपत्तिजनकवाक्यद्वयात्मिका । यथा वादिना यदा शब्दो नित्यः इति कथ्यते तथा केनचित् प्रतिवादिना कथ्यते शब्दोऽनित्यः इति । वादिप्रतिवादिनां वाक्यं श्रुत्वा कस्यचिन्मध्यस्थस्य शब्दे नित्यत्वानित्यत्वप्रतिपत्तिः जायते, तादृशप्रतीतिश्च विप्रतिपत्तिरिति कथ्यते । तादृशविप्रतिपत्तितः मध्यस्थस्यैव संशयो जायते शब्दो नित्यो न वेति । संशये जाते तन्निवृत्त्यर्थं विचारस्य प्रवृत्तिः जायते । विचारश्च वादजल्पवितण्डाभेदेन त्रिविधः । त्रिविधेषु विचारेषु विप्रतिपत्तेः आवश्यकतावश्याङ्गीकरणीया न्यायकुसुमाञ्जलिग्रन्थे जगत्कर्तृत्वमुपपादयता उदयनाचार्येण न्यायमतमवलम्ब्य ईश्वरः प्रतिष्ठापितः । तत्रापि वादकथाश्रवणाद्विचारः विचारे च विप्रतिपत्तेरावश्यकता प्रतिपादिता । न्यायदर्शने विशेषतः उदयनाचार्यपादाः यद्यपि न्यायमते क्रियामात्रस्येव क्वचित् साक्षात् क्वचिच्च परम्परया कर्तृत्वमीश्वरस्यास्ति इति प्रतिपादयन्ति तथापि बीजवपनादि क्रियातोऽङ्कुराद्युत्पत्तिदर्शनात् विप्रतिपन्नं प्रति नेश्वरकर्तृत्वप्रतिपादनमादौ सम्भवतीति आचार्येणादौ अदृष्टाधिष्ठातृतया ततो वेदप्रणेतृतया ततश्च जगत्कर्तृतया आयोजनधृत्यादिलिङ्गेन सुस्पष्टतया ईश्वरः प्रतिष्ठापितः । तत्रादौ अलौकिकस्य परलोकसाधनस्य भावादिति प्रथमा विप्रतिपत्तिः । नेदं वाक्यं विप्रतिपत्त्याकारकं किन्तु विप्रतिपत्तिसूचकमात्रम् । निरूक्तवाक्यान्तभवि भावादित्यत्र पञ्चम्यर्थस्य प्रयोजकत्वं स्वीकृत्य अलौकिकपरलोकसाधनाभावप्रयोज्यानिरूक्तिविप्रतिपत्तिरित्यर्थोऽवगम्यते अथवा अलौकिकपरलोक

साधनाभावादित्यत्र पञ्चम्यन्तप्रतिपाद्या विपरीतकोटिः। तादृशकोटिप्रतिपादकं वाक्यं विप्रतिपत्तिरित्यर्थः तत्र एतादृशविप्रतिपत्तिस्त्रिविधा भवति। अलौकिके परलोके साधने चेति। अलौकिके यथा - लौकिक प्रत्यक्षाविषयगुणत्वं साक्षाद्व्याप्यजात्यधिकरणत्वमात्मगुणे वर्तते न वा। परलोके यथा - शरीरवृत्तिजातित्वं दुःखावच्छेदकत्वासमानाधिकरणवृत्तिः न वा। अथवा शरीरवृत्तिजातित्वं सुखावच्छेदकत्वासमानाधिकरणवृत्तिः न वेति। साधने विप्रतिपत्तिश्च कार्यप्रतियोगित्वं प्रतियोगित्वप्रागभावान्न प्रागभावाविषयकप्रतीत्यविषयो न वा इत्याकारिका। अदृष्टरूपमलौकिकं परलोकसाधनं नैयायिकाः स्वीकुर्वन्ति। चार्वाकैः अलौकिकपरलोकसाधनञ्च नाभ्युपगम्यते। अतः कथमलौकिकपरलोकसाधनं भविष्यति ? एतेनालौकिकपरलोकसाधनमस्ति न वेत्यादिरूपा विप्रतिपत्तिर्न भवितुमर्हतीति आचार्येण चार्वाकाणां भावकोटित्रयमेकेनैव वाक्येन प्रतिपादितम्-अलौकिकपरलोकसाधनस्याभावादिति। अत्रायमभिप्रायः - चार्वाकास्तावत्कार्यकारणभावं नाङ्गीकुर्वन्ति। गत्यन्तराभावेन तदभ्युपगम्यापि सर्वत्र कार्यकारणभावं नाङ्गीकुर्वन्ति। उपायान्तराभावेन सर्वत्र तदङ्गीकृत्यापि कार्यकारणयोः वैलक्षण्यं नाभ्युपगच्छन्ति। विलक्षणकार्यकारणभावाङ्गीकृत्यापि परलोककारणं नाभ्युपगच्छन्ति। परलोककारणं गत्यन्तराभावेन स्वीकृत्यापि यागादेः परलोककारणत्वसम्भवात् आत्मसमवेतालौकिकरूपमदृष्टं नानुमेनिरे। इयमेव प्रथमा विप्रतिपत्तिरवान्तरभेदेन पञ्चधा विभजति। यथा कार्यं कारणसापेक्षं न वा, सकलकार्याणि कारणत्वसापेक्षत्वानि न वा, सकलकार्यं एकविधकारणसापेक्षं न वा, परलोककारणसापेक्षो न वा, परलोकसाधनमात्मवृत्ति न वा इति। सर्वासां विप्रतिपत्तीनां निराकरणं कृत्वा प्रथमा विप्रतिपत्तिः निराकृता उदयनाचार्येण महामतिना।

तत्रादौ चार्वाकादीनामाशंका तावत् कार्यकारणभावो नास्ति। कार्यं न कारणम् अपेक्षते, अतएव एतेषां मते कारणस्याभावात् कस्मात् जगत्कार्यकारणत्वेन ईश्वरसिद्धिः सम्भवति इत्यतः प्रथमं कारणत्वं व्यवस्थापयन् चार्वाकमतं निराक्रियते उदयनेन-

सापेक्षत्वादनादित्वाद्वैचित्र्याद्विश्ववृत्तितः।
प्रत्यात्मनियमाद् भुक्तेः अस्ति हेतुरलौकिकः॥

इत्यनेन श्लोकेन। अयं भावः चार्वाकमते कार्यं नालौकिकहेतुकम् अहेतुकत्वात् इति चार्वाकः। अहेतुकत्वरूपहेतुना अथवा अहेतुकत्वरूपयुक्त्या कार्यस्यालौकिकहेतुकत्वे आक्षिप्ते आचार्येणोक्तम् - सापेक्षत्वादिति। सापेक्षत्वं सकारणत्वमित्यर्थः।तथा च कार्यस्य सकारणत्वसिद्धया चार्वाकाणाम् अहेतुकत्वहेतुरसिद्धो भवति। कथं कार्यमात्रस्य सकारणत्वसिद्धिरित्याशङ्कायामाह - न हि अयं संसारोऽनेकविधदुःखमयो निरपेक्षो भवितुमर्हति, तदा हि स्यादेव न स्यादेव वा, नतु कदाचित् स्यात्। अतएव कार्यं सापेक्षं कादाचित्कत्वात् इत्याद्यनुमानप्रयोगः। सापेक्षत्वं हि अन्यापेक्षत्वमिति प्रतिपादनद्वारा यत् कार्यातिरिक्तं तदेव कारणमिति सिद्धिर्भवति। अनेन कादाचित्कत्वहेतुना कार्यस्य सकारणकत्वमनुमीयते, अनुमानेन चार्वाकस्य अहेतुकत्वं कार्यस्य निरस्तं भवति। कादाचित्कत्वञ्च किञ्चित्कालासम्बन्धित्वेसति कञ्चित्कालसम्बन्धित्वं दृश्यते यतो हि कार्यं किञ्चित्कालासम्बन्धित्वे सति किञ्चित्कालसम्बन्धि इति। अतः यत् किञ्चित्कालासम्बन्धित्वे सति किञ्चित्कालसम्बन्धि भवति तत् सहेतुकं भवतीति व्याप्तिः सिद्धा। यथा भोजनजन्या तृप्तिः इति प्रागभावस्यापि किञ्चित्कालासम्बन्धित्वे सति कञ्चित्कालसम्बन्धित्वात् तत्र सहेतुकत्वहेतुव्यभिचारी इति नाशङ्कनीयः। उत्पत्तिसत्त्वे सतीति

विशेषणप्रक्षेपात् व्यभिचारस्यानवकाशात् प्रागभावस्य चानादित्वादिति तस्योत्पत्तिविरहादिति । चार्वाकाः अनुमानस्य प्रामाण्यं नाभ्युपगच्छन्ति । कथं वात्र तान् प्रति निरुक्तानुमानं प्रसाध्य तेषां मतनिराकरणं सम्भवति ? अत्रोच्यते अनुमानं प्रमाणं प्रमितिकरणतावच्छेदकधर्मवत्वात्, अविसंवादिप्रवृत्तिजनकत्वाद्वा इत्यादिना अनुमानस्य प्रामाण्यं प्रसाध्य चार्वाकमतनिराकृतत्वात् । अनुमानस्य प्रामाण्यमादौ निरूप्य कार्यं सहेतुकं कादाचित्कत्वादिति साधनेन चार्वाकैरपि कार्यस्य सकारणकत्वाभ्युपगन्तव्यत्वादिति आशयः । अथवा अस्मादनन्तरमिदं जायते, एतद्भावेन इति प्रत्यक्षमेव कार्यकारणभावे मानमिति । अतएवानुमानप्रमाणेन कार्यकारणभावसाधने न क्वाप्यनुपपत्तिरित्यस्मद् गुरूचरणाः ।

' ननु कार्यमात्रस्य कारणं यदि सदातनं स्यात्तर्हि, तत् सापेक्षस्य कार्यस्यापि सदातनत्वं स्यादित्यापत्तिः इति कादाचित्कत्वमहेतोरिव आकाशादेः सहेतोरपि सपक्षाद् व्यावृत्तमित्यसाधारणं स्यादिति हेतुः कादाचित्को वाच्यः तथा च तस्यापि कादाचित्कत्वं हेत्वपेक्षया इत्यनवस्थापत्तिः । अहेतुकत्वे च तद्वदेव कार्यमपि अहेतुकं कादाचित्कं स्यादि'त्यत आह अनादित्वादिति । [प्रकाशटीका, वर्धमानोपाध्यायः] अयं भावः - घटादिकार्यहेतोः सदातनत्वे घटादेरपि सदातनत्वापत्तिः । अतो हेतोः कादाचित्कत्वं कल्प्यम् इति नैयायिकाः । तत्र चार्वाकास्तावत् आशङ्कां कुर्वन्ति - कार्यं कादाचित्कम् अहेतुकं भावत्वात् गगनवत् । सहेतुकमपि निश्चितसाध्यवत् गगनाद्वयावृत्तत्वात् असाधारणमेव कादाचित्कम् । अतोऽनेन हेतुना अहेतुकत्वासिद्धिः न सम्भवति । अहेतुकत्वासिद्धौ तद्वदेव अहेतुकं कादाचित्कं स्यादित्यादिरीत्या अनवस्था भविष्यति । अतस्तन्मतं निराक्रियते अनादित्वादित्यादिना । तथा च बीजाङ्कुरवदीयमनवस्था न दोषाय भवति । अप्रामाणिकी अनवस्था दोषाय भवति न तु प्रामाणिकी अनवस्था । तस्मादनवस्थादोषरहित सापेक्षत्वहेतुकानुमितिः सदैव सिध्यति ।

ननु कार्यस्य कारणसिद्धौ अपि एकस्मात् एकजातीयात् वा कारणात् कार्यमस्तु इत्यत आह - वैचित्र्यादिति । तथा च कार्यं विचित्रकारणकं विचित्रत्वात् इत्यनुमानेन कार्यस्य एक जातीयकारणकत्वम् अभिन्नकारणकत्वं वा निरस्तं भवति । विभिन्नकार्याणां यदि एककारणकत्वं स्यात् एकजातीयकारणकत्वं वा स्यात् तर्हि आकस्मिकत्वं स्यात् इति तर्कोऽपि विचित्रकारणकत्वानुमितौ सहकारी भवति इति ।

ननु तथापि दृश्यमानविचित्रकारणकं कार्यं भवतु । कथं परलोककारणरूपादृष्टे कल्पनेनेति वाच्यम् विश्ववृत्तितः विशेषां परलोकार्थिनां यागादौ प्रवृत्तितः परलोककारणमनुमीयते । तथा च विश्वमहाजनप्रवृत्तिः सफला प्रेक्षावत्प्रवृत्तित्वात् । स्वर्गादिफलकत्वज्ञानं यागादिप्रवृत्तिजनकं भवति । यागादेश्च स्वर्गादिफलकत्वं तद्कालावस्थायिव्यापारं विना न सम्भवतीति अदृष्टसिद्धिः ।

ननु तथापि तादृशादृष्टं भोग्यनिष्ठं भोक्तृनिष्ठं वा ? यदि भोक्तृनिष्ठम् अदृष्टं स्यात्तर्हि प्रतिभोक्तृनियतं सर्वसाधारणं वा ? सर्वसाधारण्ये प्रति-भोक्तृव्यवस्थितः भोगः न सिध्येदत आह प्रत्यात्मनियमाद् भुक्तेरिति । भुक्तेः सुखदुःखसाक्षात्काररूपभोगस्य प्रत्यात्मनियतत्वात् । प्रतिभोक्तृनियतमेव भिन्नभिन्नादृष्टं कल्पते । व्यधिकरणादृष्टस्य भोगजनकत्वेऽतिप्रसङ्गादिति । तथा च एकस्यैव धनवतो बहुषु पुत्रेषु समानाहारशिक्षापरिचर्यादिकृतोऽपि कश्चित् पण्डितः कश्चित् मूर्खः, कश्चित् धनवान् कश्चित् निर्धनो भवति इति ऐहिकदृश्यमानकारणानां समाजातीयत्वेऽपि फलवैचित्र्यदर्शनात् अलौकिक-परलोकसाधनादृष्टः कल्पनीयः । एतेनालौकिकपरलोसाधनस्याभावादिति प्रथमा विप्रतिपत्तिः निरस्ता ।

अथ चार्वाकःप्रत्यवतिष्ठते अकस्मादेव कार्यं भवति न किञ्चिदपेक्षं कण्टकतैक्ष्ण्यादिदर्शनादिति। कण्टकादीनां तीक्ष्णत्वं यथा न केनापि सृष्टं, स्वभावादेव जातम्, तथैव कार्याणि अपि अकस्मात् जायन्ते इति। तत्रोत्तरमाह न्यायकुसुमाञ्जलौ -

हेतुभूतिनिषेधो न स्वानुपाख्यविधिर्न च।
स्वभाववर्णना नैवमवधेर्नियतत्वतः॥

अयं भावः - अकस्माद् भवति इत्यस्य कोऽर्थः ? किं न कस्माच्चिद् भवतीति जायमानस्यास्य हेतुनिषेधः क्रियते ? किं वा कस्माच्चिन्न भवतीति उत्पत्तिनिषेधः ? यद्वा अकस्मात् किञ्चिद्भिन्नात् स्वेतरव्यक्तिभिन्नात् स्वस्माद् भवतीति स्वजन्यत्वं स्वस्य विधीयते ? आहो अकस्मात् किञ्चित् पदार्थभिन्नाद् अपदार्थाद् अलौकिकाद् उपाख्यातुमशक्यात् शशविषाणात् भवतीति असज्जन्यत्वं विधीयते? अथवा अकस्माच्छब्दस्य स्वभावे रूढ्मुररीकृत्य स्वभावाद् भवतीति वर्णते। इमे पञ्चापि पक्षाः न भवन्ति कार्याणां नियतावधिकत्वस्यावश्यकत्वादिति। [वीरराघवाचार्यकृतकुसुमाञ्जलिविस्तरव्याख्यांशः]

अत्र प्रथमे कार्यस्य हेतुनिषेधपरत्वे भवनस्य सत्ताया अनपेक्षत्वात् आकाशादिवत् कार्यस्य सर्वदा सत्त्वप्रसङ्गः। द्वितीये कार्यस्योत्पत्तिनिषेधे प्राग्वत् पश्चादपि कार्यस्यासत्त्वप्रसङ्गः। स्वानुपाख्यविधिर्न च इत्यनेन स्वं च अनुपाख्यश्च स्वानुपाख्यौ तयोर्विधिः स च न भवति। स्वं कार्यं स्वस्मात् स्वस्य कार्यस्य विधिर्न, अनुपाख्यः अलीकः, तस्मादलीकात् कार्यस्य विधिः उत्पत्तिर्न भवति। उत्पत्तेः प्राक् स्वयमसतः स्वोत्पत्तौ असमर्थत्वात् स्वस्मादिति पक्षानुपपत्तेः। न च स्वमेव स्वं प्रतिकारणमस्तु इति वाच्यम्, कार्यकारणभावस्य पौर्वापर्यनियमाद् नहि एकस्यैव वस्तुनः पूर्वत्वं परत्वं सम्भवति, पौर्वापर्यस्य भिन्नव्यक्तिनिष्ठत्वात्। एवमनुपाख्यविधिरपि न भवति, अनुपाख्यस्य हेतुत्वे प्रागपि स्वत्वप्रसक्तौ पुनः सदातनत्वापत्तेः। अनुपाख्याद् भवतीति यदि ब्रूयात् तर्हि इदानीमिव प्रागपि अनुपाख्याद् भवतीति कार्यस्य सदातनत्वप्रसङ्गः स्यात्।

भवतु हि कार्यस्य कादाचित्कत्वं तथापि स्वभावादेव कार्यमुत्पद्यते यतः नैयायिकाः अपि उपपद्यमानघटादिकार्यस्य दण्डचक्रसलिलसूत्राद्युत्पाद्यमानस्यापि कार्यं कपालदेशेषु एव वर्तते न तु दण्डादिदेशविशेषे। तत्र घटस्य कपालदेशावस्थायित्वं स्वभावादेव इति स्वीकुर्वन्ति। अतः स्वभाव एव घटादेः कपालदेशावस्थायित्वं प्रति नियामकः। अतएव कार्यं निरपेक्षमपि कादाचित्कं भवति, किञ्चित्कालानवस्थितत्वे सति किञ्चित्कालावस्थितं भवति। तस्य किञ्चित्कालावस्थितत्वे त्वभाव एव नियामकः भवतु चार्वाकाणां मते आक्षेपः।

तत्रोत्तरमाह - अवधेर्नियतत्वम्। कार्यस्य निरवधित्वे अनियतावधिकत्वे नियतकालावृत्तित्वे कादाचित्कत्वस्य अनुपपन्नत्वात् इत्यर्थः। नियतदेशत्वमपि हि वस्तुनो न निष्कारणं भवितुमर्हति। किं तर्हि अनुभवबलात् कपालस्य स्वस्मिन् घटोत्पादनसामर्थ्यं, दण्डचक्रादेश्च कपाले घटोत्पादनसामर्थ्यमिति कल्प्यते अतः कारणबलादेव तत् इति दृष्टान्तस्तावदसिद्धः इति वीरराघवाचार्यटीका। अयमर्थः - चार्वाको वदति घटस्य नियतकपालदेशावस्थायित्वं स्वभाव इति, स च दृष्टान्तासिद्धः। यतः घटस्य कपालदेशावस्थायित्वं हि सकारणम्। कपालं हि स्वस्मिन् घटमुत्पादयति। दण्डचक्रादयोऽपि कपाले

घटमुत्पादयति इति घटस्य कपालदेशावस्थितिं प्रति कपालादीनि सर्वाणि कारणानि भवन्ति इति भावः। अनेन घटस्य कपालदेशावस्थितिं सापेक्षं न तु निरपेक्षम्। यदि चार्वाकाः कार्यस्य अवधिं नाङ्गीक्रियेरन् तर्हि यदनन्वयापत्तौ कादाचित्कत्वस्य व्याक्षेपः भवति। य पदार्थः निरवधिक भवति स सदातनो भवतीति नियमबलात्। आकाशादिर्यथा। अतएव अवधेः स्वीकर्तव्यतोपपत्तौ अपि नियतावधिः न स्वीक्रियते। तर्हि अनियतावधिकत्वेऽपि कार्यस्य पूर्वं तत् पूर्वं सत्त्वस्यापत्तया तावतैव सदातनत्वापत्तिरिति द्रष्टव्या। एतेन कार्यस्य पूर्वोत्तरावधिस्वीकारे यः पूर्वोऽवधिः स हेतुः कारणमुच्यते इति। भवति हि कार्यं सकारणकमेवेति। एवमनेन कार्यं कादाचित्कमपि अकारणं भवतु इति चार्वाकमतमप्यपास्तम्। कादाचित्कस्य कार्यस्य नियतावधिकत्वस्वीकारात् नियतावधिकत्वं हि सकारणकत्वमिति भवति कार्यकारणभावसिद्धिरिति भावः।

अथ चार्वाकाः प्रत्यवतिष्ठन्ते कार्यस्य अवधिरस्तु, तथापि नियतावधिः। यद् किञ्चिदुत्तरत्वेनानुभूयते न तु किञ्चित्पूर्वत्वेन तस्य पूर्वोऽवधिः स्वीकार्यः। यथा ध्वंसस्यानुभूतिर्भवति घटादुत्तरत्वेन न कञ्चित्पूर्वत्वेन इति ध्वंसपूर्वः घटादेरेव अवधिर्भवति। यत् खलु किञ्चित्पूर्वत्वेन अनुभूयते न तूत्तरत्वेन तस्योत्तरावधिः स्वीकार्यः। यथा प्रागभावस्य घटादिपूर्वत्वेनानुभूतिर्भवति न तु किञ्चिदुत्तरत्वेन इति घटादेरेव प्रागभावोत्तरत्वेनावधिर्भवतु। अतएव यत् कार्याणां पूर्वोत्तरैकैकावधि नानुभूयते तेषां कार्याणामेकैकावधिः स्वीकर्तव्यः। अनुपलब्धावपि यदि पूर्वोऽवधिः स्वीक्रियते तर्हि सर्वस्यापि पूर्वपूर्वस्य पूर्वपूर्वावधिकल्पनया अनवस्था स्यात्। अत्रोत्तरमाह प्रवाह नादिमानेव न विजात्येकशक्तिमान्।

तथाहि एष प्रवाहः न आदिमान् भवति, आदिमत्वं हि पूर्वकालाऽसत्त्वे सति उत्तरकालसम्बन्धित्वम्। अयं प्रवाहो यदि आदिमान् स्यात्तर्हि कार्यव्यक्तीनां काचिद् हेतुका स्यात्। यतः काचित् कार्यव्यक्तिः - प्रथमोत्पत्तिः - भवति। तस्याः पूर्वं किञ्चित् कार्यं नाभवत्। अहेतुकत्वे च पूर्वापरासृष्टदोषः प्रसज्येत्। अतएव तादृशकार्यव्यक्तेः पूर्वं व्यक्त्यन्तरस्य ततोऽपि पूर्वं व्यक्त्यन्तरस्य इत्यादिकल्पनया कार्यस्यानादित्वं स्वीकार्यम्।

ननु कार्यकारणप्रवाहस्य नादित्वेऽपि एकजातीयकार्यं प्रति एकजातीयकारणम् अस्ति इत्यत्र किमपि मानं स्यात्, विजातीयकारणेभ्यः तृणारणिमणिभ्यः एकजातीयवह्नेरोत्पत्तिदर्शनादिति, न हि कार्यजातीयनियमः आकस्मिकः, विजातीयकारणेषु एक शक्त्यङ्गीकारेण तादृशकार्योपपत्तेरत आह - न विजात्येकशक्तिमान्, विविधजातिर्यस्य तद्विजाति एकाशक्तिर्यस्य तदेकशक्तिः, विजातिश्च एकशक्तिश्च विजात्येकशक्तिः कारणमित्यर्थः। विजात्येकशक्तिः अस्ति यस्य तद्वान् कार्यप्रवाहः विजात्येकशक्तिमान्। कार्यप्रवाहः नैतादृशः विजात्येकशक्तिमान्। नैकजातीयस्य कार्यप्रवाहस्य विजातीयकारणमिति चार्वाकमतनियमः, नापि एकजातीयस्य कार्यप्रवाहस्य एकशक्तिं विजातीयं कारणमिति मीमांसकमतनियमः मीमासंकास्तावत् विजातीयकारणेषु तृणारणिमणिषु एकशक्तिमत्त्वेन वह्नेः कारणतामभ्युपगच्छन्ति। तन्निरासायाह न विजात्येकशक्तिमान्, कारणविजातीयत्वे कार्यसजातीयत्वस्याकस्मिकत्वप्रसङ्गात्। अतएव न्यायनये तृणादिभ्यः उत्पादनस्य वह्नेरवान्तरजातिभेदस्वीकारात् नानुपपत्तिः। कथं तृणारणिमणिसमवधाने वह्नेरवान्तरः जातिभेदः सिध्येदित्यत उक्तम् - तत्ते यत्नवताभाव्यम् अन्वयव्यतिरेकयोरिति। तृणारणिमणिस्थले अन्वयव्यतिरेकयोः वह्न्याद्यन्वयव्यतिरेकयोः तत्त्वे यावास्थ्ये तृणाद्यन्वयव्यतिरेकसमनियतत्त्वे यत्नवताभाव्यम् यत्नः करणीयः वैजात्यं प्रकल्पनीयमित्याशयः। तथाच

तृणादिजन्यतावच्छेदकत्वेन वह्न्यादिनिष्ठतार्णत्वादिवैजात्यं कल्पनीयम्। अरणिमणिसमवधानाभावेऽपि तृणाज्जायमानस्यवह्नेः अरणिमण्यादिरूपकारणविरहेऽपि न व्यतिरेकव्यभिचारः सर्वत्र आशङ्कनीयः। तार्णवह्नित्वावच्छिन्नं प्रतितृणत्वेन, मणिजन्यवह्नित्वावच्छिन्नं प्रति मणित्वेन इत्यादिरीत्या कार्यकारणभावकल्पने न व्यतिरेकव्यभिचारसम्भवतीति अथवा तृणाद्यव्यवहितोत्तरजायमानवह्निं प्रति तृणत्वेन कारणता इत्यादिरीत्या पृथक् पृथक् कारणताकल्पनेन व्यतिरेकव्यभिचारस्यव्युदायः। व्यक्तिरेव कारणमितिमतमवलम्ब्य चार्वाकः पुनः आशङ्कते - तथापि व्यक्त्यपेक्षया नियमोऽस्तु नजात्यपेक्षया इति चेत्। अस्यार्थस्तं घटजातीयं प्रतिकपालजातीयं कारणमिति जातिमपेक्ष्य कार्यकारणभावरचना न सम्भवति, तृणादिभ्यो विजातीयेभ्यः एकजातीयवह्न्युत्पत्तिदर्शनात्। अतस्तद्व्यक्तिं प्रति तद्व्यक्तिं कारणमिति दर्शनबलात् व्यक्त्यपेक्षैव कार्यकारणभावः कल्पनीयः। 'यजेत स्वर्गकाम' इत्यादौ स्वर्गादिकारणत्वेन यागादेः निर्णीते तस्य यागादेः अव्यवहितपूर्वत्वनियामकमदृष्टं कल्प्यते। तादृशादृष्टाधिष्ठातृतया ईश्वरसिद्धिः नैयायिकानामभिप्रेता। या च न सम्भवति। ऐहिकफलकस्य यागस्य अनुष्ठितत्वेऽपि सद्यःफलादर्शनेनानुमीयते यत् काचिददृष्टव्यक्तिविलम्बेन फलविलम्ब इति तत्रापि व्यक्तिः हि कारणम्। अनयैव रीत्या कुम्भकारादिसत्त्वेऽपि घटोत्पत्तिविलम्बदर्शनात् कार्यस्य कर्तृजन्यत्वव्यभिचारशङ्का स्यात् अतः तत्रापि घटादिव्यक्तिं प्रति कपालाभिव्यक्तेः कारणत्वं प्रकल्प्य व्यभिचारस्यवारणमस्तवः। जातिनियमस्य तृणारणिमणिजन्यवह्निस्थले व्यभिचारात् सर्वत्र तद्व्यक्तिं प्रति तद्व्यक्तेः कारणत्वम् इति नियमः। तथासति पूर्वोक्तयुक्त्या नेश्वरसिद्धिरिति। आचार्येणोक्तम् - नैवम्। नियतजातीय-स्वभावत्वव्याघातात् यदि यतः कुतश्चित् भवन्नेव तज्जातीयस्वभावस्तर्हि स्यात् सर्वस्य सर्वजातीयत्वं एकजातीयत्वं वा स्यात्। एवं यदि तज्जातीयेन यतः कुतश्चिद्भवितव्यम् इति अस्य स्वभावः तदापि सर्वस्मात् सर्वजातीयमेकजातीयं वा स्यात्।

अस्यार्थस्तु,व्यक्त्यपेक्षया कार्यकारणभावस्वीकारे भिन्नजातीयव्यक्तेरपि चार्वाकैः एकजातीय-काष्ठोत्पत्तिरवश्यं स्वीकार्या। तथासति कपालजातीयात् जायमानो घटो घटजातीयो भवति इति कार्यकारणयोः नियतजातीयस्वभावसिद्धिप्रसङ्गो भवति। यदि च तज्जातीयं कार्यं सादृशतादृशकारणादपि उत्पद्यमानं तज्जातीयमेव भवतीति कार्यस्य स्वभावस्तर्हि घटजातीयकार्यस्य पटजातीयकारणात् तन्तुप्रभृतिभ्योऽप्युत्पत्तिसम्भवात् पटेऽपि घटजातीयता स्यात्। तस्माद्व्यक्त्यपेक्षया कार्यकारणभावनियमो न सम्भवति।

चार्वाकः पुनः शङ्कते - कथं तर्हि तृणारणिमणिभ्यो भवन्नाशुशुक्षणिरेकजातीयः ? उच्यते नैयायिकैः मीमांसकमतमवलम्ब्य एकशक्तिमत्त्वादिति चेत् मीमांसकाः शक्तेः पदार्थान्तरत्वमिति वदन्ति। अतस्तन्मते तृणारणिमणिषु विजातीयेषु वह्न्यनुकूला शक्तिः स्वीक्रियते सा च शक्तिः नित्ये नित्यैव, अनित्ये भावहेतुजा इति। सा च प्रतिव्यक्तिभेदेन भिन्ना। तथापि एकजातीयत्वेन शक्तेरेकत्वव्यवहारो जायते। तृणारणिमणिषु विजातीयेषु एकजातीयशक्तिसत्त्वात् तादृशैकजातीयशक्तिमत्त्वेन तृणादयः विजातीयाः अपि एकजातीयवह्नेः कारणं भवतीति।

तदुत्तरमाह न, यदि विजातीयेषु एकजातीयकार्यकारणशक्तिः स्वीक्रियते, तर्हि कार्यात् न कारणविशेषः न कदापि केनाप्यनुमीयते। कारणव्यावृत्ता च न तज्जातीयस्यैव कार्यस्यव्यावृत्तिरित्यवसीयेत तदभावेऽपि तज्जातीयशक्तिमतोऽन्यस्मादपि तदुत्पत्तिःसम्भवादिति। इति प्रकाशटीका। अयं भावः -

विजातीयेषु तृणारणिमणिषु यदि एकजातीयकार्यजातीयोत्पादनशक्तिः, एकवह्नि जातीयोत्पादनशक्तिः इत्यर्थः स्वीक्रियते, तर्हि अन्यत्रापि कारणेषु तद्वत् - एकजातीयोत्पादनशक्तिस्वीकारो युक्तः । दृश्यते च कार्यात् कारणविशेषानुमानं भवति कारणविशेषाभावाच्च कार्यविशेषाभावोऽपीति तन्न सम्भवति । यथा धूमं पश्यन् सर्वः एव तत्कारणत्वेन वह्निमनुमिनोति, वह्न्यभावदर्शनात् धूमाभावं निश्चिनोति । तन्नसम्भवति, , कार्यलिङ्गकमेकानुमानं, उपलब्ध्याभावलिङ्गकमपरानुमानं लुप्यते । यतः विजातीयेषु तृणारणिमणिषु एकशक्तिमत्त्वेन वह्निजातीयकारणत्वस्वीकारे विजातीयघटपटादिषु अपि तादृशशक्तेः शङ्कायां, वह्निदर्शनेन न तत् कारणविशेषस्यानुमानं, तृणादिभिन्नेषु घटपटादिषु शक्तेः सम्भावनया वह्निलिङ्गेन न तृणादेरनुमानं सम्भवेत् । धूमदर्शनाच्च न वह्निरूपकारणविशेषानुमानम् । वह्निभिन्नेऽपि धूमानुकूलशक्तेः शङ्का जायते ।

एतेन वह्न्यभावात् न धूमाभावनिश्चयः वह्निभिन्नेऽपिधूमजनकशक्तेः सम्भावनया कारणविशेषाभावात् कार्यविशेषाभावो नोपपद्यते इति भावः । नैयायिका अत्र शङ्कां कुर्वन्तः समाधातुं इच्छन्ति - यावद्दर्शनं व्यवस्था भविष्यतीति चेत्। अस्यार्थःकार्यदर्शनानुसारेण शक्तिं कल्प्येत । यद्धर्मावच्छिन्नेषु शक्तिं कल्पनाय वरम् इति । तेन विजातीयेषु तृणारणिमणिषु वह्निजातीयजनकशक्तिः स्वीकुर्यात् न घटादिषु । वह्न्यादिषु धूमजनकशक्तिरेव कल्प्यते नान्यत्र जलादिषु । इति न कार्यात् कारणविशेषानुमानस्य कारणाभावाच्च कार्यविशेषाभावनिश्चयस्य अनुपपत्तिः । तदुत्तरमाह चार्वाकः न, निमित्तस्यादर्शनात्, दृष्टस्यानित्यत्वात् । अयं भावः निमित्ते शक्तिः स्वीक्रियते उतो दृष्टे वा ? शक्तेर्निमित्तस्यादर्शनात् न निमित्ते । दृष्टस्य तृणत्वावच्छिन्नस्य चानिमित्तत्वात्; तृणत्वस्य कारणतानवच्छेदकत्वात् एतेन एकशक्तिमत्त्वपक्षे तृणादिषु एका अतीन्द्रिया अनुगता जातिरस्ति, तादृशजातिमत्त्वेन तृणादयः वह्निजातीयस्य कारणानि भवन्ति इति वदतां मतस्य यः परिष्कारः स च - शक्तिमत्त्वेन तृणादीनां वह्नेः कारणत्वस्वीकरे महद्गौरवं शक्तिश्च उत्पादविनाशशालिनी प्रतिव्यक्तिभिन्ना, यतः सा प्रतिबन्धकेन अपसरति, आश्रयनाशेन च नश्यति, प्रतिबन्धकापसरणे पुनरुत्पन्ना भवति । तृणादिषु चैकस्याः शक्तेरसम्भवः, अतएव तासु शक्तिषु एकजातीयत्वेन एकशक्तित्वव्यवहारः कर्तव्यः इति - अनन्तशक्तिः तत्प्रागभावध्वंस तद्गतजातयश्च कल्पनीया इति महागौरवम् । सुतरां तृणादिनिष्ठशक्तिस्थाने एकामनुगतां जातिं प्रकलप्य तृणादेर्वह्निकारणत्वनिर्वाहो उचितः । तादृशजातेश्चसूक्ष्मत्वान्नानुभव इति निरस्तः । यतः तादृशजातेः सूक्ष्मत्वेनाननुभवात् प्रत्यक्षत्वाभावाच्च तृणादिभिन्नेपि तादृशजातेः सत्त्वसम्भावनाप्रसङ्गात् तृणादीतरेभ्यः वह्नेरुत्पादप्रसङ्गात् न पूर्वोक्तदोषद्वयस्योद्धारः । एवञ्च कार्यविशेषात् कारणविशेषानुमानं, कारणभावोपलम्भात् कार्यविशेषाभावानुमानं न सम्भवतीति फलितार्थः । तथाच दृष्टकारणतावच्छेदकत्यागेन वह्नित्वस्यापि धूमकारणतावच्छेदकत्यागाद् वह्निभिन्नतोऽपि तत्सूक्ष्मजातिमतो धूमोत्पत्त्यापत्तिरिति वीरराघवाचार्यकृतकुसुमाञ्जलिविस्तरटीका।

अतएव एतन्मते लाघवसम्भवेऽपि पूर्वोक्तदोषद्वयस्य सत्त्वात् नेदं मतं युक्तम् । पूर्वोक्तदोषोद्धारकर्तुमाह नैयायिका कार्यजातिभेदाभेदयोः समवायिभेदाभेदावेव तन्त्रं न निमित्तसमवायिनो इति चेत् चावकिरुक्तम् - न, तयोरकारणत्वप्रसङ्गात् । नहि सति भावमात्रं तत् किन्तु सत्येव भावः, न च जातिनियमे समवायिकारणमात्रं निबन्धनमपितु सामग्री । अन्यथा द्रव्यगुणकर्मणामेकोपादानकत्वे

विजातीयत्वं न स्यात्। न च कार्यद्रव्यस्यैषा रीतिरिति युक्तम्। आरव्यदुग्धैरेवावयवैर्दध्यारम्भदर्शनात्। इति नैयायिकं प्रति एतादृशं उत्तरं दत्त्वा पुनः बौद्धान् निराकुरुते चार्वाकः - 'एतेन अपोहवादे नियमो निरस्तः। कार्यकारणभावाद्वा इत्यादि विप्लवप्रसङ्गात्। तस्मान्नियतजातीयता स्वभावमङ्गेन व्यक्त्यपेक्षैव नियम' इति।

बौद्धास्तावदपोहवादिनः। गौर्गौरिति अनुगतव्यवहारार्थं तैरपोहोऽपोहः गोभिन्नभिन्नः स्वीक्रियते। भिन्नत्वस्य च कल्पनामात्रम्। कल्पितेनैतेन अपोहेन अनुगतव्यवहारः कार्यकारणभावश्चोपपद्यते। अनया रीत्या अपोहेन व्यवहारसिद्धौ अतिरिक्तजातिकल्पनमयुक्तमिति बौद्धानां मतम्। तथाच तेषां मते वह्न्यपोहेन अर्थात् वह्निभिन्नभिन्नत्वरूपेण वह्निः धूमभिन्नभिन्नत्वेन धूमं प्रति कारणमिति कार्यकारणभावान्तर्भावेण वह्निधूमयोरविनाभावः सिध्यति। साध्यवति हेतुदर्शनरूपादन्वयात् साध्याभाववति हेत्वदर्शनरूपाद् व्यतिरेकात् चाविनाभावं ते न स्वीकुर्वन्ति। चार्वाकैः निराक्रियते बौद्धमतम् - एकशक्तिमत्त्वेन एकजातिमत्त्वेन वा तृणादीनां वह्निकारणत्वनिराकरणेन हेतुना बौद्धानामपोहवादः निरस्तो भवति।

जातिमस्वीकुर्वतां बौद्धानां मते वह्निभिन्नभिन्नत्वेन धूमभिन्नभिन्नत्वेन कार्यकारणभावः अभिहितः। य च न सम्भवति। सर्वेषां वह्नीनां सर्वेषां धूमानां संग्रहं कर्तुमशक्नुवन्तः यावत्स्थले स्वयं धूमदर्शनं तावद्वह्निव्यक्तिं गृहीत्वा तावद्भिन्नभिन्नत्वेन कारणत्वस्वीकारे अन्यवह्निव्यक्तितो धूमाभावप्रसङ्गात्। सकलधूमवह्निव्यक्तिसंग्रहणस्यावश्यकत्वे कतीनामपिव्यक्तीनां धूमकुर्वद्रूपत्यं तदपि चापोहरूपम् कतीनाञ्च व्यक्तीनां पृथक् पृथक् ग्रहणं तेन रूपेण न कारणत्वमित्यत्र व्यवस्था न सम्भवति इति कदाचिदवह्नेरपि धूमसम्भावनया धूमं प्रतिवह्नेर्नियमं स्थापयितुं न शक्नुवन्ति बौध्दाः। तेषां मते स्वभावः कार्यकारणभावो वा अविनाभावनियामकः। कार्यकारणभावाद्वा स्वभावाद्वा नियामकात्। अविनाभावनियमोऽदर्शनान्नो न दर्शनात् इति वदन्ति। तथाच कार्यकारणभावात्धूमकार्यदर्शनेन तत्कारणं वह्निमनुमिनोति इति कार्यकारणभावोऽविनाभावनियामकः। स्वभावात् - अयं वृक्ष शिंशपायाः इत्यत्र शिंशपायाः वृक्षस्वभावत्वेन शिंशपादर्शनात् वृक्षस्यानुमानम् इत्यत्र स्वभावोऽविनाभावनियामकः।

एतेषां मते अपोहवादस्वीकारे सकलधूमव्यक्तीनां सकलवह्निव्यक्तीनां संग्रहासम्भवात् अवह्नेरपि धूमसम्भावनया कार्यकारणभावव्याख्यातो जायते। कार्यकारणभावस्य विप्लवेन तादात्म्यरूप स्वभावोऽपि विप्लुतोभवति इति अपोहवादोऽयुक्तः।अतएव जात्यापेक्षया अविनाभावनियमस्य निरूपणस्यासम्भवात् व्यक्त्यपेक्षैव कार्यकारणभावनियमः स्वीकर्त्तव्यः इति चार्वाकाणां मतम्। तथा च यथादर्शनं तद्व्यक्तिः तद्व्यक्तिं प्रति कारणं न तु तज्जातीयं प्रति तज्जातीयत्वेन कारणता। तृणारणिमणिस्थले तृणव्यक्तिः वह्निव्यक्तिं प्रति कारणं मणिव्यक्तिः वह्निव्यक्तिं प्रति कारणम् अरणिव्यक्तिः वह्निव्यक्तिं प्रति कारणम् इति पृथक् पृथक् कारणानि भविष्यन्ति इति कार्यात् कारणविशेषानुमानम्, कारणभावाद्वा कार्याभाव-विशेषानुमानं भ्रान्तिमात्रम्।

नैयायिकः समाधत्ते तन्न। तृणादिस्थले एकशक्तिमत्त्वेन, एकसूक्ष्मजातिमत्त्वेन अपोहवादेन वा यथा कार्यकारणभावे सकलसमाधानं न सम्भवति तथा चार्वाकोक्त व्यक्त्यपेक्षया कार्यकारणभावावलम्बनेन समाधानं न भविष्यति परन्तु अनेकदोषापत्तिरपि जायते। अतएव तृणादिस्थले कार्यात् वह्न्यादिषु

तत्तद्वैजात्यं स्वीकार्यम्। तेन तृणादिकं यथा वह्ने कारणं, तथा अरण्यादयोऽपि, सहकारिवैलक्षण्यात् कार्यवैजात्यकल्पने नानुपपत्तिः, शक्तिमत्तेन कारणत्वस्वीकारे क्षुतकारादावपि शक्तिः स्वीकार्या, ततः माणिक्युतकारादितोऽपि वह्न्यापत्तिः एवमनयारीत्या अनन्तकारणेषु अनन्तशक्तिकल्पनामपेक्ष्य कार्यवैजात्यस्वीकारपक्षे लाघवः भवति।

अतएव सामान्यापेक्षया कार्यस्यवैजात्यस्वीकारात् कार्यकारणभावव्यवस्था भवतीति न्यायमतमेवादरणीयम्। तथाचायं प्रयोगः-'तृणादिजन्यवह्नयः अवान्तरजातिभेदवन्तः विलक्षण-सामग्रीजन्यत्वात्। प्रदीपदारुदहनवदिति' बोधनीटीका। अतो वह्नित्वव्याप्यधर्मावच्छिन्नं प्रति तृणादेः कारणत्वमित्यत्र नानुपपत्तेर्गन्धलेशोऽपीति विभावनीयः। एवं बहुतररीतिमवलम्ब्य कार्यकारणभावं स्थापयन् चार्वाकादीनां मतं निराकृत्य यथाक्रमं मीमांसकसांख्यबौद्धमतमपि निराकृतम् नैयायिकैः एवं अलौकिकस्य परलोकस्य साधनस्यापरस्य चादृष्टस्याधिष्ठातृतया ईश्वरसिद्धिः।

ईश्वरास्वीकुर्वतां मीमांसकानां मते ईश्वरं विनापि परलोकसाधनं यागाद्यनुष्ठानं सम्भवति, यागादेः स्वर्गादिहेतुत्वं वेदगम्यत्वात् वेदस्य नित्यनिर्दोषतया प्रामाण्यम्। प्रामाण्यस्यग्रहो महाजनपरिग्रहादिति वदन्ति। सांख्यास्तु वेदस्य प्रामाण्यमभ्युपगच्छन्तः तत्प्रामाण्यग्रहः कपिलादिकृतत्वेन जायते इति वदन्ति, अत्रापि षड्विप्रतिपत्तिरागता, आदौपञ्चभावकोटिः मीमांसकानां अन्तः विप्रतिपत्तौ च भावकोटिः सांख्यानाम्। तेषां तादृशाभिमतकोटीनां निराकरणं कृतम् नैयायिकैः प्रमायाः परतन्त्रत्वात् स्वर्गप्रलयसम्भवात्। तदन्यस्मिन्नविश्वासान्न विधान्तरसम्भवः इत्यादि कारिकोल्लेखेन, तथाच शाब्दीप्रमा वक्तृयथार्थवाक्यार्थधीरूपगुणजन्या इति गुणाधारतया ईश्वरसिद्धिः। एवं प्रलयोत्तरं पूर्ववेदनाशात् उत्तरवेदस्य प्रामाण्यं महाजन परिग्रहस्याभावात् न सम्भवतीति तत् प्रामाण्यग्रहे ईश्वरस्य सत्ता स्वीकार्या।

परमतखण्डनानन्तरं स्वपक्षं स्थापयितुं भूमिकामारचयति नैयायिकः-

कार्यायोजनधृत्यादेः पदात् प्रत्ययतः श्रुतेः।
वाक्यात्संख्याविशेषाच्च साध्यो विश्वविदव्ययः॥

इत्यादिना श्लोकेन, तथा च क्षित्यादिकं सकर्तृकं कार्यत्वात् घटवत्। स्वर्गाद्यकालीनद्व्यणुकारम्भक-परमाणुद्वयसंयोगजनकं कर्मचेतनप्रयत्नपूर्वकं कर्मत्वात् अस्मदादिशरीरक्रियावत्, ब्रह्माण्डादिपतन-प्रतिबन्धकीभूतप्रयत्नवदधिष्ठितं धृतिमत्त्वात्, वियति विहङ्गमधृतकाष्ठवत्। गुरूत्ववतां पतनाभावः धृतिः। पटादिसम्प्रदाय व्यवहारः स्वतन्त्रपुरूषप्रयोज्यः व्यवहारत्वात्। आधुनिकलिप्यादि व्यवहारवत्। प्रत्ययतः प्रमात्वात्, वेदजन्यज्ञानं कारणगुणजन्यं प्रमात्वात् प्रत्यक्षादि प्रमावत्। वेदः पौरूषेयः वेदत्वात् आयुर्वेदवत्। वेदः पौरुषेयः वाक्यत्वात्भारतादिवत्। वेदवाक्यानि पौरुषेयानि वाक्यत्वात्-अस्मदादिवाक्यवत्। द्व्यणुकपरिमाणं संख्याजन्यं परिमाणप्रचयाजन्यत्वे सति जन्यपरिमाणत्वात्। तुल्यपरिमाणककपालद्वयारब्धघटपरिमाणात् प्रकृष्टतादृशकपालत्रयारब्ध- घटपरिमाणवत् इत्यादि बहुतरानुमानेन ईश्वरसिद्धिः।

प्रथमानुमितौ विपक्षः हेत्वाभासोद्भावनं कुर्वन्ति-शरीरविशिष्टस्यकर्तृतया विशेषणबाधात्मको

विशिष्टबाधः कर्तृजन्यत्वव्यापकशरीरजन्यत्वाभावात् कर्तृजन्यत्वाभाव इति सत्प्रतिपक्षता, कर्ता शरीरी इति व्याप्तिर्विरोधिनी, शरीरीकर्ता इति व्याप्त्या कर्ता उपनेयः पक्षधर्मता च क्षित्यादावशरीरी इति विशिष्टसाध्याप्रसिद्धिः विशेषणविशेष्यविरोधश्च । शरीरजन्यत्वाद्युपाधिना व्याप्यत्वासिद्धिरपि । अत्र हेत्वाभासकानां दुर्बलतया नानुमितिः प्रतिबध्यते । अतएवोक्तम्- नवाधोऽस्योपजीव्यत्वादित्यादि तथाच ईश्वरे धर्मिणि शरीरबाधात् न कर्तृत्वस्य बाधः अधिकरणज्ञानं विना अभावज्ञानासम्भवात् । त्वयाविरूद्धवादिनापि अधिकरणत्वेन ईश्वरोऽभ्युपेतव्यः इति भावः एवमस्य कार्यत्वस्य धर्मिसाधकस्य अधिकरणज्ञानजनकतया अवश्यापेक्षणीयत्वेन बलवत्त्वात् । एवञ्च न विशेषणबाधात्मको विशिष्टबाधप्रत्यक्षात्मक इति।

ईश्वरो न कर्ता अशरीरत्वात् इत्यनुमानबाधोऽपि नेत्यर्थः । क्षित्यादिकं न सकर्तृकं शरीराजन्यत्वादिति प्रतिबन्धकं, सत्प्रतिपक्षशरीरजन्यत्वहेतोः, शरीरांशवैयर्थ्यात्, व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध्या दुर्बलत्वाच्चेति नेश्वरसाधकप्रमाणस्यासिद्धिरितिभावः।

अतएव मुक्तावल्यां मङ्गलपरीक्षावसरे क्षित्यादिकं सकर्तृकमित्यनुमितौ प्रथमोत्पन्नक्षित्यङ्कुरादीनां कर्तृत्वम् अस्मदादीनामसम्भवादीश्वरसिद्धिविवेचनावसरे शरीराजन्यत्वेन कर्त्रजन्यत्वसाधकेन सत्प्रतिपक्षमाशङ्कितम् विरूद्धवादिना । निरुक्तसत्प्रतिपक्षेऽनुकूलतर्कविरहात् ईश्वरसाधकानां मते च कर्तृत्वेन कार्यत्वेन कार्यकारणभावरूपानुकूलतर्कस्य च सत्त्वात् द्यावाभूमी जनयन् देव एक इत्यादि आगमप्रमाणसद्भावाच्चेश्वरसिद्धिरिति।

स्वर्गस्यादिकालीनद्व्यणुकारम्भकपरमाणुद्वयसंयोगरूपकर्मापि अस्मदादीनामसत्त्ववदशायां अस्माभिरसम्भवादीश्वरस्वीकारो युक्तः एवञ्च धृतिमत्त्वहेतुना पतनप्रतिबन्धकीभूतप्रयत्नवदधिष्ठितत्वरूपस्य साध्यस्य सिद्धौ तादृशाधिष्ठितत्वस्यापि अस्मादादीनामसम्भवादीश्वरसिद्धिः अतएव अनुमितिग्रन्थे दीधितिकारेण ॐ नमः सर्वभूतानि इत्यादि नमस्कारश्लोके यत् विष्टभ्य इत्यादि पदमुपात्तम् तद्व्याख्यानावसरे भट्टाचार्येणोक्तं विष्टभ्यः धृतिः सा च पतनविरोधिसंयोगः। यथा विहायसि भ्राम्यतां विहङ्गमादीनां शरीराधारकप्रयत्नाधिष्ठानान्नपतनं तथा भूवादिलोकानां गुरूतराणामपि प्रयत्नवादीश्वरसंयोगादेव न तदिति निरुक्तधृतिकर्तृत्वं भगवतोऽव्याहतमेव, 'भगवतो भूधारकत्वम् इत्यत्र उत्तमः पुरुषस्त्वन्यः परमात्मेत्युदाहृतः, यो लोकत्रयमाविश्य विभर्त्यव्यय ईश्वरः इत्यादि उपनिषदोऽपि प्रमाणयन्ति।'

एतेन संसारकर्तृत्वेन ईश्वरसिद्धौ, सृष्टिरूपं कार्यं प्रति एकस्यैव स्रष्टुः कारणत्वकथने सकलसामञ्जस्यं भवति, अतएव जन्यमात्रं प्रति अष्टविधानि साधारणकारणानि इति यन्नैयायिकैरुक्तानि तानि च ईश्वरतज्ज्ञानेच्छाकृतिप्रागभावादृष्टदिक्कालाः । उत्पन्नस्य पुनरुत्पत्तिवारणाय प्रागभावस्य कारणत्वं तैः स्वीकृतम् । एतन्मतमवलम्ब्यैव प्रशस्तपादेनोक्तम्-इदानीं चतुर्णां महाभूतानां सृष्टिसंहार विधिरूच्यते । तत्रायमर्थः-महाप्रलयं नाभ्युपगच्छन्ति नैयायिकाः, यतः महाप्रलये सकलभावजन्यवस्तूनां ध्वंसो भवति, तदवस्थायां अदृष्टस्यापि सत्ताविरहात् पश्चान्नसृष्टिः भवितुमर्हति । अतएवात्र संहारपदस्य खण्डप्रलय इत्यर्थो गृह्यते । तेन खण्डप्रलयानन्तरमपि अदृष्टस्य सत्त्वात् सृष्टौ नानुपपत्तिः।

जीवाः हि स्वस्वकर्मवशादुच्चतरतमादिक्रमेण उच्चपदं लभन्ते इति शास्त्रप्रसिद्धिः वर्त्तते। यथा कश्चित् शताश्वमेधेन इन्द्रत्वं लभते, तथैव फलाकांक्षाविरहविशिष्टकश्चित् बहुकालं यतिवृत्यवलम्बनेन ब्रह्मपदमपि लभते। पश्चाद्ब्रह्मपरिमाणेन शतवर्षकालं जीवन्नेव स्वकीयसृष्ट्यादिकं सम्पाद्य शतवर्षावसाने मुक्तिं लभते। केचित्तु भगवान् परमेश्वर एव जीवानामदृष्टानुसारेण सृष्ट्यादिक्रिया सम्पादनार्थं ब्रह्माविष्णुमहेश्वरादीनां शरीरं समवलम्ब्य सृष्ट्यादिक्रियां सम्पाद्य यदा सकलजीवानामदृष्टस्य कार्यजनने निरूद्धवृत्तिमनुभवन्ति एवं त्रितापतप्तजीवानां विश्रामं कामयते तदैव संहारेच्छया प्रणोदितः सन् संसारस्य संहारं करोति, निरूक्तदेहं त्यजति च, तदैव शरीरेन्द्रियादीनां कारणसमूहाः परमाणवः परस्परं विच्छिन्ना भवन्तः परमाणावेव पर्यवसन्नवतिष्ठन्ते।

मनुष्याणां चतुःसहस्त्रयुगे ब्रह्मणः एकः दिवसः चतुःसहस्त्रयुगे च ब्रह्मणो रात्रीरेका भवति। अस्यां रात्रिवेलायां प्रलयो भवति। अस्मिन्नवसरे किञ्चिदपि जन्यद्रव्यं नावतिष्ठते। जन्यद्रव्यं प्रति ब्रह्मणो रात्रिः स्वतन्त्ररूपेण प्रतिबन्धिकेति जगदीशानां मतम्। क्षित्यप्तेजोवायूनां चतुर्णाम् आदौ पृथिव्याः ततः जलस्य ततः तेजसस्ततः वायोः ध्वंसो जायते। उक्तक्रमेणैव सकलस्यैव ध्वंसो भवति। अनेन प्रकारेण ध्वंसो जाते खलु प्रलयो भवत्येव। तदवसरे पृथिव्यादीनां परमाणुसमूहः पृथक् पृथक् रूपेणावतिष्ठते। एवञ्च धर्माधर्मसंस्कारयुक्तनित्यात्मा, गगनादिनित्यवर्गाः पाकजरूपादयोऽनित्यवर्गाश्च ब्रह्मपरिमाणेन शतवर्षम् उदासीनतया अवस्थानं कुर्वन्ति, तदनन्तरं प्राणिनामदृष्टानुसारेण भोगसम्पादनाय परमेश्वरस्य सिसृक्षायां विद्यमानायां सकलात्मगतादृष्टानां फलोन्मुखतामपेक्ष्य पवनपरमाणुषु क्रियोत्पद्यते। तेन तस्य परमाणूनां संयोगे द्व्यणुकादिक्रमेण महावायुरूत्पन्नः सन् आकाशे सम्पितावस्थायाम् अवतिष्ठते, पश्चात् तस्मिन् पवनाभ्यन्तरे जलीयपरमाणुसमूहाः क्रमात् मिलिताः सन्तः महताजलनिधिरूपेण परिणताः सन्तः वायुकम्पनेन निराबाधेन तरङ्गिताः भवन्ति। अनेन प्रकारेण तस्मिन् जलनिध्यभ्यन्तरे पार्थिवपरमाणु-समूहात् द्व्यणुकादिक्रमेण कठिना महापृथिवी समुत्पद्यते। तदनन्तरं तस्मिन्नेव महाजलनिध्यभ्यन्तरे तैजसपरमाणुसमूहात् द्व्यणुकादिक्रमेण महातेजोराशिः समुत्पन्नः सन् तीक्ष्णदीप्तिं विकीर्यते।

इत्थं रूपेण चतुर्षु महाभूतेषु समुत्पन्नेषु परमेश्वरेच्छया पार्थिवपरमाणुभिः सह तैजसपरमाणूनां संयोगे कश्चिदेको हिरण्मयो अण्डो समुत्पद्यते। परमेश्वरः तस्मिन्नण्डान्तर्भावे भूरादिचतुर्दशभुवनसहित चतुर्मुखं ब्रह्माणं विसृज्य तं प्रजासृष्टिषु नियुङ्क्ते। सातिशयज्ञानवैराग्यैश्वर्यवानयं ब्रह्म परमेश्वरविनियुक्तः सन् प्राणिनां कर्मफलं सम्यक् विदित्वा कर्मानुरूपज्ञानभोगश्चायुयुतं मानसं पुत्रं मनुं देवर्षिं पितृगणान् मुखबाहूरूचरणाञ्च यथाक्रमं ब्रह्मणादिक्रमेण प्राणिसमूहान् संसृजति, कर्मानुरूपं ज्ञानवैराग्यैश्वर्यैश्च संयुनक्ति। केचिदाहुः- ईश्वरो यथा स्वेच्छया हिरण्मयाण्डं सृजति तथापरसहकारिकारणयोगेन स एव सर्वान् निर्णेतुं समर्थो भवति, कथं तर्हि अतिरिक्तब्रह्माणं सृजति किं वा तस्य प्रयोजनम्? एतदुत्तरे वक्तव्यं यत् शरीरनिष्पाद्यकार्यसमूहाः शरीररहितेनेश्वरेण निर्माणासम्भवात् शरीरयुक्तः कश्चित् कर्ता स्वीकर्तव्यः। तथासति शरीरी स ब्रह्मा शरीरनिष्पाद्य कार्यमुत्पादयितुं समर्थो भविष्यतीत्यत्र नास्ति कोऽपि वादः। बल्लभीया मायावादिनो वेदान्तिनश्च मिथ्याज्ञानजन्यसंस्काररूपवासना देहारम्भकादृष्टविशेषो वा स्वादृष्टोपनिबद्धदेहपरिग्रहो वा संसार इत्याहुः।

XX

RECAPITULATION OF REFLECTIONS ON SṚṢṬI

P. K. Mukhopadhyay

The way philosophies of different cultures differ may have something to do with how people of those cultures were awakened to the necessity of theoretical enquiry, what facts of experience attracted their attention and proved exacting to the theoretical being they were. These facts tend to become recurrent and major themes of theoretical enquiries of the respective cultures. It is said that the major themes of Greek philosophy are change and movement or unity and plurality whereas those of Indian philosophies are *duḥkha* and *mukti*, i.e., suffering and salvation. This difference of basic orientation is believed to be closely connected with what values are accorded in these cultures to the results of theoretical enquiry. Generally speaking knowledge is a value in itself for the Greek. In India knowledge is not valued for its own sake but for the needs of life it serves. Basic goals and interest of life are broadly divided into *abhyudaya* and *niḥśreyas*. The former
13 signifies worldly good which includes good of this world and of other world. *Darsana* or philosophy is not conceived to be an enquiry which can help man in his search for worldly good. It has a different aim. It seeks to convince man that his search
16 for good or pursuit of *abhyudaya* cannot get him permanent place or freedom from suffering. *Darsana* shows man the way to final freedom from pain or salvation. Thus in India branches of study or knowledge are distinguished in terms of which of the two broad goals of human life can be reached by their means. It is not true that the Greeks were oblivious of the darker side of life and showed no urge for tranquillity. And I think it was only after the advent of Christianity that the theme of knowledge for its own sake was so much emphasised for reasons which can be easily found out. Yet the conception of philosophy as means of salvation is not characteristically the Greek way of looking at the subject. On the other hand the Greco-Roman way of distinguishing branches of knowledge - into science, the study of nature; philosophy, the study of creatures; and theology, the study of God - is dominant in Western thought. Anyway, salvation is to be achieved through understanding and asceticism, through knowledge and right practice. Even search for salvation in right earnest does not begin before man understands the nature and origin of this life of suffering and of the world where we are born and where we live(19). So *Sṛṣṭi* or creation becomes very much a topic of philosophical study.

The term cosmology as the name of the branch of knowledge which studies the problem of creation and the view of science as study of nature seem to match perfectly against the background of Western thought. It is not surprising that the

origin of Western science is traced to the speculations of Ionian thinkers. But *Srsti* is not infrequently held to be a theme of mythology and philosophy. Besides it is quite customary to distinguish between scientific cosmology and non-scientific cosmology including such cosmologies as theological, mythological and so on. Many people, including those who dismiss Indian philosophy as a form of religion in consideration of its characteristic practical concern, think that Indian philosophies only repeat what are essentially *Purāṇa* or mythological themes when they present theories of *Srsti*. It is true that the comogonical accounts of *Sṛṣṭi* we find in the *Purāṇa*-s differ and it is also true that it has become almost a standard practice to translate "*Purana*" as "mythology". But there is need for classification.

Sense of mythology and mythological varies; it varies from merely prehistorical to allegorical, from fanciful to speculative, from body of inherited belief to near scientific study of such beliefs which employ philological or psycho-analytic method. Debates in Western countries regarding correct description and assessment of myths have been continuing from the time of Xanophanes and Euhemerus and even recently man like Levi Strauss and Marcea Eliade do not have same account to offer. There is fairly good agreement on the negative side. Mythologies of different culture are bodies of beliefs or narrative which are not scientific or not historical. By this is meant they do not satisfy the scientific standards of consistency and evidence, and as such strictly speaking they have no truth claim. About mythologies we can ask whether they are living or dead but not whether they are true or false. Is this the Indian way of looking at *Purāṇa*? Many contributors made reference to *Purana* account of *Sṛṣṭi* (6,7,8,21). This is quite in order. Since cosmology and cosmogony, *(Purāṇa)*, by definition, deals with questions about *Sṛṣṭi* or creation though not with them only. Even as account of creation the scope of *Purāṇa* is wider than that of philosophy or ontology. Ontology is primarily interested in the question of original creation how from what stuff the process of material creation started. In other words ontology is interested in the first creation of or from the ontological elements, say paramāṇu-s or *bhūta-s* or *mahābhūta-s*. *Purāṇa* tells us in addition about chaos - in the original Greek sense of a state preceding creation and not in the modern sense of a state of disorderliness - about dynasties of kings, about *divyapiṭṃ-s* and so on. Apart from this difference in scope and some other differences to be noted, *Purāṇa* and *Darśana* do not necessarily differ in respect of truth. We can distinguish them within a scheme of classification of śāstra-s (disciplines of knowledge) into *āgama śāstra* and *vicāra śāstra*. *Śāstra-s* of the latter type are analytical and critical study 'based' on observation (pratyakṣa) and tradition (āgama). Philosophy belongs to this group of *śāstra-s*; it distinguishes itself as the only analytical critical study which has the goal of salvation in view. It does not subserve the purpose of *abhyudaya*. Before we go further and discuss the question if *Purāṇa* account of *Sṛṣṭi* has any historical, scientific or philosophical value, it may be said why such an account should be taken seriously. Philosophical theories of *Sṛṣṭi* are or may be taken as theoretical and rational elaboration of insights available in *Purāṇa-s*. In the process of such elaboration the logical structure of the concept or concepts involved get clarified and the embedded conceptual structure surfaces gradually.

This is the reason why the *Purāṇa* accounts of *Sṛṣṭi* should be retold and studied. But when in philosophy we do this we need not, nor do we intend to repeat merely. We undertake a purposive study and envisage at least more sophisticated expression of most pervasive and basic outlook, world-view, which had exerted influence on standard of rationality, norms of understanding, goal of theoretical enterprise and choice of areas towards which theoretical activity is to be exerted. Whether or not the historic first is always the logically simple or explanation basic, *Purāṇa* account gives us culturally basic conceptions. We find here views about creation which are most widely believed or familiar. And different sophisticated philosophical and scientific theories may be assessed in terms of their comparative distance from the *Purāṇa* account of creation. Thus even when we doubt whether 'mythology to philosophy' picture of development human knowledge applies to '*Purāṇa* view to *Darśana* view' of this world, we believe that *Darśana* account of creation is distinct from and continuous with the *Purāṇa* account of the same that even if *Purāṇa* account is not temporally pre-theoretic, it is more basic in the sense of common to the upholders of different philosophical theories.

In the West it is almost an accepted theory that philosophies and sciences were preceded by mythology. Just as many historic civilisations are held to have a pre-historic period or phase so also philosophical and scientific period of civilisation is held to be preceded by mythological period. It is agreed that myth element in an intellectual culture retreats before growing rationalisation. But there is no abrupt change ..om mythology to philosophy or from pre-historic to historic. If Hesiodic Theogony is mythical in its successor, the Ionic cosmology, the mythical and rational elements interpenetrate in an as yet undivided unity. But in Indian conception philosophy does not supplement (even if in some very technical sense of it supplements) *Purāṇa*. Arrogant refusal to accept *Purāṇa* by some people on the basis of their equally arrogant acceptance of the Vaidika account does not reveal the traditional Indian way of thinking on the matter. What ever may be true about the *Purāṇa*-s Indian philosophy is remarkably rational and analytic in its methods of treatment and presentation. To brand it as religion on the ground that many Indian philosophies are theistic, is wrong. Close relation is held to obtain between religion and mythology. Origin of such a belief can be traced to western historiography and christian theology. Religion is a matter of faith and age of faith temporally precede that of reason - of science and philosophy. We are told that unlike neo-platonism Christianity or Christian doctrine of creation makes history possible and important. For Christianity lends support to both the views - that time is real and that it is linear rather than cyclical. Thus room is created for real (better actual) progress and novelty, including growth of knowledge. Actual situation is much more complicated. It had not been easy to reconcile scientific progress with christian doctrine of original sin and St. Thomas Aquinas had to introduce the theme of second coming of christ. On the Indian side though rejection of time is more common yet it is not universal. Even when time is held to be real and uni-directional Veda, *Purāṇa*, *Darśana* are held to be contemporaneous, chronology of books written and published and of their authors may not be impossible or unimportant style and form of presentation might

have changed (even new themes and information may have been added). Yet strictly speaking there is no chronology of thought. We may have history of discovery but not of truths. Where truth matters as in logic time becomes unimportant. Truths are always truths however we have come to discover and present them. Again some truth may be discovered by different persons at the same time at different places or at the same region of earth at different times by different persons and so on. Thus person, place and time are not important factors in truth. When a seeker of logical or metaphysical truth is told, as he is told in *Purāṇa*, some truth which the speaker himself heard from his predecessors, the seeker does not enquire about the particulars of the predecessors. The important question is not who told it but whether what is told is true. And if suspicion prompts one to suspect the authority of the speaker or the authority the latter quotes then there is no end to it, or enquiry is to be conducted at a different level and about different topics. The veda and the *Purāṇa* we study for a historical truth and all truths are a historical. So on the narratives we find in *Purāṇa* and Veda and *Itihāsa*, we were told "So we heard from our predecessors". Necessity was not felt to fix the chronology. Important point is truth and (logical) evidence not history or chronology. We find in India *pramāṇa sastra* as ancillary or near ancillary to the Veda-s and *Purāṇa*-s, but not history in the sense of chronological history. I am not unhappy that the only paper from historian we include here (6) almost totally ignores fixed chronology, though from the point of view of western historiography and works based on it the Veda-s and *Purāṇa*-s do not belong to prehistoric period of human or Vaidika civilisation. It is not our intention to challenge the widely accepted view that it is difficult to say where mythology ends and science begins, that even in historical religion like christianity elements of mythology is there. There is no one word answer to the question whether Greek Mythology ended with Hesiodic Theogony or it continued through Ionian cosmology.

Holistic approach to human knowledge reveals that different systems of beings like science, philosophy, history, religion creation or Srsti in the context of expression like "Power of Creation" or *"Sṛjana Śakti"* means a sort of doing creation or 'to create'. But in the context line "creation or *Sṛṣṭi* is the most eloquent evidence of existence of God" do not cancel each other or make impossible a stable life and common pattern of behaviour. Since Srsti is a common theme of history, philosophy, science, religion, art, mythology and so on and since our aim had been to explore the relevant pre-theoretic disposition of Indian culture, contributions were invited from representative of various disciplines. But words like cosmology and cosmogony signify specifically the study of cosmic creation. Like many other English words ending with 'ion' the world creation is also ambiguous. Some of the contributors directed their attention to the problem of fixing of sense of the word *Sṛṣṭi* (1,22,16). The word "creation" or "Sṛṣṭi" means the cosmos, the totality of objects or effects - a cosmic state of being. Cosmogony, as is clear from its etymology, strictly speaking, is a study of cosmic creation in the first sense. It is the study of the origin of the cosmos. Cosmology literally means the science of the cosmos. In this literal sense it is not always used. Besides taken in their literal senses it is not clear if and what difference

is there between cosmogony and cosmology. but in view of the fact that culture specificity of *Srsti* is so widely believed, clarity on the point is demanded. Is it just a matter of assumption or is it something more than that?

Theory of the origin of the universe - is, cosmogony - may be scientific. In fact there are such theories and the paper (23) is a survey of some of them including the most recent ones. Etymologically then these are cosmological theories, since they are scientific study of the universe. Etymologically cosmology cannot but be scientific. But expressions like scientific cosmology, speculative cosmology etc. are widely used. And this is a clear evidence that the word cosmology (and also cosmogony) does not carry any definite implication as to the nature of the study whether scientific or not. Sometimes distinction is drawn in consideration of etymology between study of the origin of the universe which is cosmogony and the study or studies which concentrate on other aspects. Scientific cosmologies are cosmogony whereas cosmography is not so. Cosmology is distinguished, sometimes as a study of themes about the universe which are other than or inclusive of the theme of origin. From this point of view cosmology is said to have a wider scope and except the few very fastidious, the word cosmology is used to designate the study of all or any aspect of the universe as a whole. I would, however, follow here and recommend a different use. This is particularly necessary when comparison of creation theories of different cultures or of different schools of thought is involved. It will be found that most of the familiar cosmologies or creation theories do not admit creation in any strict, standard or intelligible sense. But there are a second group of creation theories which discuss everything or nearby everything which the first group of theories discuss. But the second group of theories admit and discuss in addition origin of the universe understood in the strict sense of the term to be specified. This second group of theories are both cosmogony and include cosmological themes. And there is no bar to it. Grammar does not disallow discussion of everything other than origin in cosmogony. A theory of origin can study certain other things besides. Thus contrary to popular thinking and use we find that state of things, as it is, supports our according greater scope to cosmogonical (in the sense strict creation theory) theories. We shall see that Indian creation theories which take origin in the strict sense of the term discuss so many other things about nature of the universe, value of there being a universe and so on.

In many papers reference has been made to Greek or Greco-Roman culture and creation theories of this culture (1, 2, 6, 7). But in the paper explicitly proclaiming culture-specificity of *Srṣṭi* (4) such reference has been made to Christian culture only. It is both important and interesting to enquire if the point of contrast between some Indian creation theories and Christian creation theory holds if we choose the same Indian theories and compare them with creation theories of Greece- not the Christian Greece but pagan Greece. The question arises naturally for there is a continuity between the culture of the Christian West and Greek culture of the pre-Christian past. Besides, following this line of enquiry we may discover some points of contrast between Indian conception of *Srṣṭi* and those of the Greeks and

the English people which are deeper and more important than those which are very familiar.

While contrasting Indian conception of *Sṛṣṭi* with the radical christian conception of creation it needs to be emphasised and stated explicitly, what has been only implied in the paper, that while the (same) Indians reject absolute creation of Christianity they believe in actual and real creation. The basic trend in Greek culture from the pre-Socratic Indian period to the period of Greco-Roman neo-platonism was to reject that there was actually any creation. Greek cosmology really speaking is a cosmology which keeps no room for cosmogony. And its belief in actual coming into being of the universe and in a creator God who creates ex nihilo are marks of theological cosmology which comprises within its scope cosmogony than Greek or Greco-Roman cosmology is not theological.

This may not be sufficient reason why it is called scientific. There are other reasons available (as I said). But the important point is that at least one of the two rival scientific cosmologies, namely, the one which advocates solid state theory does not believe in actual creation. It is not intended that mark of scientificity is rejection of actual coming into being of the universe. And the question of accepting or rejecting has altogether a different meaning in the context of a scientific theory. Thus Hawkings recent works have the effect of undoing his earlier works on singularities. But whether or not the universe has a beginning depend on whether one uses real time or imaginary time. But this has no implication that the theory of the universe having a beginning gives us reality while the other theory gives us, metaphysically speaking, appearance. It is meaningless to ask which scientific theory is true or gives us reality. A scientific theory is a mathematical model used to describe our observations.

Best model is the one which ensures most useful description. Once we disentangle the question of creation from those about description and explanation, we begin to see the relevance and importance of scientific theories of the universe provided by astrophysicists even when they do not aspire to issue any verdict on the ontological metaphysical status of the world or concern themselves with the actual beginning of the universe.

While a consideration of the issue of culture specificity awakens us to the need for distinguishing and deeply understanding the difference between cosmogony and cosmology, it also draws our attention to the more general need - the need of clearly stating and analyzing the notion of creation. There are philosophers who are ready to understand creation of artifacts like tables and chairs, mental status like, desire; but they refuse to attach any sense to creation. Again there are theories of creation which keeps no room for God.

One Indian theory, that of the Prabhākara-s, which rejects any cosmic sense to creation i.e., actual coming into being of the universe proclaims (a) *na kadācit*

anidṛśam jagat, i.e., the world has never been otherwise. But this assertion (a) can be given a stronger as well as weaker interpretation. Under each of these two interpretation three may be different versions. One version of the weaker interpretation is that we always, have been given in our experience a tolerably ordered universe. We did not ever have any experience of a chaotic universe to framework the implanted rationality which is there in us with its demand for order, to drive us to undertake a theoretical enterprise with the hope that we might discover an order in the universe. Such a view will have an adverse effect not only on a theological cosmogonical themes but also on cosmological themes of both scientific and theological variety. The familiar story of ourselves being struck by irregularities and disorder in the world around us, is not undisputed and a state of chaos, which is supposed to have preceded the creation of the world, did not originally meant such state. Besides, one need not have to be proved to ask cosmological question by the experience of disorder. It may not be any the less effective a question of scientific cosmology to ask "Why is the universe so smooth". Thus if the world has always been or has been experienced to be in a state of order then even a platonic God or Demiurge is uncalled for to choose and combine pre-existing materials. But one can still ask the question why the universe is so ordered and so smooth? This question admits of being rewritten as 'Why and how the world was created so smooth?' or 'What initial condition must have obtained or chosen by God to create such a world?' This shows that questions about cosmic creation still remain. But assertion (a) of those who refuse to give any cosmic sense to creation may be given a stronger interpretation. The assertion mea..s that the world had been there before and always as it is now. It is just is from dateless past. But since this can hardly be a mere factual statement of observation, one is perfectly within his right to demand justification for this statement of theory. Different ways are, there in which the statement can be justified. Some of the following justifications, which by no means are jointly exhaustive or mutually exclusive, have actually been offered by philosophers of different time and culture. One characteristic Greek way to justify the assertion could be to claim that the essence of the world contained within itself very existence of it, that the being of the world was necessary. Another justification is that creation, at least material creation, cannot really have beginning for matter is eternal. If matter is here understood in the Aristotelian sense of materia prima or Sāṃkhya sense of *prādhana* then such justification may be found in the respective philosophical systems. The Christians cannot accept such justification since according to their radical theory of ex nihilo creation no pre-existing material is needed for the Efficient cause or Agent to act upon in order to create this cosmos. Another line of attack against the theory of cosmic creation which applies equally against all theological theories of creation including the ex nihilo creation theory of Christian theology is that implication of cosmic creation is incompatible with standard conception of God that he is a disembodied soul. The question regarding disembodied creator has various aspects some of which have been discussed in the paper (19) against Indian setting.

Along the line of the Naiyāyika-s or along some other line we can answer the attempted rejection of cosmic creation on the ground that God being disembodied cannot create the world while no being less than God can create it either. Another justification of the assertion (A) denying cosmic creation is that in the standard sense creation means actual beginning in time. But a cosmic creation in this sense would require prior existence of time. Those who reject time who like the christians reject eternal and uncreated time or, at least, time existing before God created the world, cannot admit cosmic creation.

On final analysis then conception of *Sṛṣṭi* in the strict sense of actual creation of the universe in real time is characteristically an Indian conception. It is so not in the sense that majority of Indian scientists, philosophers and lay men hold this view, but there is one very powerful realist school of Indian philosophy close to common sense which advocates this view. When we also take into consideration other aspect of their theory of creation including the beliefs (i) that God, the disembodied soul, creates and (ii) that He creates the whole of the created universe only, we find this optimally radical theory of theological creation to be uniquely Indian. No other major philosophy of the west is known to have had a theory like that of the Naiyāyika-s which we will soon describe. But if we take into account all the wide variety of themes of *Sṛṣṭi* developed and advocated by different groups of theorists in India together then it is hard to find any major point of known theory of creation was over looked or left unrepresented. Absolute radicalness of creation ex nihilo by which Christian theological cosmological theory distinguishes itself is perhaps found in still more radical form in the Vaibhāśika theory of *asat kāraṇa vāda* noted and explained in the paper 'Creation and causality' by Professor Gopinath Bhattacharya. Philosophers and rational theologians have repeatedly warned us that Christian doctrine of ex nihilo creation should not be understood to mean creation from nothing, it should on the other hand be understood to mean creation not out of anything. That is, God created the whole of the cosmos, everything other than Himself, including time; and for this he did not use any material. There was no material and He had need for none. The Vaibhāśika-s, however, held that every effect comes from or has for its cause a particular absence or nothing which results from the annulment of the material in place of which the new effect is being produced. Thus according to *asatkāraṇavāda* it will not be accurate or strictly sufficient to say that effect is not produced from anything, rather it is produced from a particular nothing, *asat* or *anupākhya*. In spite of the fact that *asatkāraṇavādin* advocates production out of *asat* in the literal sense of the term, whereas the Christians advocates creation out of nothing in a metaphorical and analyzable sense, asatkaranavada does not entail that before cosmic creation there could be nothing. On the contrary without annulment or destruction of some other thing no effect can get produced. Thus what distinguishes Christian cosmological (rather than cosmogonical) theory can best be described negatively thus, God creates (in a tense-neutral sense) the universe from no pre- existing stuff. All other theorists admit pre-existing stuff even though some hold this stuff to be positive while others it to be negative. Some views this as undifferentiated mass, others as well differentiated particles or

atoms. Neo-platonic theory of emanation however has no scope for real creation. This seems to be a better way to defend (in explicit awareness of the fact that there is such a theory as *asatkāraṇavāda*) the thesis that Indian theory of creation distinguishes itself from Christian ex nihilo creation theory by the truth that it is not ex nihilo theory. The other way of defending the thesis is to say that the representative Indian theories are *āstika*, theories; and none of these theories seem to admit *asatkāraṇavāda*.

The concept of pre-existing real time has been said to be a necessary requirement of any cosmogonical theory or any philosophical or scientific theory which admits real creation. In view of this fact, it is amazing to note that while scientists, theologians, and philosophers of different persuasions advance cosmological theories, majority of them do not admit reality of time. The Naiyāyika-s and the Vaiśeṣika-s - whose view have received attention of the largest number of participants of the seminar (1,18,19,20,21,22,25) are generally known as believers in the reality of time. However one of the greatest Navya Naiyāyika-s and the great Navya Naiyāyika-s of Bengal who as yet another evidence of his independent spirit of thinking advanced a thesis that a philosophical theory which admits an eternal and infinite soul called God need not admit *Kāla* (time) in addition. Certain problems which such a philosophical theory faces when creation is to be accounted for have been discussed in the paper (19). Concept of *Kāla* is so integrally connected with the concept of Sṛṣṭi, that while elaborating any theory of *Sṛṣṭi* it will be helpful to discuss the respective ancillary theory of *Kāla*.

When this anthology of papers on the theme of *Sṛṣṭi* will be available to the readers along with the other anthology on the theme of *Kāla* - on which a seminar is being organised by IGNCA in November 1990,more accurate and detail conception of different cosmological theories may be formed.

Whatever may be true of cosmogonical theory which is merely descriptive, an explanatory theory must be in terms of some basic terms, elements or notion. If the model of explanation is structural analytical model then the basic elements of non ex nihilo cosmological theory must be unanlysably simple. If the model is causal then the basic elements as must be uncaused simple. Now a theory may admit a basic which are both structurally simple (not further analyzable) and chronologically primordial that is prior to everything created. The atoms of the Naiyāyika-s and the Vaiśeṣika-s are both causally and structurally basic. The atoms happen to be material also. But causally basic materia prima need not be indissoluble unanalysable simple. It may be just undifferentiated and unlimited. This theoretically basic material stuff may not be enough for efficient cause to work on; at least it is unusable by any human agent. Again the simplicity may be a contextual notion. What is simple in respect of *bhautika Sṛṣṭi* may be different from the simple of *bhautika Sṛṣṭi*. Thus Sāṃkhya theory of creation taken as a whole, combines two notion of materia prima. In respect of while *bhūta Sṛṣṭi* it is undifferentiated and unlimited single unconscious principle of *pradhāna* but single unconscious principle

of *pradhāna* but in the context of bhautika Sṛṣṭi the immediate material cause is the five *mahābhūta-s*.

We shall return to this but first the question we were discussing and left in the middle. Why men even raised the question about the creation of the cosmos. Or, if it has a look of prejudging the case against those who pursue knowledge for its own sake, how the question about cosmic creation was suggested?

It is unlikely that man was provoked to ask this question by the experienced fact of irregularity and disorder. This is unlikely because it requires a level of sophistication. The truth is that more primitive fact of experience have been order and regularity - the sum rising and setting at regular interval and on the same side on the horizon, river flowing down and mountains standing firm, erect and unmoved. Even the facts of birth and death have very many regularities about them - no man lives forever and only adult women in society bear child. If still man from the beginning was impressed by the fact of death, it was because death was painful. And this painfulness of death or disease is necessarily due to sudden-ness of them. And smoothness or regularity of the universe had neither sudden-ness not painfulness about them. One would have to be an advance astrophysicist of recent times to be provoked by the observed regularity of the universe to ask the question about the origin of the universe in the form 'Why and how was the universe created so smooth?'. Even if disorderliness of the universe led men in the past to ask question about the origin of the universe, how this led to an enquiry about single primordial matter? Is the question about origin at the same time a question about unity? Or is it a question about order? Order and unity are not one and the same thing, even if they are 'related' what had been or would be the right and respective culture-specific way to formulate the question? How did this world of plurality come about? From which single material has this world full of diversity came to be? How from chaotic (in its currently familiar sense and not in the sense of Hesiodic Theogony) and disorderly preexisting state, this orderly world has been produced? None of these are characteristic Indian way of raising the fundamental question of Philosophic-theological cosmogony. But creation question need not be formulated in this way alone.

The characteristic concern of the Greek cosmologists is formulated alternatively as unity-plurality issue or the issue of the ultimate cause of the world. Though the claim of disorderliness to be considered a datum of common experience is questionable yet multiplicity is an undisputed fact of experience. Is there anything problematic in the fact or notion of multiplicity? One need not otherwise be led to a search for unity. Unless there is already a bias for reductive theory of monism one would not consider plurality unreal or problematic and unity to be the sole reality needing no explanation. The ultimate stuff of even material creation, let alone creation of the whole of the created universe, need not be one. Even if search for unity is a basic demand of human rationality, radical unity of a numerical one of the

reductive monists need not have to be discovered or discoverable. The realists feel satisfied with the optimal unity of four or five basic matter or material constituents.

A theory of change may combine search for ultimate cause and search for unity. Change or movement are data of experience and while it forces itself into our attention, it is, in some of its form at least, painful. It is but quite natural that man even in the pre-historic past would be impressed by the fact of movement. The movement in the wide sense in which it is being used here has been divided into coming to be and passing away on the one hand and on the other movement in the narrower sense which includes qualitative, quantitative and local movement. While theory of creation as we understand it here is a theory of the universe coming into being in real time, there are broadly speaking three theories of coming into being. First there is mechanical theory of coming into being. This later theory is either strongly anthropic to borrow and adopt a term from Hawking or mystic. One version of the mystic theory is the christian theory which contends human souls, not art of any material nor for any want he felt but to diffuse or give his communicable goodness. Such a theory leaves no room for single or multiple material cause of the world. But once such a cause is admitted according to the second theory which admits in addition to material cause efficient cause also, creation may mean efficient cause acting at a given time on the material cause and thereby bringing into being the effect.

Philosophical creation theories are not just descriptive, they are meant to be explanatory. And they differ among themselves with respect to what model of explaination is chosen, what is accepted as paradigmatic case of causal creation (in case causal model is chosen), whether efficient cause is admitted or not, whether materia prima is one, undifferentiated stuff or many isolated bits and so on. The model of causation by real combination goes well with multiple material cause or multiplicity of basic material constituent. The model of emergence or manifestation through transformation is a model which is more in harmony with the theory of single materia prima. There is a wide variety of widely different uses of *"Sṛṣṭi"* and theories of *Sṛṣṭi*. In one of its metaphorical uses in the context of sacrificial rites *(yajña)* the word *Sṛṣṭi* means *Iṣṭaka*. And theories are there which contends that there is no origin, no appearance of origin even, only appearance of origin, only illusory manifestation, only real manifestation, actual origin, creation every moment etc. Again there are theories which contends respectively that there is no cause, only illusory as the cause, only material cause. Further there are theories which contend that the creation is an arbitrary matter, accidental matter, intelligible and rational function and so on; creation is in a matter of causal change by real combination, causal change by real material transformation.

Creation is like a sculptor changing a block of marble into a figure. It is a question of choosing as causal model qualitative or quantitative change of single abiding material e.g. milk transforming into card, a seed growing into a big tree. Choice of such a model does not permit any strict spatial or temporal separation

between material cause and effect, between process and product. One may therefore choose another causal model that of threads combining through the act of some agent, to produce a piece of cloth. Temporal and spatial separation or independence, at least, of threads can be admitted. The model of causal production through combination of more than one constituent material cause highlights the importance of admitting some cause over and above the material cause - be it such things as love and strife, or a human or divine agent.

The theory that admits a plurality of basic material causal factor and conceives of, to borrow an expression from Prof. Krishna Chandra Bhattacharya, "Causal change through real combination" of constituents, has a great prospect of being considered as a theory of intelligence bringing into being" variety of causal theory. Mechanical causal theory whether monistic or pluralistic leaves us scope for an efficient cause and mystic causal theory of intelligent "bringing into being". Variety-of-creation-theory leaves us scope for any material cause. But an intelligent 'Bringing-into-being' theory is not for that reason either anthrophic or rational. It just admits a material cause and an efficient cause which acts like the material cause. What is needed in addition to turn such a theory rational is that there must be some final cause or reason why the efficient cause or agent acts so as to create. Mystic variety of intelligent 'Bringing-into-being' theories of creation may widely vary in detail but strictly speaking these theories deny any reason or motive for creation. Some such theory may contend that divine ways are even in principle incomprehensible to man. So even though God had some reason we could never know. Some other version of the theory may contend that God created in a spirit of divine playfulness for divine pleasure - the adjective divine is used to dispel any doubt that God could have contemplated to cause any harm or that He had undergone any effort or strain to create. Divine creation is so unique, so different from human creation, that it is not possible to find another example of such creation or only example available within human experience is artistic creation. Yet another version or variety of this type of theory contends that God created the universe and man, so that his goodness may be diffused. All these versions of mystic non-anthropic theories agree in the negative point that God did not create the universe either for his own need or especially and solely for the need of sentient experiencing being, particularly men. A final cause, a reason - the human need - is thus added to material and efficient cause. This anthropic principle adds again another feature to already unique notion of creation of some Indians.

We shall return to this principle soon. Introduction of this principle is said to create problem of consistency in a theistic theory of causation. The question we shall have to answer is, can a theistic theory be anthropic? A negative answer will not only go against the creation theory of Nyāya Vaiśasika, in which case, a theistic and rational creation theory would not have been a uniquely Indian theory either. But a negative answer to the present question will go against the (dominant) Indian or Vaidika world view and set at nought the creed, the cult and the scheme of values which together give this culture its uniqueness. The Christian theological rational

creation theory is not anthropic. And this is one reason why, as Professor Gopinath Bhattacharya wrote elsewhere "the semitic Christian outlook which forms the background of the philosophy of Christianised Europe for about the last two millennia is not merely different from the Vaidika outlook, it is differently opposed to it". Particular schools of thought may be found to differ at the theoretical plane in respect of notion of 'time', 'divine grace', cosmic origin etc. But the widely shared scheme of values and cult of Indian culture follow the line of theistic anthropic theory of creation. We shall return soon as I said to the question of reconstructing theistic and anthropic trends in Indian creation theories. But first I would like to discuss the question I left behind - questions of monistic versus pluralistic theory of creation and structural analytical model of explanation of physical creation.

What model of explanation an explanatory cosmology adapts is determined by the sense and paradigm of *Sṛṣṭi* or creation one has or finds acceptable. And this is related to the question whether we can make any sense of, or can clearly picture, what had been the state before creation. One strong justification to the assertion purporting to deny that the universe was created at a point of time and was not there always before as it is now, may be that we cannot picture clearly a state when there was no universe as we know it today. Hesiod perhaps for the first time in European culture introduced in his theogony the term chaos to devote such a state.

He might have derived the belief or the insight in the existence of chaos, a state 'of things' before creation of the universe, from still older Greek mythology. It is doubtful whether this temporally prior chaos itself was thought to be created on whether it was eternally there. Nor is it very clear what its nature is.

But on all probability chaos is neither absolute nothing nor a state of deluge of christian theology. Indian term for a state temporally prior to creation is *pralaya*. There is disagreement among the Indian thinkers regarding the existence, nature and right description of *pralaya*. But those who do not admit in some sense or other the existence of a state prior to creation can hardly have or have need for a cosmogonical theory. For long cosmogonical theory involving belief in the origin of the universe and chaos was held to be a metaphysical or theological theme. Science is interested in a model of the universe suggested and verified by observational model which also help us to predict future state of things once we know the state of them at any given time. So a scientific theory is concerned with the actual and possible going ons in the universe - how the things of the world behave, what are the laws which 'tell us how the universe changes with time'. It did not matter whether the universal originated at a point of time or what sort of state prevailed before that point of time, if such a point of time was there. Besides, it was thought that all the observed phenomena could be described and accounted for equally well whether the universe believed to have existed always or created at a certain point of time. As late as in 1929 when our universe was discovered to be an expounding universe did the theme of origin, some times described in physics as initial state or condition, came to be recognised as a theme of science. For now it is possible to

picture exactly the state preceding the creation of this universe. It is a state of infinite density.

One characteristic feature of Indian thought is that some times the state of *pralaya* is held to be a state following the destruction of a pre-existing universe. The conception of *Sṛṣṭi* implied is that there is no absolutely first creation. But by the same logic there is no absolutely first state of *pralaya*. It is a peculiar notion of chaos. No single uncaused chaos. A causal account is extended to the state of any individual chaos. States of chaos and cosmos alternate. Any created universe we choose to take it must have been preceded by a chaos which both follows and is followed by a state of chaos. The parallel does not hold of all individual states of chaos. It only hold, of all the infinite chaos that had gone before but not also of all the future states of chaos. There must be a last chaos and, hence, a last creation. But this is a requirement of anthropic theory of creation to which I shall note is that a theory of origin in the strict sense must take as logically prior a state of chaos. For a theory of creation admits that the universe originated in time, that it was not eternally there and even if all states of chaos cannot continue to exist through infinite future, a chaos might have been there however back we go in time, whether this is consistent with current scientific theories, concept of chaos does not involve the concept of creation the way the latter involves the former. It is no wonder then that in classics of Vaiśeṣika philosophy account of chaos (*samhāra* of previous universe) precedes an account of creation. (18). One such account of chaos is not only temporally but also logically prior a notion.

Radical theory of chaos would contend that it is a simple state of Non-Being or Nothing. A less radical theory would contend that chaos is a state which co-existed only with God and nothing else.

Still it is a state when no created thing could be there. But there is a theory of *pralaya* according to which only a state of ultimate chaos which will not be followed by any further a state of creation signifies absence of everything created. But notion of chaos which a theory of creation pre-supposes must not be a state, where only eternal things are there.

To ensure creation after it, it is logically necessary that a state of chaos must include at least one non- eternal features. But anthropic creation has put an anthropic interpretation on this logico-physical requirement.

Both the scientific notion of chaos, as we use the term here, and some Indian notion of chaos have been discussed respectively in papers. But the need is to further concentrate on this requirement placed on the conception by anthropic theological creation theory and scientific anthropic creation theory. We need to admit *pralaya* or chaos in order that a (rational and) non-mystic account of the origin of the universe be possible. This *pralaya* is a period of time marked by absence of any created substance. In such a state uncreated substance or substances are

there which are to be the material stuff at least of physical creation. Thus different non-mystic theories of cosmic origin agree that the universe originates from some uncreated substantive stuff which exists in the state of chaos a state which precedes creation. These theories however differ among themselves as to (i) the number and (ii) nature of the primordial stuff of the universe, from which the universe is originates, and (iii) the nature of the process of origination.

If a causal theory is to be an explanatory theory also it must be able to explain convincingly how a good many number of things of the world or the world of plurality itself originate from a smaller or smallest number of basic constituent. As a model of explanatory theory in any area of enquiry monism has a great attraction. It does not seem that monism was found to be attractive because it was or could be so radical, but because in it we achieve (absolute) logical economy.

We need to admit or understand, as the case may be, only a small number of terms in order to explain for greater and far more complicated number of things. But monism is not the only why to effect the sort of simplification in question. Dualism, even pluralism can achieve it. Realist explanatory systems are not monistic, often they are pluralistic. A realist hopes to achieve only optimal unity and optimally simple theory. The idea is not that a monistic theory cannot be a realistic theory, but aften monism is the result of reductive real which realism resists. So far as causal theories are concerned, depending on what sort of causality is being advocated, causal reduction carried or does not carry implication of unreality.

There may be a mystic variety of radical monism which admits numerically one cause of a single type. As it has been held sometimes that God is the sole single principle from which the universe originates and God does not need any formal, final or material cause to generate this universe. We are now speaking of monism - pluralism with reference to material cause. According to this type of monism prior to the origin of this universe there exists, in the state of chaos or during *pralaya* of the type which is followed by creation, only one basic principle from which the world originates. This basic stuff may be spiritual or material. But spiritual monism cannot explain how really from a simple single conscious principle the world of plurality including created matter also could originate. Upholders of such monistic theories are expected to hold like the Advaita Vedāntin-s that the world of plurality is nothing but how the single real principle the spiritual One appears. Here there is real causal genesis of plurality. Strictly speaking the unquestionable reality and spirituality of the One do not permit any sort of change or movement on its part. Not only it cannot 'come-to-be' or 'pass away', it cannot undergo qualitative, quantitative or local change or motion. None of the *vikāra-s* enumerated. It cannot transform. So if the plurality including the material, our familiar universe, is to come from the single spiritual unity, the one, it must be by way of appearance only. This variety of monistic theory which advocates that the so-called causal genesis is uncaused and illusory appearance of plurality, has been made familiar by the Advaita Vedāntin-s. The author of the one of the Nirukta can be attributed to the One, the Real. Papers

contributed here rightly noted that in respect of such 'creation' there is no need for a creator. But the Advaita Vedāntin-s seem to admit that (P) if certain effect is admitted to be real in some sense then there must be a cause of it which is real in that sense and there must be a sense of 'coming-to-be' such that the effect can be said to come from that real cause. This gives us an insight into why in the Advaita Vedānta system an uncaused material principle is admitted as a cause of the whole created universe. This principle or *Māyā* as it is called, is real in the same sense of the term in which the world is real. Given this sense of reality the world is no longer a mere appearance and causal change even at the cosmic level is not illusory but real. One would envisage certain difficulty in accepting from the Advaita point of view the principle (P) formulated above to explain why the Advaitin-s duplicate their account of cosmic origin - why they court *Brahmavivartavāda* as well as *māyāpariṇāmavāda*. But it would be better to hold fast to the principle and solve the difficulty. This principle unite all theories of causation except the theory which is radically and totally non-realist or anti-realist. Otherwise it unites materialistic monistic theory as well as idealistic spiritualistic monism of the Advaita Vedānta. We shall come back to this soon. But first I must mention at this point a special variety of monism advocated by the Grammarian-Philosophers. This variety of monism is called *śabdādvaita* to somehow distinguish it from *Brahmādvaita* of the Advaita Vedāntin-s. We include here a contribution(9) by great Paninian scholars, Paṇḍit Avadha Behari Tripāthi, whose sad, and recent death we mourn. In this paper an account of the cosmic genesis from the standpoint of *śabdādvaita* has been sketched. Two important point to note is that he prefers to interpret Bhartrhari's view as expressed in the very first verse of latter's Vākyapadīya very strongly. Secondly it appears from this paper that the causal monism of the *Śabdādvaitavādin-s* also duplicates account of cosmic genesis.

It should not, however, be thought that causal monism needs must involve a double account. Just as such monism is to a great extent neutral as to how the monistic principle is conceived - as material like *māyā* or *prakṛti*, as spiritual like Brahman or as *śabda tattva* - so also it is neutral between those who admit univocalism in respect of reality - i.e., admits only one kind of reality - and equivocalism - according to which there are not only different grades of reality but also different kinds of them. The operation of the principle (P) does not leave any scope for cause and effect being realities of different kinds. But the metaphysical principle of advaita does not permit two realities of the same kind. Causal monism which adheres to (P) views causation as a principle which can generate different grades of reality that is, effects which will have the same kind of reality as the cause but will have a dependent grade relative to their causes which will have relatively independent grade. If we conceptually arrange the whole world of effects vertically alongside a scale of grades of dependence then the item at the upper most point will not have dependent grade, for there will be nothing on which it is causally dependant. Depending on what interpretation we give, this highest point in the scale of grades on dependence will be materia prima or *pradhāna* or *pradhāna prakṛti*. The events at this bottom will have nothing dependent on them so they will not have

even relatively independent grade. Some realistic causal monism gives us a picture of the world in which all things of the world are arranged according to the principle of grades of dependence, of course things are not taken individually in consideration of the feasibility of the project. The type of causation that suits this type of causal account of the world best is material or physical transformation. Causal genesis is (T) a name for material or physico-chemical transformation we observe in our daily life when milk transforms into curd, water into ice or ice into water. Along this line we can explain how the food a man or an animal takes changes into blood.

The idealistic monism is left with only two alternatives to declare the created world as simply nonexistent or nought or to make it both dependent on and different in mind from the only reality which is spiritual. Since the principle (P) is unexceptionable and has to be resorted to and since (P) or (T) sometimes associated with it cannot explain how an effect can depend on something having a different kind of reality a different type of causality will have to be admitted for created things or the world. The mode of causality is such that the (V) effect necessarily has an inferior kind of reality into which the cause having a superior kind of reality cannot change in the sense (T); but the single,simple and superior cause may appear as effect as a matter of illusion, just as the same single moon appears as many when reflected in water broken into a number of ripples. Thus non-realistic monistic theory much resort to two different types of causality (T) and (V) and produce two irreducible causal accounts of the same phenomenon, the origin of the universe.

Advaita Vedanta shows us the way how metaphysical monism can be non mystic, can be reconciled with non mystic creation theory which is at the same time a form of causal monism i.e. admits one single ultimate principle from which the whole world comes into being. Non-mystic causal monism entails that there is an uncreated material principle perhaps in addition to efficient cause, in state of chaos. Now either this principle is identical with the sole single metaphysical reality or different from it. If we opt for the first alternative monism is served but by the principle of (P) this metaphysical One will be unreal or the world will be real. If the world is real but different from the metaphysical One, then monism is destroyed; if however the world is identical then there cannot be either any semblance of causality. What is more, if the world in its standard sense is identical with the One, then the One will not be real or one. If however, we choose the second alternative then monism is sacrificed. The Advaitin-s can now shows by principle (V) that a thing can be dependent on another thing and be an effect of that without needing to be an actual transformation of that. Actual transformation may involve time and in this sense what is uncreated cannot be dependent. But in the sense (V) an uncreated thing can be dependent on or 'effect' of another thing. In principle the entire illusion we call world could have been there forever and is contemporaneous with the Brahman without thereby turning Brahman unreal or destroying metaphysical monism. At the level of *vivarta* the 'transformation' itself is illusory and not an actual event taking place in time, creation according to the principle of *vivarta* is not a temporal process of change nor is time a separate reality. Anyway, the standard way of defending

monism by resorting to future destruction of *Māyā* may not be the only or the best way to defend Advaita monism, however, necessary it may be from the point of view of anthropic causal theory we shall soon term to.

It is now clear that metaphysical monism need non-mystic causal monism are not the same. Causal monism does not have any necessary metaphysical implication. Such a monist only holds that the whole world of plurality can be causally reduced to a single materia prima. Given this materia prima and a principle of causation like (T) a metaphysician, unless is an idealist or metaphysical monist, requires no further apparatus to (causally) explain (the world). If still causal monism duplicate it causal account it does so at a different level. And usually metaphysical monism repeats it too and thereby triplicates its own causal account. We shall discuss this later. A metaphysical monist need admit a second principle and duplicate his causal account if he admits either that there are difference kinds of reality or that the metaphysical One is absolutely simple not even a unity of features. Whether a person is a spiritualist or not if the simple he begins with is metaphysical One or absolute and simple unity he would be required to admit a second principle as materia prima from which the world could come into existence. Then it would be a requirement of monism to resort to (V) and duplicate the causal account of the world. If therefore the One of the monist is not *vijñānaghana* of the Advaitain-s but *śabdatattva* of *śabdādvaitavādin-s*, causal account has to be duplicated if we admit that unity of *śabdatattva* is the sort of absolute and simple unity which *śuddha caitanya* above (and not even any *saviṣaya caitanya* of a Naiyāyika) exemplifies. We therefore find that monism of different school add the account of creation which metaphysical dualist Sāṃkhya offers in addition of course to their (own) *vivarta* account. In Purāṇa also Sāṃkhya type of causal account is very popular. In Madhvavedānta as has been explained in his contribution (14), included here, by Prahladacarya similar account may be found. This suggests that Sāṃkhya model of causal account had been widely popular.

Unlike the (metaphysical) One of the metaphysical monist, the *pradhana prakrti* of the causal monist Sāṃkhya is a unity which is not simple. In it all the diversities are there in the undifferentiated and unmanifested state. Besides this *pradhāna* is material or unconscious (*jaḍa*) by nature.

It is easier to understand from the point of view of a theory of *Srsti* why metaphysical monism of the variety of Advaita Vedānta or or *Śabdadvaita* admits a subsidiary principle *māyā* or *prakṛti* or *avyakṛta* to account for experientially evident shared world of plurality. But why does causal monism which is not evidently mystical such as Sāṃkhya school offers us - has to be a metaphysical dualist. The question is not why, if at all, they should admit a creator of efficient cause, but why should they admit a principle not strictly causally related. In other words, we understand why a (non-radical) metaphysical monist must admit a subsidiary principle in consideration of its use in causal theory. But why cannot a causal monism be a metaphysical monism also? Materialism viewed as both a metaphysics

and an explanatory causal theory of creation, is monism in both these senses. In plain language the question is why did Sāṃkhya philosophers preferred not to be metaphysical monist? They could have admitted only *prakṛti*, which is the single basic and unconscious principle, needed to account for creation. This would have been the most consistent positions. For Sāṃkhya dos not admit or does not need to admit any cosmic efficient cause line God. If the world is a transformation of materia prima the transformation is mechanical and not consciously initiated as is the case with the Naiyāyika-s and the Vaiśeṣika-s. Why is there a conscious principle called *Puruṣa*? Why is Sāṃkhya a dualistic/system? Besides, if there is a causal theory according to which cosmic creation is causal change conceived of a mechanical transformation of the materia prima initiated by God (14) then such a system cannot but be so far dualistic for God is admitted in addition to a materia prima. But *Puruṣa* of Sāṃkhya is causally neutral; and transformation in the system is really uncaused (manifestation). Why then admit *Puruṣa*? In the first place we saw that spiritual monism must advance a thesis that there are different kinds of reality in order to accommodate matter and material world. A material monism (of metaphyseal variety) much do the same to accommodate spiritual reality of the spiritual and non-material world. But systems which advocate kinds of reality are bound to duplicate their account of creation. If distinction in kind is not to be drawn and at the same time matter (material) and spirit (spiritual) are to be admitted then they must only be numerically different. Thus dualism becomes unavoidable. But in it? Even if they are ontologically irreducible and have some kind of reality, they might not have same grade of reality? But sameness of grade entails, on the theory that they are related by way of causal transformation. They way causal transformation is conceived there can e relation of such transformation or unfolding only between two material or unconscious things or events. Thus we are back to the problem, why does Sāṃkhya need to admit a conscious principle at all? It seems to be the Sāṃkhya-thinking that unless there was a witnessing consciousness the world which is the causal unfolding of *prakṛti* would remain unrevealed. Even epiphenomenalism world not score the purpose for the origin of creation would remain unrevealed. So a witnessing conscious has to be admitted as existing from the first or better, from the beginning-less past.

Now just as causal monism need not be metaphysical monism and transformation theory of causation need not be mechanical so also there is no necessitating a non-mystic explanatory causal theory must be monistic. It is doubtful even whether Sāṃkhya is a system of causal monism. *Prakṛti* is not really one unitary principle but three principles of *sattva, rajas* and *tamas* taken together. They are taken together and are not strictly speaking in an undifferentiated state. It may also be seen that Sāṃkhya does not have really any objection against causal change or creation through actual combination. Some have expressed their doubt whether Sāṃkhya is a system of causal monism. But the standard view is that it is; and it admits one single basic stuff of the whole creation. It is also a part of the standard view that will such a monism causal production or change by real combination is incompatible. So Saṃkhya conception of causal change, that is, causation by way

of real transformative or unfolding, is to be already distinguished from conceptions like the one the Naiyāyika-s and the Vaiśeṣika-s share. The point of distinction here is not that according to the Sāṃkhya philosophers the material cause in the continuant cause in a very strong sense. The important point relates to the mechanism of causal creation; creation by transformation, which seems to be the sole suitable mechanism for causal monism, is the only mechanism or mode of combination which the Sāṃkhya philosophers admit. The Naiyāyika-s and Vaiśeṣika-s by contrast admit the mechanism of causal creation by real combination; (In case of production of effect other than created substance this mechanism does not apply but there also they do not admit creation by transformation).

Now the theory of *Trivṛtikaraṇa* or special case of compositional theory of causal production by actual combination. These theories have back sketched in papers (11, 13). One important point to note is that an Advaitin hardly needs such a theory if he does not duplicates his account of creation by incorporating what is called *avidyapariṇāmavāda*. But if *pariṇāmavāda* or mechanism of transformation is incompatible with mechanism of composition then even their seemed account of creation leaves no scope for it. So either their second account is not in line with causal monism or this theory of *Trivṛtikaraṇa* or *Pañcikaraṇa* is a third account of creation or a third stand in this account of creation. The implication that those who repudiates causal monism and accept causal pluralism, say the Naiyāyika-s or the Vaiśaṣika-s, will welcome the special compositional mechanism of *Trivṛtikaraṇa* or *Pañcikaraṇa*. This has not been collaborated by evidence. The Naiyāyika-s believe both in causal pluralism and some sort of compositional mechanism yet they do not admit the mechanism of *Trivṛtikaraṇa* or *Pañcikaraṇa*. For this latter variety of compositional mechanism is associated with the theory that in the composition of any single gross body there enter as constituent all the three or five *bhūta-s*. One may argue that if that were how a grown body was composed then it could not perhaps be perceived by any single sense or would be perceivable by every one sense organ. Upholders of some alternative compositional theory maintain that the many constituents which combine to cause a gross body are necessarily of the same type they are *pramāṇa-s* of the same *bhūta-s*. This is like *bhūta-vada*. Therefore it needs to be thoroughly discussed if Sāṃkhya philosopher would admit at any stage compositional theory in general or mechanism of and duplicate their transformation theory. More specifically the question in how would they account for the coming into being of gross bodies i.e., bodes which are gross compared to any one of the five *mahābhūta-s* which fall at the bottom of the scale of grades of reality or of causal dependence.

Are the gross bodies produced from the *mahābhūta-s* in the same way in which these five *mahābhuta-s* are produced from the five *tanmātra-s* or the *Mahat* from the *Prakṛti*? And what is that way or the mechanism? If this way is the way of real combination then at least in respect of causal mechanism (as distinct from conception of cause) Sāṃkhya and Nyāya *trivṛtikaraṇa* or *pañcikaraṇa* in particular positions agree. But if composition mechanism is involved or operative at the level of

bhūta Sṛṣṭi or *tattva pariṇāma* then *Prakṛti* must be viewed as just a name for three distinct principles of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* which are not even undifferentiated in any significant sense. *Prakṛti* is no unity, it is not an unitary principle. And this is the end of Sāmkhya causal monism. These are some of the general issues involved and must be sorted out before we finalise our own account of cosmic creation. We also begin to see the importance of distinguishing *Sṛṣṭi*-s including *bhūta Sṛṣṭi* and, what is directly relevant in the context of *trivṛtikaraṇa* and *Pañcikaraṇa*, *bhautika Sṛṣṭi*. Of course the insight that appreciable difference between different *bhautika* things most sometime, be recounted for in terms of preponderance or proportional except of certain *bhūta-s* over others deserves to be fully explained. But the nature of this preponderance should also be thoroughly investigated. Is there any difference between preponderance of a *guna* (in the Sāṃkhya sense) and preponderance of a *bhūta*? Clarity on these points will enable us to appreciate the Madhva theory of causation.

The four major conceptions of causality which the *Bandha-s*, Naiyāyika-s, Sāṃkhya philosophers, Advaita Vedantin-s respectively advocate have been briefly but penetratingly discussed by Professor Bhattacharya (1). He highlights the close connection between the two themes of creation and causality. We now turn to the anthropic character of characteristic Indian notion of creation. The age old theme the problem and prospect of reconciling anthropic and theistic traits of some characteristic Indian theory of creation figure prominently in some of the most lively hours of discussion during the seminar.

The world is as man needed it and it is as was needed by man. Man's need is so crucial that God's omnipotent agency is limited by the logical necessity of pre-existing material cause and practical necessity imposed, so to say, by human need. Creation is a matter of practical necessity. It has to happen the universe has to be created - and it has to be what it is because men led the practical life they led - moral deeds and misdeeds they performed - in previous creation. Creation is not a one time mysterious fit of supernatural activity. Every creation was preceded by still earlier creations in which is rooted the human practical necessity of this creation. Divine creativity is not only limited by logical necessity of pre-existing eternal material but also by non-material non-eternal deeds of sentient cultures as and what they were in previous creation. God must not only create by combining pre-existing material constituent but he must also create according to the needs of moral agents in past creations. These deeds necessitated this creation non- causally necessary that this universe must in future be created. The necessity these deeds brought with them is to be effect that if a world is created it should be such and such. But it serves the need of man if the necessary universe is created. With the basic material cause and non-material non-eternal causal factor of past deeds, physical or causal necessity of creation is not given. This means those conditions are not causally sufficient to make creation inevitable. If still it is said that there has to be a creation the nature of necessity is different. The necessity may be derived from the moral principle that every deed or misdeed morally speaking - has to produce appropriate

consequence. This necessity is weakly fulfilled if the future possibility of fruit bearing is eternally preserved. For the acceptance of the moral principle entails that every deal will bear fruit, but it does not further entail any time limit. And here comes the question of human need and God's submitting to his benevolent nature and creating the universe in fulfilment of human need ('human' is to be translated as *Jīva*).

From human point of view necessity of creation is the necessity of suffering. The world is created, when it is created so that man may born there and suffer. Preserving the possibility of future creation eternally is trans-amounts to living eternally exposed to the danger of impending spell of suffering. This does not give man peace. It is better to became the contingency, let us suffer one dues, do away with this necessity and enjoy freedom from pin even afterwards. It is not the second best thing for who are leaper, namely physical death. It is the ultimate best thing salvation, eternal freedom from suffering for which man needs that world be created. Out it cannot be created unless God be kind enough to lend his efficient causality to already existing material cause of eternal *bhūta-s*. The final cause, however, noting of liberation is a need of eternally liberated God but it is man in bondage who needs it. Salvation so far is a human reason, a human need.

But if God is a cause, it is necessary that he should cause as create this world. But his omnipotence and otherwise free causality of divine being entails that he might not create. Without him the world could not be but he can exist without creating the world. There is no physical or causal necessity which can determine him to act, cause him to act. In fact he does not have any act or feature which is non-eternal or caused. If still he produces, it is because he is benevolent. He in his infinite wisdom knows all that are to be known by any creator of the world. There is already in his knowledge of the material from which world is to be causally constructed and of the deeds of man according to which the world is to be shaped. He further has the eternal capacity to desire (*icchā śakti*) and eternal capacity to act (*kriyā śakti*). Now he further knows that man badly need that world be created so that he can achieve the highest good and final goal. Thus to know that creation is needed and needed as mean to highest good, to know that it is already in his power to create and yet not to create would have been greatest act of unkindness. If God still saves some times it is no deficiency in him but in consideration of inappropriateness of time (*karma vipāka*).

The question remains does feel the need? Is he conscious of the need? The answer is both yes and no. Information is available to him in the form of wisdom recorded in Scriptures and philosophical texts over centuries as well as a part of commonsense specific to respective culture. The original source is scriptures. Philosophical consideration and argumentative (as far as possible) presentation of that wisdom was attempted to protest non-suspecting trusting man from reductive influences of bad philosophies and ideologies. Whatever that may be, any Indian in his own way believes that highest goal of life is salvation which is to be achieved according to standard view) through knowledge and austere moral practices or

asceticism. It may even be said that mark of Indian-ness (taking India not as a present political or geographical unity but cultural unity claimed to have existed from long antiquity) is a belief in the scheme of form fold values or goals of life with salvation as the highest goal. But this indirect textual knowledge is not enough. It is neither the beginning nor the end of his search for the means of salvation. The sense of urgency in reaching the goal is not common. Even a man may have doubt or disbelief about the goodness or attainability of *mokṣa*. But God in his infinite wisdom knows that man needs *mokṣa* for that alone is final release from all pains present and future. But for this, whether or not he needs it ,man must achieve through is own effort knowledge which can neutralise, so to say, some of his past deeds, to suffer the consequences of which he would otherwise have to be learn, and also present his doing further misdeeds (634) (in the metaphysical sense). This pursuit of knowledge is possible only if individual souls have body. Birth is another name for souls assuming a body. So body is to be created and there should be created objects for then only the embodied some can have knowledge. But just as birth is an opportunity to neutralise or check metaphysical misdeeds by achieving through personal effort knowledge. It provides also an occasion for exhaust or suffer out those among the due sufferings which have to be suffered.

This creation thus follows an anthropic principle. It signifies both suffering what have to be suffered and taking measures to put an end to all other sufferings which could not otherwise be avoided. Though all who are learn need not suffer 635 yet most (Practically all) of them do. Again though all doubt take consciously and resolutely measures to neutralise effect of past deeds and refrain from further metaphysical misdeeds yet some do.

These few men do everything that are necessary to ensure absolute freedom from suffering, salvation. And they can hope to achieve salvation relatively early. Every man is consciously or unconsciously heading towards salvation. Those who are pursuing the value consciously and are doing everything for it will attain the goal relatively early. But they can do those because all that are necessary for enabling them to do every thing necessary have been achieved. The world has been created and they have been or assumed body. But they did not create the world. They needed the world to be created but it was neither in their power to create nor did they create God created it for them by dint of his infinite wisdom and power unconstrained by anything other than rational and moral necessity.

God has unlimited power. His power to act and create is unconstrained. He acts freely. He is free to act in any way. And this unconstrained freedom can be realised negatively if chooses so decides not to create this universe. But if he so chooses when in his infinite wisdom he knows that man needs it, needs it for the highest food and deserves it each in his own they, he will be deficient in moral virtue. He will be unkind. But God is kind so he freely chooses to create. His freedom to act and power to create are not so far constraint by anything other than his own moral nature, his own kindness. Similarly if his power to create and cause is

constrained by anything, it is constrained by rationality which is the same in him and outside. He could not destroy by his act the rational order in the universe. He would have done just this if he assumed the power to violate the very nature, nature and essence of things. So he cannot create the eternal, be that thing atom (*paramāṇu*) or time (*kāla*). He can use the eternal material or atom for fashioning the world which he does and which he alone can do by virtue of his own infinite wisdom. This infinite wisdom also means wisdom. This infinite wisdom also means wisdom unconstrained by anything other than rationality and logic. So it does not constitute rejection of His omnipotence to say that he does not act and cannot know what is not, what is contradictory in nature like sequence circle. If he is constrained not to create what is called predestination on *adṛṣṭa* even those are non-eternal. He is so constrained by his own moral nature. Again He would have violated physical, rational and moral necessity if he created all men happy notwithstanding the fact that only some of than deserved happiness in this creation. The popular objection that since God is the creates of this world which is full of sorrows, he must have created sorrows he most have created own. So God is unkind. And since he has not created every one equally happy or unhappy he is partial. It is no sound logic to argue that since God creates the world and the world contains suffering therefore God is the creation of those sufferings. This would be a valid argument if we grant the *pūrvapakṣin* his unstated assumption that God creates everything (in the universe). But is that assumption is granted then from it one could directly derive that God was the creator of suffering. Any way God is not creator of every thing.

To say this is not to deny to God omnipotence in any logically intelligible sense. We would be ascribing to God mysterious power and not only omnipotence if hold that he creates literally everything. God is non-mysteriously, rationally, logically, intelligibly all powerful if he creates all that is logically possible to create say things other than such alleged things as square circle. Similarly he would have been malevolently and not benevolently all powerful if he created *adṛṣṭa* or did not create the world and life. Some times impossibility of creation is sought to be established on the ground that no action no movement can be attributed to incorporeal infinite God. Well man kills and man feels. To kill a man does do something but to feel he does not need to do anything. If he has unimpaired sensitivity and the object of feeling is appropriately present then man feels without doing anything. Gods creating is like feeling of the man. Since God is there with his unconstrained (in the sense explained) power or omnipotence (infinite wisdom and infinite Kindness) the universe gets produced whenever time is ripe for this event to occur and optimally few basic material constituents are there is addition to human pre destinations which morally necessitates creation.

These are some of the basic issues relating to *Sṛṣṭi* which always lay at the centre of the debates and discussions among thinkers of different persuasions. Not that all these themes were discussed nor again these are the only themes which could be discussed. But it emerged from the large number of issues which the participants covered in their papers and discussion, that India developed unusually

great number and variety of theories of cosmic origin. In view of this it is also remarkable now great was the agreement among these thinkers. Most of them shared the view that question of cosmic creation should be viewed in relation to the concern for salvation. The characteristic orientation of Indian enquiry into the question about *Srsti* is enshrined in the remark : *'Na hyaṃ samsaraḥ anekavidha duḥkhamayo nirpekṣo bhāvitamarhati Tada hi syadeva, na syādeva va - na tu kadācit syāt'*. Co-existence of such wide diversity of theories and unity of concern has a massage. Theories proliferate not only when theoretical enterprises lose their bond with concrete realities of life and society. But in a living culture, commitment to values act as impetus to theoretical drive. Commitment to certain abiding concern further ensure pre-theoretical, basic and back-ground unity to diverse theoretical enterprises. Even renewed attempt to understand, and preserve in every possible way cultural identity or basic concern of life peculiar to the respective culture make our theoretical endeavour on the one hand and socio-political and moral experiments and exercises on the other matters of value. This value sustains us both individually and collectively. Theorising is a matter of commitment and in Indian society *ucchraṅkhal ciṅtā* was always considered a disvalue.

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